Compilation préliminaire des décisions rendues au Canada en 2002 en matière de droit d’auteur / A Compilation of the Decisions Rendered In Canada with Respect to Copyright in 2002



COMPILATIONPRÉLIMINAIREDESDÉCISIONSRENDUESAUCANADAEN2002EN
MATIÈREDEDROITD’AUTEUR
ACOMPILATIONOFTHEDECISIONSRENDEREDINCANADAWITHRESPECTTO
COPYRIGHTIN2002

by
LaurentCarrière*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.:(514)9876242-Fax:(514)8457874
info@robic.com–www.robic.ca
3464920CanadaInc.v.Strother(2002),[2002]BCJ1982,[2002]BC.CTBEdSE043,[2002]
CarswellBC2026,26B.L.R.(3d)235,2002DTC.7327,2002BCSC1179,[2002-09-29]
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/02/11/2002BCSC1179.htm(BCSC)LowryJ.
ApplicationtoVarytheTariffofLeviestobeCollectedbyCPCC,in2001and2002,fortheSale
ofBlankAudioRecordingMedia,inCanada,inRespectoftheReproductionforPrivateUseof
MusicalWorksEmbodiedinSoundRecordings,ofPerformers©PerformancesofSuchWorks
andofSoundRecordingsinWhichSuchWorksandPerformancesAreEmbodied(2002),18
CPR(4th)345,2002CarswellNat2351,[2002]CBD2,[2002-04-09]
http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c09042002-b.pdf(CopBd)
Assoc.desprofessionnelsdesartsdelascèneduQuébecCertificationApplication
(Certification)(Re)(2002),16CPR(4th)289,[2002]CAPPRT037,[2002-01-04]
http://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/37-e.html,inFrenchathttp://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/37-f.html(CanadianArtistsandProducersProfessional
RelationsTribunal)
BigComfyCorp.v.Canada(2002),[2002]TCJ247,[2002-05-09]
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/tcc/2002/2002tcc19994643.html(TaxCourtofCanada)RipJ.
Beaudryv.Goldman(2002),[2002]CarswellNat1972,[2002]FCJ609,[2002]ACF609,[2002]
FTRTBEdAU026,2002FCT462,[2002-04-26]
http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct462.html(FCTD)RouleauJ.
BellExpressVuLimitedPartnershipv.Rex(2002),18CPR(4th)289,[2002]CarswellBC851,
[2002]CarswellBC852,100BCL.(3d)1,212DLR(4th)1,[2002]5WWR1,287NR248,166BCAC
1,271WAC1,[2002]SCJ43,2002SCC42,[2002-04-26]
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-




























































©LaurentCarrière,2003.
*Avocatetagentdemarquesdecommerce,LaurentCarrièreestl’undesassociés
principauxdescabinetsd’avocatsetd’agentsdebrevetsetdemarquesdecommerce
LEGERROBICRICHARD.Lesgrassesindiquentlerecueilduquellesnotesdel’arrêtistesontété
tirées.Lawyerandtrademarkagent,LaurentCarrièreisoneoftheseniorpartnersofthe
lawfirmandofthepatentandtrademarkagencyfirmLEGERROBICRICHARD.Thebold
characterindicatesinwhichcaseseriestheheadnoteshavebeentaken.Publication296.



scc/en/rec/html/bellexp.en.htmlinFrenchathttp://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-
scc/fr/rec/html/bellexp.fr.htmlandhttp://www.canlii.org/ca/jug/csc/2002/2002csc42.html
(SCC)IacobucciJ.
BenistiImport-ExportInc.v.ModesTXTCarbonInc.(2002),20CPR(4
th)125[2002]CarswellNat
2342,[2002]FCJ240,2002FTRUned103,[2002]ACF240,2002FCT179,[2002-02-19]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct197.html,inFrenchathttp://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002cfpi197.html(FCTD)Morneau,Prothonotary
BergeronvSogidèsLtée(2002),(2002),JE2002-624,[2002]CarswellQue669,[2002-01-17]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200201fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs10165.html(QueSupCt)TellierJ.
Campney&Murphyv.Bernard&Partners(2002),22CPR(4
th)526,[2002]CarswellNat3166,
[2002]FCJ1520,2000FCT1136[2002-11-04]
http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct1136.html(FCTD)Hargrave,Prothonotary
CanadianMediaGuildv.CanadianBroadcastingCorp.(2002),[2002]CarswellOnt278,156
OAC108,[2002]OJ341[2002-01-30](OntSupCt-DivCt)
CCHCanadianLtd.v.LawSocietyofUpperCanada(2002),18CPR(4th)161,[2002]FCJ690,
[2002]ACF690],[2002]CarswellNat1000,212D.L.R.(4th)385,289NR1,2002FCA187,[2002-
05-14]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca187.html,inFrenchat
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002caf187.html(FCA);applicationforleavetoappeal
totheSupremeCourtofCanadagrantedon2002-12-12[2002]SCCA317(SCC);(2002),
[2002]CarswellNat1704[2002-07-02](FCA-Costs);

ChancellorManagementInc.(c.o.b.ChancellorHomes)v.OasisHomesLtd.(2002),19CPR
(4th)480,[2002]CarswellAlta714,[2002]AJ702,2002ABQB500,[2002]ARTBEdJN029,[2002-
05-21]
http://199.213.44.18:8080/ISYSquery/IRL12ED.tmp/49/doc(AltaQB)FraserJ.;(2002),
[2002]CarswellAlta890,[2002]10WWR121,22CPC(5th)303,2002ABQB500,[2002-07-05]
(AltaQB-Costs)FraserJ.
CitéAmériqueDistributionInc.vC.E.P.A.LeBaluchonInc(2002),[2002]RJQ1943,[2002]
CarswellQue1568,JE2002-1407,[2002-06-03]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200206fr.htm,
(QueSupCt)BishopJ.;enappel500-09-012443-024.
DelrinaCorp.v.TrioletSystemsInc.(2002),58OR(3d)339,17CPR(4th)289,[2002]OJ676,
[2002]CarswellOnt633,23BLR(3d),156OAC166,[2002-03-01]
http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2002/2002onca10099.html,
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2002/march/delrinaC30375.htm(OntCA)Morden
J.(2002),[2002]OJ3729[2002-10-02]
http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2002/2002onca10451.htmlm,(OntCA-Costs);motionfor
leavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCandadismissedon2002-11-28[2002]SCCA189
(SCC).
DesignCouncilLtd.v.NetVillageInc.(2002),[2002]CarswellNat891,[2002]FCJ589,2002FTR
Uned284,2002FCT459,[2002-04-23]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct459.html
(FCTD)RouleauJ.
DiamantToysLtd.v.JouetsBo-JeuxToysInc.(2002),19CPR(4th)43,2002CarswellNat726,
[2002]FTRTBEdAP031,[2002]FCJ.485,2002FCT384,[2002-04-05]
http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct384.html(FCTD)NadonJ.



Editors©Assn.ofCanadaCertificationApplication(Inthematterofarequestfor
reconsiderationofDecisionNo.033,asmodifiedbyDecisionNo.036,filedbyTheWriters©
UnionofCanada)(2002),22CPR(4
th)21,[2002]CAPPRT039,[2002-11-01]http://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/39-e.html.inFrenchathttp://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/39-f.html(CanadianArtistsandProducersProfessional
RelationsTribunal)
EvocationPublishingCorp.,Inc.vhamilton
(2002),[2002]BCJ2934,2002BCSC1707(BCSC;2002-12-27)
FigleyvLoran
(2002),[2002]CarswellSask838(SaskProvCt;2002-07-29)
GreatCanadianOilChangeLtd.v.DynamicVenturesCorp.(2002),21CPR(4th)318,[2002]
CarswellBC2048,[2002]BCJ2015,2002BCSC1295,[2002-09-05]
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/02/12/2002BCSC1295.htm(BCSC)GoepelJ.
GroupeChabotAST(1993)Inc.c.Ross(2002),JE2002-1984,[2002]CarswellNat1654,[2002-05-
23](QueSupCt),vard(2002),[2002]JQ4768[2002-10-25]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200210fr.html(QueCA)
HollywoodNightsSportsInc.v.BandaFilarmonicaLiraDeFatimaInc.(2002),17CPR(4th)263,
[2002]CarswellNat297,[2002]FCJ156,2002FTRUned75,2002FCT105,[2002-01-28]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct105.html(FCTD)O’KeefeJ.
InterimTariffofLeviestoBeCollectedbyCPC,in2003,ontheSaleofBlankAudioRecording
Media,InCanada,inrespectoftheReproductionforPrivateUseofMusicalWorksEmbodied
inSoundRecordings,ofPerformer©sPerformancesofSuchWorksandofSoundRecordingsin
whichsuchWorksandPerformancesareEmbodied[2002]
http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c19122002-b.pdf(Cop.Bd;2002-09-19)
Kroegerv.AmarIICanadaProductionsInc.(2002),21CPR(4th)46,[2002]CarswellBC1941,
[2002]BCJ1714,[2002]BCTCTBEdAU049,2002BCSC1099,[2002-07-23]
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/02/10/2002BCSC1099.htm(BCSC)AllanJ.
LeBlancv.R(2002),[2002]CarswellNat312,2002TCJ70(CCI)BowmanJ.
Levesquev.Desgagnés(2002),JE2003-721,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccq/2002/2002qccq24099.html,
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/c4/200211fr.html(QueCt-SmallClaims;2002-11-11)
MaisonsChantignoleInc.c.Dumont(2002),[2002]CarswellQue1397,[2002]JQ2617[2002-
07-17]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200207fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs13558.html(QueSupCt)ReevesJ.
MensysBusinessSolutionCentreLtd.c.Drummond(Municipalitérégionaledecomté)(2002),
[2002]RJQ765,[2002]CarswellQue662,[2002]JQ169,JE2002-591,[2002-01-30]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200201fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs10318.html(QueSupCt)MercureJ.



MétromédiaC.M.R.IncvAstralMédiainc(2002),JE2002-1800,[2002-08-29]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200208fr.htm,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs14563.html(QueSupCt)LaraméeJ.
MeunierAssociésInc.c.ConstructiondelaChaudièreT.L.Inc.(2002),[2002]JQ747,BE2002-
399[2002-01-31](QCA)
Pastor(c.o.b.CubanDanceEntertainment(CariciasCubanas))v.Chen(2002),19CPR(4th)
206,[2002]CarswellNat2177,[2002]BCJ1123,2002BCPC169[2002-05-21](BCProvCt)Romilly
Prov.Ct.J.
ProgrammationGagnonInc.c.Formulesd©affairesCCLInc.(2002),JE2002-1757,[2002]
CarswellQue1918,[2002]JQ4409,REJB2002-34120,[2002-09-16]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200209fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qcca/2002/2002qcca10413.html(QueCA)
Proteau(syndicde)(2002),JE2002-862,[2002]CarswellQue663,[2002]JQ702[2002-04-12]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200204fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs11545.html(QueSupCt)TellierJ.
R.vAFCSoccer(2002),22CPR(4th)369,[2002]MJ441,[2002]CarswellMan472[2002-09-04]
http://www.canlii.org/mb/cas/mbpc/2002/2002mbpc10032.html(ManitobaProvincialCourt)
DevineJ.
R.v.Farrell(2002),19CPR(4th)538,[2002]CarswellNB139,[2002]NBJ150,[2002]NBR(2d)
TBEdMY012,2002NBQB150,[2002-04-08](NBQB)RobichaudJ.
R.v.Garby(2002),[2002]CarswellOnt2869,[2002]OJ3383[2002-07-18](OntCtJ)MacPheeJ.
RagdollProductions(UK)Ltd.v.JaneDoe(2002),21CPR(4th)213,[2002]CarswellNat2457,
[2002]FCJ1232,2002FCT918,[2002-08-28]
http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct918.html(FCTD)PelletierJ.;inappealCourtFileNos.A-544-02;A-
545-02;A-546-02.
Renaudv.GroupeVille-MarieLittératureInc.(2002),[2002]JQ961[2002-04-30]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200204fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs11752.html(QueSupCt)ViauJ.
Sociétéquébécoisedegestioncollectivedesdroitsdereproduction(COPIBEC)v9030-7620
QuébecInc(2002),[2002]CarswellNat2510,
2002CFPI980,[2002-09-16]http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002cfpi980.html(FCTD)BeaudryJ.
SocietyofComposers,AuthorsandMusicPublishersofCanadav.1007442OntarioLtd.(2002),
20CPR(4th)68,[2002]CarswellNat1355,[2002]FCJ876,2002FCT657,[2002]FTRTBEdJN034,
[2002-06-11]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct657.html(FCTD)KelenJ.
SocietyofComposers,AuthorsandMusicPublishersofCanadav.CanadianAssn.ofInternet
Providers(2002),19CPR(4th)289,[2002]4FC3,215DLR(4th)118,[2002]CarswellNat964,
[2002]CarswellNat965,290NR131,[2002]FCJ691,[2002]ACF691,2002FCA166,[2002-05-01]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca166.html,inFrenchathttp://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002caf166.html(FCA)



SongCorp,(Re)(2002),[2002]CarswellOnt5,[2002]OJ14,[2002]OTC17(OntSupCtJ–Hill
Reversion);(2002),19CPR(4th)235,[2002]CarswellOnt20,[2002]OJ13,31CBR(4th)97,
[2002]OTC17,[2002-01-07](OntSupCtJ–Trustee’sMotion)
StatementofRoyaltiestobeCollectedbySocanandbyNRCCforPayAudioServices[1997
to2002forSocanand1998to2002forNRCC](2002),19CPR(4th)67,[2002]CBD1,[2002]
CarswellNat2381,[2002-03-15]
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/m15032002-b.pdf
(CopBd)[footnotesomitted]
StatementofRoyaltiesforEducationalRights1999-2002[2002-10-15]
http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/e25102002-b.pdf(CopBd)
SunarcStructuresInc.v.Nelson(2002),JE2003-585,[2002]CarswellQue3172,
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200212fr.html(QueSupCt;2002-11-12)WéryJ.
TaiFoongInternationalLtd.v.MaisonSamiT.A.FruitsInc.(2002),[2002]CarswellQue1232,
[2002]QJ334,[2002]RJQ1438,JE2002-1088,[2002-02-05](QueSupCt)MongeonJ.
Thébergev.Galeried©ArtduPetitChamplaininc.(2002),17CPR(4th)161,[2002]SCJ32,
[2002]ASC32,[2002]CarswellQue306,2002CarswellQue307,23BLR(3d)1,285NR267,210
DLR(4
th)385,JE2002-625,2002SCC34,[2002-03-28],http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-
scc/en/rec/html/laroche.en.html,inFrenchathttp://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-
scc/fr/rec/html/laroche.fr.htmlandathttp://www.canlii.org/ca/jug/csc/2002/2002csc34.html
(SCC)

TrawlercatMarineInc.v.Folden(2002),22CPR(4th)514,[2002]FCJ1601,[2002]CarswellNat
3289,2002FCT1181,[2002-11-13]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct1181.html
(FCTD)Hargrave,Prothonotary
Winklerv.Roy(2002),21CPR(4
th)539,21CPR(4th)539,222FTR161,[2002]CarswellNat2421,
[2002]FCJ1258,2002FCT950[2002-09-12]
http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct950.html(FCTD)GibsonJ.



3464920CanadaInc.v.Strother
(2002),[2002]BCJ1982,[2002]BC.CTBEdSE043,[2002]CarswellBC2026,26B.L.R.(3d)235,
2002DTC.7327,2002BCSC1179,[2002-09-29]
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-
txt/SC/02/11/2002BCSC1179.htm(BCSC)LowryJ.
[153][…]Byadvancingtheargument,[plaintiff]Monarchseemsdriventosayingthat
solicitorscannotusedocumentspreparedforoneclientasprecedentswhenpreparing
documentsforanotherclient.Butthathaslongbeencommonpractice,anditwould
certainlynotservethepublicinterestintermsoftheprovisionofprofessionalservicesifitwere
otherwise.Businessmenseekoutsolicitorspossessingtheexperienceandthenecessarytools
toperformtheworkefficientlywithoutneedingtore-inventtheproverbialwheelforeach
newtransaction.Solicitorsprovidealegalservice;theydonotasaruleselldocumentation.
Thecopyrightintheirworkproductbelongstothem:PizzaPizzaLtd.v.Gillespie(1990),75O.R.
(2d)225(Gen.Div.)at244.Solicitorsareentitledtousedocumentationtheyhaveprepared
inthecourseofanearlierretainerprovidingthatbytheirdoingsoinformationisnotdisclosed
whichremainsconfidentialtotheclientforwhomthedocumentationwasinitiallyprepared.
ApplicationtoVarytheTariffofLeviestobeCollectedbyCPCC,in2001and2002,fortheSale
ofBlankAudioRecordingMedia,inCanada,inRespectoftheReproductionforPrivateUseof
MusicalWorksEmbodiedinSoundRecordings,ofPerformers©PerformancesofSuchWorks
andofSoundRecordingsinWhichSuchWorksandPerformancesAreEmbodied
(2002),18CPR(4th)345,2002CarswellNat2351,[2002]CBD2,[2002-04-09]
http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c09042002-b.pdf(CopBd)
WithinayearoftheestablishmentbytheCopyrightBoardofatarifffor2001and2002,in
respectofprivatecopyingofsoundrecordingsofmusicalworksonblankaudiorecording
mediaunderPartVIIIoftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,twocollectivesocieties
appliedtovarythetariff.VariancebytheBoardwaspossibleunders.66.52oftheCopyright
Act,ifintheBoard’sopinion,therehadbeenamaterialchangeinthecircumstancessincea
previousdecisionhadbeenmade.
Thesocietiessubmittedthatwhenthetariffwasadopted,itwasexpectedthatarelatively
smallnumberofreadilyidentifiablesuppliersofblankrecordingmediawouldcomposethe
majorpartofthemarket.Thisprovednottobethecase.Alargenumberofsmallsuppliers
hadsurfaced,makingitdifficulttotracelesserknownbrandsandtoinsurethatthelevyhad
beenpaid.Ithadalsobeenfoundthatretailerswerereluctanttoprovideaccesstodata
whichcouldbeusedtodeterminewhetherthelevyhadbeenpaidorevadedonmedia
theysold.
Theapplicantssoughtprovisionsthatwouldyieldmoreinformationonthetypes,brand
namesandothercharacteristicsaccordingtowhichtheentityfilingthereportsellsthe
mediumoridentifiesitinitsinventory.Inaddition,termsweresoughtthatwouldallowinthe
courseofinvestigation,thesharingofinformationastotheidentityofthemanufactureror
importerandthedescriptionofthevarioustypesofmediasold.
Held,theapplicationshouldbegranted.
Amendmentsweremadetoreplaces-ss.8(d)and10(1)ofthetariffandtoaddas-s.(5)tos.
10ofthetariff.[page346]



Assoc.desprofessionnelsdesartsdelascèneduQuébecCertificationApplication
(Certification)(Re)(2002),16CPR(4th)289,[2002]CAPPRT037,[2002-01-04]
http://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/37-e.html,inFrenchathttp://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/37-f.html(CanadianArtistsandProducersProfessional
RelationsTribunal)
TwoperformingartsassociationsappliedtotheCanadianArtistsandProducersProfessional
RelationsTribunalforcertificationtorepresentsectorssuitableforcollectivebargaining
pursuanttos.25oftheStatusoftheArtistAct,S.C.1992,c.33.Thetribunalheardthe
applicationsjointlysincetheassociationswerecompetinginpart.
Theinitialapplicant,theAssociatedDesignersofCanada(« ADC »),wasanassociation
representingtherightsandinterestsofset,costume,lightingandsounddesignersacross
Canada.ADCmainlynegotiatedonbehalfofdesignerscarryingouttheirprofessionwith
Englishlanguagetheatrecompanies.ADCsoughtcertificationtorepresent »asector
composedofset,costume,lightingandsounddesignersworkingwithintheliveperforming
artsindustry ».
AsecondapplicationwasfiledbytheAssociationdesprofessionnelsdesartsdelascènedu
Québec(« APASQ »).Afterpreliminaryproceedings,APASQamendeditsbargainingsector
proposaltoread »allset,costume,lighting,sound,propsandpuppetdesigners,stage
managers,setpainters,allcostumeandsetassistantsandassistantstagedirectorsworking
withinQuebecorattheNationalArtCentreintheareasofperformingarts,danceand
varietyentertainment ».
ADC,supportedinpartbycertainoftheinterveners,opposedthesubmissionsofAPASQ,
arguingthatnotalloftheindividualsincludedintheAPASQproposal[page290]hadbeen
proventobeartists,thatnocommunityofinterestexistedwithintheQuebecbordersthat
wasdifferentfromthatintherestofCanada,andthatanyseparationshouldbemadeon
languagelinesandnotgeographiclines.ADCrepresentedthatithadtheresources,support
anddesiretorepresentalldesignersworkingthroughoutCanada.
IntervenersdidnotobjecttoAPASQ’sapplicationcoveringtheFrenchtheatredepartmentat
theNationalArtsCentre(« NAC »),butopposedthatpartoftheAPASQapplicationthatwould
covertherestofactivitiesattheNAC.
Duringthecourseoftheproceedingsbeforethetribunal,APASQenteredintofour
agreementswithotherartsassociations.InonesuchagreementbetweenAPASQandthe
NACandtheProfessionalAssociationofCanadianTheatres,APASQconfirmedthatthe
sectorproposedinitsapplicationwouldnotcoverNAC’sEnglish-languageproductions,co-
productionsand/ortheatricalproductions.AfurtheragreementbetweenAPASQand
CanadianActorsEquityAssociation(« CAEA »)wasaimedatavoidinganoverlapinrespectof
stagemanagersandassistantstagedirectors.Thesesideagreementswerenotedbythe
tribunalandtakenintoconsiderationinreachingitsconclusions.
Thesubmissionsmadetothetribunalraisedthefollowingissues:
(1)whetherthefunctionsofeachofthedesigners,setpainter,stagemanagerandassistant
stagedirectorwascoveredbytheAct;(2)whetherthesectorproposedbyeachofthe
applicantswassuitableforbargaining,bearinginmindthecriteriaspecifiedins.26(1)ofthe
Act;and(3)towhatextenteachapplicantwasmorerepresentativeofartistsinrespectofa
definedsector.

Held,eachoftheapplicantsshouldbegrantedcertificationinrespectofasectordefinedby
thetribunalwithspecificexclusions,eachbeingdeemedsuitableforbargainingandeach
beingmostrepresentativeoftheartistsinitsrespectivesector.
APASQ’sApplication
ThefunctionofeachoftheprofessionslistedbyAPASQcontributeddirectlytothecreative
aspectsofaproductionandeachpersonengagedinsuchprofessionsshouldbeconsidered
tobeanartistasdefinedintheAct.Thefunctionsofstagemanagersandassistantstage
directorsincluded »directing…inanymannerawork »,andwerespecificallycoveredins.
6(2)(b)(ii)oftheAct.Thefunctionofthevariousdesigners,theirassistantsinrespectof
costumeandset,andthesetpainter,fellwithins.2(1)(a),(b)or(c)oftheStatusoftheArtist
ActProfessionalCategoryRegulations,SOR/99-191,andeachwereartistsunders.6(2)(b)(iii)
oftheAct.
AllofthepersonswhoperformedthefunctionslistedbyAPASQcontributedtothecreative
aspectsofawork,separatefromtheperformers.Thevariousdesignersandtheassistantset
andcostumedesignerswereallapartofanoff-stagecreativeteam.Boththestage
managerandtheassistantstagedirectorhadtobefamiliarwiththeworkofeachofthe
teamandbothsharedasufficientcommunityofinterestwithdesignerstoincludethemina
singlebargainingsector.
AreviewofthewholeofAPASQ’sactivitiesconfirmedthattherewasahistoryofprofessional
relationsbetweenAPASQ,itsmembers,otherartists’associationsandproducersoftheatrein
Quebec.Aswell,ahistoryofprofessionalrelationship[page291]existedwiththeFrench
theatredepartmentoftheNAC.Thelattershouldbeincludedinthebargainingsector.While
APASQhadyettonegotiateascaleagreementindanceandvarietyentertainment,itwas
appropriatetoincludethesefieldsinthesector.Theartisticskillsrequiredtobeadesigneror
otheroff-stageparticipantwereessentiallythesameintheatre,danceandvariety
entertainment.
Abargainingsectorbasedonlinguisticratherthangeographiccriteriashouldnotbe
adopted.EvenifasectorthatincludedalldesignerswhoworkonFrenchlanguage
productionsinCanadaseemedmore »functional »,APASQonlycoveredQuebecandthe
NAC.APASQcouldnotbeignoredwhenitrepresentedapproximately110designersand
otherartistsinQuebec,outofatotalofapproximately200inthesamesector.
Sincenootherassociationhadappliedtorepresenttheinterestsoftheartistsincludedinthe
sectorthatthetribunalhadfoundsuitableforcollectivebargaining,APASQ’swasthemost
representativeoftheartistsinthesector.
ADC’sApplication
ADCwastheofficialorganizationrecognizedbytheEnglishlanguagetheatreassociation,in
negotiatingonbehalfofdesignersacrossCanada.Whileitsnegotiatingactivitieshadbeen
largelywithEnglishlanguagetheatre,thefactthatthesameartisticqualificationswere
requiredinotherareasmadeitappropriatetodefineasectorcomposedofdesignersthat
includedallareasofliveperformingartsinCanada,withtheexceptionofQuebec,for
reasonspreviouslystatedinrespectoftheAPASQapplication.Further,inviewofevidenceof
thehistoryofADC’sprofessionalrelationswithNAC,theADCsectorshouldincludeallof
NAC’sdepartmentswiththeexceptionoftheFrenchlanguagetheatredepartment.
ADC’sapplicationmadenodistinctiononthebasisoflanguagebutsoughttorepresenta
nationwidesectorofdesigners.However,inviewoftheconclusionreachedinrespectofthe
APASQapplication,theindependentdesignersengagedinproductionspresentedinthe

provinceofQuebecandbytheFrenchlanguagetheatredepartmentoftheNACwereto
beexcludedfromADC’ssector.Nootherartists’associationhavingcomeforwardseekingto
representtheinterestsofdesignersintheapprovedsector,ADCwasthemostrepresentative
ofartistsworkinginthissector.
Conclusions
Eachoftheapplicantsmettheprerequisitesforcertificationsetoutins.23(1)oftheStatusof
theArtistAct.
InthecaseofAPASQ,thesectorsuitableforbargainingwascomposedofallset,costume,
lighting,sound,propsandpuppetdesigners,stagemanagers,setpainters,assistantcostume
andsetdesigners,andassistantstagedirectorswhowereindependentcontractorsengaged
byaproducersubjecttotheStatusoftheArtistAct,inanyperformingarts,danceand
varietyentertainmentproductionpresentedwithintheprovinceofQuebec,andinany
productionoftheFrenchtheatredepartmentoftheNACinOttawa.Excludedfromthis
sectorwerestagemanagersandassistantstagedirectorscoveredbyanearliercertification
bythetribunaltotheCAEAandsubjecttoanexistingagreementbetweentheapplicant
andCAEA.[page292]
InthecaseofADC,thesectorsuitableforbargainingwasdeterminedtobecomposedofall
set,costume,lightingandsounddesignersthroughoutCanada,whowereindependent
contractorsengagedbyaproducersubjecttotheStatusoftheArtistAct,withinthelive
performingartsindustry,withtheexceptionofset,costume,lightingandsounddesigners(1)
engagedbyaproducersubjecttotheStatusoftheArtistActinaproductionpresentedin
theprovinceofQuebec,or(2)engagedbytheFrenchlanguagetheatredepartmentofthe
NAC.
Arethefunctionsofset,costume,lightingandsounddesignercoveredbytheAct?
[139]Paragraphs(a)to(e)ofsection2oftheRegulationsprovideforcertainprofessional
categoriescomprisingprofessionsinwhichthepractitionercontributesdirectlytothe
creativeaspectsoftheproductionbycarryingoutoneormoreoftheactivitiessetoutin
thatsection.Interalia,paragraph2(1)(a)oftheRegulationsreferstosoundandlighting
design;paragraph2(1)(b)referstocostumedesign;andparagraph2(1)(c)referstoset
design(« scénographie »).Thepartiesdonotdisputethatscénographieincludessetdesign
(« conceptiondedécors »).
[140]TheTribunalfindsthatset,costume,lightingandsounddesignerscontributedirectlyto
thecreativeaspectsoftheproduction,andconsequentlypersonswhoareengagedin
thoseprofessionsareartistsundersubparagraph6(2)(b)(iii)oftheAct.
IsthefunctionofpropsdesignercoveredbytheAct?
[143]Basedontheevidencepresentedbytheintervenors,TAIandtheNAC,theTribunal
understandsthatthereisaprofessioncalled »propsman »or,asMs.Ruelputit, »setpropsman »,
andthatthesepeopleareoftenemployeesandthereforenotcoveredbytheAct.The
Tribunalalsounderstandsthatinsomeproductions,thesetdesignermayberesponsiblefor
propsdesign,anddelegatetosomeoneelsethejobofassemblingorselectingprops.Itis
clearthat,inthatcase,thecontributionofthepropsmandoesnot »contributedirectlytothe
creativeaspectsoftheproduction »,sincetheartisticchoiceswillhavebeenmadebytheset
designer.TheTribunalnotesthattheintervenors’witnessesarehighlyqualifiedandcredible
people,withrelevantexperience.However,theevidencedisclosedthatforthepastfew
yearstheyhaveeachworkedprimarilyattheadministrationlevelofoneparticularinstitution.


[145]IntheTribunal’sview,thefactthatnoawardsarepresentedisnotconclusiveevidence
thatthepositiondoesnotexist.ADCitselfexplainedthatthepositionofsounddesignerhas
onlyrecentlybeenrecognized,illustratingthatfunctionsevolve.Thefactthatoneperson
mayagreetocarryoutbothpositionsdoesnotmeanthatinanothersituationthesefunctions
mightnotbeassignedtotwopeople.TheTribunalisoftheopinionthatthereisinfacta
separateactivitythatmaybecalledpropsdesign.However,itmustbeunderstoodthatthe
personwhoperformsthisfunctionmustreporttothestagedirector,justlikeotherdesignersin
aproduction,andhisorherworkmustincludethecreationortransformationofobjectsas
wellasresearchinordertodevelopawholeconceptthatexpressesthevisionofthestage
director.WemustnowexaminetheRegulationstodeterminewhetherthisfunctionisincluded
inoneoftheenumeratedcategories.
[146]Theactivitiesinparagraphs(a)to(e)oftheRegulationsdescribeartisticfields,andare
notdefinedinrelationtospecificprofessions.Forexample,paragraph2(1)(b)refersto
« costumes,coiffureandmake-updesign »,andnotto »costume…designer »,whichindicates
thatParliamentdidnotintendtorestricttheapplicationofthesecategoriestospecific
positions.TheTribunalfindsthatpropsdesignisanactivitythatisakintosetdesign.Therefore,
thispositioniscoveredbyparagraph2(1)(c)oftheRegulationsandthepropsdesignerisan
artistundersubparagraph6(2)(b)(iii)oftheAct.
IsthefunctionofpuppetdesignercoveredbytheAct?
[149]TheTribunalisoftheopinionthatthereissufficientevidencetoconcludethatthe
positionofpuppetdesignerexists,andthatthisisnotasubfunctionofthesetorcostume
designer.Nothingpreventsapuppetdesignerfromalsoworkingasasetorcostumedesigner
aswell.WemustnowexaminetheRegulationstoseewhetherthepositionisincludedinone
ofthelistedcategories.
[150]First,designingthepuppet-theatreissimilartotheatricalsetdesign.Ontheotherhand,
asMr.Lacroixtestified,whenthedesignerdrawsthepuppet,createsthepuppet’simageand
conceptualizesitsclothing,theworkresemblesthatofacostumedesigner.Whereasthese
twofunctionsareclearlycoveredbytheRegulations,inparagraphs2(1)(b):costumes,
coiffureandmake-updesign,and2(1)(c):setdesign,theTribunalconcludesthatpuppet
designisafunctioncoveredbytheRegulationsandthepuppetdesignerisanartistunder
subparagraph6(2)(b)(iii)oftheAct.
ArethefunctionsofassistantsetandcostumedesignerscoveredbytheAct?
[155]ItappearstotheTribunalthattheworkofassistantsetandcostumedesigners,asa
whole,likelyfallsomewherewithinthesetwoextremes.TheevidencepresentedbyDavid
Gaucheronthistopicconfirmsthisconclusion.Mr.Gaucherhasextensiveexperienceinthe
performingartsinQuebec.Inaddition,heworkedasanassistantforthreeyearsearlyinhis
career.Hehasalsoworkedwithassistantssincethattime.Hetestifiedthatbeinganassistant
setorcostumedesignerrequiresartisticskill,becausetheymustmaterialize, »breathelifeinto »,
thedesigner’sgeneralidea,justasthedesignercarriesouttheartisticvisionofthestage
director.PierreRousseaureinforcedthisconclusionwhenhetestifiedthattheselectionof
assistantsetandcostumedesignerscontributestotheartisticqualityofthedesigners’work.
However,theevidencerevealedthatthesepositionsnecessarilyinvolveanadministrative
component,theamountoftimedevotedbyassistantstotheseadministrativedutiesvarying
inaccordancewiththedesigner’sworkingmethodsandthesizeoftheproduction.
[156]Inlightofthesefacts,theTribunalmustdeterminewhetherassistantsetandcostume
designersare »artists »withinthemeaningoftheAct.Subparagraph6(2)(b)(iii)oftheAct
designatesindependentcontractorswhocontributetothecreationofaworkin,interalia,
theperformingarts,music,danceandvarietyentertainmentasartistswithinthemeaningof


theAct.TheRegulationsspecifythescopeofthisprovision.Forinstance,subsection2(1)of
theRegulationsprovidesthataprofessionalwhoisinvolvedinthecreationofaproductionby
contributingdirectlytoitscreativeaspectswillbecoveredbytheAct.TheRegulationsalso
providethattheprofessional’scontributionmustfallwithinoneormoreofthecategorieslisted
inparagraphs2(1)(a)to(e).
[157]TheintervenorsTAIandNACarguethatassistantsarecoveredbysubsection2(2)ofthe
Regulations,inthattheyperform »supportwork ».Subsection2(2)excludespeoplewhocarry
outnon-creativefunctions,specificallyaccounting,auditing,legal,representation,publicity
ormanagementworkorclerical,administrativeorothersupportwork.
[158]TheTribunalcoulddisposeoftheintervenors’argumentimmediately,as,initsopinion,
theassistants’workinvolvesacreativecontribution.Nonetheless,theTribunalnotesthatinthe
immediatecontextoftheprovision,wherethewords »accounting,auditing,legal,
representation,publicityormanagementworkorclerical,administrativeorothersupport
work »areconnectedgrammaticallyandlogically,theintervenors’interpretationcannot
stand.Themeaningtobegiventooneiteminagroupofwordsthataregrammaticallyand
logicallyconnectedshouldbedeterminedbyexaminingthecommoncharacteristicsofallof
theelementsofthegroup(Sullivan,DriedgerontheConstructionofStatutes,3rded.,Toronto,
Butterworths,1994,atp.200).Withrespecttothewords »accounting,auditing,legal,
representation,publicityormanagementworkorclerical,administrativeorothersupport
work »,theyallrefertoaformof »officeworkoradministrativework ».The »supportwork »does
notrefertotheworkperformedbyassistants,notwithstandingthatsomeoftheirdutiesmay
beadministrative.
[159]Thelistofactivitiesintheprofessionalcategoriesinparagraphs2(1)(a)to(e)isexplicitly
connectedtotherequirementthattherebeacontributiontothecreativeaspectsofa
production.Asnotedearlier,thesecategoriesaredescribedintermsofartisticfields,andnot
inrelationtospecificprofessions.
[160]Theevidencedemonstratesthattheindividualswhoworkasassistantsetandcostume
designersareusuallyindependentcontractors.Theseprofessionalsmeetthecriterionof
contributingtothecreativeaspectsofaproductionassetoutinsubparagraph6(2)(b)(iii),
sincetheproposedsectorrelatestotheperformingarts,danceandvarietyentertainment.
TheartisticskillsdescribedbyMr.Gaucherillustratethedirectcontributionmadebythese
assistantstothecreativeaspectsofaproduction.TheTribunalfinds,basedonthatevidence,
thatthiscreativecontributionissufficientforthesefunctionstobecoveredbyparagraphs
2(1)(b)and2(1)(c)oftheRegulationsandthatsetandcostumedesignassistantsareartists
undersubparagraph6(2)(b)(iii)oftheAct.
IsthefunctionofsetpaintercoveredbytheAct?
[163]Section9oftheActprovidesthatanartistwhocontractshisorherservicesthroughan
organizationiscoveredbytheAct.Accordingly,setpainterswhocarryouttheirfunctions
throughacorporationmaybenefitfromthelabourrelationsschemeestablishedbytheAct.
Moreover,atthecertificationstage,theTribunaldoesnotnormallyassesstheusual
relationshipbetweenproducersandeachmemberofanartists’association,whenthe
memberisengagedinhisorheroccupation:APVQ-STCVQ,2001CAPPRT035,atpara.18.
WhentheTribunalcertifiesanartists’association,everyoneworkinginaparticularartisticfield
willnotnecessarilybecoveredbythecertification.Obviously,artistswhoareengagedinan
employer-employeerelationshipwillbeexcluded.Moreover,itisimportanttopointoutthat
thereisnothingthatpreventsapersonfrombeinganemployeeandalsoworkinginthearts
asanindependentcontractor:UniondesArtistes,1996CAPPRT017,atpara.24.


[164]Inlightoftheseconclusions,theTribunalisoftheviewthatasetpaintermayperformhis
orherfunctionsintheperformingarts,danceorvarietyentertainmentasanindependent
professionalcontractor.Itremainstobedeterminedwhetherthoseprofessionalsarecovered
bytheRegulations.TheTribunalacceptsAPASQ’sevidencethatwhilesetpaintersfollowthe
artisticinstructionsgivenbythedesigners,theirworkinvolvesasignificantelementofartistic
adeptness.Basedonthiscreativecontribution,theTribunalconcludesthatsetpainters
contributedirectlytothecreativeaspectsofaproduction,andthusmeetthecriteriasetout
insubsection2(1)oftheRegulations.TheTribunalrejectstheargumentmadebythe
intervenorsTAIandtheNAC,thatsetpaintersmerelyperform »support »duties,havingregard
tothedetailedanalysisdonebytheTribunalinrespectofthepositionsofassistantsetand
costumedesigner[seeparagraph158].Asthesetpainter’sworkcomplementsthatoftheset
designer’s,theTribunalconcludesthatitiscoveredbyparagraph2(1)(c)oftheRegulations
andthesetpainterisanartistundersubparagraph6(2)(b)(iii)oftheAct.
ArethefunctionsofstagemanagerandassistantstagedirectorcoveredbytheAct?
[165]BecausetheTribunalhaspreviouslydeterminedthatstagemanagersandassistant
stagedirectorsare »artists »[CAEA1996CAPPRT010],APASQcontendsthattheTribunalneed
notaddressthisquestionagain.TheintervenorsTAIandtheNACsubmitthatthecultural
differencesexistingbetweenthewaytheEnglishandFrenchtheatresoperate,asidentified
bytheirwitnessandADC’switnesses,warrantafreshanalysisbytheTribunalofthestatusof
thesepositions.
[166]TheTribunalacknowledgesthattherearecertainoperationaldifferencesthatexist
betweenEnglishandFrench-languagetheatres,andthatthesedifferencesmayhavean
impactonthescopeofthedutiesperformedbystagemanagersandassistantstage
directors.However,theydonotnegatetheartisticcontributiontheseindividualsmaketoa
Frenchtheatreproduction.ThetwostudiescompletedbytheCQRHCregardingthese
professionsclearlydemonstratethecreativecontributionofthesetwopositionstotheoverall
stageperformance.
[167]Thestudydoneoftheprofessionofstagemanagerindicatesthatastagemanager
[TRANSLATION] »managestheperformance,byensuringthattheshow’steamperformson
cuewithprecision ».Thestudyoftheprofessionofassistantstagedirectordemonstratesthat
theassistantstagedirectorhelpsdevelopandfinalizethestagingofaproduction,underthe
supervisionofthestagedirector.BasedonthereasoningfollowedintheCAEAdecision,the
Tribunalconcludesthatthefunctionsofstagemanagersandassistantstagedirectorsinclude
« directing…inanymanner »awork.Accordingly,theyare »artists »pursuanttosubparagraph
6(2)(b)(ii)oftheAct,evenifthisdirectioniscarriedoutunderthesupervisionofthestage
director[see1996CAPPRT010,atparagraphs31,32and39].
BigComfyCorp.v.Canada
(2002),[2002]TCJ247,[2002-05-09]
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/tcc/2002/2002tcc19994643.html(TaxCourtofCanada)RipJ.
[25][wordsmissing]referredtotheCanadianCustomsandRevenueAgency(« CCRA »)
InterpretationBulletinIT-441,CapitalCostAllowance-Certifiedfeatureproductionsand
certifiedshortproductions.TheBulletinstatesthattoqualifyforcapitalcostallowancean
investormustbeneficiallyholdanundividedproprietaryinterest,whetheraloneorjointlywith
otherpersons,inallthecomponentsofthefilmortapepropertyandnotmerelyaninterestin
someelementsthereof.TheBulletinlistselementsofapropertywhichtheinvestormust
acquiretoestablishownership,oneofwhichiscopyright.


[26]Subsection13(4)oftheCopyrightActrequiresthat,tobevalid,anyassignmentof
copyrightmustbeinwritingandsignedbytheowneroftheright.Counselfortheappellant
notedthatwhiletheInvestmentAgreementsbetweentheInvestorsandtheappellantarein
writing,thereisnoclearstatementintheAgreementstoassignanyportionofcopyrightto
theInvestorsandtheAgreements,inandbythemselves,therefore,arenotcapableof
transferringacopyrightinterest.
Beaudryv.Goldman
(2002),[2002]CarswellNat1972,[2002]FCJ609,[2002]ACF609,[2002]FTRTBEdAU026,2002
FCT462,[2002-04-26]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct462.html(FCTD)RouleauJ.
[35][…]Butiftheagreements[publishinganddistributionagreementsbetweendefendants]
inquestionweretobeofanyrelevancewhatsoever,suchrelevancecouldonlystemfrom
theissueoftheassessmentofthequantumofdamagesthattheplaintiffsmightbeentitledto
claimfromthedefendantsonceaninfringementhadbeenproved,asthisissuecamewithin
theprohibitioninRule247.Accordingly,ProthonotaryMorneauerredinlawinorderingthe
productionofthethreeagreementsforthepurposesofdetermining »theparticipationof
eachdefendantintheallegedinfringementof[theplaintiffs’]work ».Thisquestioncouldonly
beraisedinthecourseofdeterminingthequantumofthedamagesandprofitsor
subsequently.However,ithasnoimpactontheissueoftheallegedinfringementof
copyrightnowbeforethisCourt.
BellExpressVuLimitedPartnershipv.Rex
(2002),18CPR(4th)289,[2002]CarswellBC851,[2002]CarswellBC852,100BCL.(3d)1,212
DLR(4th)1,[2002]5WWR1,287NR248,166BCAC1,271WAC1,[2002]SCJ43,2002SCC42,
[2002-04-26]
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/bellexp.en.htmlinFrench
at
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/fr/rec/html/bellexp.fr.htmland
http://www.canlii.org/ca/jug/csc/2002/2002csc42.html(SCC)IacobucciJ.
TheplaintiffwaslicensedbytheCanadianRadioandTelevisionCommissiontobroadcast
televisionprogrammingviasatellitetoCanadiansubscribers.Theplaintiffbroughtan
applicationbeforetheBritishColumbiaSupremeCourtrequestinganordertoprohibitthe
defendantsfromsellingdecodersthatenabledtheircustomerstoreceivesatellitetelevision
signalsbroadcastfromtheUnitedStates.TheRadiocommunicationAct,R.S.C.1985,c.R-2,s.
9(1)(c),providedthatnopersonshalldecode »anencryptedsubscriptionprogramming
signal »without »authorizationfromthelawfuldistributorofthesignalorfeed ». »Lawful
distributor »wasdefinedins.2tomean »apersonwhohastheawfulrightinCanada »to
transmitorauthorizethedecoding. »Subscriptionprogrammingsignal »wasdefinedtomean
« radiocommunicationthatisintendedforreceptioneitherdirectlyorindirectlybythepublic
inCanadaorelsewhereonpaymentofasubscriptionfeeorothercharge ».Thechambers
judgedeclinedtogranttheinjunction,findingthats.9(1)(c)didnotapplytothepaid
subscriptionbyCanadianstosignalsfromdistributorsoutsideCanada.TheBritishColumbia
CourtofAppealdismissedtheplaintiff’sappeal,andtheplaintiffappealedtotheSupreme
CourtofCanada.
Held,theappealshouldbeallowed.[page290]


Section9(1)(c)wasunambiguous,sotherewasnoneedtoresorttoexternalaidsforstatutory
interpretation,suchasthestrictconstructionofpenalstatutesandthepresumptionthatthe
courtsshouldinterpretthelawinaccordancewiththevaluesandprinciplesenshrinedinthe
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.Thereceptionsoughttobeenjoinedoccurred
entirelyinCanada,sotherewasnoissueofthestatutehavinganextraterritorialreach.The
definitionof »subscriptionprogrammingsignal »encompassedsignalsoriginatingfromforeign
distributorsandintendedforreceptionbyaforeignpublic.TheActprohibitedthedecoding
ofallencryptedsatellitesignals,withalimitedexception.Theexceptionoccurredwhere
authorizationwasacquiredfromadistributorholdingthenecessarylegalrightsinCanadato
transmitthesignalandprovidetherequiredauthorization.ThedistributorsintheUnitedStates
werenot »lawfuldistributors »undertheAct.
[50]Thereisanothercontextualfactorthat,whilenotinanywaydeterminative,is
confirmatoryoftheinterpretationofs.9(1)(c)asanabsoluteprohibitionwithalimited
exception.AsIhavenotedabove,theconceptof »lawfulright »inthedefinitionof »lawful
distributor »incorporatescontractualandcopyrightissues.Accordingtotheevidenceinthe
presentrecord,thecommercialagreementsbetweentheappellantanditsvarious
programmesuppliersrequiretheappellanttorespecttherightsthatthesesuppliersare
grantedbythepersonsholdingthecopyrightintheprogrammingcontent.Therightsso
acquiredbytheprogrammesupplierspermittheprogrammestobebroadcastinspecific
locations,beingallorpartofCanada.Assuch,theappellantwouldhavenolawfulrightto
authorisedecodingofitsprogrammingsignalsinanareanotincludedinitsgeographically
limitedcontractualrighttoexhibittheprogramming.
[51]Inthisway,thepersonholdingthecopyrightintheprogrammingcanconcludeseparate
licensingdealsindifferentregions,orindifferentcountries(e.g.,CanadaandtheU.S.).
Indeed,thesearrangementsappeartypicaloftheindustry:inthepresentappeal,theU.S.
DTHbroadcasterDIRECTVhasadvocatedthesameinterpretationofs.9(1)(c)asthe
appellant,inpartbecauseofthepotentialliabilityitfacestowardsbothU.S.copyright
holdersandCanadianlicenceesduetothefactthatitsprogrammingsignalsspillacrossthe
borderandarebeingdecodedinCanada.
[52]Ialsobelievethatthereadingofs.9(1)(c)asanabsoluteprohibitionwithalimited
exceptioncomplementstheschemeoftheCopyrightAct.Sections21(1)(c)and21(1)(d)of
theCopyrightActprovidebroadcasterswithacopyrightinthecommunicationsignalsthey
transmit,grantingthemthesolerightofretransmission(subjecttotheexceptionsins.31(2))
and,inthecaseofatelevisioncommunicationsignal,ofperformingitonpaymentofafee.
Byreadings.9(1)(c)asanabsoluteprohibitionagainstdecodingexceptwhereauthorization
isgrantedbythepersonwiththelawfulrighttotransmitandauthorizedecodingofthesignal,
theprovisionextendsprotectiontotheholdersofthecopyrightintheprogrammingitself,
sinceitwouldproscribetheunauthorizedreceptionofsignalsthatviolatecopyright,even
wherenoretransmissionorreproductionoccurs:seeF.P.EliadisandS.C.McCormack,
« VanquishingWizards,PiratesandMusketeers:TheRegulationofEncryptedSatelliteTVSignals »
(1993),3M.C.L.R.211,atpp.213-18.Finally,Inotethatthecivilremediesprovidedforinss.
18(1)(a)and18(6)oftheRadiocommunicationActbothillustratethatcopyrightconcernsare
ofrelevancetotheschemeoftheAct,thussupportingthefindingthatthereisaconnection
betweenthesetwostatutes.
BenistiImport-ExportInc.v.ModesTXTCarbonInc.
(2002),20CPR(4
th)125[2002]CarswellNat2342,[2002]FCJ240,2002FTRUned103,[2002]
ACF240,2002FCT179,[2002-02-19]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct197.html,in


Frenchathttp://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002cfpi197.html(FCTD)Morneau,
Prothonotary
Theplaintiffhadcommencedanactionforindustrialdesignandtrade-markinfringement.
Thedefendanthadfiledastatementofdefenceandcounterclaim.Inthecounterclaim,the
defendantalleged,interalia,thattheplaintiffhadmadefalseandmisleadingstatements
relatingtoindustrialdesignscontrarytotheprovisionsofs.7(a)oftheTrade-marksAct,R.S.C.
1985,c.T-13.Theplaintiffbroughtamotiontostriketheparagraphscontainingthese
allegationsonthegroundthatifs.7(a)wastoapply,theissuemustberelatedexclusivelyto
atrade-markquestion.
Held,themotionshouldbedismissed.
OnamotiontostrikeunderRule221(1)(a)oftheFederalCourtRules,1998,SOR/98-106,the
issueiswhetheritisclearandobviousinlawthattheplaintiff’spositionisjustified.[page126]
Itwasclearfromareviewoftherelevantauthoritiesthats.7(a)couldapplynotonlytotrade-
marksbuttoother
intellectualproperty.Theprotectionaffordedbys.7oftheTrade-marksActmightbemore
readilyextendedtomattersexpresslyreferredtoins.91oftheConstitutionAct,1867,thatis
patentsofinventionanddiscoveryandcopyright.However,s.7itselfisinastatutethe
subjectmatterofwhichdoesnotfallwithintheexpresspowersofs.91.Itwasnotclearand
obviousthatasituationinvolvingindustrialdesigncouldnotbecoveredbys.7(a)ofthe
Trade-marksAct.
[21]Thefactthatitiseasiertoextendtheprotectionofsection7oftheActtosomematters
expresslyreferredtoinsection91oftheConstitutionAct,1867(heads22and23insection91,
thatis,patentsofinventionanddiscoveryandcopyrights)mightnotbeasmeaningfulasthe
plaintiff’scounselhopes,sincesection7itselfisinastatutethesubjectmatterofwhichdoes
notfallwiththeexpresspowersofsection91oftheConstitutionAct,1867.
BergeronvSogidèsLtée
(2002),JE2002-624,[2002]CarswellQue669,[2002-01-17]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200201fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs10165.html(QueSupCt)TellierJ.
Résumé
Actionvisantàfairedéclarerlanullitéd’uneclausedecontratd’éditionetenréclamationde
sommesdues.Rejetée.
En1989,ledemandeurasignéunpremiercontratd’éditionavecunefilialedela
défenderesseSogidès.Laclauseno13.4,relativeauxredevancesduesàl’auteur,précisait
qu’aucuneredevanceneseraitduesurles50exemplairesdistribuésauservicedepresseni
surceuxdistribuésdansl’intérêtdelavente.Conformémentaucontrat,Sogidèsaremis
différentsrapportsannuelsaudemandeur.Le28juillet1993,elleluiaversé5539$àtitrede
redevances.Le27août1997,ledemandeuraintentéleprésentrecours.Ilaétéautoriséà
intenterunrecourscollectif.Ilfaitvaloirquelescontratsd’éditionconstituentdescontrats
d’adhésion.Ildemandel’annulationdelaclauseno13.4,qu’ilconsidèrecommeabusive
parcequ’ellepermetàl’éditeurdedéduiredesredevancesdueslecoûtdesexemplaires
donnésgratuitement,cecoûtétantcalculésurunpourcentagedutirageplutôtquedes
ventes.Ilréclameleremboursementdesredevancesquicorrespondraientàladéductionde


10%dutirageeffectuéesurlesventesréelles.Lesdéfenderessesinvoquentlaprescriptiondu
recours.
Décision
L’actionquitendàfairevaloirundroitpersonnelseprescritpartroisans(art.2925duCode
civilduQuébec).Lorsquelaloinouvelleabrègeundélai,lenouveaudélais’appliquemais
courtàcompterdel’entréeenvigueurdelaloinouvelle(art.6delaLoisurl’applicationde
laréformeduCodecivil).Ledemandeurréclamel’annulationd’uneclauseabusivedansun
contratd’adhésion.Cerecoursviseundroitpersonnelassujettiàlaprescriptiondetroisans.
Laloinouvelleayantabrégéledélaideprescription,cedernieracommencéàcourirle
1erjanvier1994.Ledroitderecoursdudemandeurétaitprescritàcompterdu1erjanvier
1997.Parailleurs,iln’estpascertainquelaclauseno13.4contrevienneàl’article31delaLoi
surlestatutprofessionneldesartistesdesartsvisuels,desmétiersd’artetdelalittératureetsur
leurscontratsaveclesdiffuseurs.Deplus,commelelégislateurn’apaspréciséles
conséquencesdelanon-conformitéducontrataveclaloi,lanullitéabsoluenepeut
s’appliquer.D’autrepart,lescontratsd’éditionnesontpasincompréhensibles.Enoutre,le
présentrecoursneconsistepasenuneactionenredressementdecompte.Detoutefaçon,
ledemandeurconnaîtlesdonnéessurlesquellesilfondesaréclamation.Iln’yapaslieu
d’ordonnerlaredditiondescomptes.Sidesmembresdugroupequeledemandeur
représenteontencoredesdroitsàfairevaloir,ilsneserontpaslésésparlerejetduprésent
recours.
20Lapremièrequestionàseposerestdesedemanderdequelrecoursils’agit.D’entréede
jeu,disonsimmédiatementquelefaitqu’ils’agissed’unrecourscollectifnechangerienau
problèmeouàlanaturedurecours.Essentiellement,ils’agitd’uneactionquidemande
l’annulationd’uneclauseabusivedansuncontratd’adhésionetdeprononcerune
condamnationpécuniaireenconséquence.
28Ceciétant,ildoitêtreditqueledélaideprescriptionsousl’ancienCodeaété
nécessairementabrégésuivantl’article6ci-hautcitéetqu’ilaétéréduità3ans.Par
conséquent,laseuleconclusionpossibleestqueledélaideprescriptionpourl’exercicede
toutrecoursenvertudecessixcontratsestde3ans.
29Enfin,cedélaideprescriptionréduità3anscommenceàcouriràcompterdu1
erjanvier
1994,datedel’entréeenvigueurdunouveauCode.
30End’autrestermes,toutrecoursquiaouauraitpuprendrenaissancesousl’empirede
l’ancienCode,avantle1
erjanvier1994,estirrémédiablementprescritle1erjanvier1997,s’il
n’apasétéexercéavantcettedate.
38Ilyaplus.Mêmeenadmettantpourlesfinsdeladiscussionquelescontratsd’édition
alléguésparledemandeurneseraientpasconformesàl’article31[delaLoisurlestatut
professionneldesartistesdesartsvisuels,desmétiersd’artetdelalittératureetsurleurs
contratsaveclesdiffuseurs,L.R.Q.c.S-32.01],laconclusionquel’onpourraitretenirn’estpas
cellepréconiséeparledemandeuretcepourplusieursraisons.
39D’abord,danslaloi,lelégislateurneprécisepaslesconséquencesdelanonconformité
d’uncontrataveclaloi.Enconséquence,ondoitdèsledépartéliminerlaquestiond’une
nullitéabsolue.C’estdumoinslarègleénoncéeparl’article1421C.c.Q.àl’effetque:
1421.Àmoinsquelaloin’indiqueclairementlecaractèredelanullité
,lecontratqui
n’estpasconformeauxconditionsnécessairesàsaformationestprésumén’être
frappéquedenullitérelative.(soulignésdutribunal)


40Onnedoitdoncpasconsidérercetargumentdenullitéabsolueet,parconséquent,
cettenotiond’imprescriptibilitédurecours.D’ailleurs,sionpoussaitleraisonnementàlalimite,
onseraitobligédeconsidérersoitlanullitéabsoluedetoutlecontrat,soitdelaclausede
droitdepasse.Ainsi,sic’esttoutlecontratquiestabsolumentnul,ilseraitconsidérécomme
n’ayantjamaisexisté.Alors,commentledemandeurpeut-ilinvoquerlessixcontratsqui
n’auraientjamaisexistépourenfairelefondementdesonrecourspersonneletcollectif?
41Sic’estuniquementlaclausededroitdepassequiseraitabsolumentnulle,onarriveàdes
résultatssimilaires.Laclausededroitdepasseseraitprésuméen’avoirjamaisexisté,mais
touteslesautresclausesdemeurentintactes,dontlaclausederedevancesquidonne
ouvertureàunrecoursprescriptiblepar3ans.
Campney&Murphyv.Bernard&Partners
(2002),22CPR(4
th)526,[2002]CarswellNat3166,[2002]FCJ1520,2000FCT1136[2002-11-04]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct1136.html(FCTD)Hargrave,Prothonotary
Theplaintiffhadcommencedarbitrationproceedingsagainstthepartnersofthedefendant
partnershipundertheplaintiff’spartnershipagreementandhadobtainedanexparte
injunctionintheBritishColumbiaSupremeCourttoprovidethatneithersidewouldtake
proceedingsinrespectofmattersthatwerethesubjectofthearbitration.Theindividualswho
formedthedefendantpartnershipwereformerpartnersoftheplaintiff.Theplaintiffthen
appliedforanexparteinjunctionagainstthedefendantsallegingcopyrightincertain
precedentmaterialswhichhadbeencopiedbythedefendants.Thedefendantsbroughta
motiontohavetheapplicationstayedinfavourofthearbitrationproceedings.
Held,themotionshouldbegrantedandtheapplicationforanexparteinjunctionstayed.
Theplaintiff’spartnershipagreement(the »agreement »)providedthatalldisputesarisingout
oforinconnectionwiththeagreementshouldbereferredtoandfinallyresolvedby
arbitrationundertheCommercialArbitrationAct,R.S.B.C.1996,c.55(the »Act »).Forastayto
begrantedunders.15oftheAct,theapplicantmustshow:(a)apartytoanarbitrationhad
commencedlegalproceedingsagainstanotherpartytotheagreement;(b)thelegal
proceedingswereinrespectofamatteragreedtobesubmittedtoarbitration;and(c)the
applicationhadbeenbroughtbeforetheapplicanttookastepintheproceeding.Theparty
seekingthestayneededonlytoshowanarguablecase.Further,theterm »arisingoutof »asit
appearedintheagreementdeservedagenerousinterpretation.
Onlywhereitwasclearthatapartywasnotapartytoanarbitrationagreementshoulda
courtreachanyfinaldeterminationinrespectofanapplicationforastayofproceedings.
Theplaintiffhadarguedthatthepartnersofthedefendantpartnership,eachofwhomhad
incorporatedfortaxpurposes,werenotpartiestotheagreementand,therefore,were
outsidethejurisdictionofthearbitrator.However,acorporationcouldactasanagentfor
andonbehalfofthosebywhomithadbeencalledintoexistence.Asapartnershipwasthe
relationshipsubsistingbetweenpersonscarryingonbusinessincommonwithaviewforprofit,
thedefendants’lawfirmcouldnothaveactedasaneffectivepartnershipifthecorporate
persona,asopposedtotheindividualsthemselves,wereincontrol.Accordingly,therewas
nothingtotheplaintiff’sargumentthatthearbitratorwouldhavenojurisdictionoverthe
allegedperpetratorsofcopyrightinfringement.


Itwasnotnecessarytodecideifthedisputeastothecopyingofprecedentsfellwithinthe
arbitrationclause.Itwasonlyifthearbitrationclauseclearlydidnot[page528]extendtothe
dispute,oriftheentitiesactuallyinvolvedinthewrongdoingwerenotsubjecttothe
arbitrationprocess,thatthestayshouldbedenied.Thereweretwoarguablereasonsthat
demonstratedthattheindividualsallegedtohavetransgressedweresubjecttothe
arbitrationprocess.First,thepartieshadinitiallyagreedthatthetakinganduseofcopyright
materialbelongingtotheplaintiffbyapartnershipofindividuallawyerswasclearlyarbitrable.
Second,ifthewrongdoerswereanumberofentitiesincorporatedfortaxpurposes,inall
likelihoodthesecorporatepersonasactedasagentsfortheindividuallawyers.
[18]ThearbitrationclauseintheCampney&MurphyPartnershipAgreement,inusingthe
term »arisingoutof »,isverybroadinscope.Ineednotdecide,asanabsolute,whetheror
notthepresentdisputeastocopyingofprecedentsfallswithinthearbitrationclause.Rather,
Ineedonlydecideifitisarguablethatthedisputefallswithinthearbitrationprovision.HereI
mustresolveanydoubtastoarbitrabilityinfavourofcoverageunderthearbitration
provision.OnlyifIcanconclude,withpositiveassurance,thatthearbitrationclausedoesnot
extendtothedispute,andhereIincludeaconsiderationofwhethertheentitiesactually
involvedinthewrongdoingaresubjecttothearbitrationprocess,oughtItodenyastayin
favourofarbitration.
[19]Therearetworeasons,eachatleastarguable,bywhichtodemonstratethatthe
individualsallegedtohavetransgressedaresubjecttothearbitrationprocess.First,this
FederalCourtproceeding,asitstands,isagainstapartnershipofindividuallawyerswhoare
saidtohavetakenandusedcopyrightmaterialbelongingtoCampney&Murphy.That,as
thepartiesinitiallyagreed,isclearlyarbitrable.Thepartnershipofindividuallawyers,indeed
thoseindividualsthemselves,aresubjecttothearbitrationprocess.
[20]Second,ifIamincorrectinthefirstconclusionandthewrongdoersareanumberof
entitieswhichwereincorporatedfortaxplanningpurposes,thosecorporatepersonasof
eachlawyerwithBernard&Partners,includingMrHiltonwere,atleastarguablyandindeed
inalllikelihood,actasagentsfortheindividuallawyers.Thisbeingthecasethereisnoissue
astoBernard&PartnersandMrHiltonbeingtheproperpartiestothearbitrationagreement,
sothattheissueoftheobtaininganduseofprecedentmaterial,whichoriginatedfrom
Campney&Murphy’srecords,maybearbitrated.
CanadianMediaGuildv.CanadianBroadcastingCorp.
(2002),[2002]CarswellOnt278,156OAC108,[2002]OJ341[2002-01-30](OntSupCt-DivCt)
[26]InherentintheAppellant’spositionisthepropositionthattherighttoareusefeeexistsin
perpetuityasnoagreedterminationdateisspecificallyprovided.Thisisinconsistentwiththe
publicpolicyofthelawandoneshouldassumethecontractterminableonreasonable
notice.SeeWaddams,TheLawofContracts,4thed.,CanadaLawBook,1999atpara.502.
TheprovisionsoftheCopyrightActarenotapplicable.ThereisnothingintheStandardForm
Agreementorthe1977Agreementtolimitthedurationoftheright.Alimitationperiodofthe
performer’slifeisinherentinthenatureofretirementbenefitswhichwerethesubjectof
Dayco.
[27]TheArbitratorconsideredtheargumentsoftheparties.Heanalyzedthereasonable
expectationsoftheparties.HeknewsomeperformershadsignedStandardForm
Agreementswithtermsdifferentfromthoseinthethenextantcollectiveagreement.Mr.
Chevrierhadnot.TheArbitratormadeareasoneduseofprecedentcasesandconcluded



thatsolongasthecollectiveagreementincludedaprovisionforreusefees,areusewould
crystallizetheright.Thereusecrystallizedtherightpursuanttothethenextantcollective
agreement.Iftheagreementwassilentonthesubject,nofeewaspayable.Anyvestingof
therightwastiedtotheprovisionsofthethencurrentcollectiveagreement.
[28]Thisinterpretationovercomestheanathematothelawofaperpetualagreement,since
therightsunderacollectiveagreementexistonlyforthetermoftheagreement.Therights
maybecontinued,terminatedorreplacedbytherightsunderasuccessoragreement.
Daycoisdistinguishablebecausetherightswhichvestedinthatcasewerethoseprovidedin
thecollectiveagreementinforceatthetimeoftheretirement.Heretherewerenolonger
benefitstovest.
CCHCanadianLtd.v.LawSocietyofUpperCanada
(2002),18CPR(4th)161,[2002]FCJ690,[2002]ACF690],[2002]CarswellNat1000,212D.L.R.
(4th)385,289NR1,2002FCA187,[2002-05-14]
http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca187.html,inFrenchathttp://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002caf187.html(FCA);applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupreme
CourtofCanadagrantedon2002-12-12[2002]SCCA317(SCC);(2002),[2002]CarswellNat
1704[2002-07-02](FCA-Costs);

Theplaintiffpublishersproducedlegalmaterials.Thedefendantlawsocietywasanon-profit
corporationthatgovernedaprovinciallegalprofession.Thelawsocietyoperatedalibrary
containingalargecollectionoflegalmaterialsincludingthepublishers’publications.Over
theyearsthelawsocietyoperatedaphotocopyservicewhereby,uponrequest,it
photocopiedandforwardedlegalmaterialsforaperpagefeeintendedtocover
associatedcosts.Theservicewasoperatedinaccordancewithanaccesstothelawpolicy
whichprovidedguidelinesforthemakingofsinglecopiesoflibrarymaterialsforthepurpose
of,interalia,researchandprivatestudy.Inadditionthelawsocietymadefree-standing
photocopiersavailableinitslibraryforusebylibrarypatronsusingcoinsorpre-paidcards.The
lawsocietydidnotmonitorthephotocopiersbutpostedanoticeaboveeachphotocopier
advisingthatcertaincopyingmaybeaninfringementofcopyrightlawandthatthelibrary
wasnotresponsibleforinfringingcopies.[page163]
Thepublishersobjectedtothelawsociety’sphotocopyingservicebydeliveringaceaseand
desistletter,andthencommencedlegalproceedingsforcopyrightinfringement.The
publishersreliedon11specificitemsinwhichtheyassertedcopyrightandallegedthatthe
lawsocietyhadinfringedinfringedcopyrightin10oftheitemsbyphotocopyingthem,by
communicatingthemtolibrarypatronsbyfacsimile,andbydistributingandsellingthecopies
tolibrarypatrons.Inaddition,thepublishersassertedthat,byprovidingfree-standing
photocopiers,thelawsocietyauthorizedlibrarypatronstoreproducetheirworks.The11items
comprisedreportedjudicialdecisions,headnotesofsuchdecisions,acasesummary,a
topicalindex,anannotatedstatute,achapterinatextbookandamonograph.The
publishersobtainedcertificatesofregistrationofcopyrightinthe11itemsincontemplationof
thelitigation.
Thelawsocietydefendedongroundsthattheoperationofitsphotocopyingservicein
accordancewithitsaccesstothelawpolicyfellwithinthefairdealingexception,andon
variouspublicpolicyandequitabledefences.Bycounterclaimthelawsocietysought
declarationsthat,byofferingitsphotocopyingserviceandfree-standingphotocopiersin
accordancewiththeaccesstothelawpolicyanditspractice,itdidnotinfringeanyofthe
publishers’copyright.


Attrialthetrialjudgeconcludedthat,butfortheannotatedstatute,textbookand
monograph,thepublishers’workswerenotoriginalandthereforewerenotprotectedby
copyright.Althoughthepublishersexercisedextensiveskill,labourandjudgmentincreating
theworks,theylackedimaginationorcreativesparkessentialtoafindingoforiginality.Asto
theannotatedstatute,textbookandmonograph,thetrialjudgefoundthattheworkswere
originalandprotectedbycopyrightandthatcopyrighthadbeeninfringedbyphotocopying
themonographandachapterofthetextbookandbydistributingthecopiestothepersons
requestingthecopies.Thetrialjudgefoundthattherewasnoinfringementbysaleofthe
copiesbecausethelawsocietydidnotprofitfrommakingthecopies,andrejectedthefair
dealingdefencebecausethepurposeofthelawsocietyinmakingthecopieswasnotafair
dealingpurpose.
Afterthehearingofthetrial,amendmentstotheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,creating
certainlibraryexemptionscameintoforce.Theseexemptionsincludeds.30.2(a)which
providedthatitwasnotaninfringementofcopyrightforalibrary,archiveormuseumtodo
anythingonbehalfofanypersonthatthepersonmaydopersonallyunderfairdealing.The
trialjudgedidnotconsidertheapplicationofthelibraryexemptionindetail.
ChancellorManagementInc.(c.o.b.ChancellorHomes)v.OasisHomesLtd.
(2002),19CPR(4th)480,[2002]CarswellAlta714,[2002]AJ702,2002ABQB500,[2002]ARTBEd
JN029,[2002-05-21]
http://199.213.44.18:8080/ISYSquery/IRL12ED.tmp/49/doc(AltaQB)Fraser
J.;(2002),[2002]CarswellAlta890,[2002]10WWR121,22CPC(5th)303,2002ABQB500,
[2002-07-05](AltaQB-Costs)FraserJ.
TheplaintiffretainedtheservicesofthedefendantHaddon,adesignfirm,todesignplansfor
ashowhome(the »plans »).Theplaintiffsignedawrittencontract(the »contract »)
acknowledgingthat »thiscontractgiveslegalpermissionforthishouseplantobebuiltonly
once »andthatitwasHaddon’s »righttoretainalloriginalwork ».Afternumerousrevisionshad
beenrequestedbytheplaintiff,Haddonfinalizedtheplansandtheplaintiffbuiltitsshow
homealongwithfiveadditionalhomes.Severalyearslater,thedefendantOasispurchaseda
copyoftheplansfromHaddonandbuiltashowhomebasedonthoseplans.Theplaintiff
broughtanactionforadeclarationthatitwastheownerofcopyrightinthearchitectural
workrepresentedbytheplans,aninjunctionrestrainingthedefendants[page481]fromusing
orreproducingtheplans,anddamages.Haddoncounterclaimedforbreachofcontractor,
inthealternative,infringementofcopyright.
Held,theactionshouldbedismissed;thecounterclaimforbreachofcontractshouldbe
allowed.
Copyrightmaysubsistinplansandarchitecturalworksasartisticworksprovidedthattheyare
« original ».Aworkwillbeoriginalifitistheworkoftheauthorandnotsimplyacopyof
someoneelse’sproduction.AstheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,wasamendedto
deletetherequirementthatanarchitecturalworkmusthave »anartisticcharacterordesign »,
uniquenessmaynolongerberequiredforhouseplanstobethesubjectofcopyrightunder
thedefinitionof »architecturalwork ».However,thecourtdidnotneedtodeterminetheissue,
astheplanswereuniqueinthesensethattheyweredistinctive.Itwastheplansasawhole
andnottheirconstituentpartsthatattractedcopyright.
Thecontractwasdeterminativeoftheissueofownershipofcopyrightintheplans.The
ordinarymeaningofthelanguageusedinthecontractclearlyindicatedthatHaddonwasto


retainownershipofcopyrightintheplans.Inaddition,thenoticeontheblueprintsthat »[a]ll
drawingsandspecificationsarethepropertyofthedesignerandmaynotbereproduced
withoutwrittenpermissionfromthedesigner »wasconsistentwithaproperinterpretationof
thecontract.
Further,asthename »JohnHaddonDesign »appearedoneachpageoftheplans,pursuant
tos.34(4)(a)oftheCopyrightAct,Haddonwaspresumedtobetheauthoroftheplans,and
thereforetheownerofcopyrightpursuanttos.34(3)(b).Thereisnocopyrightinideas;rather
itistheexpressionofideasthatattractscopyright.However,thepersonwho »actuallywrites »
mustnotbeamerescribeoramanuensis;similarly,apersonwhomerelygivesideasisnotan
author.Evenifitcouldbeconcededthattheplaintiffhadprovidedtheideasforthevarious
designelements,theplaintiffwouldstillnotenjoyauthorshipintheplans,asitwasHaddon
thatputthoseideasonpaper.AsHaddonhadbeenresponsibleforhundredsofdecisions
thatresultedintheplans,itsimplycouldnotbesaidthatHaddonwasmerelyadraftsperson.
Accordingly,theplaintiffhadnotrebuttedthepresumptionthatHaddonwastheauthorof
theplans.
Astheplaintiffhadbuiltanadditionalfivehousesusingtheplans,ithadbreachedthe
contract.
[27]Thus,theActmakesclearthathouseplansmaybesubjecttocopyrightprotection,so
longastheyareoriginal.Whatconstitutes »original »inthiscontextandwhetheranelementof
uniquenessisalsorequiredbeforecopyrightprotectionwillobtain,as[defendant]Oasis
suggests,remainsinissue.
[35]Ifindfurtherthathouseplansarenotrequiredtobeunique,inthesensethatthe
elementscontainedthereinhaveneverbeenseenbefore,inordertoengagecopyright
protection.Whetheraworkisrequiredtobeuniqueinthesensethatitisdistinctive,however,
isnotasclear.Inthatregard,Iwouldnotethatthedefinitionof »architecturalworkofart »was
amendedin1993.[…]
[36]Inthe1995versionoftheAct,whichisunderconsiderationhere, »architecturalwork »was
definedasmeaninganybuildingorstructureoranymodelofabuildingorstructure.Without
determiningwhetherthescopeofthatdefinitionwouldincludeplans,Inotethatthe1995
definitionnolongerrequiredanelementof »artisticcharacterordesign ».Thismaterially
distinguishesthecasescitedbyOasisinsupportofitspositionthatdistinctivenessisrequired
beforecopyrightcanexistinhouseplans.Inotherwords,distinctivenessmaynolongerbe
requiredinorderforhouseplanstobesubjecttocopyrightunderthedefinitionof
« architecturalwork ».
[37]Inthecircumstancesofthepresentcase,however,Ineednotfinallydeterminethisissue
asIfindthatthePlansaresufficientlydistinctivetosatisfyanyrequirementinthatregard.
Specifically,Ifindthatthevariousdesignelementsusedinthecombinationsetoutinthe
Plansareuniqueinthesensethattheyaredistinctive.
CitéAmériqueDistributionInc.vC.E.P.A.LeBaluchonInc
(2002),[2002]RJQ1943,[2002]CarswellQue1568,JE2002-1407,[2002-06-03]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200206fr.htm,(QueSupCt)BishopJ.;enappel500-09-
012443-024.


Résumé
Actioneninjonctionpermanenteetenréclamationderedevances.Accueillieenpartie.
Demandereconventionnelleenréclamationdedommages-intérêtsetendiminutiond’un
prixdevente.Rejetée.
LademanderesseaétéforméeafindedistribuerauCanadadessériestéléviséesetleurs
produitsdérivés.SonactionnaireprincipaleestégalementprésidentedeCitéAmérique
Cinématélévisioninc.,quiproduitdesfilmscinématographiquesettélévisés.Ellea
notammentproduitlatélésérieMargueriteVolant,quiaétédiffuséeen1996etquirelatela
viedecertainspersonnagesayantvécuautempsdelaconquête.Ladéfenderesseexploite
souslaraisonsocialeSeigneurieVolantuncomplexehôtelierquioffreàsaclientèledes
forfaitsd’activitésrécréotouristiques.Unepartiedesbâtimentsquisetrouvesur
l’emplacementdececomplexefaisaitpartiedesdécorsutilisésdanslecadredelatélésérie
MargueriteVolant.Eneffet,auxtermesd’uneententeconcluele10mars1998,la
demanderesseavenducesbâtimentsàladéfenderesseetelleluiacédéledroitexclusif
d’exploiterleslieuxoùlatélésérieaétéfilméeainsiqueles«élémentsdelasérie(titres
intellectuels)»pourunepériodedehuitans.Encontrepartie,ladéfenderesses’estengagéeà
verserdesredevancessurleprixdeventedesdroitsd’accèsàl’emplacement,surlesforfaits-
séjoursainsiquesurlaventedetouslesproduitsdérivésdesélémentsdelatélésérie.Àcette
fin,ladéfenderessedevaitremettreàlademanderesse,touslessixmois,desrapportsde
vente.Dèslemoisdedécembre,lademanderesseamisladéfenderesseendemeurede
respecterlestermesdecetteententenotammentencequiconcernelaproductiondes
rapportsdeventeetlepaiementdesredevances.Vul’inactiondeladéfenderesse,la
demanderesseréclamequesoitrendueuneordonnanceluienjoignantdefournirlaliste
détailléedetouslesproduitsetdetouteslesactivitésfaisantl’objetd’uneredevanceainsi
quesesrapportsdevente.Elleréclameégalement566607$àtitrederedevancespourles
troispremièresannéesdel’ententeliantlesparties.Invoquantl’exceptiond’inexécutionetles
faussesdéclarationsdelademanderesseeuégardauxdroitsquiluiauraientétécédés,la
défenderessedemandelerejetdel’action,uneréductionde100000$duprixd’achatdes
bâtimentsainsiquedesdommages-intérêtsde150000$.Elleallèguequelesdroits
d’utilisationdesélémentsdelatélésériequiluiontétécédéssonttroprestrictifsetqu’ilssont
difficilesàexercer,etellesoutientquelademanderessen’apasrespectésonobligationde
collaborationquantàlapromotiondesoncomplexehôtelier.Celle-ciauraitégalementomis
deluiremettreplusieursbiensmeublesfaisantpartiedesdécorsintérieursdesbâtiments.Au
surplus,lademanderesseluiauraitcédédesdroitsexclusifsd’exploitationetd’utilisationdu
titredelatélésérie,alorsqu’ellenedétientaucundroitd’auteuràcetégard.
Décision
Afindedéterminersi,en1998,lademanderessedétenaitdesdroitsd’auteuroud’autres
droitsexclusifssurlesélémentsdelatélésérieMargueriteVolant,etnotammentsurcetitre
ainsiquesurlesnomsdespersonnages,ilfauts’enremettreauxdéfinitionsprévuesàlaLoisur
ledroitd’auteur.Uneoeuvrecinématographiquepeutêtreprotégéeparcetteloitout
commeuneoeuvreartistiqueoudramatiquedanslamesureoùils’agitd’uneoeuvre
originale(art.5(1)delaloi).Enl’espèce,ondoitconclureàl’originalitéduscénariodela
télésérieetdelaproductiondel’oeuvredramatiquemêmesicertainsfaitshistoriqueset
politiquesyserventdetoiledefond.Ils’agitd’uneoeuvrefictivequiestleproduitd’une
contributioncréativeetoriginale.Ilexistedoncuneprésomptionquel’oeuvreMarguerite
Volantestprotégéeparundroitd’auteuretquesonproducteurenestletitulaire(art.34.1de
laloi).Lesnomsdecertainspersonnages,dontceluideMargueriteVolantetceluidela
SeigneurieVolant,n’étaientpasenregistréslorsdelaconclusiondel’ententedemars1998,
maisiln’étaitpasnécessairequ’ilslesoientpourprotégerlesdroitsdel’auteur.Lesmots
«MargueriteVolant»,utilisésseuls,nesontpasoriginauxpuisqu’ilsproviennentdesrecherches
effectuéesparuntiers.Toutefois,lorsqu’ilssontutiliséscommetitred’uneoeuvreoriginale,ils


deviennentunepartieintégrantedel’oeuvreetfontpartiedesonoriginalité.L’utilisationdu
titredelatélésérieétaitétroitementliéeàl’oeuvredelademanderesseet,parconséquent,
elleétaitprotégéeparlaloi.Certainsdespersonnagesprincipauxdelatélésérie,
notammentceluidel’héroïne,sontsuffisammentindividualisésetidentifiablespourconstituer
unepartieessentielleetsubstantielledel’oeuvreet,parconséquent,ilssontaussiprotégés
parlaloi(ProductionsAvantiCinéVidéoinc.c.Favreau,[1999]R.J.Q.1939(C.A.)(J.E.99-
1607)).Parailleurs,lesbâtimentsvisésparl’entente,etquisontdesreproductionsoudes
copiesd’immeublesdel’époquedelaconquête,ontétéconstruitsparC.A.Télévisionen
1995afind’êtreutiliséscommedécordelatélésérie.Cesbâtimentsetl’emplacementoùils
sontsitués,prisisolément,neconstituentpasdesoeuvresarchitecturalesprotégéesparlaloi.
Toutefois,sionlesconsidèredansleurensemble,onpourraitconclurequ’ils’agitd’une
compilationd’oeuvresextraitesd’uneoeuvredramatique(art.2delaloi)ouencored’une
oeuvreartistiqueoriginale(art.3(1)et5(1)delaloi)quisontprotégéesparlaloi.Eneffet,on
adémontréquelescaractéristiquesetl’arrangementdesbâtimentssurleslieuxdela
télésérieétaientuniquesenAmériqueduNord.Laclause3del’entente,auxtermesde
laquelleladéfenderesseaobtenuledroitexclusifd’exploiterl’emplacement,lesbâtimentset
lesélémentsdelatélésérie,doitêtreinterprétéeàlalumièredelaclause2,envertude
laquelleelleaobtenulapropriétédecesbâtiments.Saprétentionselonlaquelleellen’aurait
pasacquisundroitexclusifd’exploiterlesbâtimentsetl’emplacementnepeutdoncêtre
retenue.Lesdroitsexclusifsd’exploitationquiontétéaccordésàladéfenderesse
proviennentdedroitsd’auteurprotégésparlaLoisurledroitd’auteur.Envertudel’article
34.1(2)c)delaloi,leproducteurdel’oeuvre,C.A.Télévision,estletitulairedesdroits
d’auteur.Or,celle-ciaautorisélademanderesseàcéderlesdroitsd’exploitationquien
découlent,cequecettedernièreafaitauxtermesdel’ententedemars1998.La
défenderesseadonctortdeprétendrequ’ellen’ajamaisobtenulesdroitsprévusàcette
conventionparcequesonauteurnedétenaitaucundroitdanslatélésérie.D’autrepart,
l’utilisationgratuitedesphotosdescomédiensdelatélésérieoudeleursvisagesafinde
promouvoirl’entreprisedeladéfenderessen’estpasviséeparcetteentente.Mêmesielleest
ambiguë,l’expression«titresintellectuelsdelatélésérie»nepeutengloberl’imagedesartistes-
interprètespuisqu’unetelleutilisationnécessitelepaiementd’unerémunérationadditionnelle
auxcomédiensalorsquel’ententedespartiesestsilencieuseàcetégard.Enconséquence,
lefaitqueladéfenderesseaitétéempêchéed’utiliserlesvisagesdescomédiensouleurs
photosnerésultepasd’unefautequ’auraitcommiselademanderesse.Quantauxmeubles
quecettedernièreauraitomisderemettreàladéfenderesse,ilsontétéprêtésàunmusée
avantl’ententedemars1998,àlaconnaissancedeladéfenderesse.Cependant,auxtermes
del’entente,lademanderesseavaitl’obligationdefournir«lesélémentsvisuelsdebase
qu’elledétenait»àcemoment.Lesallégationsconcernantl’inexécutiondel’obligationdela
demanderessedecollaboreràlapromotionducomplexedeladéfenderessenesontpas
nonplusfondées.Lademandereconventionnelleseradoncrejetée.
L’intentioncommunedespartiesconcernantlepaiementdesredevancesestclaire:les
activitésetlesforfaitsquotidiensdonnantaccèsàl’emplacementouauxbâtimentssont
sujetsaupaiementd’uneredevancede7%,lesproduitsdérivés,àuneredevancede15%,
tandisqu’uneredevancede5%estexigiblesurleprixdesforfaits-séjours.Cessommes
doiventêtrecalculéessurlesrevenusgagnésparladéfenderesseàcompterdu1erjuin
1998.Lademanderesseaprouvélebien-fondédesaréclamationenpaiementdes
redevancesjusqu’àconcurrenced’unesommede492312$.Enfin,ilseraordonnéàla
défenderessedefournirlalistedétailléedetouslesproduits,detouteslesactivitésetdetous
lesforfaitsfaisantl’objetd’uneredevance,deremettreàlademanderesse,touslessixmois,
unrapportdeventeetdeluiverserlesredevancesdues.


54LescénariodeMargueriteVolantestoriginal,ainsiquelaproductiondel’oeuvre
dramatiqueparC.A.Télévision,mêmesicertainsfaitshistoriquesetpolitiquesdel’époque
serventdefondàl’oeuvrecinématographique.
55Primafacie,laTélésérie,aveclesvidéocassettesdecettesérieproduitescommeP-19A,B
etC,constituentune »oeuvrecinématographique ».Ils’agitd’unecombinaison,ou
compilation,d’une »oeuvreartistique »,et/oud’une »oeuvredramatique »,et,quantau
scénario,d’une »oeuvrelittéraire »,dontlecaractèreoriginalestévidentetn’estpascontesté.
C’estuneoeuvrefictive,plutôtquehistorique,etnerésultepas »d’unsimplecollagede
morceauxépars ».LaTélésérieestleproduitd’unecontributioncréativeetoriginale.
63Baluchonnepeutpasseplaindredelapossibilitéquesonutilisationdutitreseulneserait
pasprotégéeparlaLoicommeprétextepoursonrefusdeverserlesredevancesprévuesà
l’Entente.Ensignantl’entente,lebutdeBaluchonétaitd’utiliserlenomdeMargueriteVolant
pourattireràsoncomplexehôtelier,ycomprisleSite,uneclientèlequiconnaissaitla
Télésérieetvoulaitrevoirlespersonnagesetlesdécorsquienfaisaientpartie.Par
conséquent,l’utilisationparBaluchondecetitreétaitétroitementreliéeàl’oeuvre
cinématographique/artistique/dramatique,etainsiprotégéeparlaLoi.
64Probablementlesmots »MargueriteVolant »,utilisésseuls,nesontpasoriginaux,parcequ’ils
proviennentdesrechercheshistoriquesd’unetiercepersonne.Cependant,lorsquecetitre
estutiliséparrapportàl’oeuvreoriginalequ’ildécrit,letitredevientunepartieintégrantede
cetteoeuvreetparticipeàsonoriginalité.Lecaractèredistinctifdutitreestévident;c’estle
nomdel’héroïnedel’oeuvre,quipermetdedistinguerl’oeuvre,delaparticulariser.
66MargueriteVolantestuneoeuvrefictive,etcertainspersonnagesprincipauxdecette
Télésérie,commel’héroïne,sontsuffisammentindividualisésetidentifiablespourconstituer
unepartieessentielleetsubstantielledel’oeuvre,etainsipourêtreprotégésparlaLoi.
67Lesplaintesdel’Uniondesartistesconcernantl’utilisationparBaluchondesphotosdes
comédiensdansMargueriteVolantn’étaientpasfondéessurlaprétentionqu’ilsétaient
titulairesdecertainsdroitsauxpersonnagesdelaTélésérie,maisplutôtàl’utilisationdes
photospersonnellesdescomédiens.Ceux-cinepossédaientpaslesdroitsauxpersonnages,
selonl’art.17(1)delaLoi.
77Lesbâtimentsconstituentessentiellementdescopiesoureproductionsdeconstructions
semblablesquiexistaientàl’époquedelaTélésérie.Lapreuvenedémontrepasqueles
Bâtiments,prisindividuellementoudansl’ensemble,sontdessinésavecflairouqueleur
constructionfaitpreuved’originalité,enl’absenced’élémentsdistinctifs.Parconséquent,la
Courestd’avisquelesBâtiments,prisindividuellement,etévidemmentleSite,neconstituent
pasd’oeuvresarchitecturalesprotégéesparlaLoi.
78Cependant,selonlesdéfinitionsdel’art.2delaLoi,lesBâtimentsetleSiteconsidérés
commeunensemblepourraientconstituerune »compilation »d’oeuvresextraitesd’une
oeuvredramatique(laTélésériemontrantleSiteetlesBâtiments–uneoeuvre
cinématographique)et/oud’uneoeuvreartistique(l’arrangementdesBâtiments–une
oeuvrearchitecturale),quiserait,commeuneoeuvreoriginale,protégéeparlesart.3(1)et
5(1)delaLoi.Lapreuveaétabliquelescaractéristiquesetl’arrangementdesBâtimentssur
leSite,priscommeunensemble,étaituniqueenAmériqueduNord
92Lesdifficultésàcesujetprennentleursourcedansl’art.15(1)delaLoi,quiaccordeun
droitd’auteuràl’artiste-interprète,oucomédien.L’art.17(2)permetàl’artiste-interprètede


stipuler,danssoncontratparrapportàuneoeuvrecinématographique,unerémunération
pourlareproductiond’unephotodesaperformancedansl’œuvre.
DelrinaCorp.v.TrioletSystemsInc.]
(2002),58OR(3d)339,17CPR(4th)289,[2002]OJ676,[2002]CarswellOnt633,23BLR(3d),
156OAC166,[2002-03-01]
http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2002/2002onca10099.html,
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2002/march/delrinaC30375.htm(OntCA)Morden
J.(2002),22CPR(4th)332,[2002]OJ3729[2002-10-02]
http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2002/2002onca10451.htmlm,(OntCA-Costs);motionfor
leavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCandadismissedon2002-11-28[2002]SCCA189
(SCC).
BDwasemployedbyDCorp.toimproveacomputerprogramcalledSysview,whichwas
usedtomonitortheperformanceofaHewlett-PackardHP3000computer.BDleftDCorp.in
1985andbegantodesignaprogramcalledAssess,whichwasfunctionallysimilartoSysview
andmeanttocompetewithit.DCorp.,allegingthatAssessinfringeditscopyrightinSysview,
suedforcopyrightinfringement,anditobtainedaninterlocutoryinjunctionrestrainingthe
defendantsfromselling,givingaway,ormarketingAssess.Thecopyrightinfringementaction
cameonfortrialandO’LearyJ.dismissedDCorp.’sactionandorderedthatitpaydamages
pursuanttotheundertakinggiventoobtaintheinterlocutoryinjunction.DCorp.appealed
boththejudgmentandtheorder.
Held,theappealsshouldbedismissed.
Asitsfirstgroundofappeal,D.Corp.submittedthatthetrialjudgeerredinhisdefinitionof
« copying ».Inthelawofcopyright,copyingincludescopyingfrommemory,
evensubconsciousmemory.Whenthereasonsofthetrialjudgewerereadasawhole,his
essentialfindingswerenotbasedonaviewthatcopyingfrommemorycouldnotbeabasis
ofcopyrightinfringementand,accordingly,effectcouldnotbegiventothisgroundof
appeal.
Asitssecondgroundofappeal,DCorp.submittedthatthetrialjudgeerredbyexcusing
copyingonthebasisofthefactorsthatDdeliberatelydesignedAssesstobesimilarto
Sysviewandthathewastheauthorofbothprograms.Whileitwouldbeanerrortousethese
factorstoexcusecopying,thetrialjudgemadenosucherrorand,accordingly,effectcould
notbegiventothisgroundofappeal.
Asitsthirdgroundofappeal,DCorp.submittedthatthetrialjudgeerredindenying
copyrightabilitytomuchofSysviewand,inparticular,itwasamistaketodissectSysviewinto
partsandthendeterminewhethereachpartwasentitledtocopyrightprotection.Thetrial
judge,however,madenosucherror.Theproperanalysis,whichheapplied,wasto
determinewhetherSysviewasawholewasentitledtocopyrightandthentodetermine
whetherthequalityandthequantityofpartreproducedbyBDwasasubstantialpartofthe
whole.ThetrialjudgeproperlyconsideredwhethertheelementsofAssessallegedtobe
similartoSysviewwereentitledtocopyrightprotection.Inthiscase,thetrialjudgefoundthat
alloftheallegedsimilarities,includingsimilaritiesinthearrangementsofelements,were
dictatedbyfunctionalconsiderationsorotherwisenotprotectablebycopyright.Itisa
fundamentalfeatureofcopyrightlawthatcopyrightprotectsonlyoriginalexpression.Itdoes
notprotecttheideaunderlyingtheexpression,andithasbeenrecognizedthatthenon-
protectionofideasembracestheviewthatthereisnocopyrightinanyarrangement,
system,schemeormethodfordoingaparticularthingorprocess.Itwassubmittedthatthe


trialjudgeerredbyrelyingonUnitedStatesauthoritiesthathavetheeffectofnarrowingthe
scopeofwhatisentitledtocopyrightprotection;however,thetrialjudge’sanalysisdidnot
showanydenialofcopyrightprotectiontoideasreflectingskillandlabouronthepartofD
Corp.thatwouldattractprotectionunderwhatissaidtobethelessrigorousEnglish
applicationoftheidea/expressiondichotomy.
Thefourthgroundofappealwasthatthetrialjudgeerredindrawinganadverseinference
thatDCorp.didnotproducewhatitsubmittedwasaprivilegedexpert’sreportbecauseit
wouldnothavebeenhelpfultoDCorp.Thispointcouldbedealtwithontheshortground
thatthereasonsforjudgmentonthisissuehadnobearingonhowthetrialjudgearrivedat
hisultimateconclusion.
Turningtotheappealwithrespecttotheawardundertheundertakinggivenatthetimeof
thegrantingoftheinterlocutoryinjunction,thetrialjudgeproperlyappliedtheapplicable
principles.Thedamagesmustbereasonablyforeseeableatthetimeofthegrantingofthe
interlocutoryinjunctionandtheymustbecausedbytheinjunctionandnotbysomething
else.Therewasnobasisforanappellatecourttoaltertheaward.
[10]Itisnotinissuethat »copying »inthelawofcopyrightclearlygoesbeyondcopyingfrom
somethingwhichisphysicallybeforethepersonwhocopies.Itincludescopyingfrom
memory,evensubconsciousmemory
Résumédel’arrêtiste
[11][…]Asmyreasonswillindicate,themainbasisforexplainingsimilaritiesbetweenAssess
andSysviewisthatfeaturescommontobothprogramsarenotcapableofcopyright
protection.
DesignCouncilLtd.v.NetVillageInc.
(2002),[2002]CarswellNat891,[2002]FCJ589,2002FTRUned284,2002FCT459,[2002-04-23]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct459.html(FCTD)RouleauJ.
[9]IwassatisfiedthatthedefendantGregoirewastheoneresponsibleforcreatingtheweb,
notthedefendantNetVillageInc.;itisonlyaserver.
[10]Inordertograntaninjunction,theCourtmustbesatisfiedthatthereisseriousissuetobe
tried;weighthebalanceofconvenienceanddetermineirreparableharm.
[11]Withrespecttotheseriousissue,twoquestionsarise:doestheCourthavejurisdiction(isit
acopyrightmatter,orcontractualdispute);andwhythedelayinlaunchingtheapplication.I
amalsosatisfiedthatthetextiledesignsandprintsarealreadyinthepublicdomainand
shouldtheplaintiffultimatelyprovesuccessful,damagesasaremedyareavailable.
DiamantToysLtd.v.JouetsBo-JeuxToysInc.
(2002),19CPR(4th)43,2002CarswellNat726,[2002]FTRTBEdAP031,[2002]FCJ.485,2002FCT
384,[2002-04-05]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct384.html(FCTD)NadonJ.
Theplaintiffs’werethesuccessor-in-titletotheintellectualpropertyincludingcopyrightina
lineoftoyproducts.Thecopyrightincludedartisticworks,namelydrawingscreatedby


employeesoftheplaintiffs’predecessor-in-titleandphotographscreatedbyphotographers
retainedbythepredecessor.Thedefendantpurchasedinventoryandotherphysicalassets
ofthepredecessor.
Thedefendantlaunchedabrandoftoyproductsthatcloselymimickedthepackagingof
thepredecessor’slineofproductsandincorporatedmanyoftheartisticworksofthe
predecessor.Theplaintiffscommencedanactionforcopyrightinfringementandbroughta
motionforanorderpursuanttos.38(1)oftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,forseizure
beforejudgmentofthedefendant’sproductsbothinthepossessionofthedefendantandin
thepossessionofthirdparties.Thedefendantdidnotchallengetheplaintiffs’assertionthatits
productswereessentiallyidenticaltothepredecessor’slineofproducts.Insteadthe
defendantchallengedtheplaintiffs’titletothecopyrightandassertedthatithadacquired
rightsintheintellectualproperty.
Held,themotionshouldbegranted.
Therewasnoevidencetosupportthedefendant’sassertionthatitacquiredanythingmore
thanphysicalassetsfromthepredecessor.
Thedefendantreproducedthecopyrightedphotographsonpackaging,thecopyrighted
drawingsonwritteninstructionsaccompanyingitsproductsandthecopyrighteddrawingsas
partofanumberoftheproducts.Theplaintiffshadthereforeestablishedaprimafaciecase
ofcopyrightinfringement.Asaresulttheplaintiffswereallowedtoseizeallinfringingcopiesof
theworksinviewofs.38(1)oftheCopyrightActandRule377(1)oftheFederalCourtRules,
1998,SOR/98-106.Itwasnotnecessaryfortheplaintiffstomeetthetripartitetestapplicable
tointerlocutoryinjunctionapplications.
Inanyevent,theplaintiffsmetthetripartitetest.First,theplaintiffsestablishedaprimafacie
caseofcopyrightinfringement.Secondly,withrespecttoirreparableharm,asthecopying
wasblatant,itwasnotnecessarytoestablishthattheplaintiffswouldsufferirreparableharm.
Thirdly,asitwouldbeunconscionabletoallowtheprimafacieinfringementtocontinueuntil
trial,thebalanceofconveniencefavouredtheplaintiffs.
AnorderissuedauthorizingabailiffintheprovinceofQuebectoseizebeforejudgment
specifiedproductsofthedefendantandanyotherproductsbearingorcontaininganyof
thecopyrightedworksinthepossessionofthedefendantorinthepossessionofspecified
thirdparties.Thedefendantwasalsodirectedtotakeallnecessarystepsandprovideall
reasonableassistancetothebailifftopermitthebailifftofullycarryouttheorder.[page45]
[55]Ithereforeconcludethattheplaintiffshaveestablishedaprimafaciecaseofcopyright
infringementbythedefendant.Consequently,itismyviewthatparagraphs38(1)(a)and(b)
oftheCopyrightAct,inconjunctionwithRule377(1)oftheFederalCourtRules,1998,allow
theplaintiffstoseizebeforejudgmentallinfringingcopiesoftheworksinregardtowhichthey
ownthecopyright.
[56]IfIamrightthattheplaintiffsareentitledtoaseizurebeforejudgment,akintotheseizure
beforejudgmentwhichaplaintiffcanobtainunderarticle734(1)oftheQuebecCodeof
CivilProcedure,thentheplaintiffsneednotmeetthetripartitetestapplicabletointerlocutory
injunctionapplications[Thébergev.Galeriesd’ArtYvesLarakia(2000),9C.P.R.(4th)259
(Que.C.A.)].


Editors©Assn.ofCanadaCertificationApplication(Inthematterofarequestfor
reconsiderationofDecisionNo.033,asmodifiedbyDecisionNo.036,filedbyTheWriters©
UnionofCanada)(2002),22CPR(4
th)21,[2002]CAPPRT039,[2002-11-01]http://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/39-e.html.inFrenchathttp://capprt-
tcrpap.gc.ca/decisions/tribunal/39-f.html(CanadianArtistsandProducersProfessional
RelationsTribunal)
Aneditors’associationhadappliedforcertificationtorepresentasectorcomposedoffreelance
editors.Thecertificationhadbeengrantedonthebasisthattheeditorswerejointauthorswithin
themeaningoftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,and,therefore,artistswithinthemeaning
oftheStatusoftheArtistAct,S.C.1992,c.33.Awriters’unionappliedforareconsiderationofthe
certificationdecision.
Held,theapplicationshouldbegrantedinpart.
StandardofReview
Section20(1)oftheStatusoftheArtistActempowersthetribunaltouphold,rescindoramend
anydeterminationorordermadebyit.Thereconsiderationpowerisnotintendedtobean
appealprocessnorisitmeanttocontestthefindingsorthedecisionoftheoriginalpanel.
Accordingly,thetribunalwillnotinterferelightlywiththefindingsoftheoriginalpanelunlessithas
committedanerroroflaworaseriouserroroffact.
JointAuthorship
Thedefinitionof »workofjointauthorship »setoutins.2oftheCopyrightActrequirestwo
elements:collaborationandcontribution.Essentially,aneditormustcontributesignificantoriginal
expressionandmustcollaboratewiththeotherauthorinapre-concertedjointdesign.Theissue
ofjointauthorshipcannotbedeterminedonthebasisoftheintentofthepartiesalone.
Theevidencehadshownthatalthoughauthorsandeditorsworkedtowardacommongoal,the
finalproductremainedthatoftheauthors.Further,theeditorshadneverconsideredthemselves
jointauthorsevenwheretheircontributionhadbeensignificant.Theeditorscollaboratedwith
theauthorsonlyinthesensethattheyassistedtheauthorsinperfectingtheirwork.Accordingly,
althoughtheeditorsandauthorsworkedtogetheronacommonproject,theydidnot
collaborateonapre-concertedjointdesignasthetermisunderstoodintheCopyrightAct.
Professionalfreelanceeditorswhoprovidedservicesinthenatureofdevelopmentaland
substantiveeditingdidnotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheStatusoftheArtistActandtheoriginal
panelerredincertifyingthissector.
Professionalfreelanceeditorswhocreatedoriginalcompilationsofdata,includingbutnot
limitedtooriginalindexes,glossaries,tablesofcontentsandbibliographies,however,were
authorswithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightActand,therefore,artistswithinthemeaningofthe
StatusoftheArtistAct.Asectorcomposedofsuchfreelanceeditorswasasectorsuitablefor
bargainingandtheeditors’associationwastheassociationmostrepresentativeoftheartistsin
thesector.Theoriginalpanelwascorrectincertifyingthissector.
Issue1:Whatistheappropriatetesttodeterminejointauthorshipwithinthemeaningofthe
CopyrightAct?
[70]TheTribunalconsidersthattheissueofwhetherprofessionalfreelanceeditorsarejoint
authorscannotbedeterminedonthebasisoftheintentofthepartiesalone.Itisonefactor
thatmustbetakenintoconsiderationanditisunclear,atthistime,whetheritconstitutesan
independentpartofthetestforjointauthorship.TheTribunalwillthereforelookfirsttothe



elementsofjointauthorshipthathavebeenclearlyestablishedbyCanadianandBritish
jurisprudencetodeterminethetestforjointauthorship.
[71]Thedefinitionof »workofjointauthorship »foundintheCopyrightActrequirestwo
elements:collaborationandcontribution.Regardingthesetwoelements,theoriginalpanel
statedatparagraph61ofDecision033:
Turningtothequestionofjointauthorship,theCopyrightActdefines »workofjoint
authorship »intermsofcollaborationandcontribution.Twoormoreauthorsmust
collaborateinordertobeconsideredjointauthors.Ontheissueofcollaboration,
McKeownwrites: »Frequently,thiswillinvolveengagingintheproductionofawork
byjointlabourintheimplementationofapre-concertedjointdesign. »(Atpp.322-
323.)Respectingcontribution,hestates: »Thecontributionmustbethatofan
‘author’andtheexerciseofskill,labourandjudgementintheexpressionofthe
workinmaterialformisrequired. »(Atp.323).Thecontributionsdonothavetobe
equalinquantityorquality,providedthattheyaresignificantandoriginal.
[72]Essentially,aneditormustcontributesignificantoriginalexpressionandmustcollaborate
withtheotherauthorinapre-concertedjointdesigninordertobeajointauthor.Thispanel
concursthatthisisthecorrecttesttobeappliedindeterminingwhetherprofessional
freelanceeditorscanbe,incertaincircumstances,jointauthorswiththeauthorsoftheworks
thattheyedit.
Issue2:Didtheoriginalpanelerrindeterminingthatcertainprofessionalfreelanceeditors
werejointauthorsofaliteraryworkwithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightActandtherefore
artistswithinthemeaningoftheAct?
[73]Theoriginalpanelconcludedthateditorswhoperformsubstantiveanddevelopmental
editingcontributeoriginalsignificantexpressiontotheworksthattheyedit.Jointauthorship
alsorequiresanelementofcollaborationwiththeotherauthororauthors.Whileweagree
withthetestthattheoriginalpaneladoptedinDecision033,weareoftheviewthatitwas
notappliedcorrectly.TheoriginalpanelreliedonthesecondcomponentoftheNeudorftest,
whichrequiresthatputativeco-authorsintendthattheircontributionsbemergedintoa
unitarywhole.Paragraph64ofDecision033states:
TheTribunalwasgivenaspecificexampleofextensivecollaborationand
contributionasbetweenaneditorandagroupofwriters.JimLyonsandthe
writersoftheRevenueCanadaAdvisoryCommitteesubcommitteereports
collaboratedoveraperiodofapproximatelyfivemonthstocreatethework,
ElectronicCommerceandCanada’sTaxAdministration.Mr.Lyonscontributed
significantoriginalexpressiontothiswork,particularlyinrelationtothecontextual
chapters.Mr.Lyonsdidnotmerelycopyorlineedit:hemadesubstantiveand
structuralchangestobringaboutthefinalproduct.Mr.Lyonsandthewriters
workedwiththecommonintentionthattheircontributionsbemergedintoa
unitarywhole.IntheTribunal’sopinion,thisisaconcreteexampleofjoint
authorship.(Emphasisadded)
Thecruxoftheissuebeforethispanelistodeterminewhetherprofessionalfreelanceeditors
« collaborate »withinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct.
[74]TWUCandPUCtookthepositionthatalthoughanauthorandaneditorworktogetherto
completeacommonproject,thislimitedmeaningofcollaborationisnotsufficientto
establishtheexistenceofapre-concertedjointdesignbetweenwriterandeditor,asthis
concepthasbeendevelopedbythejurisprudence.
[77]TheTribunalfindsthattheconclusionsoftheCourtinBoudreauv.Lin[(1997),75C.P.R.
(3d)1(Ont.Gen.Div.)]andtheevidenceindicatethataneditorcollaborateswithanauthor


onlyinthesensethatheorsheassiststheauthorinperfectingawork.Theauthor’sroleisto
writethebestworkpossibleandtheeditor’sroleistohelptheauthorachievethatgoalwhile
preservingtheauthor’svoice.
[80]Inlightoftheabove,theTribunalfindsthatalthoughaneditorandanauthorwork
togetheronacommonproject,theydonotcollaborateonapre-concertedjointdesign,as
thistermisunderstoodundertheCopyrightAct.
[83]TheTribunalfindsthatwhethereditors’suggestionsareorarenotaccepteddoesnotin
andofitselfaddresstheissue.Rather,thiselementofcontroldemonstratesthatwhilean
editor’ssuggestionsmaycontributetoaworkcreatively,thefinaldecisionrestswiththewriter.
[86]Inlightoftheabove,wefindthattheoriginalpanelerredwhenitcertifiedasectorthat
includedprofessionalfreelanceeditorswhosecontributionwasinthenatureofjoint
authorship,astheseeditorsarenotauthorswithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct,and
thereforenotartistswithinthemeaningoftheAct.Giventheseconclusions,theEAC’s
argumentrespectingeditors’credoofinvisibilityneednotbeaddressed.
[87]AlthoughthispanelhasdecidednottoadopttheNeudorftestinitsanalysis,the
evidencepresentedbytheEACandTWUCdemonstratesthatprofessionalfreelanceeditors
whoperformdevelopmentalandsubstantiveeditingonaworkdonotviewthemselvesas
jointauthors.Accordingly,wecanonlyconcludethateditorswhoperformanykindof
editing,fromdevelopmentalandsubstantiveeditingtolineandcopyediting,donotintend
tobejointauthors.GiventhatthethirdcriteriaoftheNeudorftestrequiresputativejoint
authorstointendtobejointauthorswithoneanother,hadweadoptedthistest,our
conclusionwouldhavebeenthesame:professionalfreelanceeditorswouldnotbe
consideredjointauthorswithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct.
Issue4:Canprofessionalfreelanceeditorsbeauthorsoforiginalliteraryworksintheformof
compilationsandcollectiveworkswithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct?
[89]InDecision033,theTribunalalsocertifiedasectorcomposedofprofessionalfreelance
editorswhoareauthorsofcompilationsandcollectiveworks.Theoriginalpanelreliedon
McKeown,supra,toconcludethat,legally,compilationsandcollectiveworksare »essentially
similar »,andthatthe »definitionof »compilation »isbroadenoughtoincludealloftheworks
listedinthedefinitionof »collectivework »(seeDecision033,para.58).
[91]TWUCconcedesthatasectorcomposedofprofessionalfreelanceeditorswhoarethe
authorsofcompilationsofdatawhichincludeindexes,glossaries,tablesofcontentsand
bibliographies,providedtheseworksmeetthetestoforiginality,isanappropriatesectorto
becertifiedanddoesnotoverlapwithitssector.Weagree.Theseworkscorrespondtothe
seconddefinitionofcompilationfoundinsection2oftheCopyrightAct.
[92]McKeown,supra,atp.319,definesauthorsofcollectiveworksasfollows:
Generallyspeaking,theindividualwhoprovidesthegeneralconceptionand
designwillbetheauthorofthecollectiveworkalthoughtheremaybemuch
detaillefttoindividualcontributors.Inthecaseofcollectiveworkssuchas
encyclopedias,directories,newspapers,periodicalsandjournalstheeditoror
arrangerofthewholeworkistheauthoroftheworkinsofarasitconsistsofthe
arrangementandco-ordinationoftheseparateparts.(Footnotesomitted)
[93]TheTribunalmustnowdeterminewhethertheevidencepresentedattheoriginalhearing
andthereconsiderationhearingsupportstheconclusionoftheoriginalpanelthat
professionalfreelanceeditorsareauthorsofcollectiveworksandcompilationsofliterary


works,suchauthorsbeing,asindicatedinMcKeown,supra,theindividualswhoprovidethe
generalconceptionanddesignofthework.
[96]Ms.ShiptonandMs.Latham’s[EACwitnesses]contributionstothesecollectiveworks
wereundoubtedlyvaluable.Theydidnot,however,providethegeneralconceptionand
designnordidtheyarrangeandco-ordinatetheseparateparts.Itistheorganizingeditors
whoarerecognizedasauthorspursuanttotheCopyrightAct.TheEACdidnotpresentany
evidencethatwouldallowtheTribunaltoconcludethatprofessionalfreelanceeditorsactin
thecapacityof »organizingeditor »ofcollectiveworksorcompilationsofliteraryworks.We
mustthereforeconcludethat,withinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct,professional
freelanceeditorsarenotauthorsoftheseworks.
Decision
[98]TheTribunalacknowledgesthevalueoftheworkperformedbyprofessionalfreelance
editors.Editorsareessentialtotheliteraryworld,and.manyliteraryworkswouldnotbe
publishedwereitnotfortheirassistance.Asthelegislationisnowdrafted,however,
professionalfreelanceeditorswhoprovideservicesinthenatureofdevelopmentaland
substantiveeditingdonotfallunderthejurisdictionoftheAct.
FigleyvLoran
[2002]CarswellSask838(SaskProvCt;2002-07-29)DiraufJ.
[9]IshouldsaythatwhileTheSmallClaimsActallowsaclaimforthedebtordamages,Ihave
somedoubtsthatanactionthatinvolvesthedeterminationofcopyrightandcopyright
infringementiswithinthejurisdictionoftheSaskatchewanSmallClaimsCourt.Whilesection37
ofTheCopyrightActprovidesforconcurrentjurisdictionoftheFederalCourtwithProvincial
Courts,theCopyrightActalsoprovidesforreliefthatwouldnotbeavailableinourSmall
ClaimsCourt,forexample,injunction.
GreatCanadianOilChangeLtd.v.DynamicVenturesCorp.
(2002),21CPR(4th)318,[2002]CarswellBC2048,[2002]BCJ2015,2002BCSC1295,[2002-09-
05]
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/02/12/2002BCSC1295.htm(BCSC)GoepelJ.
Theplaintiffoperateddrive-throughlubeandoilfranchises.Thedefendantsincludedthe
owneroftheLangleybuilding,thecompanythatconstructedthebuilding,thearchitectural
firmthatdrewuptheplansforthebuilding,thecompanythatownedtheWalnutGrove
buildingandthecompanythatoperatedanoilchangebusinessintheLangleybuilding.
Theplaintiffarrangedforarchitecturalplansanddrawingstobemadeforanewdesignfora
buildinginKamloopsforitsfranchiseesandbyanassignmentacquiredcopyrightinsuchplans
anddrawingsandinabuildingconstructedtotheplansanddrawings.Theplaintiffarranged
for10buildingstobeconstructedtothedesignshownintheplansanddrawings,including
theWalnutGrovebuilding.
ThedefendantscreateddrawingsfortheFraserHighwaybuildingtobeusedbyanoil
changebusiness.Thebuildingdidnotproceedbeyondthestageofmunicipalapproval.The
defendantsthenpreparedplansfortheLangleybuildinginitiallyintendedasanoilchange
andautomotiverepairbuildingfortheplaintiff.Thearchitecturalfirmwasthesamefirmthat
preparedthedrawingsfortheFraserHighwaybuilding.Thefirmallegedthatitdidnotcopy


anyplansordrawingsforthebuildingbutinsteaddesignedthebuildingtomeettheplaintiff’s
programandfunctionalrequirements.
Ultimately,theplaintiffdecidednottolocateafranchiseeintheLangleybuilding.
Nevertheless,thedefendantsproceededtoconstructthebuildingusingtheexistingplans.
Oneofthedefendantsenteredintoafranchiseagreementwithacompetitoroftheplaintiff
operatingitsbusinessoutoftheLangleybuilding.Thereweredifferencesbetweenthe
LangleybuildingandtheKamloopsbuilding,includingthecoloursanddesignontheoutside
ofthebuildingandthesignage.Therewasno[page319]signortrade-markontheLangley
buildingwhichwouldsuggestanyconnectiontotheplaintiff.
Theplaintiffcommencedanactionagainstthedefendantsforcopyrightinfringementofthe
plansanddrawingsfortheKamloopsbuildingandinthebuildingitself,andforpassingoff.
Theplaintiffallegedthatthedefendantinfringedcopyrightbycopyingthedrawingsand
plansfortheKamloopsbuildingandthats.40oftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,did
notprecludethecourtfromorderingthealterationoftheLangleybuilding.Thedefendants
allegedthats.64.1oftheActbarredtheactionbecausetheconstructionoftheLangley
buildinginvolvedamethodorprincipleofmanufactureorconstruction.
ThedefendantsmovedforsummaryjudgmentunderRule18AoftheB.C.RulesofCourt,B.C.
Reg.221/90.Thepartiesfilednumerousaffidavitsandextractsfromexaminationsfordiscovery
onthemotion.Submissionsonthemotiontookfivedays.
Held,themotionforsummaryjudgmentshouldbedismissedwithrespecttotheclaimfor
copyrightinfringementandgrantedwithrespecttotheclaimforpassingoff.
UnderRule18Athecourtmustdeterminewhethertheapplicationisnotsuitablefor
dispositiononsummaryjudgment.Anapplicationisnotsuitablefordeterminationifthecourt
isunabletofindthefactsnecessarytodecidetheissuesoffactorlaworitwouldbeunjustto
decidetheissuesonamotionunderRule18A.Thevolumeofmaterialalonemaybesufficient
tomakeacaseunsuitablefordeterminationunderRule18A.
Basedonthemassofmaterialssubmittedandthecomplexityoftheissues,thecopyright
aspectsoftheactionwerenotsuitablefordeterminationunderRule18A.Inaddition,the
conflictsontheevidencemadethecourtunabletodeterminetheissuesoffactandlaw
raisedbythemotion.Furthermore,theactionraisednovelargumentsoflawunders.40ands.
64.1oftheCopyrightActforwhichamotionunderRule18Awasnottheappropriatemeans
fordetermination.
Ontheotherhand,withrespecttotheclaimforpassingoff,therewasnomisrepresentation
bythedefendantsandnodamageorpotentialdamageflowingtotheplaintiff.Theplaintiff’s
claimforpassingoffwasthereforedismissed.
[44]Aspartofthepresumptionofsubsistenceofcopyrightinaworkunders.34.1(1),
originalityoftheworkisalsopresumed.Theburdenisonthedefendanttoprovethatawork
isnotoriginal.However,thereisnopresumptionthatcopyrightisownedbyaparticular
plaintiffinanactionforcopyrightinfringement.Whilecopyrightispresumedtosubsistthereis
nopresumptionastowhotheownerofaparticularcopyrightmightbe.SeeInhesion
IndustrialCo.v.AngloCanadianMercantileCo.(2000),6C.P.R.(4th)362at371-372
(F.C.T.D.).
[45]Toestablishaclaimforcopyrightinfringement,aplaintiffmustestablishthattheworkin
whichtheplaintiffclaimscopyrightisoriginal,thattherehasbeencopyingfromthatwork


andthatiftherewascopyingasubstantialportionoftheworkhasbeenreproduced.See
BritishColumbiaAutomobileAssn.[BritishColumbiaAutomobileAssn.v.Office&Professional
EmployeesInternationalUnion,Local378(2001),85B.C.L.R.(3d)302atpara.171(B.C.S.C.)
]atpara.173;andSlumber-MagicAdjustableBedCo.Ltd.v.Sleep-KingAdjustableBedCo.
Ltd.(1984,)3C.P.R.(3d)81(B.C.S.C.).
[46]Althoughaplaintiffmustshowthatthecopyrightworkisthesourcefromwhichthe
infringingworkwasderived,thecopyrightworkdoesnotneedtobethedirectsource.Itis
immaterialwhethertheinfringingarticleisderiveddirectlyorindirectlyfromtheoriginalwork.
Thestandardisobjective.Thequestioniswhetherornottheoriginalwork,orasubstantialpart
thereof,hasbeenreproduced.Ifithasbeen,thenitisnoanswertosaythatithasbeen
copiedfromaworkwhichwasitself,whetherlicensedorunlicensed,acopyoftheoriginal.
Indirectinfringementmayoccurwhenthecopyrightisderivedfromanintermediatecopy.
SeeKingFeaturesSyndicateInc.v.KleemanLtd.,[1940]2AllE.R.355at359(Ch.D.).
[47]Inordertoconstituteaninfringementtheactcomplainedofmustbedonewithoutthe
consentoftheownerofthecopyright.Consentmaybepresumedfromthecircumstances,
buttheinferenceofconsentmustbeclearbeforeitwilloperateasadefence.Itmustcome
fromthepersonholdingthepredicatedrighttobeinfringed.SeeBishopv.Stevens,[1990]2
S.C.R.467.
[48]Unders.39adefenceliestoacopyrightclaimifthedefendantcanprovethatatthe
dateoftheinfringementthedefendantwasnotawareandhadnoreasonablegroundsfor
suspectingthatcopyrightsubsistedintheworkinquestion.Thissectiondoesnotapplyifthe
copyrightwasregisteredatthedateoftheinfringement(s.39(2)).Inthecaseofacontinuing
infringement,aregistrationwillbeopposabletoactionscontinuingthereafter.
[50]ThereareobviouslysimilaritiesbetweentheLangleyBuildingandthefacilitiesoperated
bytheplaintiff.GiventhefunctionalusesofsuchbuildingsandthegenesisoftheLangley
Building,thefactthatsimilaritiesarefoundisnotsurprising.Thatthebuildingsaresimilardoes
notestablishtheplaintiff’scauseofaction.Theplaintiffmustproveactualcopying.
[55][…]Iwouldnoteinpassingthattheagreementsbywhichtheauthorsassignedtheir
interesttotheplaintiffarebeforeme.Thoseagreementsstatethatthecopyrightswere
assignedforonedollarandothergoodandvaluableconsideration.Theotherconsideration
referencedintheagreementwasnotputinevidencebutmightwellbeofsomesignificance
indetermininghowdamagesshouldbeawardedinthiscase.
GroupeChabotAST(1993)Inc.c.Ross
(2002),JE2002-1984,[2002]CarswellNat1654,[2002-05-23](QueSupCt),vard(2002),[2002]JQ
4768[2002-10-25]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200210fr.html(QueCA)
Résumé
Appeld’unjugementdelaCoursupérieureayantrenduuneordonnancedesauvegarde.
Accueillienpartie.
L’intiméeexploiteuneentreprisequifaitconcurrenceàcelledel’appelante.Lesmisen
causeRossetGervaisonttravaillépourl’intimée.Rossoffremaintenantsesservicesà
l’appelante.Le3mai2002,laCoursupérieurearenducontreluiuneordonnanceprovisoire
luiinterdisantnotammentdesolliciterlesclientsdel’intiméeetluiordonnantdenepas
détruirelesdocumentsdecelle-ciensapossessionmaisdelesremettreàl’huissier.Desvisites
etdesfouillesonteulieuausiègesocialdel’appelanteetàlarésidencedeRossainsique


chezGervais.Onyatrouvédesdocumentsappartenantàl’intimée.Le8maisuivant,
l’ordonnanceaétéprolongéeàtitred’ordonnancedesauvegarde.Le14mai,Gervaisetsa
compagnieontprésentéunerequêtevisantàfairedéclarerl’illégalitédelasaisieetà
obtenirlaremisedesbienssaisis.Le23mai,laCoursupérieureaprolongédenouveau
l’ordonnance,quivisaitaussiGervaisainsiquesacompagnie.Le28mai,ellearendutrois
jugements,quiontfaitl’objetd’unappeldelapartdel’appelante(dossierno200-09-004085-
020),delapartdeGervaisetdesacompagnie(dossierno200-09-004090-020)etdelapart
del’intimée(dossierno200-09-004082-027).L’appelantedemandederayerlamention
«MatériauxBomatinc.»duparagraphe20dujugementdepremièreinstance,debifferles
paragraphes21,23,25à30etderetirerlesmots«actionnaires»et«associés»duparagraphe
24.S’appuyantsurlesproposdujugeLeBeldansl’arrêtLacd’amianteduQuébecltéec.
2858-0702Québecinc.,[2001]2R.C.S.743(J.E.2001-1735),l’appelanteetGervaisfontvaloir
qu’uneordonnancedetypeAntonPillernepeutêtrerendueauQuébecparcequ’ellene
respectepaslesdispositionsduCodedeprocédurecivilerelativesauxsaisiesavant
jugementetqu’ellevaàl’encontredesdroitsetlibertésfondamentauxprévusdanslaCharte
desdroitsetlibertésdelapersonneetauCodecivilduQuébec.
Décision
M.lejugeMorin:Lamention«MatériauxBomatinc.»doitêtreretiréeduparagraphe20.
Cetteentrepriseestl’undesclientsdel’appelantedepuis1999.Rienn’autorisaitlepremier
jugeàmettrefinàcetterelation,quinepeutêtrereliéeauxmanoeuvresdéloyales
reprochéesàRossetàGervais.D’autrepart,iln’yapaslieudebifferlesparagraphes21et23
sousprétextequel’appelanten’apaslalistedesclientsdel’intiméeetqu’elleneconnaîtpas
lenomdespersonnesviséesparl’ordonnance.Elleaaccèsàcettelisteparl’entremisede
RossetdeGervais.Cependant,l’interdictiondesolliciterlaclientèlementionnéeau
paragraphe21esttroplargeetnedevraitpasempêcherl’appelanted’exploiterson
entreprisenidesolliciterdesclientsparlesmoyensusuels(GroupefinancierAssbecltéec.
Dion,[1995]R.D.J.172(C.A.)(D.T.E.95T-70etJ.E.95-181)).Ceparagraphedoitêtrebifféetle
paragraphe23doitêtremodifiéafindepréciserlaportéedel’interdictionainsiquela
catégoriedepersonnesviséesparelle.Parailleurs,iln’existeaucuneraisondesupprimerles
mots«actionnaires»et«associés»setrouvantauparagraphe24.Selonl’espritdel’article751
duCodedeprocédurecivile(C.P.C.),uneinjonctionrendueàl’égarddelasociétépeut
viserlesassociés.Quantaumot«actionnaires»,ilnecauseaucunproblème,étantdonné
queGervaisestleseulactionnairedesacompagnieetquel’appelanten’aelleaussiqu’un
seulactionnaire.
SileCodedeprocédurecivileneprévoitpasdedispositionautorisantprécisémentune
mesurehybridecommel’ordonnancedetypeAntonPiller,quitientàlafoisdelasaisieetde
l’injonction,ilnecontientpasnonplusdedispositionl’interdisant.D’autrepart,l’objetd’une
telleordonnancediffèredeceluiviséparlesordonnancesdesaisieavantjugementou
d’injonctionhabituelles.Enoutre,lesdispositionsduCodedeprocédurecivilerelativesàla
conservationdelapreuvenecouvrentpaslemêmechamp.Envertudesarticles20et46
C.P.C.,lestribunauxpeuventdoncrendreuneordonnancedetypeAntonPiller.Parailleurs,
mêmesicetyped’ordonnanceentreenconflitaveclesdispositionsdelaChartedesdroits
etlibertésdelapersonneetduCodecivilduQuébecquiportentsurlerespectdelavie
privée,ledroitàlajouissancepaisibledesbiens,l’inviolabilitédelademeureetlerespectde
lapropriétéprivée,ilpeutfairel’objetd’unjugementauQuébec.Eneffet,lesdroitsetlibertés
fondamentauxnepeuventêtreinvoquésentouttemps;ilsdoiventêtreexercésentenant
comptedesvaleursdémocratiques,del’ordrepublicetdubien-êtregénéraldescitoyens
(art.9.1delacharte).
PourrendreuneordonnancedetypeAntonPiller,ilfautuncommencementdepreuvetrès
solide,l’existenced’unpréjudiceréeloupossibletrèsgravedemêmequ’unepreuve


manifestequelesdéfendeursontenleurpossessiondesdocumentsoudesobjetspouvant
servirdepiècesàconvictionetqu’ilestréellementpossiblequ’ilslesdétruisent.Sicestrois
conditionssontremplies,larequêtedevraitêtreaccueillie.Sonrejetseraitsusceptiblede
déconsidérerl’administrationdelajustice.L’article9.1delachartenedoitpasservirà
l’auteurd’undommagepoursesoustraireàsesobligationsenluipermettantdesupprimerles
preuvesdesafaute.Danslecasprésent,l’appelanteetlesmisencausen’ontpasréellement
contestél’existencedesdeuxpremièresconditions,quiestdonctenuepouracquise.Ence
quiconcernel’appréciationdelapreuvequantàlapossibilitédedestructiondes
documents,rienn’indiquequelepremierjugeacommisuneerreurgraveetdéterminanteà
cesujet.Ilarendusonjugementensefondantsurl’affidavitdel’intiméeetsurdiversautres
documentsdontilfaitétatdanssonjugement.Aprèsavoirconstatél’existencedes
conditionsrequises,ilétaitdoncfondéàrendreuneordonnancedetypeAntonPiller.
D’ailleurs,c’estleseulmoyendontl’intiméedisposepourrevendiquersesbiensqu’ellecroiten
lapossessiondesmisencauseetqu’ellenepeutidentifierdefaçonprécise.Laportéede
l’ordonnancerenduen’estpastroplarge.Celle-civiselesécritsémanantdel’intiméeoudes
copiesdeceux-ci.Cettedescriptionestsuffisammentprécise.Malgrécela,leparagraphe28
doitêtrerayéparcequ’ilvaàl’encontred’uneordonnancedetypeAntonPiller,laquelle
consisteenuneordonnancedeselaissersaisir.Onpeutdoncdifficilementautoriserdes
huissiersàutiliserlaforcenécessairepourexécuterl’ordonnance.Enl’absencedepreuve
quelespersonnesviséesontrefusél’enlèvementdesbiens,iln’yapaslieud’interveniràcet
égard.Quantauparagraphe29,ilnecontrevientpasauxdispositionsduCodede
procédurecivile.L’huissierquiexécutel’ordonnancenesetrouvepasdanslasituation
prévueàl’article297C.P.C.,quiportesurlasignificationd’uneassignationetdiffèrede
l’exécutiond’uneordonnance.Parailleurs,leparagraphe29n’autorisepasl’huissierà
interrogerdestémoins:ilordonneplutôtauxmisencausedefournirl’informationetles
documentsréclamés.Cetteobligationdefairenecontrevientpasauxrèglesrelativesau
témoignage.Iln’existeaucunepreuvequel’intiméeauraitobtenulesdocumentsparlaforce
aprèsunpremierrefus.Enrésumé,àl’exceptionduparagraphe28,lesparagraphes25à30
sontvalides.
Danssonappel(dossierno200-09-004090-020),Gervaisatortdeprétendrequel’ordonnance
nedevaitpasvisersacompagnienilui.Lorsdel’audienceenvuedel’ordonnancedu28mai
2002,lepremierjugeapréciséqu’ilallaitrendreuneordonnancedesauvegardeavecles
conséquencesimportantesquecelaentraînaitpourlasuitedudossier.SiGervaisetson
procureursesontméprissurlesensdecespropos,celanejustifiepasd’accueillirleurappel.
Ilsnepeuventprétendreavoirétésurprisdecequel’ordonnances’appliquaitaussiàGervais
etàsacompagnie.D’ailleurs,cesderniersavaientacceptédesepliervolontairementàces
conclusionsjusqu’au28mai2002.Detoutefaçon,envertudel’article761C.P.C.,toute
personnenondésignéequicontrevientsciemmentàuneinjonctionserendcoupable
d’outrageautribunal.EnmentionnantGervaisetsacompagniedanssesconclusions,lejuge
n’afaitquerendrelasituationencoreplusclaireàleurégard.Leurappelestdoncrejeté.
L’ordonnancedetypeAntonPillerpeutêtrerenduemêmeàl’égardd’inconnus.Dansuntel
cas,ilestpréférablededésignerleplusrapidementpossiblelespersonnescontrequielleest
exercée,etce,dèsqu’ellessontconnues.C’estcequis’estproduitlorsdel’ordonnance
renduele3mai2002.Le21mai,l’intiméeaprésentéunerequêteafind’yajouterlenomde
Gervaisetdesacompagnie.Lepremierjugeadonceutortd’accueillirlarequêteen
annulationdel’injonction,delasaisieetdelaperquisitionrendueàl’endroitdeGervaisetde
sacompagnie.L’appeldel’intimée(dossierno200-09-004082-027)estaccueilli.
Lademandesubsidiairedesmisencauseenvuedefairelimiterladuréedel’ordonnance
jusqu’àlafind’octobre2002estrejetée.Àcejour,lespartiesn’ontsoumisaucunprojet
d’échéancierrelatifàlarequêteeninjonctioninterlocutoire.Lesconclusionsdupremierjuge


permettentàl’uneoul’autredespartiesdes’adresseràlaCourpourfairefixerunterme
précis,aubesoin.Danslescirconstances,ilestpréférabledecontinuerl’applicationdu
mécanismeenpermettantauxpartiesdefairetoutelapreuverequise,plutôtquedefixerun
termefondéseulementsurlaplaidoiriedesavocats.
93.Toutefois,danslaprésenteinstance,lesallégationsportaientaussisurdesatteintesau
droitd’auteurdeGroupeAST(1993)inc.etlasaisiedesbiensvisésparl’ordonnancedevenait
alorsnécessairepourfairelapreuvedecetteatteinte.Deplus,l’ordonnanceAntonPiller
constituaitpourGroupeAST(1993)inc.leseulmoyendemettrelamainsurdesbienslui
appartenantqu’ellecroyaitêtredésormaisenlapossessiondesintimés,sanspouvoirles
identifierindividuellement,defaçonprécise.
96.Jecroisbondesoulignericiqu’àcausemêmedel’objetd’uneordonnancedetype
AntonPiller,onnepeutexigerlamêmeprécisionquantàladescriptiondesbiensvisésque
danslecasd’unesaisietraditionnelle.Eneffet,lapersonnequirequiertl’ordonnanceconnaît
lanaturedesbiensqu’ellerecherche,maiselleignoreparcontrequelsbiensprécisse
trouvententrelesmainsdespersonnesàquiestsignifiéel’ordonnance.Danslamesureoùla
naturedesbiensvisésestdécritedefaçonàidentifierclairementcesbiens,jecroisquela
requêterecherchantunetelleordonnancenedoitpasêtrerejetéesousprétexted’une
descriptiontropvaguedesbiens.
97.Jesuissurpris,parcontre,ducontenuduparagraphe28del’ordonnance:
[28]ORDONNEqueleshuissiersdejusticechargésd’exécuterlejugementsoient
autorisésàutiliserlaforcenécessairepourcefaireetàrequérir,s’ilslejugentutile,
l’assistanceimmédiatedesforcesconstabulaires.
98.Eneffet,cettedispositionvaàl’encontredel’idéequ’uneordonnancedetypeAnton
Pillerestuneordonnancedeselaissersaisir.Ilestdifficile,danslescirconstances,devoir
commentonpeutautoriserleshuissiersàutiliserlaforcenécessairepourexécuter
l’ordonnance.C’estleprocessusdel’outrageautribunalquidoitplutôtêtresuiviaucasde
refusd’obtempéreràl’ordredeselaissersaisir.Jesuggèredoncdebifferleparagraphe28
dujugement.
HollywoodNightsSportsInc.v.BandaFilarmonicaLiraDeFatimaInc.
(2002),17CPR(4th)263,[2002]CarswellNat297,[2002]FCJ156,2002FTRUned75,2002FCT
105,[2002-01-28]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct105.html(FCTD)O’KeefeJ.
Theplaintiffwasapartytoanagreementwithabroadcasterpursuanttowhichitobtained
exclusiverightstobroadcastPortuguesefootballgamesincommercialestablishmentsin
Canada.Theplaintiffhadcommencedanactionagainstthedefendantsforcopyright
infringementandinfringementoftheRadiocommunicationAct,R.S.C.1985,c.R-2.Itbrought
amotionforaninterlocutoryinjunction.[page264]
Certainofthedefendantsappearedandwererepresentedatthehearing(the »named
defendants »).Theevidenceshowedthatpriortodateoftheagreement,thenamed
defendantshadenteredintoanarrangementwithawhollyownedsubsidiaryofthe
broadcasterwherebythedefendantswerepermittedtoreceivethePortuguesegames.The
plaintiffallegedthatthedefendantshadfalselyrepresentedthattheyhasU.S.addressesand
hadfailedtomentionthattheywerecommercialestablishments.Counselforthenamed
defendantsrequestedthatthehearingofthemotionbeadjournedpendingcross-


examination.Accordingly,theplaintiffrequestedaninteriminjunctionagainstthenamed
defendantsandaninterlocutoryinjunctionagainstthosedefendantswhodidnotappear.
Held,themotionforaninteriminjunctionagainstthenameddefendantsshouldbedismissed;
themotionforaninterlocutoryinjunctionagainstthosedefendantswhodidnotappear
shouldbeallowed.
Toobtaineitheraninterimorinterlocutoryinjunction,theplaintiffmustshowthatithasraised
aseriousissuetobetried,thatitwouldsufferirreparableharmiftheorderisnotgrantedand
thatthebalanceofconveniencefavoursthegrantoftheorder.
Iftheplaintiffcanbecompensatedbydamagesforanylossthatitmaysuffer,thereisno
justificationtoissueaninteriminjunction.Withrespecttotheissueofirreparableharmarising
fromtheactivitiesofthenameddefendants,thetimeperiodtothenexthearingdatewas
veryshort.Astheplaintiff’sevidencedidnotshowthatitwouldsufferalossofreputationor
thatitsbusinesswouldbelostpriortothehearingdate,ithadnotestablishedthatitwould
sufferirreparableharmarisingfromtheactivitiesofthenameddefendants.
Thesituationwasdifferentwithrespecttothosedefendantswhodidnotappearorput
forwardanyevidencethattheyhadanyrighttoreceivetheservicestowhichtheplaintiff
claimedsolerights.Withrespecttothosedefendants,theplaintiffhadmetthetestforthe
grantofaninterlocutoryinjunction.Therewasaseriousissuetobetried–didtheplaintiff
havethesolerighttoprovidetheservices?Therewasirreparableharminthattheplaintiff’s
businesscouldceaseifcustomerswerenotpurchasingtheservicesfromtheplaintiff.Finally,
thebalanceofconveniencefavouredtheplaintiffasitwasentitledtoprovidetheservices
pursuanttoitsagreementwiththebroadcaster.
InterimTariffofLeviestoBeCollectedbyCPC,in2003,ontheSaleofBlankAudioRecording
Media,InCanada,inrespectoftheReproductionforPrivateUseofMusicalWorksEmbodied
inSoundRecordings,ofPerformer©sPerformancesofSuchWorksandofSoundRecordingsin
whichsuchWorksandPerformancesareEmbodied[2002]
http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c19122002-b.pdf(Cop.Bd;2002-09-19)
BothCSMAandtheRetailershaveaskedthattheinterimtariffprovideforatransitionperiod
betweenthedateofthefinaldecisionandthedatethecertifiedtariffbecomeseffective.
TheBoardconsidersthatthisisnotanissueforthisinterimtariffbutratheraquestiontobe
determinedinthefinaltariff.Notransitionperiodwillthereforebeprovidedinthisinterimtariff.
Kroegerv.AmarIICanadaProductionsInc.
(2002),21CPR(4th)46,[2002]CarswellBC1941,[2002]BCJ1714,[2002]BCTCTBEdAU049,
2002BCSC1099,[2002-07-23]
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-
txt/SC/02/10/2002BCSC1099.htm(BCSC)AllanJ.
Theplaintiffs,membersofarockband,enteredintoanagreementwiththecorporate
defendanttoprovidemanagementservicesrelatingtotherecordingofarecordinreturnfor
compensationbasedonnetmonthlyearningsoftheband.Therockbandwrotethemusic
andlyricsfortherecordingandrecordedtherecordin1996.Thecorporatedefendant
retainedthemasterrecording.Theplaintiffscommencedanactionseekingadeclaration
thatthemasterrecordingwasthepropertyoftheplaintiffsandanorderthatitbereturnedto
them.


Theplaintiffsbroughtasummarytrialapplicationforjudgmentintheaction.Thecorporate
defendantcontendedthatitundertookarrangementsfortherecordingoftherecordand
thereforequalifiedasamakeroftherecordingandwasentitledtoaninterestinthe
copyrightintherecordingandpossessionofthemasterrecording.
Held,judgmentshouldbefortheplaintiffs.
Onasummarytrialapplication,thecourtmaygrantjudgmentunlessitisunabletofindthe
factstodecidetheissuesoffactorlaworthecourtisoftheopinionitwouldbeunjustto
decidetheissues.
TheapplicableprovisionsoftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,werethoseinplaceat
thetimetherecordwasrecordedandnottheamendmentstotheActmadeeffective
September1,1997.Thedefinitionof »maker »inrelationtoarecordins.2oftheActappliedto
thepersonbywhomthearrangementsnecessaryforthemakingoftherecordwere
undertaken.Section38oftheActprovidedthattheownerofcopyrightinaworkmay
recoverpossessionofinfringingcopiesandallplatesusedorintendedtobeusedforthe
productionofinfringingcopies.
TheintentoftheActisthattheauthorofarecordormusicalworkisthefirstownerof
copyrightandtheowneroftheplate,inthiscasethemasterrecording.
Anyactdonebythecorporatedefendantpursuanttothemanagementserviceagreement
itdidinitsmanagerialcapacityfortherockband.Itwasreimbursedfor[page47]all
expensesincurredonbehalfofthebandinperformingthemanagementservices.The
corporatedefendantcouldnotthereforebedescribedasamakeroftherecording.
[24]ItisclearthatthegeneralintentoftheActisthattheauthorofarecordormusicalwork
isthefirstownerofthecopyrightintheworkandtheowneroftheplate(here,theMaster)is
theauthorofthatworkinwhichcopyrightarises.
[25]Amarclaimsthatitqualifiesasamakerbecauseitis »thepersonbywhomthe
arrangementsnecessaryforthemakingofthe[record]areundertaken. »Itsaysthesourceof
thefundingfortheproductionofCurbwasprovidedjointlybytheplaintiffsandAmarand
thatAmarmadeallofthearrangementsfortherecording.Itpreparedanapplicationto
raisefundstopayfortherecordingofthealbum.Itmadearrangementswiththerecording
studioandpurchasedthemetaltapes.
[26]Amarsubmitsthattheremaybemorethanonemakerofarecord.Whetherornotthatis
correct,IconcludethatAmarcannotbedescribedas »themaker »or »amaker »ofthe
Master.Amarandtheplaintiffsenteredintoaformofwrittenagreement(thevalidityof
whichwillbedeterminedintheotheraction).ThatAgreementbetweenAmarasmanager
andNickelbackasartistprovidedthatAmarwouldreceivecompensationof20%of
Nickelback’snetmonthlyearnings,aswellas20%ofmoniesearnedandreceivedasaresult
ofNickelbackwastoberesponsibleforallout-of-pocketexpenseincurredbyAmarin
performingthemanagementservices.
[27]AnyactsdonebyAmarinrelationtotherecordingofCurbweredoneinitsmanagerial
capacityasagentforNickelback.IfAmarpurchasedthemagnetictapes,itmerelyincurred
anexpense,onbehalfofNickelback,forwhichitisentitledtobereimbursed.Thereisno
evidenceofanyactorfinancialcontributionbyAmarthatwouldentitleittoacopyright



interest.ItistellingthatAmarmadenoclaimtosuchaninterestbeforetheplaintiffsfiledtheir
defenceintheotheraction.
LeBlancv.R
(2002),[2002]CarswellNat312,2002TCJ70(CCI)BowmanJ.
Incometax—Businessandpropertyincome–Whetherabusiness–Reasonableexpectation
ofprofit—Taxpayerwasprofessionalmusicianwhohadproducedandrecordednumerous
songsandalbums–Taxpayer’smusicwasplayedonradiostationsinCanada,UnitedStates
andEurope–Taxpayerwasmemberofprofessionalassociationformusiciansandcollected
royaltiesforhiswork–MinisterofNationalRevenueassessedtaxpayer–Ministerdisallowed
deductionsforbusinesslossesongroundstaxpayerdidnothavereasonableexpectationof
profit–Taxpayerappealed–Appealallowed–Taxpayer’sexpenses,eventhoseforvehicle
andmoving,werereasonableandwereforpurposeofimprovingmusiccareer–Although
taxpayer’sexpensesweresignificantlygreaterthanhisincome,taxpayerwasinvolvedin
business,nothobby–Taxpayerhadreasonableexpectationofprofit.
39S’ilétaitnécessairepourmoid’exprimeruneconclusionsurlaquestionde »expectative
raisonnabledeprofit »jediraisqu’ilyacertainementuneexpectativeraisonnabledeprofitici.
Jereconnaisquecesdernièresannéespourl’industriedelamusiqueontétémaigres.Cene
doitpasêtrelerôledecettecouroulerôledugouvernementderendrelasituationencore
plusdifficilepourunepersonnecommeM.LeBlanc,quiessaieconsciencieusementetde
bonnefoidedévelopperlesartsauCanada.
Levesquev.Desgagnés(2002),JE2003-721,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccq/2002/2002qccq24099.html,
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/c4/200211fr.html(QueCt-SmallClaims;2002-11-11)VézinaJ.

[16]Pourlerequérant,lesilencesursonidentificationcommecréateurdes
plansetdel’aménagementdecettecuisinehautdegammeest
générateurdedommageséconomiquesàsonendroitparcequ’il
contrevientàunusagedûmentétablidanslemondedel’éditionet
publicationdecegenrederevuesspécialisées.
[21]Ilnes’agitpasicid’uneprésentationtrompeused’unproduitdansle
butdecréeruneconfusiondansl’espritdupublic,maisplutôtd’une
omissiondesesoumettreàunusagebienétablietquiapour
conséquencedepassersoussilenceetdecacheraupublicl’identitédu
concepteur.Cefaisant,cetteomissionprivelerequérantd’unevisibilitéà
laquelleiladroit.
[26]Ilestdeconnaissancejudiciairequedetellesrevues,soitpardesnotes
infine,desnotesenbasdepage,ouparlerenvoiàunelisted’adressesà
lafindelarevue,identifientsystématiquementlescréateurs,fabricantsou
concepteursdesbiensetservicesquifontl’objetdesphotospubliéesdans
cegenrederevues.
[28]LeTribunalconclutdoncqueDesgagnés,esqualitésd’auteurede
l’articleenquestion,CuisinesRochon,esqualitésd’employeurde


Desgagnésetdecommanditairedecetarticle,etPrestige,esqualités
d’éditeurdelarevuePrestige,sontsolidairementresponsablesdes
dommageséconomiquessubisparlerequérant,vulemanquedevisibilité
conséquentaufaitqu’ellesontoccultél’identificationdurequérantàtitre
decréateuretdeconcepteurdesplansetdel’aménagementdela
cuisine-secrétariatdontils’agit.
MaisonsChantignoleInc.c.Dumont
(2002),[2002]CarswellQue1397,[2002]JQ2617[2002-07-17]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200207fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs13558.html(QueSupCt)ReevesJ.
[32]Alorsqu’ilestcommundediscuterducaractèreetdumériteartistiqued’uneoeuvre,il
estaussireconnuquetoutepréférenceencedomaineestsubjective.Lequalificatif
« artistique »estdoncenpratiqueinapplicableàlareconnaissanced’undroitd’auteur.
[38]Brefl’esthétiquen’estpasessentielleàl’originalité,maissansesthétiquel’originalitén’aura
guèredevaleur.
[39]Ondoitdistinguerentrelesplans(icilesplansdel’architecte)etl’immeubleoul’oeuvre
volumétriqueréaliséeconformémentà,ouàpartirdetelsplans.
[62][…]Laloisurledroitd’auteurétantuneloinationale,lesTribunauxduQuébectout
commeceuxdesautresprovincesdevraientfavoriserlastabilitédansl’industrieplutôtquela
proliférationdelitigesmarginauxinvoquantdeprétendusdroitsd’auteur.
[71]Siaucunprofitn’aété »réalisé »ausensdel’art.35.2,leTribunalnepeutdéterminerde
montantàceposte.
MensysBusinessSolutionCentreLtd.c.Drummond(Municipalitérégionaledecomté)
(2002),[2002]RJQ765,[2002]CarswellQue662,[2002]JQ169,JE2002-591,[2002-01-30]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200201fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs10318.html(QueSupCt)MercureJ.
Résumé
Actionenréclamationdedommages-intérêts(242000$).Accueillieenpartiecontrela
défenderesseMRCdeDrummond(12000$).
Lademanderesseestcessionnairedesdroitsd’auteurdeBevadecinc.dansleslogicielsque
celle-ciaspécialementconçuspourlesmunicipalitésquébécoises.Enseptembre1986,la
défenderesseMRCdeDrummondaacquisdeBevadecquelques-unsdeceslogiciels.Après
quelesystèmed’exploitationThouroughbreddeDrummondeutétéremplacéparun
systèmeUnix,en1993,celle-ciaapportédesmodificationsauxlogicielsdelademanderesse
afinderéglercertainesincompatibilités.Enjanvier1995,ladéfenderesseMRCdeNicolet-
Yamaskaaconcluuneentented’uneduréedecinqansavecDrummondvisantlafourniture
parcettedernièredesoutieninformatiquepourlesmodulesd’évaluationfoncieretlocatif
ainsiquedusoutieninformatiqueàl’implantationduserviced’évaluationetduservicede
comptabilitéinformatisée.Lesdonnéesnécessairesàlaconfectiondurôled’évaluation,qui
étaientsaisiesparlesemployésdeNicolet-Yamaska,étaientalorsacheminéesparmodemà


l’ordinateurdeDrummond,quipréparaitlesrôlesd’évaluationgrâceauxlogicielsde
Bevadec.Informéedelasituation,lademanderesseafaitappelàlaGendarmerieroyaledu
Canadaafinqu’elleouvreuneenquête,maisaucunesuiten’aétédonnée.Àcompterde
cemoment,Nicoletamisuntermeàl’ententelaliantàDrummond.Lademanderesse
prétendqueDrummondauraitviolésesdroitsd’auteurgrâceàlacomplicitédeNicolet,d’où
sonactionenréclamationd’unesommede92000$àtitrededommages-intérêtsetd’une
indemnitéde150000$àtitrededommagesexemplaires.Lesdéfenderessesontadmisque
lecodesourceetlecodeobjetdechacundeslogicielsacquisparDrummondconstituaient
uneoeuvreausensdesarticles2et3delaLoisurledroitd’auteur.Ellesallèguenttoutefois
quelademanderessen’apasdémontréquelesdroitsd’auteurdansceslogicielsluiauraient
étécédésniqueceuxqu’onleurreproched’avoirutilisésétaientbienceuxquiavaientété
créésparBevadec.
Décision
Lacessiondesdroitsd’auteurdeBevadecàlademanderessen’ajamaisétéconstatéepar
écrit(art.13(4)delaLoisurledroitd’auteur).Toutefois,lesrésolutionsdesconseils
d’administrationdelademanderesseetdeBevadecautorisantlaventedescodessources
deslogicielssatisfontauxexigencesdecettedispositionetétablissentlacessiondedroits.En
effet,l’article13(4),quiapourbutdeprotégerlepremiertitulairedudroitd’auteur,nedoit
pasêtreinterprétédemanièreàpermettreauxtiersd’échapperàleurresponsabilitédansle
cadred’unepoursuitepourviolationdedroitsd’auteur.D’autrepart,leslogicielsvenduspar
BevadecàDrummondétaientvisésparlacessiondedroitsd’auteur.Lademanderessea
reconnuquelaclauseinterdisantàDrummondd’utiliserseslogicielssurplusd’unordinateurà
lafoisnevisaitpaslecasoùcettedernièreremplaçaitsonéquipementafindele
moderniser.Parailleurs,lecontratd’utilisationdeslogicielsn’interdisaitpasàDrummondde
changerdesystèmed’exploitation.Cettedernièren’apascontrefaitleslogicielsdela
demanderessedanslebutdelesvendreoudelesloueràdestiers,maiselleapermisà
Nicolet,moyennantrémunération,d’avoiraccèsàsondisquerigideparlebiaisd’unmodem
etd’utiliserseslogicielsafindesaisirsespropresdonnéesetd’effectuerdesopérationsdans
sesdossiersd’évaluation.Mêmesi,auxtermesdelaconventiond’utilisationdeslogiciels,il
étaitpermisàDrummonddelesmodifieraufildesans,ledroitd’auteurdeBevadecsubsistait
surleslogicielsainsimodifiés.Parconséquent,enfaisantunecopiedeceslogicielsdansun
répertoiredesondisquerigideetenlamettantàladispositiondeNicolet,Drummonda
contrevenuàlaconventiond’utilisation.Lesdommages-intérêtsqu’elledevraverseràla
demanderesseàcetégardsontfixésà12000$.Enl’absencedepreuvedemauvaisefoiou
d’intentionmalicieusedelapartdeDrummond,quis’esttoutsimplementméprisesur
l’étenduedesdroitsqueluiconféraitlaconventiond’utilisationdeslogiciels,lapartiedela
réclamationconcernantlesdommagesexemplairesdoitêtrerejetée.D’autrepart,la
demanderessen’apasdémontréqueNicolet,danslecadred’undesseincommun,avait
autoriséDrummondàcontrefaireseslogiciels.D’ailleurs,Nicoletneconnaissaitmêmepas
l’existencededroitsd’auteursurceslogicielsetelles’estempresséedemettrefinàl’entente
laliantàDrummonddèsqu’elleenaétéinformée.L’actiondoitdoncêtrerejetéeàson
égard.
[29]Lajurisprudenceetladoctrineretiennentlesprincipessuivantsencequiatraità
l’exigencedel’écritcommeconditionessentielleàlacessiondudroitd’auteur:
-l’absencedetoutécritestfataleencequ’elleempêchelapersonnequiseprétend
cessionnairedefairelapreuvedelacession.Unecessionverbalen’estpasvalide
-l’exigenced’unécritestuneconditiondefondetnonunesimplerègledepreuveou
deprocédure
-l’écritn’apasàprévoirexplicitementlacession.Ilsuffitqu’ilsoitsignéparl’auteuret
quel’onpuisseraisonnablementinférerlacessiondudroitd’auteurdutextedel’écrit


-unepreuvetestimonialepeutêtreadmisepourpermettreautribunald’interpréter
l’écritetdedéciders’ilemportecessiondudroitd’auteur;
-l’écritpeutêtrerédigéetsignépostérieurementàlacessiondudroitd’auteur.
[36]Àlavuedecespiècesproduitesaudossier,leTribunalconsidèrequ’ilnesauraitconclure
àl’absencedetoutécritsignéparletitulairedesdroitsd’auteurouparsonagentautoriséau
sensdel’article13(4)précité.
[37]LarésolutiondeBevadecàl’effetdevendreetcelledeMensysàl’effetd’acheterles
codessourcessontdes,écrits.IlsémanentdesConseilsd’administrationdechacunedes
deuxsociétésimpliquées.LestémoignagesnoncontreditsdeLampronetdePicard
établissentqu’àcompterdecesrésolutions,c’estMensysquidétenaittouslesdroitssurles
logicielsvendus.LampronaffirmequeBevadecadèslorscessétoutesopérationsdansce
domainetoutencontinuantd’opérercommeconsultant.C’estMensys,avecLampronet
Picardàlabarre,quiacontinuédedévelopperlesmêmeslogicielsetdelesoffrirsurle
marché.
[38]Lebutviséparl’exigenced’unécritsignéprévueàl’article13(4)estdeprotégerle
premiertitulairedudroitd’auteurmaiscertespaslestiersenleurpermettantd’échapperplus
facilementàdespoursuitespourviolationdesdroitsd’auteur.
[39]LeTribunalconclutdel’ensembledelapreuvequ’ilyaiciunécritémanantdeBevadec
etdeMensysquisatisfaitauxexigencesdel’article13(4)etpermetd’établirlacession.
[81][…]Elleajoutequecen’estfinalementquelorsdesinterrogatoireshorsdecourtenus
danslecadredesprésentesprocéduresetparticulièrementdeceluideLangelierqu’ellea
étéàmêmedeconstaterl’ampleurdelaviolationdesesdroitsd’auteuretdecomprendrele
stratagèmeélaboréparDrummondpourmaquillerleslogicielsetlesoffrirenventeàNicolet-
Yamaska.Ellerappellequedansdetellescirconstances,lajurisprudencepermetautitulaire
dudroitd’auteurdepoursuivrelecontrefacteurplusdetroisansaprèslacommissionde
l’actedecontrefaçon
[82]Cesprincipes,reconnusparlajurisprudence,nesauraients’appliquerici.LalettreDD-1
écriteparPicardsemble-t-il,maissignéeparLampron,estdatéedu28avril1989.Mensysy
metengardeDrummondcontrel’utilisation »decopiepiratedelogiciels »etl’incite »àprendre
lesmesuresnécessairespourcorrigercettesituation,lesconséquencespolitiquesd’unetelle
attitudedelapartd’unorganismepublicétantfacilementprévisibles ».Picardexpliqueque
Mensyshésitaitàallerplusloinetàintenterdesrecoursétantdonnéquedesmunicipalités
formantlaMRCdeDrummondétaientdéjàclienteschezellependantqued’autresétaient
considéréescommedesclientespotentielles.
[83]Danslescirconstances,leTribunalconclutqu’ilyaprescriptionquantauxgestes
reprochésàDrummondantérieursàaoût1994.

MétromédiaC.M.R.IncvAstralMédiainc
(2002),JE2002-1800,[2002-08-29]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200208fr.htm,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs14563.html(QueSupCt)LaraméeJ.
Résumé
Requêteeninjonctioninterlocutoireprovisoire.Rejetée.


Larequéranteréclameladélivranced’uneordonnanceinterdisantauxintimésdediffuserles
capsuleshumoristiquesquel’intiméPérusseavaitréaliséesalorsqu’iltravaillaitàtitredepigiste
pourl’unedesesstationsradiophoniques.Pérusseareconnuquelarequéranteest
propriétairedumatérielqu’ilaproduit,maisilprétendqu’ildemeureleseultitulairedesdroits
d’auteurdécoulantdecetteoeuvre.
Décision
Laquestionrelativeàladétentiondesdroitsd’auteurrelatifsauxcapsulesradiophoniquesest
complexeetdevraêtretranchéeparlejugequidécideradufonddulitige.Lepréjudice
invoquéparlarequérante,quiprétendqueladiffusiondescapsulespourraitluifaireperdre
desauditeursalorsqu’ellenesesertplusdecematériel,estincertainetinsuffisantpour
justifierladélivranced’uneordonnanceinterlocutoire.Ausurplus,riennepermetdeconclure
qu’unrecoursendommages-intérêtscontrel’unoul’autredesintimésseraitillusoire.Ilyalieu
dedistinguerladifficultédeprouverl’étenduedesdommagessubisdupréjudicequipeut
difficilementêtrecompensépardesdommages-intérêts.Larequéranten’apasnonplus
démontréquelaprépondérancedesinconvénientspenchaitensafaveur,d’autantmoins
qu’aucunepreuven’aétéprésentéequantàl’intentiondesintimésdediffuserlescapsules
faisantl’objetduprésentlitige.Enfin,commel’associationdesintimésestbienconnuedansle
milieudepuislemoisdejuinetquelarequéranteaattendujusqu’au28aoûtavantderéagir,
onnepeutconsidérerqu’ils’agitd’uncasd’extrêmeurgencejustifiantunemesureaussi
exceptionnellequel’injonctionprovisoire.
8.Deplus,lepréjudicen’estpascertainpuisquerienn’indiqueaveccertitudequeles
capsulesserontdiffuséesparlesintimés.Larequéranteprétendqu’ellepourraitperdre
des
auditeurs,celan’estpassuffisant.Elledoitallégueretsupporterl’allégationqu’elleperdra
des
auditeurs.Sesallégationssontpuresspéculations.Ellenousdit«peut-êtrequelesintimésvont
diffuseretpeut-êtrequejesubiraiuneperted’auditeurs».Celanerencontrepasles
exigencesdelaloietdelajurisprudenceetàcetitreleJugeréfèreplusspécifiquementaux
arrêtsLassondec.OasisetSyntexc.Novopharm.
11.Ledossier,danssonétatactuel,révèlequ’undesintiméssemblesolvableàpremièrevue.
Riennepermetdeconclureàcestadedudossierqu’unrecoursendommagesseraitillusoire.
Ladifficultéàfairelapreuvedesdommagesn’estpassynonymedel’impossibilitédefairela
preuvedesdommages.Lorsquelelégislateurparlededommagesirréparables,ilparledela
notiondupréjudicesubietnondesonétendue.S’ilyapertedeprofits,cen’estpas
irréparable.Ilnefautpasconfondreladifficultéàcompilerlesdommagesaveclepréjudice
quipeutdifficilementêtrecompensépardesdommages-intérêts.Cetteexigencen’estdonc
pasrencontrée.
20.L’urgence,enmatièreprovisoire,semesurenonpasenrapportautempsrequispourune
décisionaufondmaisplutôtenrapportautempsrequispourladécisioninterlocutoire.Vu
quecettedernièreestelle-mêmeunemesureprovisionnelleentendueetjugéeenpriorité,il
s’ensuitquel’ordonnanceprovisoireneseraaccordéeques’iln’yaaucundoutequantà
l’urgenceexceptionnelle,quantàl’apparenceclairededroitetquantaupréjudice
irréparable,c’est-à-direceluiquin’estpassusceptibled’êtrecompenséenargentou
autrement.
22.Nousnedevonspasperdredevuelefaitqu’uneinjonctionestunemesureprovisionnelle
etuneprocédurespéciale.Elleneseradoncaccordéequesitouteslesconditionsrequises
parlaloiontétérencontrées


MeunierAssociésInc.c.ConstructiondelaChaudièreT.L.Inc.
(2002),[2002]JQ747,BE2002-399[2002-01-31](QCA)
[1]Lecroquisetlesplansdel’appelanteontétéutilisésparlesintiméspourréaliserla
conceptionetlaconstructiond’unemaisonquiestindubitablementlefruitd’unecopie;
[2]Lesdifférencesquel’onaidentifiéessontinfimesetneserventvéritablementqu’àtenter
dedissimuler,avecpeudesubtilité,laressemblancesinonlasimilaritéentrelecroquis,les
plansoriginauxetlemodèleconstruit;
[3]IlyaeucontrefaçoncontrairementàlaLoisurledroitd’auteur.Latitularitédesplanset
croquisestclairementétablieetlaressemblanceestmanifeste.Quantàl’accèsàl’oeuvre,
elleafaitl’objetd’unepreuveclaire;
[4]Enl’espèce,ilyaeucopiedelamanifestationtangibledutravaildel’auteur,duconcept
etdustyledumodèledemaison;
Pastor(c.o.b.CubanDanceEntertainment(CariciasCubanas))v.Chen
(2002),19CPR(4th)206,[2002]CarswellNat2177,[2002]BCJ1123,2002BCPC169[2002-05-21]
(BCProvCt)RomillyProv.Ct.J.
Thecomplainantwasachoreographer,danceranddancinginstructorperformingand
teaching,atVancouver,aCubanformofSalsacalled »LaRueda »(thewheel).Heclaimedto
haveaddedtothisdanceformparticularmovesandstyleswhichhehadcreatedand
choreographed.Thedancewasperformedinagroup,requiringaminimumofthree
couples.Eachmovementwasexecuteduponacallfromaleader,withconstantexchange
ofpartners.
Thedefendantwasatfirstapupilofthecomplainant,thenanapprenticeinthe
complainant’sdancecompany.Upongraduatingtothestatusofaperformerinthe
company’spublicperformances,thecomplainantrequiredhimtosignaconfidentiality
agreementobliginghimnottodivulge,publiclyperformorteachtheartisticworkthathe
hadaccesstoasaperformer/student,withoutthecomplainant’spermission.Theagreement
alsoincludedanacknowledgementthateverything[page207]taughttohimbythe
complainantwasconfidentialandthepropertyofthecomplainant.Theagreementdidnot
identifywhichmoveshadbeencreatedbythecomplainant.Inhisevidence,the
complainantstatedthatthesigningoftheconfidentialityagreementwasapreconditionto
anyoneperforminginhisgroup.
About10monthsaftersigningtheagreement,thedefendantleftthecomplainant’sdance
company.HetravelledtoMontrealandToronto,whereheobservedperformancesof »La
Rueda »byothers.Heclaimedtohavepickedupmovestherethathehadnotbeentaught
andsawothermovesthathebelievedweresimilartothosetheinstructorclaimedtohave
invented.UponhisreturntoVancouver,thedefendantcollaboratedwithcompetitorsofthe
complainantinteaching »LaRueda ».Hedeniedthathehadthereaftereverpublicly
performedanyofthecomplainant’smoves.
Thecomplainantcommencedanactionclaimingbreachofcontractinrelationtothe
confidentialityagreementandinfringementofcopyright.Heclaimedthatthedefendant’s


actionshadcausedhimtosufferalossofincomeandotherdamages.Attrialthe
complainantwithdrewhisclaimforcopyrightinfringement.
Held,thecomplainantshouldbeentitledtojudgment,anddamagesassessedonthebasis
ofreasonablecompensationforuseoftheconfidentialinformation.
Theconfidentialityagreemententeredintobythedefendantdidnotamounttoan
unenforceablerestraintoftrade.Althoughthedefendantmayhavebeenprohibitedfrom
disclosingcertaintradesecretsoftheclaimant,hewasnotrestrictedbythecovenantfrom
carryingouthistrade,norwastheagreementunreasonablebetweenthepartiesorinjurious
tothepublicinterest.TherewasnorestrictionimposedonthedefendanttoperformSalsaor
« LaRueda »inthemanyotherformsthatthedefendant’sevidenceallegedtoexist.
Theinformationthatthecomplainanttaughtwasamixture,themovesbeingpartlyinthe
publicdomainandpartlyhavingasignificantelementoforiginality,notalreadyintherealm
ofpublicknowledge.Thedefendantandhiscollaboratorsmusthavereliedonthe
defendant’sknowledgeoftheclaimant’smovesanddancestylestoattractstudentsaway
fromthecomplainant.Thecomplainant’senrolmentofstudentsbegantodropandreached
thepointwherehewasattractinganegligiblenumber.Hecancelledhisclassesaltogether
andhislivelihoodsubstantiallydiminished.
Theassessmentofdamageswascalculatedonthesameprinciplesasdamagesforbreach
ofcopyrightwouldbecalculated.
[71]Fairburn&Thorburn[LawofConfidentialBusinessInformation(CanadaLawBook,
Canada2001)]alsostates »Thereisnoonedefinitionof »ConfidentialInformation ».Copyrightis
butoneoftheindicatorsthatsomethingiscapableofprotection.Merelybecausesomething
hasearnedthetitleofcopyrightdoesnotautomaticallymeanthatitisalsoconfidential. »
[85]IfindthattheClaimantgraphicallydisplayedtomeduringhisevidencehisuniquely
choreographedmovesanddancestyleswhichIfindwerehisinventionandproperly
coveredbycopyright.Hereadilyadmittedthatsomeofhismovesliketheoneheinvented
attheageof16werenowinthepublicdomain.Howevertheonesthathemadethesubject
ofaConfidentialityAgreementsignedbyallhisperformerscertainlywerenot.Ifindthatthe
Claimant’smovesanddancestyleshavea »significantelementoforiginality,notalreadyin
therealmofpublicknowledge, »andcertainlycouldnotbefoundingardenvariety
instructionalvideoswhichdemonstrateratherbasicstepsformerenovices.
ProgrammationGagnonInc.c.Formulesd©affairesCCLInc.
(2002),JE2002-1757,[2002]CarswellQue1918,[2002]JQ4409,REJB2002-34120,[2002-09-16]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200209fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qcca/2002/2002qcca10413.html(QueCA)
Résumé
Appeld’unjugementdelaCoursupérieureayantrejetél’actiondel’appelanteeninjonction
permanenteetenréclamationdedommages-intérêts.Rejeté.
L’appelanteaintentéuneactioneninjonctionpermanenteetellearéclamédes
dommages-intérêtsàl’intiméeparcequecettedernièreauraitviolésesdroitsd’auteuren
reproduisantundocumentintitulé«Avisd’évaluationfoncièreetcomptedetaxes»,àl’égard
duquelelleavaitobtenuuncertificatd’enregistrementdel’Officedelapropriété


intellectuelleduCanadaen1997.Aprèsavoirreconnuqueledocumentàlasourcedulitige
constituaituneoeuvrelittéraireausensdelaLoisurledroitd’auteur,lejugedepremière
instancearejetél’actiondel’appelanteaumotifqu’ellen’avaitpasdémontréquel’intimée
avaitplagiésesformulaires.L’appelantesoutientquelejugeauraiterréennetenantpas
comptedecertainsaveuxjudiciairesdel’intiméeetqu’ilauraitmalappréciélapreuve
qu’elleaprésentéeenrelationaveclacontrefaçondesonoeuvre.
Décision
Lestémoignagesinvoquésparl’appelantenecontiennentpasd’aveuxclairs,nonambigus
etnonéquivoquespermettantdeconclurequel’intiméeauraiteuàsadispositiondescopies
ouencoredesoriginauxdesesformulaires.D’autrepart,laconclusiondujugedepremière
instanceselonlaquellelasimilitudedesformulairesutilisésparlespartiesnerésultaitpasd’une
contrefaçonétaitfondéesurletémoignaged’uneemployéedel’intimée.Contrairementà
cequeprétendl’appelante,sonappréciationdelapreuvenecontientpasd’erreur
manifesteetdéterminante,desortequ’iln’estpaspossibled’intervenir.
[8]Enl’espèce,lejugedepremièreinstanceadécidéquelasimilitudeentrelesformulaires
visésparledroitd’auteurdélivréaubénéficedel’appelanteetceuxconçusetproduitspar
l’intiméenerésultepasd’unecontrefaçon.Cetteconclusionreposenotammentsurle
témoignagedeMmeLindaMoreau,laresponsableduserviced’infographiechezl’intimée.
Celle-ciaexpliquéque,bienavantl’enregistrementdudroitd’auteursusdit,l’intimée
produisaitdéjàdesformulairesàpartirdesortiesd’imprimantefourniesparlesmunicipalités
clientesgrâceàunlogicielconçuetdistribuéparl’appelante.Elleapréciséqueces
formulairesontsubidesmodifications,aufildesans,pourtenircomptedesexigencesdela
législationetdelaréglementationenmatièremunicipaleetqu’unebanquededonnées
imposanteaétéconstituéeauseindesonserviceàmêmelesformulairesainsimodifiés.
MmeMoreauadémontréqu’enutilisantcettebanquededonnées,ellepouvait,grâceàsa
longueexpérience,produiredesformulairescompatiblesaveclelogicieldistribuépar
l’appelante,sansplagierlesformulairesproduitsparcettedernière.
Proteau(syndicde)
(2002),JE2002-862,[2002]CarswellQue663,[2002]JQ702[2002-04-12]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200204fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs11545.html(QueSupCt)TellierJ.
Résumé
Requêteenannulationdecontrat.Rejetée.
Le18janvier1994,ledébiteuracédésesdroitsd’auteuràl’intiméLafond.Libéréd’une
troisièmefaillitele1ermars1994,ilafaitcessiondesesbiensle14juinsuivant.Leregistrairede
failliteasuspendusalibérationpourunepériodedecinqans.Le20juillet1998,lerequérant
estdevenulecréancierdelafailliteàlasuited’unecessiondecréanceensafaveur.Le17
mai1999,leregistrairel’aautoriséàintenterunrecoursenannulationdelacessiondesdroits
d’auteur(art.38delaLoisurlafailliteetl’insolvabilité).Le5octobre1999,unjugementdela
Coursupérieureaconfirméladécisionduregistraire.Le1erseptembresuivant,lerequérant
aprésentésarequêteenannulationdelacession.Le6septembre2001,ledébiteurest
décédésansavoirremplilesconditionsdesalibération.
Décision


Enjanvier1994,ledébiteurn’étaitpaslibérédesatroisièmefaillite.Lacessiondesesdroits
d’auteur,pourlaquelleiln’areçuaucunecontrepartie,estsurvenuedansles12moisquiont
précédésaquatrièmefaillite.Elleestdoncnulle.Parailleurs,lerequérantexerceunrecours
quiluiestpropreetpourlequelilaétéautorisé(art.38delaLoisurlafailliteetl’insolvabilité).
Cerecoursluiestconféréparlaloietnonenvertudelacessionfaiteparlesyndic.Toutefois,
iln’apasplusdedroitquelecédantn’enavaitcontreledébiteur.Or,commelecédant
connaissaitlacausedenullitédelacessiondesdroitsd’auteurdepuisle18juillet1995,le
requérantdevaitexercersonrecoursennullitéavantle18juillet1996.Parconséquent,
lorsquelerequérantaprésentésarequêteennullitédelacession,sonrecoursétaitprescrit.
R.vAFCSoccer
(2002),22CPR(4th)369,[2002]MJ441,[2002]CarswellMan472[2002-09-04]
http://www.canlii.org/mb/cas/mbpc/2002/2002mbpc10032.html(ManitobaProvincialCourt)
DevineJ.
Thedefendantpleadedguiltytoonechargeunders.42(1)(a)oftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.
1985,c.C-42,relatingtothesaleofsoccerjerseysandotherarticlesofbrandnameclothing
inwhichcopyrightexisted.TheCrownhadproceededbywayofindictment.Thematter
thencamebeforethecourtforsentencing.
Thedefendantknewthatthearticlesofclothingwerecounterfeit.Intotal1,118articlesof
clothingandcomputerizedbusinessandaccountingrecordswereseized.
TheCrownsoughtafineintherangeof$50,000to$70,000basedongrossrevenueof
$180,000fortheperiodoftimecoveredbythecharge.Thedefenceurgedafinebetween
$2,500and$3,500.Counselagreedthatthecomputersseizedweretobereturnedandthat
thearticlesofclothingweretobeforfeited.
Held,thedefendantshouldpayafinesetat$45,000.
TheamountandvalueoftheseizurewasunprecedentedinCanada.Furthermore,therewas
apaucityofprecedentrelatingtofinesimposedunders.42(1)(a).
Inviewofthediscrepancybetweenthefinesproposedbycounselandthelackof
precedent,itwasnecessarytoturntofirstprinciplesofsentencing.Therewasno[page370]
doubtthatthiswasaseriousinstanceofdeliberateandrelativelysophisticatedinfringement
ofcopyright.Theincomegeneratedbythesaleofthecounterfeitclothingwasbynomeans
insubstantial.Thesaleswerenotonlynationalbutinternationalinscope.Aninappropriate
finecouldpotentiallyamounttoacalculatedcheaperlicencefeethancouldbeobtained
fromtherightsholder.Therefore,thefinemustbearsomerelationshiptothescopeofthe
profitfromtheoffendingactivity.
Ontheotherhand,thedefendantwasalocalsoleproprietorandthiswasafirstoffencewith
thedefendantacknowledgingwrongbypleadingguilty.Therewasalreadyafinancial
penaltytothedefendantcausedbytheseizureandsurroundingnegativepublicity.This
wouldmilitateagainstthelikelihoodofthedefendantrepeatingtheoffence.
Basingthefineonapercentageofknowngrossrevenueswasthemostappropriatemanner
inwhichtoproceed.InmostcasesthefiguresoughtbytheCrownat30to40percentof
grossrevenuecouldbejustified.However,inthiscase,aloweramountwasappropriatein
viewofthecircumstancesrelatingtothesmallsizeofthedefendant.Theamountofthefine
wassetat$45,000,approximately25percentofgrossrevenuesgeneratedfromtheinfringing
items.


[19]Thereisnoquestionthatthisisaseriousinstanceofcopyrightinfringement,deliberate,
relativelysophisticated,andongoingforanextensiveperiodoftime,witheconomicharm
causedtomorethanonecopyrightholder.Undoubtedly,therelativeeconomicharmto
thesemultinationalcorporationslikeAdidasandUmbroislesssignificantthanitwouldbeto
anindividualcopyrightholder,butitiseconomicharmnonetheless.Itisalsoclearthatthe
incomegeneratedbytheseinfringementswasbynomeansinsubstantial,amountingtotens
ofthousandsofdollarsoveralmostanentireyear.Theuseofthewebsiteforsalesofgoods
importedfromThailandalsomeantthattheforumforthedistributionoftheinfringing
productsbecamenotonlynationalbutalsointernationalinscope.Iagreethat
inappropriatelylowfinesforthesekindsofregulatoryoffencesriskcanpotentiallyamountto
acalculatedlycheaperlicensingfeethanactuallyobtainingtheproperlicensefromthe
manufacturer.Thereforethefineoughttobearsomerelationshiptothescopeandprofitof
theoffending
activity.
[20]Ontheotherhand,AFCSoccerisalocalsoleproprietorshipoperatedessentiallyasa
familybusiness.Thisisafirstoffenceandthecompany’sguiltypleaconstitutesan
acknowledgementofthewrongdone.Therehasalreadybeensomefinancialpenaltytothis
companybyvirtueofthenegativepublicityanditsimpactonbusiness,aswellastheseizure
ofover1100apparelitemsalongwithcomputersandbusinessrecords.Thisspecific
deterrencealreadymetedouttothecompanyshouldmilitateagainstthelikelihoodofits
repeatingtheoffence.Howeverthereismanifestlyaneedforgeneraldeterrenceforthiskind
ofoffenceaswell.
[21]Oneofthetroublingaspectsofthiscaseisthelackofconcretedataprofferedastothe
currenteconomichealthofthecompany.ClearlyAFCSoccerisnotonaparwithMicrosoft
whenitcomestoabilitytopay.NonethelessIfinditdifficulttoacceptthebareassertionby
defensethatafineintherangesoughtbythecrownwillputthecompanyoutofbusiness,
nordoIacceptthatifthisweretobetheendresultitwouldnecessarilyamounttoa
legitimaterationaleforthecourtnottoassesstheappropriatepenalty.
[22]UltimatelyIhaveconcludedthatthemostappropriatemethodofassessingafinein
thesecircumstancesistotiethefineinsomewaytothegrossrevenuesgeneratedbythe
infringingbehaviour,atthesametimeweighingalloftheotherfactorsIhaveenumeratedso
astotailorthefinetotheindividualcircumstances.TheCrown’sassertionofgrossrevenues
fromthesaleoftheinfringingitemsof$17,000permonthoveraperiodofapproximatelyten
andahalfmonthsfortotalgrossrevenuesofapproximately$180,000wasnotdisputedby
defense.Thediscrepancybetweenthepartiesrelatedtothenetprofits.Ifthesegross
revenueswererepresentativeoftheusualretailpatternofa200to300%percentmarkup
referredtoearlier,theywouldrepresentactualnetprofitstothedefendantofbetween
$60,000and$120,000fortheperiodinquestion.
[23]InallofthecircumstancesIconcludethatbasingthefineonapercentageofknown
grossrevenuesisthemostappropriatemannerinwhichtoproceed.WhileIthinkthatinmany
casesthefiguresoughtbythecrownamountingtosomethirtytofortypercentofgross
revenuesgeneratedcouldeasilybejustified,Iampersuadedthatinthisinstancealower
amountisappropriateforthereasonsindicatedaboverelativetothisparticularsmall
business.Ontheotherhand,thefineurgedbythedefendantcompanyequatingtosome
twopercentorlessofgrossrevenuesismanifestlyinadequateandwouldclearlyamountto
nothingmorethananominal
licensingfee.



[24]Inmyview,afineof$45,000isappropriateherewhichIfindrepresentsapproximately
twenty-fivepercentofthegrossrevenuesgeneratedbythedefendantfromtheinfringing
items.
R.v.Farrell
(2002),19CPR(4th)538,[2002]CarswellNB139,[2002]NBJ150,[2002]NBR(2d)TBEdMY012,
2002NBQB150,[2002-04-08](NBQB)RobichaudJ.
Theaccusedhadofferedforsaleandsoldanumberofcounterfeithatsbearingthetrade-
markNIKE,FUBUorTOMMYHILFIGERalongwithsunglassesandclothcasesbearingthetrade-
markOAKLEY.Hewaschargedbysingleindictmentwithfourcountsunders.42(1)(a)ofthe
CopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,andfourcountsunders.412(1)(a)oftheCriminalCode,
R.S.C.1985,c.C-46.
Held,theaccusedshouldbefoundnotguiltyonallcounts.
TheburdenontheCrownisproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.OffencesundertheCopyright
Actarenotstrictliabilityoffences.Themensreaforwhichtheaccusedischargedis
knowledgethattheTommyHilfiger,Nike,OakleyandFUBUarticleshewasofferingforsale
infringedthecopyrightinthoseworks.Intheabsenceofknowledge,itisopentotheCrown
toprovethattheaccused’sconductamountedtowilfulblindnessoftheinfringementof
copyrightinthoseworks.TheCrownmustalsoprovewilfulintenttodeceiveordefraudwith
respecttothefourcountsundertheCriminalCode.Resolutionofproofbeyondareasonable
doubtmeansthatthecourtmustfindtheaccusednotguiltyif:(a)thecourtbelievesthe
evidenceoftheaccused;(b)ifthecourtdoesnotbelievetheevidenceoftheaccusedbut
afterconsideringalltheevidence,stillhasreasonabledoubtastohisguilt;or(c)ifthecourtis
unabletodecidewhomtobelieve.[page539]
Thattheaccusedwasofferingforsaleinfringingcopieswasbeyonddispute.However,the
evidenceshowedthattheaccusedhadobtainedthecounterfeitgoodsonconsignment
fromanindividualwho,onanumberofpreviousoccasions,hadsuppliedhimwithavariety
ofgoodswithoutincident.Hehadbeeninstructedtosellthegoodsatpricesthatclosely
approximatedthepricesofthegenuinearticles.Theaccusedwasnotasophisticated
consumerandhadneverseenthegenuinearticles.TheCrown’sownwitnesshadconceded
thatthegeneralpubliccouldeasilyhavebeenledtobelievethatthearticlesweregenuine.
Thecourtacceptedtheaccused’sevidenceastotheabsenceofhisknowledgeandthe
absenceofanyintenttodeceiveordefraud.Accordingly,theCrownhadnotdischargedits
burdenofprovingthecommissionoftheoffencebeyondareasonabledoubt.
[60]Inmyview,thePhotoCentrecase[PhotoCentreInc.v.TheQueen(1986),9C.P.R.(3d)
425(QueSupCt)]hasnoapplicationtothepresentsituation.Further,Iamoftheviewthat
PhotoCentredoesnotstandforthepropositionthatoffencesundertheCopyrightActare
strictliabilityoffence.Itmerelydealswiththeactionsrequiredwhereithasbeenproventhat
anaccusedhasknowledgeofaninfringementandseekstoestablishhisinnocenceby
showingduediligence.
[63IagreewiththereasoningofJudgeBrien[inR.v.BironaNewBrunswick[1992]NBJ746
NBProvCt].Inthiscasethemensreaoftheoffencesforwhichtheaccusedischargedisthe


knowledgethattheTommyHilfiger,Nike,OakleyandFUBUarticleshewasofferingforsale
werearticlesinfringingthecopyrightinthoseworks.TheCrownhasnotprovedthis
knowledgebeyondareasonabledoubt.Intheabsenceofproofofknowledge,itisopento
theCrowntoprovethattheaccused’sconductamountedtowillfulblindnessofthe
infringementofthecopyrightinthoseworks.
[71]Ibelievetheaccusedwhenheassertsthathedidnotknowthathewasdealingwith
infringingproductsinwhichacopyrightsubsists.Havingheardalloftheevidence,Iam
satisfiedthattherewaslittle,ifanything,aboutthesearticlestoraisethesuspicionofan
unsuspectingindividual.InotethatthepricesoftheTommyHilfiger,NikeandFUBUhats,in
particular,werenotsooutoflinewithretailpriceastoarousesuspicion.AstotheOakley
sunglasses,thepriceof$25.00wasconsiderablylessthantheretailwhichisofteninexcessof
$100.00.Butwiththeaccusedbeinganunsophisticatedconsumerandneverhavingbeen
exposedtothesehigh-endsunglassesbefore,Ibelievehimwhenhesayshewasunawareof
theircounterfeitnature.
R.v.Garby
(2002),[2002]CarswellOnt2869,[2002]OJ3383[2002-07-18](OntCtJ)MacPheeJ.
[1]Mr.Garby,youareasmallplayerfranklyinahugenationalandinternationalproblem,
andthatistheinfringementofcopyright.[…]
[2]Theinfringementofcopyrightisaseriousinternationalphenomenon.Youarebeforethe
courttofaceresponsibilityforyourpartinthatphenomenon.Ithinkthekeyfactorhereisa
questionofbusinesspracticesandtheethicsofbusinesspracticesandthisisunethical
businesspractice,andclearly,itwasillegal,unlawful.Iamjustsimplygoingtomakean
assumptionthatanyonewhoisinvolvedinthat,knowsthattobethecase,despite
protestationstothecontract.Now,youhaveenteredpleasofguilthere,andthatisavery
strongmitigatingcircumstance.Thereisnopriorrecord.Thesumsthatweregarneredby
yourparticipationandaswellnotinsignificant,arenotlargeintheoverallschemeofthings.
Generaldeterrenceistheprimaryprinciplehere.[…]
[3][…]Copyrightisintegraltotheeffectofoperationofourfreemarketsystemwithout
adherencetoit,thenmany,manypeoplesuffer.Manyinnocentsufferaswell.Itiscritical
thatcopyrightberespected,particularlyinthoseeconomieslikeourswherethefreemarket
systemissointegraltothehealthandwelfareofourcitizens.
[44]Withrespecttotheissueofforfeiture,itisclearthatalloftheoffendingmaterial
producedbymeansofthecomputeristobeforfeitedtothecrown.Ineednotgetmore
specificthanthat.Thedifficultyhereisascertainingwhetherornotthecomputersthemselves
shouldbeorderedforfeitedtothecrown,thereisacasetobemadefranklyonbehalfofthe
crownandofthedefencehere,Itakethefollowingview,Iamnotgoingtoorderforfeitureof
thecomputers,butIamgoingto,asaconditionofprobationmakethefollowingorder:you
arenottohaveinyourpossession,fortheperiodofprobation,anycomputersthatyouputto
usingforpurposesrelatedtothechargesbeforethecourt.Doyouunderstandthat?
[46]It’stheusethatyouusethecomputerfor,thatisthesubjectofmyprohibition.For
purposesofaidingtheissueofgeneraldeterrence,itismyviewthatyouarenottohave
possessionofthesecomputersforafurtherperiodofsixmonths.Atthatpointintime,the
crownwillhavenofurtherinterestinthepossessionofthecomputers,andtheywouldbe
returnedtotheowner.[…]


[48]THECOURT:Areyouconsentingtoapurgingoftheharddriveofthosecomputers?
[49]MR.GARBY:That’sfine.Youcandothat,that’snoproblem.
RagdollProductions(UK)Ltd.v.JaneDoe
(2002),21CPR(4th)213,[2002]CarswellNat2457,[2002]FCJ1232,2002FCT918,[2002-08-28]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct918.html(FCTD)PelletierJ.
Theplaintiffseachownedanumberoftrade-marksandcopyrights.Theyhadobtainedand
executedarollingAntonPillerorderagainstthedefendantsandhadseizedanumberof
counterfeititems.Theexecutionorderhadbeenreviewedandtheinteriminjunctionagainst
thedefendantshadbeenconvertedtoaninterlocutoryinjunction.Thedefendantsdidnot
appearonthereviewmotiontocontestthelawfulnessoftheexecutionorder.Theplaintiffs
thenbroughtamotionfordefaultjudgment.Withoutfilingastatementofdefenceorseeking
anextensionoftimetofileastatementofdefence,thedefendantsfiledarespondingrecord
totheplaintiffs’motionfordefaultjudgment.
Held,judgmentshouldbefortheplaintiffs.
ProofofInfringement
PursuanttoRule184(1)oftheFederalCourtRules,1998,SOR/98-106,theabsenceofa
statementofdefencemeansthatasnoneoftheallegationshavebeenadmitted,allmust
betakentohavebeendenied.Accordingly,theplaintiffmustestablishitsentitlementtothe
reliefclaimedbywayofaffidavitevidence.Thestandardofsuchproofisonabalanceof
probabilitiesandisthesamestandardrequiredonmotionstoreviewtheexecutionofAnton
Pillerorders.Therevieworderisajudicialdeterminationthatinfringementhasoccurredand,
intheabsenceofevidencetothecontrary,aplaintiffisentitledtorelyonit.Asthe
defendantshadnotputforwardapositivedefence,theplaintiffswereentitledtorelyonthe
revieworderinwhichtrade-markinfringementhadbeenshown.Theplaintiffswerenot
requiredtoputforwardthesameevidenceforafreshdeterminationofinfringementonthe
motionfordefaultjudgment.
AvailabilityofDamages
Adefendant’sabilitytopay(ortheplaintiff’sinabilitytocollect)isnotafactorindeciding
whetheraplaintiffisentitledtodamages.Thelegislationgoverningcopyrightandtrade-
marksexpresslyprovidesfortheavailabilityofbothinjunctivereliefanddamages.Whileitwas
truethatinjunctionshavebeenrefusedwheredamageshadbeenshowntobean
adequateremedy,therewerenoinstanceswheredamageswererefusedbecausean
injunctionhadbeenawarded.Accordingly,althoughtheplaintiffshadalreadyobtained
injunctivereliefbasedinpartonallegationsofirreparableharmnotcompensablein
damagesandthedefendants’inabilitytopaydamages,thatfactdidnotprecluderecovery
ofpastdamageswhoseexistenceandscopehadbeenprovenbytheplaintiffs.[page215]
QuantumofDamages
Onceaplaintiffhasproveninfringementandthatdamageshaveoccurred,itisentitledto
thecourt’sbestestimateofthosedamageswithoutnecessarilybeinglimitedtonominal
damages.Whereadefendant’sbusinessmethodsandafailuretodefendaclaimmakethe
calculationofdamagesimpossible,theuseofconventionalawardsisfairertothat
defendantthanwouldbeasysteminwhicheachcasewastreatedassuigenerisand
damagesassessedwithoutreferencetolikecases.Thepracticeestablishedbythecourt
distinguishesbetweenmarketandtransientvendors,fixedretailoperations,and


manufacturersanddistributors.Theamountofawardsinthesecases,particularlywhenthere
aremultipleawardsagainstadefendant,exceedanynotionof »nominal »or »minimum
nominal »damages.Suchdamagescanonlybejustifiedascompensatorydamageswhose
amountisdeterminedbyconvention.Theplaintiffswereeachentitledtodamagesinthe
amountof$6,000,costsof$750,declaratoryreliefandapermanentinjunction.
[17]TheplaintiffsarguethatboththeCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42andtheTrademarks
Act,R.S.C.1985,c.T-13providefordamages(oraccounting)aswellasinjunctiverelief,
consequentlythereisnostatutorybasisfortreatingtheremediesasmutuallyexclusive.
[18]Asforthequantumofdamages,thecurrentpracticeofassessingwhathasbeen
describedas »minimumnominaldamages »hasdevelopedasaresultofthetimeand
expenseinvolvedinthepreviouspracticeofdirectingareferenceinapplicationsfordefault
judgment.Thedefendantsrarelyattendedwiththeresultthattheplaintiffsandthecourt
werelefttoassessdamagesonaminimumofinformationwithouttheparticipationofthe
defendants.Itwasthoughtthatthiswassimplyawasteofresources.Thecurrentpracticehas
beeninplacesince1997andwasrecentlyreviewedinOakleyIncv.JohnDoe,[2000]F.C.J.
No.1388(QL).Thereisnothinguntowardabouttheawardofnominaldamageswhereno
actualdamagesareshown.
[28]Ifthestandardofproofisnolower,isitalsonohigher?Itisdifficulttoseethelogicof
exactingahigherstandardofproofincircumstanceswheretheproofisunchallenged.The
testiswhetherthejudge,havingconsideredtheevidencebeforethecourt,issatisfiedthat,
onabalanceofprobabilities,infringementhasoccurred.Settingahigherstandardsimply
requiresthejudgetodoforthedefendantthatwhichithasdeclinedtodoforitself.
[32]Bothoftheseargumentsareessentiallybasedonestoppel.Havingpersuadedthecourt
tograntitanexceptionalremedybaseduponcertainrepresentationsastothe
ineffectivenessofconventionalremedies,cantheplaintiffsnowcometothecourtandclaim
theveryremedieswhoseallegedineffectivenessjustifiedthegrantingoftheAntonPiller
order?Thequestionisagoodone,andtheanswer,whilevalid,cannotmatchthecartesian
logicofthequestion.Itisessentiallyananswerbasedonlegalentitlement.Adefendant’s
abilitytopay(or,toputitanotherway,aplaintiff’sabilitytocollect)isnotafactorindeciding
whetheraplaintiffisentitledtodamages.Astoentitlement,thelegislationgoverning
copyrightandtrademarksexpresslyprovidesfortheavailabilityofbothremedies:[s.34ofthe
CopyrightActandsection53.2oftheCopyrightAct]
[33]Noauthoritywascitedtomewhichwouldsupporttheconclusionthattheseprovisions
mustbereaddisjunctivelysothataplaintiffcouldclaimeitherinjunctionordamagesbutnot
both.Andwhileitistruethatinjunctionshavebeenrefusedwheredamageshavebeen
showntobeanadequateremedy(seeforexample,CutterJLtd.v.BaxterTravenol
LaboratoriesofCanada,Ltd.(1980),47C.P.R.(2d)53(F.C.A.)),Ihavenotfoundany
instanceswheredamageswererefusedbecauseaninjunctionhadbeenawarded.
[34]Totheextentthatthegrantingofaninjunctiondealswithprospectivedamages(whose
occurrencetheinjunctionseekstoprevent),itdoesnotprecluderecoveryofpastdamages
whoseexistenceandscopemustbeprovenbytheplaintiffs.Asfortheimmunityofcertain
defendantsfromthelaw’sconventionalremedies,itwouldbepoorpolicytoexemptfrom
liabilitythosewhoseektoescapeitsconsequences.Whiletheplaintiffs’positionhasanairof
having-your-cake-and-eating-it-too,itis,uponreflection,neitherunfairnorbadpolicy.


[37]Itisalwaysopentoadefendanttoprovetheextentofitstradeincounterfeitgoodsand
toseektohavedamagesassessedonthebasisofitsactualsales.Butwherevendorskeep
norecords,itdoesnotlieintheirmouthstosaythattheplaintiffhasnoevidencebywhichto
provethedamagesflowingfromtheirbusinessoperations.
[38]Intheabsenceofbusinessrecords,thequantityofgoodsseizedisunreliableasan
indicatorofthelevelofadefendant’sbusinessactivity.Thecaseofanunsuccessfulinfringer
whoissimplyunabletomovehisstock,sothathisentireinventoryisseized,doesnotsupport
the »obvious »conclusionthathecausedtheplaintiffmoredamagebecausehehadmore
goodsinhispossession.Damagesduetosaleswouldbenilfortherewerenosales,
notwithstandingtheamountofstockseized.Ifthesameoperatorsoldouthisentirestock
saveforoneT-shirt,the »obvious »conclusionthatlittleharmwascausedbecauseonly1shirt
wasseizedwouldbeequallyfalse.Theevidenceoftheharmcausedwouldbeonthebacks
ofthepurchasers.Consequently,thequantityofgoodsseizedtellsthecourtnothingabout
thescopeandscaleofadefendant’soperations.
Renaudc.GroupeVille-MarieLittératureInc.
(2002),[2002]JQ961[2002-04-30]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200204fr.html,
http://www.canlii.org/qc/jug/qccs/2002/2002qccs11752.html(QueSupCt)ViauJ.
[35]Enforçantlanote,commeondit,etàsonavantagedesurcroît,ledéfendeur[i.e.,the
publisher]n’apasrespecténonplusuneimportanteclauseducontrat.Etsesfaitsetgestes
ontcauséuncertainpréjudiceaudemandeur[i.e.,theauthor].Maispasaupointdepublier
un »Frankenstein »desonouvragede1964.
[36]Pouravoirlulesouvragesdéposésaudossier,leTribunaln’estpasconvaincuquela
publicationaportéatteinte,defaçonimportante,àlaréputationdudemandeur.C’estson
ouvrage,sonstylevivant,intéressant.Ilauraitpuêtredifférents’ilavaitrespectésoncontrat
etl’avaitencoremodifiécommeilpouvaitlefaire.Maisilnel’apasfait,etnepeutreprocher
sapropreomissionàsonéditeur.
Sociétéquébécoisedegestioncollectivedesdroitsdereproduction(COPIBEC)v9030-7620
QuébecInc
(2002),[2002]CarswellNat2510,
2002CFPI980,[2002-09-16]http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002cfpi980.html(FCTD)BeaudryJ.
ENCONSÉQUENCE,LACOURORDONNEcequisuit:
[…]
AUTORISEl’inspectiondeslieuxdetravaildeladéfenderesseetlasaisiedurantlesdeux
premièressemainesdechaquesessiond’étudeàl’UniversitéduQuébecàMontréaldetout
documentactuelouàvenirreproduit,distribuéet/ouvenduparladéfenderesse
comportantdesreproductionsillégalesd’oeuvresdontlestitulairesdedroitd’auteursont
représentésparlademanderesse(COPIBEC),quedetelsdocumentssoientensapossession
ousoussoncontrôle;
ORDONNEàladéfenderessedeproduireunedéclarationassermentée,danslestrente(30)
joursdujugementàvenirsurlaprésenterequête,comportantlesrenseignementssuivants
quantauxoeuvresreproduitesetvenduespourlebénéficedesprofesseursetdesétudiants
del’UniversitéduQuébecàMontréaloudetoutesautresuniversités,àsavoirlestitresdes


oeuvresreproduites,lesdatesetlenombredepagescopiéesetlenombred’exemplaires
reproduits;
SocietyofComposers,AuthorsandMusicPublishersofCanadav.1007442OntarioLtd.
(2002),20CPR(4th)68,[2002]CarswellNat1355,[2002]FCJ876,2002FCT657,[2002]FTRTBEd
JN034,[2002-06-11]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct657.html(FCTD)KelenJ.
Thecorporatedefendantoperatedanexoticdancingclubfrom1993throughSeptember
1997.Thedancerswerenotpaidbythecorporatedefendantbutinstead,asindependent
contractors,soughtasmallfeefrompatronsoftheclub.Musicwasanintegralpartofthe
entertainmentconductedattheclub.Theindividualdefendantwasthepresident,director,
ownerandoperatorofthecorporatedefendant.
OnSeptember20,1996,theCopyrightBoardhadissueditsdecisionwithrespecttothe
plaintiffperformingrightssociety’sTariff3.Bwhichappliedmostlytoestablishmentswhose
formofliveentertainmentwasexoticdancing.Initsdecisionthe[page69]board
acknowledgedthattherewasconfusionsurroundingthepreviousTariff3.Bandits
applicabilitytoclubsthatdidnotpaytheirdancers.TheboardcertifiedanewTariff3.C
whichsetanamountpayableperseat,perday,andwhichthereforeappliedtoclubsthat
didnotpaytheirdancers.
Theplaintiffcommencedanactionforpaymentoftheappropriatetariffasrequiredbythe
CopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,andforcopyrightinfringementwithrespecttothe
performanceofmusicalworksatthecorporatedefendant’sclub.Theplaintiffmovedfor
summaryjudgment.Thecorporatedefendantconsentedtojudgmentandtheplaintiff
proceededwiththemotionasagainsttheindividualdefendant.Theissuewaswhetherthe
individualdefendant,asdirectorandofficerofthecorporatedefendant,wasseparatelyand
independentlyliablefortheactsofinfringement.
Held,themotionshouldbedismissedasagainsttheindividualdefendantandgrantedas
againstthecorporatedefendant.
Thetestforsummaryjudgmentiswhether,basedontheevidence,theplaintiffhasshown
thatthedefendanthasnogenuineissuefortrial.
Theappropriatetestfordeterminingtheliabilityoftheindividualdefendantwaswhetherthe
defendant’sactionscouldbecharacterizedasdishonest,deceptiveanddeliberately
recklessbehaviour,orwhethershewasindifferenttotheobviousconsequencesofher
actions.
TherewasclearevidenceofuncertaintywithrespecttotheapplicabilityofTariff3.Bwhich
wasonlyresolvedbytheCopyrightBoardinitsSeptember20,1996decision.Itwas
reasonabletoassumethattheimpactofthedecisionwouldnotbeknownimmediately
uponitsissuance.Accordingly,itwasbeyondthepurviewofamotionforsummaryjudgment
toevaluatetheimpactofthedecisionandanyresultingliabilityofacorporatedirector.The
evidenceoftheindividualdefendanthadtobeassessedbythetrialjudgetodetermineher
personalliability.
[19]TheCourtderivesfromthejurisprudencethattheappropriatetestincasessuchasthis
liesinanalysisoftheconductofthepersonaldefendant,todeterminewhetherornother


actionscanbecharacterizedasdishonest, »deceptiveanddeliberatelyrecklessbehaviour »,
orindifferencetotheobviousconsequencesofheractions,suchthatafindingofpersonal
liabilityisappropriate.
[30]Theprinciplethatanincorporatedcompanyisaseparateentityfromitsdirectorsand
officersissacrosanctinthecommonlaw.BeforetheCourtwillpiercethecorporateveiland
holdadirectorpersonallyliableforactionstakenintheircapacityasarepresentativeofa
corporation,questionsoffactandcredibilitymustbedecided.
SocietyofComposers,AuthorsandMusicPublishersofCanadav.CanadianAssn.ofInternet
Providers
(2002),19CPR(4th)289,[2002]4FC3,215DLR(4th)118,[2002]CarswellNat964,[2002]
CarswellNat965,290NR131,[2002]FCJ691,[2002]ACF691,2002FCA166,[2002-05-01]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca166.html,inFrenchathttp://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/cf/2002/2002caf166.html(FCA)

ThiswasanapplicationtosetasidethedecisionoftheCopyrightBoardexcludingmost
Internetintermediariesfromliabilitytopayroyaltiesforcopyingmusictransmittedonthe
Internet.TheSocietyofComposers,AuthorsandMusicPublishersofCanada(SOCAN),the
applicantherein,collectivelyadministersinCanadatheperformingandcommunication
rightsofitsmembersandofforeigncomposers,authorsandpublishers.In1995,itproposed
the[page5]firsttariffofroyaltiespayableinrespectofmusictransmittedontheInternet.This
tariff,knownasTariff22,coveredtheyears1996to1998inclusive.Attheendofthefirstphase
ofaproceedingtodeterminetheamountandallocationoftheroyaltypayabletocopyright
ownersforthecommunicationofmusicontheInternet,theCopyrightBoardheldthata
royaltycanbeimposedonthosewhopostmusiconaserverlocatedinCanadatowhich
Internetusershaveaccess,butcannotbeimposedonthosewhoseonlyroleinInternet
transmissionsistooperateaserveronwhichmusicisstored,ortoprovidearecipientwith
Internetaccess.TheBoardalsofoundthatthenormalactivitiesofInternetintermediariesdo
notconstitutecommunicationbytelecommunicationforthepurposesoftheCopyrightAct,
andthusdonotinfringetheexclusivecommunicationrightsofcopyrightowners.SOCAN
challengedeachoftheseconclusions.Fiveissueswereraisedonappeal:(1)thestandardof
reviewoftheBoard’sdecision;(2)whethertheBoarderredinlawininterpretingparagraph
2.4(1)(b)oftheCopyrightAct;(3)whethertheBoarderredinconcludingthattheservices
andequipmentsuppliedbyoperatorsofhostserversandInternetaccessproviders
constitutedonlythemeansoftelecommunicationnecessaryforenablinganotherto
communicate;(4)whethertheBoarderredinnotconcludingthat,inprovidingtheircore
servicesandequipment,Internetintermediaries »authorize »thecommunicationofmaterial
requestedbyendusersfromhostservers,and(5)whethertheBoarderredinfindingthatthe
CopyrightActdoesnotapplytocommunicationsbytelecommunication,includingthe
Internet,thatoriginatefromoutsideCanada.
Held(SharlowJ.A.dissentinginpart),theapplicationshouldbedismissedinpart.
PerEvansJ.A.:(1)TheCopyrightBoard’sdeterminationinTariff22oftheparties’potential
liabilitytopayaroyaltywasareviewable »decision »underparagraph18.1(3)(b)ofthe
FederalCourtActandcouldbesetasideforerroroflawunderparagraph18.1(4)(c)ofthe
Act.Thepragmaticorfunctionalanalysisisnowtheacceptedmethodologyforsettingthe
standardbywhichacourtwillreviewaspecialistadministrativeagency’sdeterminationsof
questionsoflaw.Theconceptofjurisdictionhaslostitsformersignificanceasadeterminant
ofthestandardofreviewinadministrativelaw.TheCourtmustembarkonapragmaticor


functionalanalysis[page6]inordertodeterminethestandardofreviewrelevanttotheissues
decidedbytheBoard.TheBoardexercisesaverybroaddiscretionwhendeterminingwho
shouldpayaroyaltyandonwhatbasistheroyaltyshouldbecalculated.Thesamestandard
ofreviewwillnotnecessarilyapplytoanadministrativeagency’sdeterminationswithrespect
toeveryprovisioninitsconstitutivelegislation.Reviewingcourtsmustdistinguishbetweenthe
interpretationofastatutoryprovisionanditsapplicationtothefactsofagivencase.The
impactoftheBoard’sdecisionontheparties’legalrightsislimited.Whiletheresolutionofthe
legalquestionsraisedinTariff22wasofsignificantcommercialinteresttotheparties,andto
Internetendusers,theinterestsatstakewereprimarilymonetaryinnature.TheCopyright
Board’sdecisioncouldnotbesaidtoimpingeonconstitutionalorquasi-constitutionalrights.
ThelimitedlifespanoftariffsapprovedbytheBoardalsoservestoreducetheimpactofthe
Board’sdecisionsontherightsoftheparties.Thus,neitherthenatureoftherightsaffectedby
theBoard’sdecision,northeseriousnessofitsimpactonthem,indicatesthattheCourt
shouldreviewtheBoard’slegaldeterminationsonastandardofcorrectness.TheCopyright
Board’sdecisionsareneitherprotectedbyapreclusiveclause,norsubjecttoarightof
appeal.ThescaleistippedinfavourofcorrectnessreviewbecausetheCopyrightBoard’s
interpretationofprovisionsoftheCopyrightActindisputeisnotwithinitsexclusivedomain,
butmayariseincourtproceedingsotherthanjudicialreviewproceedings.Simple
unreasonablenesswastheappropriatestandardofreviewoftheBoard’sdecision,insofaras
itinvolvedtheapplication,ratherthantheinterpretation,ofthestatute.
(2)Threeconditionsmustbeestablishedforanintermediary’sactivitytofallwithinparagraph
2.4(1)(b)oftheCopyrightAct,andnottoattractliabilityforinfringingcopyrightby
communicatingaworktothepublicbytelecommunication.First,theintermediary’sactivities
mustamounttotheprovisionof »themeansoftelecommunication »;second,thesemeans
mustbe »necessary »forenablinganotherpersontocommunicateaworktothepublic;and
third,theactivitiesinquestionmustconstitutetheintermediary’s »onlyact »withrespecttothe
communication.[page7]TheCopyrightActisnotconcernedexclusivelywithadvancingthe
interestsofwriters,composers,artistsandothercreativepeople.Thus,itsprovisionsshouldbe
interpretedwithaneyetostrikinganappropriatebalancebetweenpromotingthepublic
interestintheencouragementanddisseminationofworksoftheartsandintellectand
obtainingajustrewardforthecreator.TheBoardwascorrectinconcludingthattheword
« means »iscapableofdescribingawiderrangeofservicesandequipmentthanthose
providedbytraditionalcommoncarriers.Therefore,thatwordshouldnotbegiventhenarrow
interpretationurgedbytheapplicant.AnotherissuewaswhethertheBoardmisinterpreted
theword »necessary »whenitheldthatitextendedtoanactivitythatmerelyimprovesthe
qualityofInternetcommunication.Thecontextofparagraph2.4(1)(b)doesnotjustify
interpreting »necessary »inasensethatisatoddswithitsmostfamiliarmeaning.Hence,a
personprovidesonlythemeansoftelecommunicationnecessaryforanotherpersonto
communicatewhen,withoutthatperson’sactivity,communicationinthatmediumof
telecommunicationwouldnotbepracticableor,inallprobability,wouldnothaveoccurred.
Whethersomethingis »necessary »forthepurposeofparagraph2.4(1)(b)shouldbe
determinedwhenthetransmissionofmaterialfromtheserveroccurs,notwhenthecontent
providerchoosesthemeanstocommunicate.TheBoarddidnoterrinlawonthatissue.
However,iterredinlawwhenitheldthatanInternetintermediarywhocachesmaterialis
therebyprovidingthemeansnecessaryforanothertocommunicateit.Thefactthatthe
cacheenhancesthespeedoftransmissionandreducesthecosttotheInternetaccess
providerdoesnotrenderitapracticalnecessityforcommunicationbyothers.Theoperator
ofacachecommunicatesbytelecommunicationtoendusersthematerialtransmittedto
themfromthecacheandtherebyinfringestheexclusiverightoftheauthororcomposerto
communicateamusicalworktothepublic.Thus,heisnotmerelyapassivetransmitterof
data.Finally,theBoardwasrightinholdingthatanInternetintermediary’sactivitiesarestill
onlythemeansoftelecommunicationwhentheyareancillarytoitsprovisionofthe


necessarymeansoftelecommunicationbyothers,providedthattheseadditionalactivities
donotthemselvesamounttocommunication.Thus,operatorsofhostserversdonotlosethe
protectionofparagraph2.4(1)(b)byprovidingtheirnormalfacilitiesandservices.
(3)TherewasampleevidencebeforetheBoardtojustifyitsconclusionthatoperatorsofhost
serversandInternetaccessprovidersdonoteffectivelycontrolthecontentofwhatis
transmitted,thattheirroleispassiveandthattheiractivitiesusuallyconsistonlyofthe
provisionofthemeansoftelecommunicationforthepurposeofparagraph2.4(1)(b).Onthe
otherhand,theBoard’sconclusion,thatoperatingacacheisnecessaryforanotherperson
tocommunicatebytelecommunication,wasbasedonanerroneousinterpretationof
paragraph2.4(1)(b).
(4)TheapplicantarguedthatInternetintermediariesauthorizecontentprovidersto
communicatecopyrightmaterialfromthehostservers.Authorizingacommunicationby
telecommunicationisadiscreteinfringementundersubsection3(1)oftheCopyrightAct.It
wasopentotheBoardtoconcludethat,byperformingtheircorefunctions,Internetaccess
providersdidnotauthorizecontentproviderstocommunicatematerialfromtheWebsiteat
therequestoftheircustomers,theendusers.Courtshavegenerallyrejectedtheargument
thattheauthorizationofcommunicationcanbeinferredmerelyfromthesupplyof
equipmentthatenablesanothertocommunicateortoperformawork.Sinceoperatorsof
hostserversonlyprovidethepassivemeansforotherstocommunicate,theyarenotinany
realsenseapproving,consentingorclaimingtherighttopermitcontentprovidersto
communicatethematerialstoredontheirservers.ItwasnotunreasonablefortheBoardto
concludethatthenormalactivitiesofhostserveroperatorsdonotimplicitlyauthorizecontent
providerstocommunicatethematerialpostedontheserver.
(5)Theapplicantisonlyentitledtoaroyaltyinrespectofcopyrightinfringementsthatoccur
inCanada.Sincetheprincipalinfringementreliedoninthiscasewasthatofcommunicating
copyrightworkstothepublicbytelecommunication,theBoardcouldonlyapprovearoyalty
payableforthecommunicationsthatoccurredinCanada.Inrulingthatacommunication
bytelecommunicationoccursattheplacefromwhichthetransmissionoriginates,theBoard
wasdeterminingageneralquestionoflawthatwasnotconfinedtothefactsofthecase
beforeitand,hence,itsrulingwasreviewableonastandardofcorrectness.Thelocationof
thecommunicationshouldnotbedeterminedsolelybythatofthehostserver,especially
sincetheInternetcommunicationsunderconsiderationwereonlyeffectedattherequestof
theenduser.Theprincipalinfringingactivityhereinwascommunicationbythecontent
provider,copyrightmaterial[page9]wasnotcommunicateduntilitwasreceivedontheend
user’scomputer,andthelocationofthehostservercouldnotalonedeterminewherethe
communicationoccurred.AroyaltymaybemadepayableinCanadainrespectof
communicationsbytelecommunicationthathavearealandsubstantialconnectionwith
Canada.TheCopyrightBoarderredinlawwhenitignoredallconnectingfactorsotherthan
thelocationofthehostserverforthepurposeofidentifyingcommunicationsthatoccurredin
Canadaandcouldthereforeattractliabilitytopayaroyaltytotheapplicant.Sincethe
policyoftheActistoprotectcopyrightintheCanadianmarket,thelocationoftheenduser
isanimportantfactorindeterminingifanInternetcommunicationhasarealandsubstantial
connectionwithCanada.
PerSharlowJ.A.(dissentinginpart):TheBoardwasrightincharacterizingcachingasan
activitythatisancillarytoInternetcommunicationandinconcludingthatanInternet
intermediarywhoseonlyactivityistoprovidecachingisentitledtotheprotectionof
paragraph2.4(1)(b)oftheCopyrightAct.Theword »necessary »inlegislationthatisintended
todescribethetechnologyofcommunicationmustbeinterpretedwithenoughflexibilityto
recognizeincrementaltechnologicalimprovements.Inthecontextofparagraph2.4(1)(b),


somethingshouldbeconsiderednecessaryforcommunicationifitmakescommunication
practicableormorepracticable,whichisthemeaningthattheBoardhasimplicitly
adopted.

[111]Hence,threethingsmustbeestablishedforanintermediary’sactivitytofallwithin
paragraph2.4(1)(b),andthusnottoattractliabilityforinfringingcopyrightbycommunicating
aworktothepublicbytelecommunication.First,theintermediary’sactivitiesmustamountto
theprovisionof »themeansoftelecommunication »;second,thesemeansmustbe
« necessary »forenablinganotherpersontocommunicateaworktothepublic;andthird,the
activitiesinquestionmustconstitutetheintermediary’s »onlyact »withrespecttothe
communication.
[116][…]Paragraph2.4(1)(b)isinmyviewsimplypartofthedefinitionofthephrase
« communicatingbytelecommunication »,andisintendedtoclarifywhatmightotherwisebe
anuncertaintyaboutthescopeoftheword »communicate ».Evenwithoutthisparagraph,it
couldhavebeenarguedthattheword »communicate »implicitlyexcludesmerelyenabling
anothertocommunicate.Thatparagraph2.4(1)(b)shouldberegardedasdefinitional,rather
thanasanexemption,isalsosuggestedbyitslocationinthedefinitionssectionofthe
CopyrightAct.Hence,paragraph2.4(1)(b)shouldnotbegivenanarrowinterpretationasan
exemptionfromliabilityforcopyrightinfringement.
[117]Inanyevent,evenifparagraph2.4(1)(b)wereproperlyregardedasanexemptionfrom
theliabilityimposedbyparagraph3(1)(f),itwouldstillnotbejustifiabletosubstitutethe
narrowerword »facilities »forthebroaderword »means »,ortoreadintoparagraph2.4(1)(b)
theadjective, »physical »,asamodifierofthenoun, »means ».
[124]Inmyopinion,theBoardwascorrecttoconcludethattheword, »means »,iscapableof
describingawiderrangeofservicesandequipmentthanthoseprovidedbytraditional
commoncarriers.Accordingly,itshouldnotbegiventhenarrowinterpretationurgedby
SOCAN.Animportantindicatorthatapersonisprovidingthemeanstoenableothersto
communicatebytelecommunicationisthatthepersonlacksthepracticalabilitytocontrol
andmonitorcontent,andhenceplaysonlyapassiveroleinthecommunication.
[132][…]Inmyopinion,thecontextofparagraph2.4(1)(b),includingtheexistenceofthe
competingpolicyconsiderationsoutlinedabove,doesnotjustifyinterpreting »necessary »in
paragraph2.4(1)(b)inasensethatisatoddswithitsmostfamiliarmeaning.Hence,aperson
providesthemeansoftelecommunicationnecessaryforanotherpersontocommunicate
when,withoutthatperson’sactivity,communicationinthatmediumoftelecommunication
wouldnotbepracticableor,inallprobability,wouldnothaveoccurred.
[133]Whethersomethingis »necessary »forthepurposeofparagraph2.4(1)(b)shouldbe
determinedwhenthetransmissionofmaterialfromtheserveroccurs,andnotwhenthe
contentproviderchoosesthemeansthroughwhichtocommunicate.[…]

[150]Authorizingacommunicationbytelecommunicationisadiscreteinfringementunder
subsection3(1)(CompoCo.Ltd.v.BlueCrestMusicInc.,[1980]1S.C.R.357,atpage373).
Further,paragraph2.4(1)(b)doesnotapplytotheactofauthorizinganyoftheinfringingacts
setoutinsection3(1),includingthecommunicationbytelecommunicationofacopyright
work.Thus,eventhoughthecoreactivitiesofoperatorsofserversandInternetaccess
providersdonotconstitutecommunicationbyvirtueofparagraph2.4(1)(b),theymaystillbe
requiredtopayaroyaltyiftheycanbesaidtobeauthorizingthecontentproviderto
communicatethematerial.



[153][…]Paragraph2.4(1)(b)doesnotsheltercontentproviders,northosewho,whilenot
themselvescommunicating,areauthorizingotherstocommunicatetothepublic.[…]
[156]Nonetheless,itseemscounterintuitivetoconcludethatapersonwhosuppliesthe
meanstoenableanothertocommunicatematerialtherebyauthorizes,asopposed,say,to
facilitates,itscommunicationbythatotherperson.Theconceptof »authorizing »impliesthat
thepersonwhoisallegedtohaveauthorizedhastherighttogiveanyrequisitepermission.It
isthusdifferentfromthenotionofwhatis,ineffect,vicariousliabilityused,forexample,inthe
lawofcopyrightinfringementintheUnitedStates.
[157]Notsurprisingly,therefore,courtshavegenerallyrejectedtheargumentthatthe
authorizationofcommunicationcanbeinferredmerelyfromthesupplyofequipmentthat
enablesanothertocommunicateortoperformawork:see,forexample,Vigneuxv.
CanadianPerformingRightsSociety,[1945]A.C.108(P.C.);MuzakCorporationv.
Composers,Authors,andPublishersAssociationofCanada,[1953]2S.C.R.182(« Muzak »).The
inabilityofthesupplierofequipmenttocontroltheusetowhichtheequipmentisput
indicatesthatthesupplierisnotimpliedlyauthorizingacommunicationorperformanceofa
work.
[158]Sinceoperatorsofhostserversonlyprovidethepassivemeansforothersto
communicate,theyarenotinanyrealsenseapproving,consentingorclaimingtherightto
permitcontentproviderstocommunicatethematerialstoredontheirservers:Apple
ComputerInc.vMackintoshComputersLtd.,[1987]1F.C.173,atparagraph73,aff’d.[1990]
2S.C.R.209.Thus,sinceitcannotbeinferredfromtheiractivitiesthatInternetintermediaries
« sanction,approveorcountenance »(Muzak,supra,atpage193,perKellockJ.)the
communicationofmaterialstoredbyothersontheirservers,theynormallycannotbesaidto
authorizecontentproviderstocommunicateinfringingmaterial.

SongCorp,(Re)
(2002),[2002]CarswellOnt5,[2002]OJ14,[2002]OTC17(OntSupCtJ–HillReversion);
(2002),19CPR(4th)235,[2002]CarswellOnt20,[2002]OJ13,31CBR(4
th)97,[2002]OTC17,
[2002-01-07](OntSupCtJ–Trustee’sMotion)

SongRecordingsInc.(« Recordings »)carriedonthebusinessofenteringintoagreementswith
recordingartiststoco-ordinatetheproductionofmastersoundrecordingsforuseinthe
manufactureofcompactdiscsorothermedia.Recordingstypicallypaidtherecordings
artistsadvanceswhichwererecoupedbyretainingroyaltiesotherwisepayabletotheartists.
TheprincipalbusinessofeachofSongPublishingInc.(« Publishing »)andAtticMusicLtd.
(« Attic »)wastoacquirebyassignmenttheproprietaryinterestinallorpartofcopyrightfrom
songwritersandtoadministerthecopyrightincludingtocollectincomefromtheexploitation
ofthecopyright.TheexpensesofeachofPublishingandAtticwereoftenrecoupableoutof
royaltiespayabletothesongwriters.Approximately50percentofthecatalogueofmusical
worksadministeredbyPublishingandAtticwererecorded.Theremainderwereunrecorded.
Recordings,PublishingandAtticbecamebankruptandthetrusteeinbankruptcymovedfor
declarationsrelatingtotheapplicationoftheBankruptcyandInsolvencyAct,R.S.C.1985,c.
B-3,tothecopyrightsofthebankruptcompanies.Inparticular,thetrusteesoughtordersthat
s.83oftheActdidnotapplytocopyrightinsoundrecordingsormusicalworksandthat
certaincontractualprovisionsinagreementsbetweenthebankruptcompaniesandauthors
orartistswerenoteffectiveasagainstthetrustee.Thetrusteeproposedtosellthecopyright


intereststoapurchasewhowouldcovenanttoensurethatdistributionsandroyaltiesdelayed
bythebankruptcywereeffected,topayoutroyaltiesduepriortothebankruptcy,andto
payfutureroyaltiesatratesnotlessthanthebankruptcompanieswereobligedtopay
pursuanttotheiragreementswithsongwritersandothers.
Held,themotionshouldbegranteddeclaringthats.83oftheActappliedtocopyrightin
musicalworksheldbythebankruptcompaniesbyassignment,butnottocopyrightinsound
recordingsheldbythecompaniesasmakers.
Thebankruptcompaniesheldcopyrightinterestsinmusicalworksreferredtoins.3(1)ofthe
CopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,assignedtothembytheirauthorsandcopyrightinterests
insoundrecordingsbyreasonofbeingthemakersoftherecordingsandtheoperationofs.
18(1)oftheAct.
Section83oftheBankruptcyandInsolvencyActprovidesrulesforthetreatmentofcertain
copyrightinterestsinworksassignedtoapersonbecomingbankruptandtocertain
agreementsrelatingtheretobetweenthebankruptandauthorsortheirheirs.Section83(1)
provides,interalia,thatcopyrightinsuchunpublishedworksshallreverttotheauthorsortheir
heirsonpaymentofanyexpensesincurredbythebankruptforputtingtheworkintotype.
Section83(2)provides,interalia,thatthetrusteeisentitledtosellanycopiesofsuch
publishedworksprovidedroyaltiesthatwouldhavebeenpayablebythebankruptarepaid
totheauthorsortheirheirs.Section83(2)(b)provides,interalia,thatthetrusteeisnotentitled
toassignthecopyrightwithouttheconsentoftheauthororhisheirsexceptontermswhich
guaranteepaymentofroyaltiesataratethatthebankruptwouldhavebeenliabletopay.
Section83(2)(c)provides,interalia,thatanyagreementbetweenthebankruptand
[page237]theauthororhisheirsterminatesatthetimeofthebankruptcyandisvoidexcept
fortheentitlementtosellcopiesoftheworkasprovidedins.83(2)(a)
Section83onlyappliestocopyrightinworksassignedtoabankrupt.Itdoesnottherefore
applytocopyrightinterestssuchasthoseinsoundrecordingsacquiredthroughtheactivityof
makingandnotbywayofassignment.
TheBankruptcyandInsolvencyActshouldbeinterpretedinapracticalandnotlegalistic
manner.Thetrusteesubmittedthatapplyings.83tocopyrightinmusicalworkswouldbe
detrimentaltotheproperinterestofcreditorsofthebankruptcompaniesbecausethetrustee
wouldbewithoutcompensationforamountspaidbythecompaniestoacquirethe
copyrightinterests.Inaddition,thetrusteesubmittedthats.83shouldbenarrowlyconstrued
becausethesectiondepartedfromthebasicprinciplethatallunsecuredcreditorsofa
bankruptbetreatedequally.Copyrightassignmentshave,however,anumberoffeatures
whichdifferentiatethemfromadebtowedasupplier.Theassigneehasacontinuing
obligationtoremitroyaltiesfortheexploitationofthecopyright.Itisthereforeunderstandable
thattheActaccordsspecialtreatmenttosuchassignments.Areadingofs.83suggeststhat
Parliamentsetoutaregimetoapplytoallassignedcopyrightregardlessoftheindustry
involved.Arestrictionofs.83toexcludemusicalworksandthemusicindustrycouldnot
thereforebesupported.
Theordinarymeaningofs.83(2)(b)isthatatrusteeisgivenpermissiontoassigncopyrightina
publishedworkprovidedthattheroyaltypaymentisguaranteed.Theremainingdeclarations
requestedbythetrusteerequiredfurtherconsultationbetweenthetrusteeandinterested
partiesandfurthersubmissionstothecourt,ifnecessary,forthecourttomakea
determination.


StatementofRoyaltiestobeCollectedbySocanandbyNRCCforPayAudioServices[1997
to2002forSocanand1998to2002forNRCC]
(2002),19CPR(4th)67,[2002]CBD1,[2002]CarswellNat2381,[2002-03-15]
http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/m15032002-b.pdf(CopBd)[footnotesomitted]
Bothaperformingrightscollectivesocietyandaneighbourrightscollectivesocietyfileda
proposedstatementofroyaltieswhichincludedaproposedtarifftargetingdigitalpayaudio
(« DPA »)services.AnumberofpartiesobjectedtotheproposedtariffandtwoDPAservice
providers,twogroupsofdistributionundertakings,twodirect-to-home(« DTH »)satellite
companiesandrepresentativesofcablesystemoperatorsparticipatedinproceedings
beforetheCopyrightBoardtoresolvetheobjections.
ThetwoDPAserviceproviderscommencedoperationinCanadain1997.Theserviceswere
offeredatnoextracosttodigitalcablesubscribersandaspartofbasicpackagestoDTH
subcribers.DPAofferedpremiummusicservicesexclusivelywithnoadvertisementsandno
on-airtalent.Direct-to-homesatelliteserviceshaveachievedexplosivegrowthinthe
penetrationinCanadawiththeresultthatDPRserviceprovidershaveenjoyedsubstantial
profitmargins.
Thecollectivesocietiesproposedatariffrateofbetween30and40percentofadistribution
undertaking’saffiliationpaymentstoaDPAserviceprovider.Theobjectorsproposedarate
between3and5percentbasedoncurrentcommercialradiotariffs.
Held,thetariffsshouldbecertifiedinaccordancewiththefindingsoftheboard.
Noneofthecomparisonswithothertariffsproposedbythepartieswasclearlypreferableto
anyother.Thecomparisonsweresufficientlyweaktomaketheuseofoneoracombination
highlyproblematic.DPAdidnotcompetewith,norwasitasubstitutefor,commercialradio.
Asaresult,therewerenousefulproxiesavailabletotheboardtouseinsettlingtheamountof
theproposedtariffs.Insuchcases,tariffsettinginvolveslookingatthecharacteristicsofthe
industryandtryingtofigureoutwhatmakessenseatthetime.Theroleoftheboardinso
doingistobalancethecompetinginterestsofcopyrightownersandusers.
Theboardsetthetariffinfoursteps.First,theboardlookedattherelativevalueofthe
repertoires.Allthingsbeingequal,composersrepresentedbytheperformingrightssociety
shouldreceivethesameamountasperformersandmakersofsoundrecordingsrepresented
bytheneighbouringrightssociety.Secondly,therangeof[page68]theproposedtariffswas
setbydoublingtheperformingrightssociety’scommercialradiotariffto6.4percentofgross
revenuesadjustedforthegreatermusicuseanddifferencesinbusinessmodels.The
applicationofthesefactorsincreasedthebottomendoftherangetobetween15to20per
cent.Thetopoftherangewassetat30percentbyprovidingadiscounttothehigherfigures
advancedbythecollectivesocieties.Thirdly,certainfactorstendedtofavourahigherpart
oftherangewhileotherfactorstendedtofavourthelowerpartoftherange.Factors
favouringthehigherpartwerethatdistributionundertakingsfoundDPAvaluableinproviding
acompetitiveedgeovercable,rightsholderswereentitledtoreceiveadditionalbenefits
fromnewuseoftheirrepertoire,theavailabilityoftherepertoireenabledDPAtoachieve
efficiencies,althoughDPAwasastartupindustryitwouldnotremainsoforlong,andfinally,
DPAprovidedforegroundratherthanbackgroundservices.Factorsfavouringthelowerpart
oftherangewerethatDPAwasanewbusiness,collectiveswerenotentitledtoappropriate
alloftheefficienciesachievedbyusingtheirrepertoires,andtheremustbesomeroomleft
forothercopyrightsincludingthevalueofthereproductionright.Thefourthstepwasto


selectaratetobeadjustedbytheeligiblerepertoire.Asthefactorsfavouringthehigherpart
oftherangeweremoreimportantthanthosefavouringthelowerpart,26percentwas
selectedasthestartingpointfortheroyalty.Theratewasadjustedtoreflectthat5percent
ofthemusicusedbyDPAwaspublicdomainandthatonly45percentofsoundrecordings
usedwereeligibletoshareintheremuneration.Applyinginadditionadiscountof10per
centfortherightsholderstoshareintheriskfactorassociatedwithDPAasanewindustry,the
royaltywassetat16.38percentoftheamountpaidbydistributionundertakings,being
11.115percentfortheperformingrightssocietyand5.265percentfortheneighbouring
rightssociety.
Theambitofthetariffwastotargetallpayaudioservicesincludingthoseconvertedintoan
analogueFMsignal.Asingletariffapplicabletothetwocollectivesocietieswasset.Aseach
collectivesocietycouldseekpaymentfromeitherthedistributionundertakingortheDPA,the
certifiedtariffdidnottargetoneortheotherforpayment.
Atmost,thereareavarietyofmarginallyrelevantindicators,allofwhichneverthelessserve
toestablisha »comfortzone »withinwhichtheBoard,givenallthecircumstances,isableto
exerciseitsdiscretioninsettingthetariff.Ascounseltothecablesystemoperatorsputit,thisis
acasewheretariffmakinginvolveslookingatthecharacteristicsoftheindustryandtryingto
figureoutwhatmakessenseatthetime.Indoingso,theBoardwillkeepinminditsraison
d’êtrewhich,contrarytowhatcounseltotheDPAserviceprovidersstated,isnotsomuchto
supervisetherateschargedbySOCAN’smembersastobalancethecompetinginterestsof
copyrightownersandusers.[atpage77CPR.]
[…]
Underthecircumstances,theBoardintendstosetthetariffinfoursteps.First,itdecidesonthe
relativevalueoftherepertoires.Thisisnecessarytothesecondstep,whichestablishesthe
rangewithinwhichareasonableratemightbefound,usingthetoolsmadeavailableinthe
proceedings.Third,theBoardwillidentifythefactorswhich,initsview,tendtopushtherate
higherorlowerwithinthatrange.Fourth,itwillselectafigure,tobeadjustedtoaccountfor
theeligiblerepertoires.[atpp.67-68CPR.]
[…]
Forreasonsoutlinedinearlierdecisions,theBoardfindsthatallthingsbeingequal,authors
andcomposersshouldgetthesameasperformersandmakers.Furthermore,theprivate
copyingtariff,beingpaidonaccountofthereproductionright,shouldnotbeusedinthe
contextofpricingthetelecommunicationright.Thisbeingsaid,thenon-exclusivecharacter
ofremunerationrightsisnotareasonfordiscountingtheremuneration.Bydenyingtorights
holderswhoareentitledtoremunerationtheabilitytowithholdtheuseoftheirproperty,
Parliamentonlywishedtoguaranteeaccesstotherepertoire.Nothingindicatesthat
Parliamentthoughtthepriceshouldbelessasaresult.[atp.78CPR.]
[…]
Fromalegalperspective,whenapublishedsoundrecordingofamusicalworkis
communicatedtothepublicbytelecommunication,therightsadministeredbySOCANare
quitedifferentfromthoseadministeredbyNRCC.Whenactingindividually,[Authorsand
composerscandecidenottoadministertheirrightscollectively;thatoptionisnotopento
performersandmakers]authorsandcomposerscancontrolorevenprohibitthat
telecommunication.Performersandmakersareonlyentitledtoreceiveequitable
remunerationthroughacollectivesociety.Still,whentherightsovermusicalworksare
administeredcollectively,andforsolongasuserspayroyaltiessetbytheBoard,SOCANand
NRCCare,forallpracticalpurposes,inthesamesituation.Indeed,asinglesetofprovisions


setsouthowbothcollectivesobtainacertifiedtariff.[SeeSections67to68.2oftheAct.][at
p.85CPR.]

StatementofRoyaltiesforEducationalRights1999-2002
[2002-10-15]
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/e25102002-b.pdf(CopBd)
First,settingtherateatthelevelproposedbytheEducationCoalitionwoulddefeatthe
objectivesoftheregime.Itsmainobjectistoprovideaccesstoprogramsthateducational
institutionsfindvaluableandthatarenotreadilyaccessiblecurrently.Itismeanttoallow
accesstomoreprogramming,notless.Theregimewasnotsetuptoallowinstitutionstolower
theircostofaccessingprogramming,nortoreducetheincomeofrightsholders.Asaresult,
andunderthecurrentconditions,thetariffmustcoexistwiththeexistingdistributionmarket,
andnotactasasubstituteforit.[atp.5]
Atariffthatthreatensexistingmarketsalsoseemstorunagainstthereasonswhichgenerally
leadParliamenttoasktheBoardtoplayaroleinamarket.WhentheBoardisaskedto
intervene,itgenerallyistoaddressmarketfailures,nottobringfailuretoproperlyfunctioning
markets.TheBoard’sroleisnottoprotecttheexistingmarket,buttoprovideeducational
institutionswithreasonableaccesstoeducationalprogrammingatareasonableprice.Ifthe
existingmarketbecameinefficientoruncompetitive,atariffsetatareasonableratewould
(rightly)forcethemarketintoanewdisciplineorleadtoitsdemise.Inthesamevein,ifa
competingdistributionmodel8succeededinbringingdowntheeducationalinstitutions’cost
ofpurchasingprogramming,thatwouldprobablyhaveadirectimpactontherateofthe
tariff.[atp.6]
Itassumesthatinstitutionswillsubstitutethetapingofbroadcastprogramsforthepurchaseof
prerecordedvideos,whentheobjectoftheregimeisnottoofferasubstitutetotheexisting
marketbuttocomplementit.[atp.11]
Thoughratessetinforeignjurisdictionsforsimilarusesmayserveasarealitycheck,to
establishaCanadianratesolelyonthebasisofoneormoreexistingforeignratesraisestoo
manydifficulties.[atp.10]
Second,the“legalcertainty”thattheEducationCoalitionseeksfromtheBoardalready
exists.First,theActsetsoutwhattriggersthepaymentofroyaltiessetoutinatariffcertifiedby
theBoardandwhatdoesnot.Otherwise,theinstitutioncanmakecopiesandusethemfor
freeaslongasitcomplieswiththeActandanyregulations.Second,reportingrequirements
canbeimposedonlythroughregulations.ReportingregulationscameintoforceonAugust
31,2001,andwerenotretroactive.Therefore,institutionscannotbeforcedtoreportonthe
makingoruseofcopiesbeforethatdate.[atp.18]
TheBoarddoesnotfinditnecessarytoprovideadiscountforcopiesmadebetween
September1,2001andthedateonwhichthetariffiscertified.Noincentiveisneededto
ensurethatinformationisreported,sincethedutytoreportissetbyregulationasis
independentofanytariffbeinginplace.[atp.20]
SunarcStructuresInc.v.Nelson(2002),JE2003-585,[2002]CarswellQue3172,
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/cs/200212fr.html(QueSupCt;2002-11-12)WéryJ.


16.ISSUESamandatoryinjunctionorderingDefendanttocancelandwithdraw
fromcirculationandtodelivertoPlaintiffincontinuanceofsuit,LITWIN
BOYADJIANINC.,allinfringingcopiesandreproductionswhichembodyinany
substantialformwhatsoevertheSUNARC’sworkentitled »transparentsolar
structurephotographs »,includingbutnotlimitedto,anyandallnegativesand
photographsinanymaterialshapeorformand,withoutlimitation,including
thosereproducedanddisplayedonthewebsiteswww.solaroof.comand
www.building.com;
TaiFoongInternationalLtd.v.MaisonSamiT.A.FruitsInc.
(2002),[2002]CarswellQue1232,[2002]QJ334,[2002]RJQ1438,JE2002-1088,[2002-02-05]
(QueSupCt)MongeonJ.
Résumé
Requêteeninjonctioninterlocutoire.Rejetée.Requêteenannulationd’uneordonnancede
sauvegardeetenannulationd’unesaisieavantjugement.Accueillie.
Larequérante,TaiFoongInternationalLtd.,distribueauxdétaillantsetauxrestaurantsdes
produitsalimentaires,dontdurizblancparfuméprovenantdeThaïlandesouslamarquede
commerce«OxHead».Cettemarqueaétéenregistréeen1997.Sonlogoestconstituéd’un
cercleàl’intérieurduquelsetrouveunetêtedeboeufflanquéededeuxcrevettes.Elle
prétendquelesélémentsfaisantpartiedesamarquedecommercesontuniqueset
distinctifsetqu’ilscontribuentàidentifierfacilementlesproduitsqu’ellevend.Foongsoutient
quel’emballageutiliséparl’intimée,laMaisonSamiT.A.Fruitsinc.,pourapprovisionnerses
clientsendenréespérissablesetautresmarchandisesvioleraitsamarquedecommerce.En
effet,elleutiliseraitpourlaventederizblancparfuméunemballagecomportant
d’importantessimilitudesavecceluiutiliséparFoong,desorteque,enplusdecréerdela
confusion(art.6delaLoisurlesmarquesdecommerce),elleauraitcommisundélitde
substitution(art.7).LelogodeSamiestconstituéd’unetêtedetruitedessinéedansuncercle
etflanquéededeuxcrevettes.Foongafaitsaisir92tonnesderizblancparfuméimportées
parSamietdontlavaleurestestiméeàenviron175000$.Enplusdes’opposeràlaprésente
requête,Samiréclamel’annulationdecettesaisieavantjugement.
Décision
LesacutiliséparSamicomporteunlogoquiestsixfoisplusgrosqueceluideFoong.Àl’instar
del’emballageutiliséparcettedernière,onyindiqueclairementlenomdel’entreprisede
distribution.Enoutre,lesdessinsquiyfigurentsonttrèsdifférents.Mêmes’ilsprésententde
nombreusessimilitudes,lesdeuxsacscomportentdoncd’importantesdifférences.D’ailleurs,
lessacsutilisésparlesautrescompétiteursdespartiesprésententcertainesdecessimilitudes:
ilssonttousfaitsdumêmematériauetontàpeuprèslesmêmescouleurs,ilspossèdentdes
poignéesrougesetleurslogosillustrentunanimaldansuncercle.Deplus,Samiadémontré
quelesdifférencesentrelesdeuxemballagessontassezimportantespourqu’un
consommateurexigelerizcontenudansuncertainemballageplutôtqu’unautre.Lefait
d’invoquerl’enregistrementd’unemarquedecommerceneconstituepasunepreuveprima
faciequ’ilexisteuneconfusionentrelesemballagesutilisésparlesparties.Onnepeutdonc
conclureàlaconfusionouencoreaurisquedeconfusionentrelesdeuxmarquesde
commerceausensdel’article6delaLoisurlesmarquesdecommerce.D’autrepart,Foong
n’aprésentéaucunélémentsusceptibledeprouverlapertedeprofitqu’elleauraitpusubir.
Mêmes’ils’agitd’unequestionrelativeaudroitdesmarquesdecommerce,lescritèresétablis
danslesaffairesSociétédedéveloppementdelaBaieJamesc.Kanatewat,[1975]C.A.166,
etProcureurgénéralduManitobac.MetropolitanStoresLtd.,[1987]1R.C.S.110(J.E.87-396


etD.T.E.87T-322),doiventêtreremplis.Or,laprépondérancedesinconvénientspencheen
faveurdeSami,quipourraitsubirunpréjudiceimportantsilarequêteeninjonction
interlocutoireétaitaccueillie.Lesconséquencespoursonentreprisesontextrêmement
sérieusespuisqu’ellenepeutavoiraccèsàlamarchandisequiaétésaisieetdontelledoit
supporterlecoûtd’entreposage.Enoutre,lapreuvequ’elleaprésentéequantàl’absence
deconfusionouderisquedeconfusionn’apasétécontrediteparFoong.Enfin,les
allégationsdel’affidavitfourniàl’appuidecettesaisieavantjugementsontinsuffisantespour
justifierunetellemesure.D’unepart,aucunedispositiondelaLoisurlesmarquesde
commercenepermetàFoongdeprétendreàundroitdepropriétédanscette
marchandise.D’autrepart,seulslessacslecontenantpourraientfairel’objetd’une
procédureenvertudel’article38delaLoisurledroitd’auteursil’onenvenaitàlaconclusion
qu’ils’agitd’oeuvres.Ausurplus,FoongdevaitdémontrerenquoilesemballagesdeSami
constituaientunecontrefaçondesespropressacs.Or,ellenes’estpasnonplusdéchargée
decefardeau.Enconséquence,larequêteeninjonctioninterlocutoireserarejetéeetla
saisieavantjugement,annulée.
[100]Consequently,itisclearthatonlythericebagscouldbethesubject-matterofthe
exerciseofarightundersection38oftheCopyrightAct[andnotthericeitself].
[105]Ademonstrationthatone »work »isa »colourableimitation »ofanothernecessitatesthe
applicationofamuchnarrowertestthanthetestofconfusionorlikelihoodofconfusion
requiredundertheTradeMarkActtoconcludethatatrademarkinfringesuponanother.
Havingbeenunabletoestablishastrongprimafaciecaseoftrademarkinfringement,Tai
Foongfallsshortofestablishingthatthereishereacolourableimitationamountingtoa
copyrightinfringementgivingrisetotheapplicationofsection38oftheCopyrightAct.
[106]Acolourableimitation,byoppositiontoacopy,isareproductiontowhichchanges
havebeenmadebutconservingenoughsoareaderoroneobserverwouldbelievethatthe
imitationisinfacttheoriginal.Inthepresentinstance,acomparisonofthetwobags,thetwo
logosandthetwoget-upshavenotshownenoughelementsofsimilaritytoenabletheCourt
toconcludetoconfusionorlikelihoodofconfusionbasedupontheevidencepresented.It
wouldnecessarilyfollowthatwithoutastrongfindingofconfusionorlikelihoodofconfusion,
therecannotbe,onthesameevidentialbasis,afindingofcopyrightinfringement.
Thébergev.Galeried©ArtduPetitChamplaininc.
(2002),17CPR(4th)161,[2002]SCJ32,[2002]ASC32,[2002]CarswellQue306,2002
CarswellQue307,23BLR(3d)1,285NR267,210DLR(4
th)385,JE2002-625,2002SCC34,[2002-
03-28],
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/laroche.en.html,inFrenchat
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/fr/rec/html/laroche.fr.htmlandat
http://www.canlii.org/ca/jug/csc/2002/2002csc34.html(SCC)

Résumé
PourvoicontreunarrêtdelaCourd’appelduQuébecayantrejetél’appeld’unjugementde
laCoursupérieureduQuébec.Accueilli,avecdissidence.
L’intimé,unartistepeintrejouissantd’uneréputationinternationaleenviable,cèdepar
contratàunéditeurledroitdepublierdesreproductions,descartesainsiqued’autres
produitsdepapeteriereprésentantcertainesdesesoeuvres.Lesgaleriesd’artappelantes
achètentdel’éditeurdescartes,photolithographiesetaffichesreprésentantdifférentes
oeuvresdel’artiste,pourensuiteenentoilerl’image.L’entoilageestunprocédéquipermet
depréleverd’uneaffichepapierimpriméelesencresutiliséesetdelesreportersurunetoile.


Ceprocédélaissantl’affiched’origineblanche,iln’yapasd’augmentationdunombretotal
dereproductions.L’intiméintentecontrelesappelantsunrecourseninjonction,redditionde
comptesetdommages-intérêtsdevantlaCoursupérieureduQuébec.Ilobtientégalement
ladélivranced’unbrefdesaisieavantjugement,envertudel’article735duCodede
procédurecivile(C.P.C.),quivisetouslesentoilagesdesesoeuvres,alléguantavoirundroit
depropriétéprésumésurcesbiensenvertudel’article38delaLoisurledroitd’auteur.
L’article38(1)delaloiénoncequeletitulairedudroitd’auteurpeutrecouvrerlapossession
detouslesexemplairescontrefaitsd’oeuvres.La«contrefaçon»àl’égardd’uneoeuvreest
définieàl’article2delaloicomme«toutereproduction,ycomprisl’imitationdéguisée,quia
étéfaitecontrairementàlaprésenteloiouquiafaitl’objetd’unactecontraireàlaprésente
loi».Lesappelantsdemandentlacassationdecettesaisie.LaCoursupérieureconclutque
l’entoilaged’unereproductionpapierautoriséen’équivautpasàcontrefaçonausensdela
loietaccordeunemainlevéedessaisies.LaCourd’appel,concluantqu’ilyacontrefaçon,
infirmecejugementetmaintientlasaisieavantjugementquantauxentoilages.
Décision
M.lejugeBinnie,àl’opinionduquelsouscriventlajugeenchefMcLachlinetlesjuges
IacobuccietMajor:LaLoisurledroitd’auteurconfèreàl’intiméàlafoisdesdroits
économiquesetdesdroitsmorauxsursonoeuvre.Lesdroitséconomiquessontfondéssurune
conceptiondesoeuvresartistiquesetlittérairesquilesconsidèreessentiellementcommedes
objetsdecommerce.Cesdroitspeuventêtrecédésetl’intiménepeutfairevaloirenvertu
delaloiquelesdroitséconomiquesqu’ilaconservés.Lesdroitsmoraux,quisontincessibles,
traitentl’oeuvrecommeunprolongementdelapersonnalitédel’artisteetluiattribuentune
dignitéquimérited’êtreprotégée.Iln’yaviolationdel’intégritédel’oeuvrequesicelle-ciest
modifiéed’unemanièrepréjudiciableàl’honneurouàlaréputationdel’auteur.Lesdroits
morauxrestreignentdefaçonpermanentel’utilisationquelesacheteurspeuventfaired’une
oeuvreunefoisquesonauteurs’enestdéparti,maisilfauttenircomptedeslimitesqui
constituentunepartieessentielledesdroitsmorauxcréésparlelégislateur.Ilnefautpas
interpréterlesdroitséconomiquesenleurattribuantuneportéetellementlargequ’ils
engloberaientlesmêmesélémentsquelesdroitsmoraux,cequirendraitinapplicablesles
limitesauxdroitmorauximposéesparlelégislateur.
Enl’espèce,l’intimétentedefairevaloirundroitmoralsouslecouvertd’undroitéconomique
etcettetentativedoitêtrerepoussée.Lesappelantsontachetédesaffichesdespeintures
del’intiméreproduiteslégalementetontutiliséunprocessuschimiquepourdétacherla
couched’encredupapier(laissantcelui-ciblanc)etpourl’apposersurunetoile.Enleur
qualitédepropriétairesdesaffiches,ilsavaientledroitd’agirainsi.Iln’yapaseude
production(nidereproduction)d’unenouvelleoeuvreartistiquenid’une«partieimportante
del’oeuvre,sousuneformematériellequelconque»ausensdel’article3(1)delaloi.
L’image«fixée»dansl’encresurlesaffichesn’apasétéreproduite.Elleaététransféréed’un
supportàunautre.Uneinterprétationlargedesdroitséconomiquesselonlaquellela
substitutiond’unsupportàunautreconstitueunenouvelle«reproduction»quiporteatteinte
auxdroitsdutitulairedudroitd’auteurmêmesilerésultatn’estpaspréjudiciableàsa
réputationfaittroppencherlabalanceenfaveurdutitulairedudroitd’auteuretne
reconnaîtpassuffisammentlesdroitsdepropriétédesappelantssurlesaffichesqu’ilsont
achetées.
Ilfautgarderàl’espritlaportéehistoriquedelanotionde«reproduction»figurantdanslaLoi
surledroitd’auteur.La«reproduction»estgénéralementdéfiniecommel’actiondeproduire
descopiessupplémentairesounouvellesdel’oeuvresousuneformematériellequelconque.
Bienquelaloireconnaissequel’évolutiontechnologiquepermetmaintenantlareproduction
del’expressionpardenouveauxmoyens,l’évolutionimportantedesconceptsjuridiquesdans


ledomainedudroitd’auteurn’entrepasenjeu,comptetenudesfaits.Ilyaeuen
l’occurrencetransfertlittéralmatérieletmécaniquesansmultiplication.
L’existencedanslaloiderégimesdistinctscouvrantlesdroitséconomiques,d’unepart,etles
droitsmoraux,d’autrepart,dénotel’intentiond’établirunedistinctionetuneséparation
claires.Encequiatraitauxrecours,lelégislateuravouluquelamodificationsans
reproductionsoitrégieparlesdispositionsportantsurlesdroitsmorauxplutôtqueparcelles
portantsurlesdroitséconomiques.Adopteruneopinioncontrairepermettraitàunartistequi
s’opposeàunemodificationdelareproductionautoriséedesesoustraireàl’exigence
importantedeprouverlepréjudicecauséàsonhonneurouàsaréputationpourétablirque
sesdroitsmorauxontétéviolés.
L’intiménerépondantpasauxcritèresd’applicationdel’article38delaloi,l’article734C.P.C.
neluipermettaitpasd’obtenirlasaisiedesexemplairesdesappelants.Ilseraitplusjustede
considérerlavéritableplaintedel’intimécommevisantl’atteinteprésuméeàsesdroits
«moraux»etl’effetpotentieldecetteatteintesurlemarchédesesoeuvres.L’artisteou
l’auteurquiallèguelaviolationd’undroitmoralnepeutpasrecouriràlasaisieavant
jugementpermiseparl’article734.L’évaluationd’uneviolationpotentielledesdroitsmoraux
faitgrandementappelàl’exercicedujugement.Ladéformation,lamutilationoula
modificationd’uneoeuvrenepeutdonnerlieuàunepoursuitequesielleestfaite«d’une
manièrepréjudiciableàl’honneurouàlaréputationdel’auteur».L’artisteoul’auteurnedoit
pasdevenirjugedesaproprecauseencesmatièresetilesttoutàfaitcompréhensibleque
lelégislateurinsistesurlatenued’unexamenjudiciairepréalableàtoutesaisiefondéesur
uneallégationdeviolationdesdroitsmoraux.Ilappartiendraaujugedepremièreinstance
dedéterminersilapreuvepluscomplèteproduiteauprocèsdémontrel’existenced’une
violationdesdroitséconomiquesoudesdroitsmoraux.Àcestade-ci,ilnoussuffitde
conclurequeledossierinterlocutoirenejustifiaitpaslasaisieavantjugement.
M.lejugeGonthier,dissident,àl’opinionduquelsouscriventlesjugesL’Heureux-Dubéet
LeBel:LaLoisurledroitd’auteurpourvoitàlafoisàlaprotectiondudroitd’auteur(copyright)
etdesdroitsmorauxdel’auteur.Ledroitd’auteurprotègecontrel’appropriationetla
disséminationillicitesdel’expressioncréative.C’estundroitdenaturepatrimonialequipeut
fairel’objetd’unecession.L’objetdudroitd’auteurestundroitsurl’oeuvreetnonundroit
personnel.L’élément-cléestl’oeuvreincluantsonsupportmatériel,etnonl’idéedel’oeuvre.
Pourleurpart,lesdroitsmorauxs’attachentprincipalementàlaprotectiondel’intégritéetde
lapaternitédel’oeuvre,celle-ciétantalorsconsidéréecommeuneextensiondela
personnalitédel’auteur.Ils’agitdoncdedroitsextra-patrimoniaux,pardéfinitionincessibles.
Lesnotionsdedroitsmorauxsontinapplicablesauxfaitsdelaprésenteaffaire.
Enl’espèce,lesappelantsontillégalementprocédéàlareproductiondesoeuvresdel’intimé
sousuneformematériellequelconqueenviolationdel’article3(1)delaloi.Pourqu’une
oeuvresoitreproduite,iln’estpasnécessairededémontreruneaugmentationdunombre
totaldecopiesdecelle-ci.Lelégislateurn’apasuniquementprotégéledroitdereproduire
latotalitédel’oeuvre,maiségalementunepartieimportantedecelle-ci.Ilfautdonctenir
comptenonpasuniquementdel’aspectquantitatif,maiségalementdel’aspectqualitatif.
Uneanalyserestrictiveuniquementbaséesurlamultiplicationdel’oeuvrenesauraitlui
octroyerlaprotectionnécessaireetignoreraitleconceptde«partieimportantedel’oeuvre»
quisetrouveprotégéeparl’article3(1).
Lanotiond’«oeuvre»renvoieàtouteformed’expressionmatérialiséeetoriginale.Lafixationà
unsupportmatérielconstitueuneconditionsinequanondelaproductiond’uneoeuvre.
Ainsi,«produire»uneoeuvrefaitréférenceàunepremièrematérialisationetla«reproduire»à
toutefixationmatérielleultérieurequis’inspire(ausenscausal)delapremièrefixation.La


fixationàunnouveausupportmatérielconstituedoncl’élémentfondamentaldel’actede
«reproduire[…]sousuneformematériellequelconque»cequiexistaitdéjàsousunepremière
formematérielle.Untelcomportementrelèveduplagiatetconstitueuneviolationdesdroits
d’auteurtrouvésàl’article3(1).
Ilestimportantdedistinguerentrelesupportmatérielprotégéparl’article3(1)delaloietqui
estinextricablementliéàl’oeuvre,etlanotionde«structure»quiseretrouveàl’article28.2(3)
delaloi.Unemodificationdusupportmatérielestprohibéeparl’article3(1)delaloi,tandis
quelamodificationd’unestructurequicontientl’oeuvreseraprohibéeparl’article28.2(3)si
l’auteurdémontrequelanouvellestructureportepréjudiceàl’intégritédesonoeuvre.
Laloiprévoitlapossibilitépourletitulairedudroitd’auteurdedisposerdesondroitentotalité
ouenpartie,conservantalorslereliquatdesdroitsexclusifsdereproductionqu’iln’apas
cédés.L’intiméaautorisédefaçontrèsdétailléelareproductiondesesoeuvresparses
éditeurs.Lecontratentrel’intiméetseséditeursdoits’interpréterselonlesdirectivesgénérales
offertesauxarticles1425à1432duCodecivilduQuébec.L’intimén’ajamaiseul’intentionde
céderlatotalitédesondroitdereproduirelesoeuvresviséessousuneformematérielle
quelconque.Uneinterprétationdel’ensembledesdispositionscontractuellesmontrequele
droitconféréselimiteàlaseulereproductionsurproduitspapier,excluantparlefaitmêmela
reproductionsoustouteautreformematérielle,dontl’appositiond’uneimagereprésentant
uneoeuvredel’intimésurunetoile.L’utilisationdel’expression«autresproduitsdepapeterie»
laissecroirequelesproduitsexpressémentautoriséssontégalementdesproduitsde
papeterie.Lapossibilitéd’encadrer,laminerouregrouperleproduitavecd’autresindique
égalementqueleproduitenestundepapeterie,lesupportautorisénesubissantpasde
modificationmatérielleetdemeurantdupapier.Lesdroitscédésparcontratn’incluent
certainementpaslapossibilitédedénaturerleproduitautoriséenenchangeantlesupport.
Enlimitantexpressémentlesdroitscédésàdesreproductionsdesesoeuvressursupport
papier,l’intiméadoncconservétoussesdroitsdereproductionsurquelqueautresupport
quecesoit.Enentoilantdesaffichespapierdesoeuvresdel’intimé,lesappelantsontbelet
bienreproduitlesoeuvresdel’intiméouunepartieimportantedecelles-cisousuneforme
matériellequelconqueencontraventiondel’article3(1)delaloi.L’absencede
consentementdel’intiméfaitensortequesondroitd’auteuraétéviolé.Lesappelantsse
sontainsiadonnésàdesactesdecontrefaçonetl’intiméétaitendroitdesaisirlesentoilages
conformémentauxdispositionsdesarticles734(1)C.P.C.et38(1)delaLoisurledroit
d’auteur.
Therespondent,apainterwhoenjoysawell-establishedinternationalreputation,assignedby
contracttherighttopublishreproductions,cardsandotherstationeryproductsrepresenting
certainofhisworkstoapublisher.Theappellantartgalleriespurchasedcards,
photolithographsandpostersembodyingvariousoftheartist’sworksfromthepublisher,and
thentransferredtheimagetocanvas.Theprocessinissuehereinvolvesliftingtheinkthatwas
usedinprintingapaperposterandtransferringitontoacanvas.Sincethisprocessleavesthe
posterblank,thereisnoincreaseinthetotalnumberofreproductions.Therespondent
appliedforaninjunction,accounting,anddamagesagainsttheappellantsintheQuebec
SuperiorCourt.Healsoobtainedawritofseizurebeforejudgment,underart.735oftheCode
ofCivilProcedure(C.c.p.),withrespecttoallofthecanvas-backedreproductions
embodyinghisworks,claimingtohaveadeemedrightofownershipinthoseitemsunder
s.38(1)oftheCopyrightAct(C.A.).Section38(1)C.A.providesthattheownerofthe
copyrightinaworkmayrecoverpossessionofallinfringingcopiesofthatwork. »Infringing »,in
relationtoawork,isdefinedins.2C.A.as »anycopy,includinganycolourablecopy,made



ordealtwithincontraventionofthisAct ».Theappellantsappliedtohavetheseizure
quashed.TheSuperiorCourtconcludedthattransferringanauthorizedpaperreproduction
ontocanvasdidnotamounttoinfringementwithinthemeaningoftheC.A.,andordered
thattheseizurebequashed.TheCourtofAppeal,findingthattherehadbeeninfringement,
setasidethatdecisionandupholdtheseizurebeforejudgmentwithrespecttothecanvas-
backedreproductions.
Held(L’Heureux-Dubé,GonthierandLeBelJJ.dissenting):Theappealshouldbeallowed.The
orderofthemotionsjudgesettingasidetheseizureandorderingthattheseizedgoodsbe
returnedtotheappellantsshouldberestored.
PerMcLachlinC.J.andIacobucci,MajorandBinnieJJ.:TheCopyrightActprovidesthe
respondentwithbotheconomicandmoralrightstohiswork.Theeconomicrightsarebased
onaconceptionofartisticandliteraryworksessentiallyasarticlesofcommerce.Suchrights
canbeassignedandtherespondentcanonlyassertundertheActtheeconomicrightshe
hasretained.Moralrights,whicharenotassignable,treattheoeuvreasanextensionofthe
artist’spersonality,possessingadignitywhichisdeservingofprotection.Theintegrityofthe
workisinfringedonlyiftheworkismodifiedtotheprejudiceofthehonourorreputationofthe
author.Moralrightsactasacontinuingrestraintonwhatpurchaserscandowithaworkonce
itpassesfromtheauthor,butrespectmustbegiventothelimitationsthatareanessential
partofthemoralrightscreatedbyParliament.Economicrightsshouldnotbereadsobroadly
thattheycoverthesamegroundasthemoralrights,makinginoperativethelimitsParliament
hasimposedonmoralrights.
Inthiscase,therespondentisassertingamoralrightintheguiseofaneconomicright,and
theattemptshouldberejected.Theappellantspurchasedlawfullyreproducedpostersofthe
respondent’spaintingsandusedachemicalprocessthatallowedthemtolifttheinklayer
fromthepaper(leavingitblank)andtodisplayitoncanvas.Theywerewithintheirrightsto
dosoasownersofthephysicalposters.Therewasnoproduction(orreproduction)ofanew
artisticwork »oranysubstantialpartthereofinanymaterialform »withinthemeaningofs.3(1)
oftheCopyrightAct.
Theimage »fixed »ininkontheposterswasnotreproduced.Itwastransferredfromone
displaytoanother.Anexpansivereadingoftheeconomicrightswherebysubstitutionofone
backingforanotherconstitutesanew »reproduction »thatinfringesthecopyrightholder’s
rightseveniftheresultisnotprejudicialtohisreputationtiltsthebalancetoofarinfavourof
thecopyrightholderandinsufficientlyrecognizestheproprietaryrightsoftheappellantsin
thephysicalposterswhichtheypurchased.
Thehistoricalscopeofthenotionof »reproduction »undertheCopyrightActshouldbekeptin
mind. »Reproduction »hasusuallybeendefinedastheactofproducingadditionalornew
copiesoftheworkinanymaterialform.WhiletheActrecognizesthattechnologieshave
evolvedbywhichexpressioncouldbereproducedinnewways,theimportantevolutionof
legalconceptsinthefieldofcopyrightisnotengagedbythefactshere.Thisisacaseof
literalphysical,mechanicaltransferinwhichnomultiplicationtakesplace.
TheseparatestructuresintheActtocovereconomicrightsandmoralrightsshowthata
cleardistinctionandseparationwasintended.Intermsofremedies,Parliamentintended
modificationwithoutreproductiontobedealtwithundertheprovisionsdealingwithmoral
rightsratherthaneconomicrights.Acontraryviewwouldallowanartistwhoobjectedtoa
« modification »ofanauthorizedreproductiontosidesteptheimportantrequirementof
showingprejudicetohonourorreputationinordertoestablishaninfringementofmoral
rights.


Sincetherespondenthasnotbroughthimselfwithins.38oftheCopyrightAct,hehadno
authoritytoobtainaseizureoftheappellants’copiesunderart.734C.c.p.Therespondent’s
realcomplaintismoreproperlycharacterizedastheallegedinfringementofhis »moral »rights
anditspotentialimpactonthemarketforhisworks.Anart.734seizurebeforejudgmentisnot
availabletoanartistorauthorwhoreliesontheallegedinfringementofamoralright.The
evaluationofapotentialbreachofmoralrightscallsfortheexerciseofagooddealof
judgment.Adistortion,mutilationormodificationofaworkisonlyactionableifitisto »the
prejudiceofthehonourorreputationoftheauthor ».Theartistorwritershouldnotbecome
thejudgeinhisowncauseonsuchmattersanditisthereforeentirelyunderstandablethat
Parliamentshouldinsistonpriorjudicialreviewbeforeanyseizuretakesplacebasedonan
assertionofviolationofmoralrights.Whetherafullerrecordadducedattrialwilldemonstrate
abreachofeconomicrightsormoralrightswillbeforthetrialjudgetodetermine.Atthis
stage,weneedtodecideonlythattheinterlocutoryrecorddidnotjustifytheseizurebefore
judgment.
PerL’Heureux-Dubé,GonthierandLeBelJJ.(dissenting):TheC.A.providesprotectionforboth
copyrightandtheauthor’smoralrights.Copyrightprotectsagainsttheunlawfulappropriation
anddistributionofcreativeexpression.Itisapatrimonialrightthatmaybeassigned.The
subject-matterofcopyrightisarightintheworkandnotapersonalright.Thekeyfactoristhe
work,includingitsmaterialsupport,andnottheideaexpressedbythework.Moralrightsare
concernedprimarilywithprotectingtheintegrityandpaternityofthework,whichisthen
regardedasanextensionoftheauthor’spersonality.Theseareextra-patrimonialrights,
which,bydefinition,arenotassignable.Theconceptsofmoralrightsareinapplicabletothe
factsofthiscase.
Inthiscasetheappellantsunlawfullyreproducedtherespondent’sworksinamaterialformin
breachofs.3(1)C.A.Inorderforaworktobereproduced,thereisnorequirementto
establishthattherehasbeenanincreaseinthetotalnumberofcopiesofthework.
Parliamentdidnotprotecttherightonlytoreproducetheworkasawholebutalsoto
reproduceasubstantialpartofthework.Itisthereforenecessarytoconsidernotonlythe
quantitativeaspect,butalsothequalitativeaspect.Arestrictiveanalysisbasedsolelyon
multiplicationoftheworkcouldnotprovidetheworkwiththenecessaryprotectionand
wouldignoretheconceptof »substantialpartthereof »,whichisprotectedbys.3(1).
Theconceptof »work »referstoanymaterializedandoriginalformofexpression.Fixationof
theworkinamediumisaconditionsinequanonoftheproductionofawork.Therefore,
« producing »aworkreferstotheinitialmaterializationand »reproducing »itreferstoany
subsequentmaterialfixationthatismodelled(inthecausalsense)onitsfirstfixation.Fixation
oftheworkinanewmediumisthereforethefundamentalelementoftheactof
« reproduc[ing]…inanymaterialformwhatever »whatalreadyexistedinafirst,original
materialform.Thattypeofconductamountstoplagiarismandconstitutesaninfringementof
copyrightunders.3(1)C.A.
Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweenthemedium,whichisprotectedbys.3(1)C.A.andis
inextricablyconnectedtothework,andtheconceptof »structure »ins.28.2(3)C.A.Achange
tothemediumisprohibitedbys.3(1)C.A.,whileachangetoaphysicalstructurecontaining
theworkwillbeprohibitedbys.28.2(3)iftheauthorestablishesthatthenewphysical
structurecausesprejudicetotheintegrityofhisorherwork.
TheC.A.providesthatacopyrightownermaydisposeofhisorherright,eitherwhollyor
partially,retainingtheresidueofthesolereproductionrightsthatwerenotassigned.The
respondenthadgivenhispublishersverydetailedauthorizationforthereproductionofhis
works.Thecontractbetweentherespondentandhispublishersmustbeinterpretedin


accordancewiththegeneralrequirementsofarts.1425to1432oftheCivilCodeofQuébec.
Therespondentneverintendedtoassigninfullhisrighttoreproducetheworksinquestionin
anymaterialformwhatever.Thecontractualprovisions,whenconstruedasawhole,show
thattherightconferredislimitedsolelytoreproductiononpaperproducts,therebyexcluding
reproductioninanyothermaterialform,includingaffixinganimagerepresentingthe
respondent’sworkontoacanvas.Theuseoftheexpression »otherstationeryproducts »implies
thattheproductsthatareexpresslyauthorizedarealsostationeryproducts.Thefactthatthe
productmaybeframed,laminatedorcombinedwithotherproductsalsosuggeststhatthe
productisinfactastationeryproduct,astheauthorizedmediumisnotphysicallyalteredand
isstillpaper.Therightsassignedbycontractcertainlydonotincludetheabilitytoalterthe
authorizedproductbychangingitsmedium.
Byexpresslyconfiningtherightsthatwereassignedtoproducingreproductionsofhisworks
onpaper,therespondentthereforeretainedallhisrightstoproducereproductionsonany
othermediumwhatsoever.Bytransferringpostersoftherespondent’sworksontocanvas,the
appellantsdidinfactreproducetherespondent’sworksorasubstantialpartthereofinany
materialformwhatever,contrarytos.3(1)C.A.Thefactthattherespondentdidnotconsent
meansthathiscopyrightwasinfringed.Theappellantshadthereforeengagedin
infringementandtherespondentwasentitledtoseizethecanvas-backedreproductions
underart.734(1)C.C.P.ands.38(1)C.A.
TrawlercatMarineInc.v.Folden
(2002),22CPR(4
th)514,[2002]FCJ1601,[2002]CarswellNat3289,2002FCT1181,[2002-11-13]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct1181.html(FCTD)Hargrave,Prothonotary
Theindividualdefendantgavetheindividualplaintiffadepositforstudycopiesofplansfora
catamaranyachtwhichthedefendantintendedtohavebuiltbyathirdparty.The
defendantsubmittedplansfora55-footcatamaranbutelectednottoproceedwiththe
projectafterlearningthattheplaintiffhadnotmadearrangementsforthecatamarantobe
built.
Theindividualdefendantsubsequentlyretainedanarchitectwhodesignedforhima70-foot
catamaranofsleekerdesignthanthatshownintheplansfortheindividualplaintiff.The
plaintiffnamedthecatamarantheAmityandhadtheAmitypartiallyconstructed.[page516]
Theplaintiffscommencedactionforbreachofcopyrightthroughtheuseoftheplaintiffs’
drawings,breachofcontract,negligence,fraudulentmisrepresentationandotherrelief.The
plaintiffsclaimedreliefinremagainsttheAmityandarrestedthepartiallycompleted
catamaran.Theplaintiffsallegedthatthedisputesoundedinrembyreasonofs.22(1)and
22(2)(m)or(n)oftheFederalCourtAct,R.S.C.1985,c.F-7.
ThedefendantsbroughtamotiontostrikeouttheinremclaimandforreleaseoftheAmity
fromarrest.
Held,themotionshouldbegranted.
Section22(1)oftheFederalCourtActgrantsthecourtjurisdictionforaclaimsoughtbyvirtue
ofCanadianmaritimelaworotherlawrelatingtonavigationandshipping.Section22(2)(m)
provides,forgreatercertainty,thatthecourthasjurisdictionforaclaimforthesupplyof
goods,materialsorservicesfortheoperationormaintenanceofaship.Section22(2)(n)


provides,forgreatercertainty,thatthecourt’sjurisdictionalsoincludesanyclaimarisingout
ofacontractrelatingtotheconstructionofaship.
CopyrightClaim
Section22(1)oftheFederalCourtActistobebroadlyconstruedtogivethecourtjurisdiction
oversubjectmattersointegrallyconnectedtomaritimemattersastobelegitimate
Canadianmaritimelaw.Theplaintiffs’copyrightclaiminvolvedplansforashipneitherbuilt
norinexistence.Theplansweresenttoaprospectivecustomersohemightvisualizewhatthe
shipwouldlooklike.Theclaimdidnotthereforefallwithinmaritimelaworfederaljurisdiction
inrespectofnavigationandshippingandwasnotthereforewithintheinremjurisdiction
establishedpursuanttos.22(1).
ContractClaim
Theplaintiffsclaimeddamagesforbreachofacontracttoenterintoacontracttobuilda
vessel.Atbestthiswasaninpersonamclaimonwhichtherewasnothinginthepleadingsto
establishanexuswiththeAmity.Thereisnoinremproceedingavailableinthecaseofanin
personamcontracttoenterintoacontracttobuildavessel.
Section22Claim
Aclaimformaterialsorservicessuppliedtoashipunders.22(2)(m)oftheFederalCourtActis
broaderthanthetraditionalclaimtosupplynecessaries.Thereare,however,limitationsina
claimunders.22(2)(m).First,thesupplymustbefortheoperationormaintenancewhichis
notthecasewherethereareonlyplansforanon-existingship.Secondly,thesectionrefersto
« theship »not »aship ».Theexistenceoftheshipisessentialotherwisetherecanonlybein
personamliability.
Theclaimunders.22(2)(n)relatedtotheconstructionofaship.Thebestcasefortheplaintiffs
wasthattherewasacontracttoenterintoacontractfortheconstructionofavessel.Sucha
contractdidnotcomewithinthesection.Furthermore,[page517]theconstructioncontract
contemplatedbys.22(2)(n)isonebetweentheshipbuilderandtheowner.
Thereforetherewasnothingpleadedwhichclothedthecourtwithinremjurisdictionoverthe
Amity.TheinremclaimwasstruckoutandtheAmitywasreleasedfromarrest.
[1]Theissuesonthismotionincludewhetherallegeduseofcopyrightyachtdesignsmight
soundinrem.TheDefendantscontendthatthereisnoapplicableinremjurisdictioninthis
Courtincopyrightorotherwiseandthereforethe[Defendants’ship]Amitymustbereleased
fromarrest.
[11]WhiletheFederalCourthasjurisdictionundersection20oftheFederalCourtRules,1998,
todealwith,amongotherthings,mattersofcopyright,thatjurisdictionmustbefounded
uponapplicablefederallawandnotonthebasisofanactionintortorcontract,incidental
tocopyrightlaw.Thesourceoffederallaw,inthepresentinstance,issaidtobethe
CopyrightAct.
[12]Inreachingtheconclusionthatacopyrightclaimoughtnottosoundinrem,Ihavekept
inmindthatIshouldinterpretsection22(1)oftheFederalCourtActbroadly.Ihavealsokept
inmindthatthereferencetoremediesbeingsoughtunderorbyvirtueofCanadianmaritime
lawshouldnotbeconfinedtoatraditionalorhistoricapproach,butshouldbeinterpretedin
amodernandrelevantcontext:hereseekMonkCorporationv.IslandFertilizersLtd.,[1991]1
S.C.R.779at795.ThisapproachofbroadinterpretationallowstheFederalCourtjurisdiction
intosubjectmatter »sointegrallyconnectedwithmaritimemattersastobelegitimate
Canadianmaritimelaw… »(loc.cit.).


[13]AfurtherdifficultyIhavewithfindingjurisdictionwithinsection22(1)oftheFederalCourt
Actisthatthecopyrightclaiminvolvedplanssuppliedforashipneitherbuiltnorinexistence.
Thisisbecausetheclaim,involvingcopyrightinavessel’splanssenttoaprospective
customersohemightvisualizethenatureofthevessel,neitherfallswithinthescopeof
admiraltyormaritimelawasincorporatedintothelawsofCanada,norfallswithinthefederal
legislativejurisdictioninrespectofnavigationandshipping:seeforexampleQuebecand
OntarioTransportationCo.v.The »IncanSt.Laurent »(1979)104D.L.R.(3d)139at141-142
(F.C.A.),affirmed[1980]2S.C.R.242.
[14]CertainlytherehavebeencasesintheFederalCourtinvolvingyachtdesignandhereI
haveinmind,asanexample,BaylinerMarineCorporationv.DoralBoatsLtd.(1985),5C.P.R.
(3d)289(F.C.T.D.)and(1986),10C.P.R.(3d)289(F.C.A.).However,Baylinerdidnothavean
inremaspect.Indeed,Idonotseehowcopyrightorindustrialdesignmattersmightbe
enforcedinrem.Inremjurisdictiondependsuponcomingwithinsection22oftheFederal
CourtAct,enforcedinremasauthorizedbysection43(2)andasexceptedinsection43(3).
ThisleadsbacktoaconsiderationofwhethertheclaimofthePlaintiffscomewithinsection
22(2),(m)or(n),whichIwilldealwithshortly.
[27]Thereisnothingpleadedinthisaction,orexplainedintheaffidavitmaterial,bywhichthe
clotheofFederalCourtwiththenecessaryinremjurisdictiontoallowthearrestoftheAmity.
WhiletheinpersonamaspectofthisclaimmayfallwithinFederalCourtlegislative
competency,apointnotarguedonthismotion,itisnotsufficient,inordertoestablishinrem
jurisdiction,merelyforthesubjectmattertohavesomeconnectionwithaship.
[30]Allofthisisnottosaythattheinpersonamactionmightnot,tosomedegree,succeed.
Rather,theactionshallnowproceedpurelyasaninpersonamaction,withtheAmitybeing
releasedfromarrest.
Winklerv.Roy
(2002),21CPR(4
th)539,[2002]CarswellNat2421,222FTR161,[2002]FCJ1258,2002FCT950
[2002-09-12]
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct950.html(FCTD)GibsonJ.
KelleywastheauthorofanumberofbooksincludingTheBlackDonnellysandVengeanceof
theBlackDonnellys(the »DonnellyBooks »).Byletteragreementin1968theauthorgrantedto
therespondentSaroyFilmProductionsanoptiontoacquirethesoleandexclusivepublishing,
motionpictureandalliedrightsintheDonnellyBooks.SaroyFilmProductionsexercisedits
optionin1968inconsiderationofaone-timepaymenttotheauthor.Theassignment
agreementprovidedthattheassignmenttoSaroyFilmProductionswasforeverandthatno
rightsgrantedwouldrevertbacktotheauthor.
TherespondentEdperbrascanwasthesuccessorofPagurianPresswhichpublishedthe
DonnellyBooksinthe1970sandwhichregisteredcopyrightinTheBlackDonnellysin1974.
In1992,afterPagurianPresshadceasedpublishingtheDonnellyBooks,therespondentRoy,
theprincipalshareholderanddirectorofSaroyFilmProductionsandadirectorandofficerof
threeotherrespondentcorporations(collectivelythe »RoyRespondents »),approachedthe
respondentFireflyBookstopublishthebooks.FireflyBooksagreedandcommenced
publishingthebooksandfromtimetotimeremittedroyaltiestoSaroyFilmProductions.


TheauthordiedonFebruary14,1982.Theapplicantwastheexecutorundertheauthor’swill
andthesolesurvivingnamedbeneficiaryinthewill.Theapplicantandsubsequentlyher
granddaughtermadeinquiriesoftheRoyRespondentsastothearrangementsbetweenthe
authorandtheRoyRespondentswithrespectto[page541]copyrightintheDonnellyBooks.
TheRoyRespondentsstonewalledtheinquiries.
In2000theapplicantregisteredcopyrightintheDonnellyBooksinherownname,andthen
bothinherowncapacityandasexecutoroftheauthor’sestate,commencedan
applicationfor,interalia,adeclarationthatshewastheownerofcopyrightintheDonnelly
Books,thattherespondentshadinfringedthecopyrightandthatthe1974registrationof
copyrightinTheBlackDonnellysbeexpunged.TherespondentRoyfurnishedanaffidavitin
theapplicationannexingthedocumentsconstitutingtheagreementassigningcopyrightin
theDonnellyBookstoSaroyFilmProductions.Theapplicantclaimedthattheagreementwas
voidbyreasonofss.57(3)and14(1)oftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42.FireflyBooks
pleadedandrelieduponthelimitationperiodins.41(1)oftheAct.TheRoyRespondentsdid
notpleadthelimitationperiod.Theapplicant’sgranddaughtertestifiedthatshefirstbecame
awareoftheFireflyBookseditionsoftheDonnellyBooksinorshortlybefore1999bywhich
timeshehadachievednosuccesstoobtaininformationconcerningtheDonnellyBooksfrom
theRoyRespondents.
Held,the1974copyrightregistrationshouldbeexpungedandtheapplicationshould
otherwisebedismissed.
LimitationPeriod
Section41(1)providesalimitationperiodofthreeyearsinrelationtoinfringementof
copyrightinacaseinwhichtheownerofcopyrightkneworcouldreasonablyhavebeen
expectedtoknowoftheinfringementatthetimeitoccurred,andinacaseinwhichthe
applicantdidnotknowandcouldnotreasonablyhavebeenexpectedtoknowofthe
infringementofcopyright,whereproceedingsarecommencedwithinthreeyearsofwhen
theownerfirstkneworcouldreasonablybeexpectedtoknowoftheinfringement.
Section41(2)providesthatacourtcanonlyapplythelimitationperiodins.41(1)infavourof
apartywhopleadsthelimitationperiod.AstheRoyRespondentsdidnotpleadthelimitation
period,alimitationdefencecouldnotoperateintheirfavour.
Ontheevidence,asbetweentheapplicantandFireflyBooks,theapplicanthadnotknown
orcouldnotreasonablyhavebeenexpectedtohaveknownofinfringementofcopyrightin
theDonnellyBooksbefore1999.FireflyBookscouldnotthereforesucceedongroundsthat
theapplicant’sclaimwasbarredbythelimitationperiod.
The1974CopyrightRegistration
Section57(4)providesthattheFederalCourtmayexpungeanyentrywronglymadeor
remainingontheRegisterofCopyrights.Section53(2)providesthatacertificateof
registrationofcopyrightisevidencethatcopyrightsubsistsandthatthepersonregisteredis
theownerofcopyright.Inthiscasetherewasevidencecontradictingthepresumptionin
favourofPagurianPressastheownerofcopyrightestablishedbythe1974copyright
registration.Anorderthereforeissuedtoexpungethe
registration.
ValidityoftheAssignmentofCopyright
Section57(3)providesthatanassignmentofcopyrightisvoidagainstasubsequentassignee
forvaluableconsiderationwhotakestheassignmentwithoutactual[page542]noticeofthe
priorassignment,unlessthepriorassignmentisregisteredbeforeregistrationofthe


subsequentassignment.Althoughonthedeathoftheauthortheapplicanthadnonoticeof
thecopyrightassignmentinfavourofSaroyFilmProductions,theapplicantassoleexecutor
andsolesurvivingnamedbeneficiaryundertheauthor’swill,couldnotbesaidtobean
assigneeofcopyright.Furthermore,eveniftheapplicantcouldhavebeensaidtobean
assigneeofcopyrightundertheauthor’swill,theassignmentwasnotconsideredtobe »for
valuableconsideration ».Theapplicantcouldnotthereforeinvalidatethecopyright
assignmentonthebasisofs.57(3).
Section14(1)providesthatwhereanauthoristhefirstownerofcopyright,nograntofan
interestotherthanbywill,willvestinthegranteeanyrightsbeyond25yearsfromthedeath
oftheauthorandthatanyagreemententeredintobytheauthorastothedispositionofthe
reversionaryinterestisvoid.Theapplicant’scontentionthattheentireassignmenttoSaroy
FilmProductionswasvoidbecauseitpurportedtoaffectthe
reversionaryinterestwasnotconsistentwiththeschemeoftheCopyrightAct.Instead,the
assignmentwouldnotbeoperativebeyond25yearsfromthedeathoftheauthor.The
applicantcouldnotthereforeinvalidatethecopyrightassignmentonthebasisofs.14(1).
AsbetweentheapplicantandSaroyFilmProductions,thelatterwastheownerofcopyright
intheDonnellyBooksbyassignment.
TheReversionaryInterest
Totheextentthattheassignmentpurportedtoassigncopyrightinrelationtothereversionary
period,theassignmentwasvoidwithrespecttosuchperiod.Thereversionaryinterestinthe
copyrightthereforewilldevolveontheapplicantastheauthor’sexecutoronFebruary14,
2007.
Costs
Althoughtheapplicationwasonlymarginallysuccessful,becauseoftheunco-operative
attitudeoftheRoyRespondentstheapplicantcouldnotbefaultedforhavingbroughtthe
application.Theapplicantwasthereforeentitledtohercostsontheordinaryscaleas
againsttheRoyRespondents.
[30]TheRoyrespondentsdidnotpleadthelimitationperiod.Intheresult,alimitation
defencecannotoperateintheirfavour.
[43]Here,IamsatisfiedthatthereisevidencetocontradictPagurian’scertificateof
registration.ItwasnotindisputebeforemethatMr.KelleywastheauthorofTheBlack
Donnellys.TheevidencebeforetheCourtdemonstratesthattheremaybesomedoubt
whetherthelateMr.Kelley,andthroughhim,theapplicant,ortheRoyrespondents,isorare
theownersofcopyrightinTheBlackDonnellys.Butthereisnoevidenceotherthanthe
registrationinfavourofPagurianPressLimited,andthebaldassertionontheintroductory
pagesofthePagurianeditionofTheBlackDonnellysthatisanexhibittotheaffidavitofJuliet
Fernandesswornthe26thofOctober,2000tosupportthecertificate.
[54]Counselfortheapplicanturgedthattheunderlinedwordsintheclosingthree(3)linesof
subsection14(1)oftheActmustbereadasrenderinganyagreement,otherwisevalidunder
subsection13(4)oftheAct,entirelyvoidwhereitpurportstoassignthereversionaryinterestas
describedinsubsection14(1).Counselurgedthisinterpretationontwo(2)grounds:first,
becauseiftheclosingwordsarenotsoread,theywouldbepurelyduplicativeoftheearlier
wordsinthesubsectionthatIhaveemphasized;andsecondly,becauseonlysuchan
interpretationaccordswiththegrammaticalstructureoftheclosingwords.


[55]Bycontrast,counselforFireflyurgedthatsubsections13(4)and14(1)oftheActmustbe
readtogetherandthattheinterpretationurgedonbehalfoftheapplicantwouldbeentirely
inconsistentwiththeobjectiveofsubsection13(4)andtheobjectivesoftheAct,readasa
whole.
[56][…]Iamsatisfiedthattheinterpretationurgedonbehalfoftheapplicantwouldsimply
notbeconsistentwiththeschemeoftheActasawholeand,moreparticularly,withthe
schemeofsubsections13(4)and14(1)oftheAct,readtogether.
[66]Theapplicanthasbeenonlymarginallysuccessfulonthisapplication.Thatbeingsaid,
shecertainlycannotbefaultedforhavingbroughttheapplicationinlightofthecompletely
uncooperativeattitudedisplayedbytheRoyrespondentswhoweretheonlyonesina
positiontoeffectivelyanswerthequestionsthataroseinthemindsoftheapplicantandher
granddaughtersurroundingtheownershipofcopyrightintheDonnellyBooks.Inthe
circumstances,anOrderforcostsontheordinaryscalewillgoinfavouroftheapplicant
againsttheRoyrespondents.
[67]Fireflywasequallyinconvenienced,wasputatrisk,andwaslikelydeprivedofrevenues
byreasonoftheintransigenceoftheRoyrespondents.TheRoyrespondentshavingfailedto
effectivelyidentifytheircopyrightinterestsintheDonnellyBookstotheapplicantwhenasked
tosodoasandtoeffectivelydefendtheircopyrightinterestswhencalleduponinthis
proceedingtodoso,intereststhroughwhichFireflyclaimeditsowninterests,Fireflywasputto
whatIassumemustbesubstantiallegalexpensetodefenditsinterestsand,insodoing,to
defendtheinterestsoftheRoyrespondents.Inallofthecircumstances,anOrderwillgofor
costsinfavourofFirefly,asagainsttheRoyrespondents,taxed,ifnototherwiseagreedupon,
onthebasisoftheupperendofcolumnVofTariffBtotheFederalCourtRules,1998.



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