Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin V. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée: The Protection of Famous Trade-Marks in Canada

VEUVECLICQUOTPONSARDINv.BOUTIQUESCLIQUOTLTÉE:
THEPROTECTIONOFFAMOUSTRADE-MARKSINCANADA

JacquesA.Léger,Q.C.andBarryGamache*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,L.L.P.
Lawyers,PatentandTrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria–BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.(514)987-6242-Fax(514)845-7874
info@robic.com-www.robic.ca

I.INTRODUCTION
OnJune2,2006,theSupremeCourtofCanadahandeddownitsmuch
anticipateddecisioninVeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée.
1
AunanimousCourtconfirmedthelowercourts’dismissalofVeuveClicquot
Ponsardin’svariousclaimsunderCanada’sTrade-marksAct
2(includingits
requestforinjunctiverelief)againstachainofwomen’sretailstoresusingthe
servicemarkCLIQUOT.Attheheartofthistrade-markcasewasthescopeof
protectiontobegrantedtofamoustrade-marksandinthisparticular
instance,tothelongstandingVEUVECLICQUOTmark,ownedbytheplaintiff
champagnehouseandwhichwasdescribedbytheCourtas“undoubtedly
famous”
3anddeserving“wideprotection.”4Despitetheseenviablequalities,
theCourtconcludedthattheevidencedidnotsupportafindingthatthe

©CIPS,2006.*Partners,LEGERROBICRICHARD,L.L.P.,Montreal,Quebec,AssociateMemberofthe
InternationalTrademarkAssociation.JacquesA.Léger,Q.C.andBarryGamache
representedVeuveClicquotPonsardin,maisonfondéeen1772,beforetheFederalCourt,
TrialDivision(nowtheFederalCourtofCanada),theFederalCourtofAppealandthe
SupremeCourtofCanada.Publication351.Lawyer,BobH.SotiriadisisapartnerofLEGER
ROBICRICHARD,
L.L.P.,amultidisciplinaryfirmoflawyers,andpatentandtrademarkagents.
Notesforaconferencepronouncedforthe2006-03-29MCLEDoingBusinessinCanada.
Publication345.

1VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23;affirming(2004),35C.P.R.
(4th)1(F.C.A.);affirming(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.).TheCourt’sdecisionwas
handeddownonthesamedayascompanioncaseMattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.,
2006SCC22wheretherejectionofMattel,Inc.’soppositiontotheregistrationofthetrade-
markBARBIE’S&Designforrestaurantserviceswasaffirmed.
2Trade-marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.T-13.3VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.2.4Id.

2
VEUVECLICQUOTmarkwouldbeassociatedbyordinaryconsumerswithmid-
pricedwomen’sclothingsoldindefendants’CLIQUOTboutiques.
5
Initsreasons,theCourtagreedwithVeuveClicquotPonsardin(and
intervenerInternationalTrademarkAssociation)thatcaselawwhichhad
beenrelieduponbythetrialjudge
6hadputtoomuchemphasisonthe
similaritiesanddissimilaritiesinthenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness
whenanalyzinglikelihoodofconfusioninvolvingafamoustrade-mark.
However,inthecircumstancesofthecasebeforeit,theCourtconcluded
thatTremblay-LamerJ.didapplytheappropriate“allthesurrounding
circumstances”testrequiredbysection6oftheTrade-marksAct.
7Onecan
saythattheCourt’sdecisioninthiscase(andinthecompanionMattel
8case)
hasclarifiedthelikelihoodofconfusiontestreviewedbytheFederalCourtof
AppealinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.
9andfurther
describedbythesameappellatecourtinToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.
LexusFoodsInc.
10TheSupremeCourt’sclarificationofthePinkPantherBeauty
Corp.testispartoftheVeuveClicquotPonsardinlegacy.
II.BACKGROUND
WritingfortheSupremeCourt,BinnieJ.introducesplaintiffanditsmuch
appreciatedbeveragewithkindwords:“Amongthosewithchampagne
tastes,thebrandofVeuveClicquotPonsardinisconsideredamongthevery
best.”
11EstablishedduringthelastyearsofFrance’sancienrégime,plaintiff
VeuveClicquotPonsardinhasearneditswelldeservedreputationinpartdue
totheconsiderableeffortsofNicoleClicquotPonsardin(1777-1866)who,asa
youngwidow,tookoverherlatehusband’schampagnehousein1805.
MadameClicquotwasinstrumentalinestablishingherchampagneasoneof
thefinest;shewascrucialinthedevelopmentofthepupitrederemuage(or
riddlingrack)whichallowsustodaytoenjoytranslucentchampagne–as
comparedtoitslessaestheticallypleasinglate18thcenturypredecessor
whichpresentedasomewhatcloudyappearance.Canadawasintroduced
toVeuveClicquotchampagneduringthelastdecadeofthe19thcentury.

5Id.,atpara.33.6PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.)[applicationfor
leavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadagrantedonNovember19,1998infile
26689;discontinuancefiledonJune21,1999];ToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoods
Inc.,[2001]2F.C.15(F.C.A.)[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtof
CanadadismissedonJuly12,2001infile28376].
7VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.27.8Mattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.,2006SCC22.9PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.).10ToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,[2001]2F.C.15(F.C.A.).11VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.1.

3
Eversince,ithascontinuouslybeenenjoyedbyconnoisseursandoccasional
usersalike.VeuveClicquotPonsardin’searliesttrade-markregistrationwas
securedinCanadaforoneofitslabelsbackin1909whilealaterapplication
forthewordmarkVEUVECLICQUOTwasregisteredforchampagnewinesin
1980withaclaimofuseofthetrade-markinCanadasinceatleast1899.
DefendantsBoutiquesCliquotLtée,MademoiselleCharmanteInc.and
3017320CanadaInc.canonlyclaimamuchyoungercorporateexistence.
TheyoperateintheprovinceofQuebecandineasternOntarioachainof
mid-pricedwomen’sretailclothingstoresundervarioustradenamessuchas
MademoiselleCharmante,Colette,CadancePetiteandCharmantePetite.
12
In1995,defendantsintroducedtwonewtrade-marks,CLIQUOTandCLIQUOT
“UNMONDEÀPART”forsixoftheirboutiques.
13OnAugust20,1996,
defendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.appliedtoregisterthetrade-marks
CLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”,bothfortheoperationofretail
clothingstoreswithrespectofladies’wearandaccessoriesonthebasisof
useofeachtrade-markinCanadasinceasearlyasMarch1995.Both
applicationswerepublishedforoppositionpurposesonMarch5,1997,and
absentanyobjection,maturedtoregistrationonAugust1,1997.
OnNovember5,1998,afterlearningoftheexistenceoftheCLIQUOT
boutiquesthroughitsCanadianagent,
14plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardin
institutedproceedingsagainstthedefendantsbeforeCanada’sFederal
Court.
15PlaintiffsoughtaninjunctiontoendtheuseofthemarksCLIQUOT
andCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”;additionally,itrequestedthatboththe
1997registrationsofthesemarksbestruckout.
16
Plaintiff’sactionbeforetheFederalCourtwasbasedonsection20ofthe
Trade-marksActwhichsetsouttherightoftheownerofaregisteredtrade-
marktostoptheuseofanyconfusingtrade-mark.Thegroundsfor
expungementwerealsofoundedonallegedconfusion.Finally,plaintiff’s
requestforaninjunctionwasfurtherbasedonsection22oftheTrade-marks
Actwhichstatesthatnopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanother
personinamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthevalue
ofthegoodwillattachingthereto.
III.VEUVECLICQUOT:AFAMOUSTRADE-MARK

12VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.6.
13Id.,atparas.4and60.14Id.,atpara.39.15TheFederalCourtwasthenknownastheFederalCourt,TrialDivision.16VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.12.

4

TheSupremeCourtofCanadaaffirmedthefindingmadebythetrialjudge
thatVEUVECLICQUOTis,infact,afamoustrade-mark.
17Whythenarefamous
trade-markslikeVEUVECLICQUOT–andotherwellknownmarksreferredto
bytheCourt,suchasKLEENEX
18andWALTDISNEY19–innoneedoffurther
introduction?Becauseoverthedecadesand,inthecaseofVEUVE
CLICQUOT,overthecenturies,theirrespectiveownershavespenttime,
energyandresourcestocreatelighthousesthatsurvivethepassingtidesin
oureverchangingconsumerworld.Membersofthepublicareirresistibly
drawntotheselighthousessinceinthesefamoustrade-marks,theyrecognize
symbolsofquality,forexample,asenseofreliability,orasenseof
reassuranceintheirpurchasingexperience.IntheCourt’sview,famoustrade-
markshaveahold“onthepublicmind.”
20
Trade-marks–famousornot–playanimportantpsychologicalrolein
nudgingconsumerstowardsparticularproductsorservices.Ontheeveofthe
mid-20thcenturyexpansionofourconsumersociety,thisimportantrolewas
recognizedbyFrankfurterJ.oftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesin
MishawakaRubber&WoolenManufacturingCo.v.S.S.KresgeCo.:
21
Theprotectionoftrade-marksisthelaw’srecognitionofthe
psychologicalfunctionofsymbols.Ifitistruethatwelivebysymbols,itis
nolesstruethatwepurchasegoodsbythem.Atrade-markisa
merchandisingshort-cutwhichinducesapurchasertoselectwhathe
wants,orwhathehasbeenledtobelievehewants.Theownerofa
markexploitsthishumanpropensitybymakingeveryeffortto
impregnatetheatmosphereofthemarketwiththedrawingpowerofa
congenialsymbol.Whateverthemeansemployed,theaimisthesame–
toconveythroughthemark,inthemindsofpotentialcustomers,the
desirabilityofthecommodityuponwhichitappears.Oncethisis
attained,thetrade-markownerhassomethingofvalue.Ifanother
poachesuponthecommercialmagnetismofthesymbolhehas
created,theownercanobtainlegalredress.
22
TheVEUVECLICQUOTmarkcertainlyhas“commercialmagnetism”.Thefact
thatitisfamousisalsoimportantbecause“famepresupposesthatthemark

17VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.26.18Id.,atpara.48.19Id.,atpara.32.20Id.,atpara.27.21MishawakaRubber&WoolenManufacturingCo.v.S.S.KresgeCo.,316U.S.203(1942).22Id.,atpage205.

5
transcendsatleasttosomeextentthewareswithwhichitisnormally
associated.”
23
Ifafamoustrade-markcarriesamessagewhichtranscendstheproductor
servicetowhichitistraditionallyassociated,howthenisonetoreactwhena
thirdpartytakessuchamarkandcarriesitovertoanareaoftradedifferent
fromtheonethroughwhichitcultivateditsfame?Inotherwords,shouldthis
thirdpartyreaptherewardsofareputationtowhichithasnotcontributed?
Beforethetrialjudge,plaintiffadducedevidence,whichpurportedtoshow
thatdefendantswereinfactridingonplaintiff’scoattails.Afterreviewingthe
evidence,thetrialjudgemadeseveralfindingsfavourabletoplaintiff.She
notedthatwhileplaintiff’sregisteredtrade-markwasVEUVECLICQUOT,
24its
distinctivepartwasCLICQUOT,whichshealsodescribedasoneofplaintiff’s
marks;
25shefoundthatplaintiff’smarksVEUVECLICQUOTandCLICQUOThad
significantinherentdistinctivenessanddeservedextensiveprotection;she
alsofoundthattherewasnoothersimilarmarkonthemarketinCanada;
26
sherecognizedthegreatdegreeofresemblancebetweentheparties’
marks
27astheirdominantfeatureswererespectivelyCLICQUOT(forplaintiff)
andCLIQUOT(fordefendants).Finally,shemadethecrucialfindingthat
plaintiff’smarkwasfamous.
28
Twootherfindingsmadebythetrialjudgewerenoteworthy.Althoughplaintiff
hadnotestablishedthatitwishedtoextenditsmarksintothefashionindustry,
theevidencedidrevealthatithadsponsoredfashioneventsandhad
advertisedinfashionmagazinesreadbywomen,whichleadthetrialjudgeto
concludethatwomenweretargetedbytheplaintifffortheconsumptionof
itschampagne.
29Moreimportantly,thetrialjudgefoundthatitwasplaintiff’s
advertisinginafashionmagazinewhichinspireddefendantstochoosethe
word“Cliquot”fortheirboutiques.
30
However,plaintiff’sactionwasdismissedinlargepartduetothe1998
decisionhandeddownbytheFederalCourtofAppealinPinkPantherBeauty

23VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.26.24VEUVECLICQUOTwasoneofseveralregisteredtrade-marksrelieduponbyplaintiff;itwas
howeverthemostrelevantoneasbeingtheonehavingthegreatestdegreeof
ressemblancewithdefendants’marks.
25VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,(2003)28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
paras.8,44,58and63.
26Id.,atpara.58.27Id.,atparas.44and62to66.28Id.,atpara.75.29Id.,atpara.47.30Id.,atparas.36,37,42,43,44,63and64.

6
Corp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.31whichthetrialjudgereliedupontoreject
plaintiff’sclaimoflikelihoodofconfusion;thelikelihoodofdepreciationclaim
wasalsorejected.
IV.PINKPANTHER’SLONGSHADOW
Despitetheenviablequalitieswhichsherecognizedinplaintiff’smarks,the
trialjudgeconcludedthatplaintiffhadnotmadeitscaseforlikelihoodof
confusioninthecircumstances.Section6oftheTrade-marksActdescribes
howlikelihoodofconfusionbetweentrade-marksistobemeasured:
6.(…)
(2)Theuseofatrade-markcausesconfusionwithanothertrade-markif
theuseofbothtrade-marksinthesameareawouldbelikelytoleadto
theinferencethatthewaresorservicesassociatedwiththosetrade-
marksaremanufactured,sold,leased,hiredorperformedbythesame
person,whetherornotthewaresorservicesareofthesamegeneral
class.
(…)
(5)Indeterminingwhethertrade-marksortrade-namesareconfusing,
thecourtortheRegistrar,asthecasemaybe,shallhaveregardtoall
thesurroundingcircumstancesincluding
(a)theinherentdistinctivenessofthetrade-marksortrade-namesand
theextenttowhichtheyhavebecomeknown;
(b)thelengthoftimethetrade-marksortrade-nameshavebeeninuse;
(c)thenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness;
(d)thenatureofthetrade;and
(e)thedegreeofresemblancebetweenthetrade-marksortrade-
namesinappearanceorsoundorintheideassuggestedbythem.
Undersection6,likelihoodofconfusionrequiresananalysistodetermineifthe
wordsordesignsusedbytwodifferententitiesarelikelytosuggesttheidea
thatthewaresorserviceswithwhichtheyareassociatedareproducedor
marketedbythesameperson.
32Thisfindingcanbemade“whetherornot
thewaresorservicesareofthesamegeneralclass”asstatedinsubsection
6(2)oftheTrade-marksAct.

31PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.).32TheRowntreeCompanyLimitedv.PaulinChambersCompanyLimited,[1968]S.C.R.134,at
page138.

7
OnMarch30,1998,inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,33an
oppositioncasewhichhadoriginatedfromtheTrade-marksOpposition
Board,
34adividedFederalCourtofAppealtackledtheissueastothescope
ofprotectiontobegrantedtofamoustrade-marksinCanadawhenapplying
thetestoflikelihoodofconfusionundersection6.Becauseofthe
“connection”testwhichwasdescribedtherein,thereasonsofthemajority
wereinterpretedasdownplayingtheimportanceofthefinalwordsof
subsection6(2)byemphasizingthat,evenwhendealingwithafamoustrade-
mark,“whereno(…)connectionexists[betweentheparties’areasoftrade]
afindingofconfusion[betweentheparties’trade-marks]willberare.”
35
Writingforthemajority,LindenJ.concluded:

[46]Anumberofothercaseshavecometomyattentioninvolving
famoustrade-markssuchas“Coca-Cola”,“Cartier”and“Wedgwood”.
Ineachofthesecasesthefamousmarkprevailed,butineachcasea
connectionorsimilarityintheproductsorserviceswasfound.Whereno
suchconnectionisestablished,itisverydifficulttojustifytheextensionof
propertyrightsintoareasofcommercethatdonotremotelyaffectthe
trade-markholder.Onlyinexceptionalcircumstances,ifever,shouldthis
bethecase.
36[Emphasisadded.]
Themajoritydecidedineffectthattrade-marks–andspecificallyfamous
ones–willbeconfusingonlyifaconnectionorlinkisestablishedbetweenthe
areasoftradeofthelitigants.Ownersoffamoustrade-marksweretherefore
invitedtoestablishaconnectionbetweentheirareasoftradeandthefieldto
whichnewcomershadcarriedtheirfamoussymbols,shouldtheywishto
succeedagainstinfringers.

33PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.)whereUnited
ArtistsCorporation,ownerofthefamoustrade-markTHEPINKPANTHER(associatedtothe
comedyfilmswithPeterSellersasInspectorClouseau),wasunsuccessfulbeforetheFederal
CourtofAppealinitsoppositionagainsttheregistrationofthetrade-markPINKPANTHERfor
haircareandbeautyproductsuppliesandtheoperationofabusinessdealingintheir
distribution.Themajoritymadethefollowingfindingatpara.50:“(…)theissuetobedecided
isnothowfamousthemarkis,butwhetherthereisalikelihoodofconfusioninthemindofthe
averageconsumerbetweenUnitedArtists’markandtheoneproposedbytheappellantwith
respecttothegoodsandservicesspecified.Thatquestionmustbeansweredinthenegative.
Thereisnolikelihoodofconfusionastothesourceoftheproducts.Thekeyfactorhereisthe
gapingdivergenceinthenatureofthewaresandinthenatureofthetrade.Itisnotafissure
butachasm.”[Emphasisadded.]
34Inanoppositioncase,suchastheoneinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,theapplicantmust
establishitsrighttoregistration;inaninfringementcase,suchastheoneinVeuveClicquot
Ponsardin,theonusisonplaintifftoprovelikelihoodofconfusion.
35PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.),atpara.51.36Id.,atpara.46–citationsomitted.

8
Inhisdissent,McDonaldJ.wrotethatitwasnaivetobelievethata
newcomer’sdecisiontouseafamoustrade-markwasnotdeliberateor
unrelatedtothemark’sfame;underthecircumstances,seeingwords–such
asPINKPANTHER–wouldleavetheaverageconsumerwonderingifthe
ownerofthefamoustrade-markwasthepromoterbehindthesenew
products.
37
Bylookingforaconnectionbetweentheareasoftradebeforeafindingof
confusioncanbemade,themajorityinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.wasseen
ashavingcreatedapre-conditiontoafindingofconfusionwhileParliament
clearlystatedthattheparties’areasoftradeshouldnotbeacontrolling
factorwhenappreciatinglikelihoodofconfusion,inlightofthewordingof
subsection6(2)infineoftheTrade-marksAct.Thiswashighlightedbylearned
authorDanielR.Bereskinwhowrote:“Bydemandingthattheremustbesome
similaritybetweenthewaresorservicesofthecompetingtradersbeforea
findingofconfusionmaybemade,theCourtofAppealriskstransforminga
non-determinativefactorintoanecessarypre-condition.”
38
WhatwasseenasariskmorphedintorealitywhenthetrialjudgeinVeuve
ClicquotPonsardinanalyzedtheprinciplesofPinkPantherBeautyCorp.and
wroteinherreasonsaboutthefindingsmadeinthatcase:“TheCourtfound
noconnectionbetweentheparties’productsandservices,and
consequentlyheldthattherewasnoriskofconfusion.”
39Inthetrialjudge’s
view,theabsenceofconnectionbetweentheparties’areasoftradeinPink
PantherBeautyCorp.consequentlyleadtoafindingofabsenceoflikelihood
ofconfusion.Thisemphasisinlookingfora“connection”issurprising
consideringParliament’sclearintenttosetasidetheareasoftradeasa
controllingfactorindetermininglikelihoodofconfusion.
Inordertofullyappreciatethenowdiminishedimportanceofthecriteria
relatingtoparties’areasoftradewhenassessinglikelihoodofconfusionunder
section6,onemustturntothelegaltestapplicabletotheissueunderthe
legislativeframeworkwhichexistedpriortothecomingintoforceofthe
currentTrade-marksActonJuly1,1954.
Forexample,inthe1949caseofDastousv.Mathews-WellsCompany
Limited,
40theSupremeCourtofCanadareviewedtheprovisionsofTheUnfair

37Id.,atpara.71.38FrederickW.Mostert,FamousandWell-KnownMarks,2nded.,InternationalTrademark
Association,NewYork,2004,atpages4-117and4-118whereDanielR.Bereskinanalysesthe
situationinCanada.
39VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.78.
40Dastousv.Mathews-WellsCompanyLimited,[1950]S.C.R.261.

9
CompetitionAct,193241(theantecedentstatutetothecurrentTrade-marks
Act).TheCourthadtodecidewhethertheExchequerCourt
42hadcorrectly
decidedtoorderadefendantfromusingtheword“ROSIE”inassociationwith
cannedchickenattherequestofatraderwhosoldjams,jellies,pickles,
saucesandvinegarinassociationwiththetrade-markROSEBRAND.Inhis
reasons,RinfretC.J.reproducedtherelevantprovisionsanddefinitionsofThe
UnfairCompetitionAct,1932relieduponbyplaintiff:
3.NopersonshallknowinglyadoptforuseinCanadainconnectionwith
anywaresanytrademarkoranydistinguishingguisewhich
(a)isalreadyinuseinCanadabyanyotherpersonandwhichis
registeredpursuanttotheprovisionsofthisActasatrademarkor
distinguishingguiseforthesameorsimilarwares;
*****
(c)issimilartoanytrademarkordistinguishingguiseinuse,orinuse
andknownasaforesaid.
(…)
“Similar”,inrelationtotrademarks,***ismeanttodescribe
marks,namesorguisessoresemblingeachotherorsoclearlysuggesting
theideaconveyedbyeachotherthatthecontemporaneoususeof
bothinthesameareainassociationwithwaresofthesamekind,would
belikelytocausedealersinand/orusersofsuchwarestoinferthatthe
samepersonassumedresponsibilityfortheircharacterorquality,forthe
conditionsunderwhichortheclassofpersonsbywhomtheywere
produced,orfortheirplaceoforigin.
(…)
“Similar”inrelationtowares,describescategoriesofwareswhich,by
reasonoftheircommoncharacteristicsorofthecorrespondenceofthe
classesofpersonsbywhomtheyareordinarilydealtinorused,orofthe
mannerorcircumstancesoftheiruse,would,ifinthesameareathey
contemporaneouslyborethetrademarkorpresentedthedistinguishing
guiseinquestion,belikelytobesoassociatedwitheachotherby
dealersinand/orusersofthemastocausesuchdealersand/orusersto
inferthatthesamepersonassumedresponsibilityfortheircharacteror

41TheUnfairCompetitionAct,1932,22-23GeorgeV,c.38.42TheExchequerCourtwasthepredecessorofCanada’scurrentFederalCourt;thelatter
wascreatedbythecomingintoforceoftheFederalCourtAct,R.S.C.1970(2ndSupp.),c.10
andthesubsequentCourtsAdministrationServiceAct,S.C.2002,c.8.Foritspart,the
ExchequerCourtwascreatedbythecomingintoforceofAnActtoestablishaSupreme
CourtandaCourtofExchequerfortheDominionofCanada,S.C.1875,38Vict.,c.11.

10
quality,fortheconditionsunderwhichortheclassofpersonsbywhom
theywereproduced,orfortheirplaceoforigin.
43[Emphasisadded.]

TheSupremeCourtallowedtheappealandorderedthedismissalofplaintiff’s
actionwhilehighlightingthefactthattheparties’respectiveproductswere
not“similar”.Inhisreasons,theChiefJusticewrote:

(…)anditseemstobequiteclearthatalthoughthewaresofboth
partiesmaybeclassifiedascomingunderthegeneralcategoryof
“food”,itcannotbeheldthatiftherespondentholdstrademarksforthe
particulararticlesoffood,towhichCounselfortherespondenthas
himselflimitedthevalidityofthetrademarks,towit,jams,jellies,pickles,
saucesandvinegar,itcancomebeforetheCourtstoaskthemto
excludetheappellantfromusingatrademark,evenifithasthesame
characteristicsasthetrademarkoftherespondent,tobeusedin
connectionwithdifferentarticlesoffood,towit,cannedchicken
productsinwhichtheappellantdealsalone.Theyarenotwaresofthe
samekindasrequiredbythedefinitionof“similar”(…).
44

UnderTheUnfairCompetitionAct,1932,Parliament’schoicetolimitthe
protectionoftrade-markstoproductstowhichamarkwasassociatedandto
“similar”waresreflecteditsconcernthatunlesstheseconstraintswerein
place,toomuchmaterialwouldbedrainedfromthepoolofavailabletrade-
marks.UnderTheUnfairCompetitionAct,1932,identicaltrade-markscould
beusedbytwodifferentownersaslongastheirrespectiveproductswerenot
“ofthesamekind”.Itcouldbeargued,however,thatthisapproach
underestimatedboththeresourcesofCanada’snationallanguages(English
andFrench)
45andhumancreativity.
TheReportofTradeMarkLawRevisionCommitteetotheSecretaryofStateof
Canada(the“Report”)ofJanuary20,1953(thedraftingofwhichpreceeded
thecurrentTrade-marksAct)drovehomethepointandcautionedagainst
maintainingtherequirementofhavingwares“ofthesamekind”inorderto
findconfusion.AccordingtothelearnedauthorsoftheReport,trade-mark
legislationshouldprotectthepublicagainstconfusionastothesourceof
productsandservices;itshouldnotbeconcernedwiththeapprehended
dryingupofthepoolofavailabletrade-marks:

43Dastousv.Mathews-WellsCompanyLimited,[1950]S.C.R.261,atpages267and268.44Id.,atpages270and271.45ThebilingualnatureofCanadaisnowenshrinedintheCanadianCharterofRightsand
Freedoms,s.16whichispartoftheConstitutionAct,1982,whichcameintoforceonApril17,
1982.

11
Therehaslongbeenafeelingthroughoutthecommercialworldthatthe
ambitofprotectionaccordedtotrademarkswastoonarrowand
restricted.(…)Thus,theownerofthetrademark“Quaker”–wellknown
initsapplicationtobreakfastfood–couldonlycomplainofitsuseby
anotheronwaresofasimilarorrelatedcharacter.Thisconceptsprings
fromthetheorythatadoptionofatrademarkwithdrawssomethingfrom
thepoolorfundoftrademarkmaterialavailableforusebythepublic.It
has,however,graduallycometoberecognizedthatthisconcepttends
tominimizetheresourcesoftheEnglishandFrenchlanguagesaswellas
ofthedesigningingenuityofman.Sometrademarksaresowellknown
thattheuseofthesameorsimilartrademarksonanywaresofanykind
wouldcausethegeneralpurchasingpublictobelievethattheoriginal
userandownerofthetrademarkwasinsomewayresponsibleforthe
warestowhichtheuseofthemarkhasbeenextended.Anexampleof
thistypeofmark–andtheexamplemaybemultiplied–isthewell
knowntrademark“Kodak”.Ithasbeenusedbyitsowneron
photographicmaterialsandequipmentandis,ofcourse,entitledtofull
protectioninthatfield.Butitmustberecognizedthattheusebyany
otherpersonofthetrademark“Kodak”onanywaresofanykindwould
tendtotheconclusionthattheywereinsomewayassociatedwiththe
photographiccompany,thusconducingtothedeceptionofthe
purchasingpublicandthedepreciationofthereputationandgoodwill
ofthatcompany.(…)
46
Theadoptionofsubsection6(2)oftheTrade-marksActconfirmed
Parliament’sintentin1954tocraftatestofconfusionbasedontheimpression
thatislikelytobecreatedbythesimultaneoususeoftwotrade-marksinthe
sameareaastothesourceofproductsorservicesassociatedwiththese
trade-marks,irrespectiveoftheparties’areasoftrade.Whenthetrialjudgein
VeuveClicquotPonsardinreferredtothefactsofPinkPantherBeautyCorp.
wherethemajorityfoundnoteworthythat“[s]hampooisnotsoldinmovie
theatresorvideostores”and“[v]ideosarenotavailableinbeautyparlours”
47
andthereafterconcludedthattheFederalCourtofAppealinthatcase
“foundnoconnectionbetweentheparties’productsandservices,and
consequentlyheldthattherewasnoriskofconfusion”,
48itcanbeargued
thatwhatsheappliedwasatestofconfusionbasedonsimilaritiesinareasof
trade,atestwhichParliamentchosetosetasidein1954.

46ReportofTradeMarkLawRevisionCommitteetotheSecretaryofStateofCanada,
January20,1953,reproducedinHaroldG.Fox,TheCanadianLawofTradeMarksandUnfair
Competition,vol.2,2nded.,Toronto,TheCarswellCompanyLimited,1956,atpage1163.
47VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.78.
48Id.

12
Therealtestoflikelihoodofconfusion(torestatethefactsofPinkPanther
BeautyCorp.referredtobythetrialjudge)isnottodeterminewhether
shampooisorisnotsoldinmovietheatresorwhethervideosareavailableor
notinbeautyparlours;ratheritshouldbetoexaminetheimpressioncreated
withmembersofthepublicbyanewcomerwhoadoptsthedistinctive
characteristicsofafamoustrade-markandcarriesthemovertoitsownfield
oftrade.
Moreover,theprotectionoffamoustrade-markswasofconcerntothe
draftersofthecurrentTrade-marksActwhentheydevisedthetestof
likelihoodofconfusionundersection6.Thetestwastailoredtoprovide
protectiontoanygivenmark;however,thisprotectionwasintendedtobe
proportionaltoamark’sdegreeoffame.AccordingtoChristopherRobinson,
Q.C.,oneofthelearnedauthorsoftheReport,thetestoflikelihoodof
confusionundersection6isnotconcernedwithfindingaconnection
betweenareasoftrade;thelearnedauthorunderlinedthepointin1959ina
reviewofthethenrelativelynewfeaturesoftheTrade-marksAct:
Althoughintheabstracttheremightbesaidtobenosimilarity,for
instance,betweensoftdrinksandashtrays,neverthelessthepublicmight
wellconcludethatCOCAROLAashtrayshadsomethingtodowiththe
softdrinkCOCA-COLA,thoughthepublicmightcometonosuch
conclusioninthecaseofalittleknownsoftdrinksoldunderthetrade
markAJAXandashtrayssoldunderthetrademarkADAX.(…)
Alltrademarkshaveacertaindegreeoffame,andexamplescanbe
broughttomindofalldegreesfromslighttogreat.Hence,itseemedto
thedraftsmenoftheCanadianActthatthereshouldbeasinglebasic
formulaforalltrademarkcomparisonswhich,asinanalgebraicformula,
willgivedifferentresultsdependingontheparticularvaluesgivenin
differentcasestothefactorscomposingit.
49
BecausetheTrade-marksActdidnothavetherestrictionsofTheUnfair
CompetitionAct,1932whenappreciatingthelikelihoodofconfusion,the
requirementthataconnectionbetweenareasoftradebeestablishedifa
findingoflikelihoodofconfusionistobemadeisallthemorepuzzling.Itis
withinthiscontextthattheSupremeCourtofCanadaconsideredthe
statutoryrequirementsforthetestoflikelihoodofconfusioninVeuveClicquot
Ponsardin.
V.WHATTHESUPREMECOURTOFCANADADECIDED

49ChristopherRobinson,Q.C.,“TheCanadianTradeMarksActof1954-AReviewofSomeof
itsFeatures”(1959),32C.P.R.45,atpage53.

13
A.TheLikelihoodofConfusionClaim
Attheoutset,BinnieJ.agreedthatthesearchforaconnectionoutlinedin
PinkPantherBeautyCorp.puttoomuchemphasisonthesimilaritiesand
dissimilaritiesin“thenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness”–i.e.the
circumstancesdescribedinparagraph6(5)(c)oftheTrade-marksAct–and
tothatextentstrayedfromthestatutory“allthesurroundingcircumstances”
test.
50InthecompanionMattelcase,BinnieJ.wrotethatthe“exceptional
circumstances…ifever”testoutlinedatparagraph46ofthemajority’s
reasonsinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,quotedsupra,putsthebartoohighand
maybeseenasanattempttoimposerigiditywherenoneexists.
51Therefore,if
theresultoftheuseofanewtrade-markwouldbetointroduceconfusionin
themarketplace,thisshouldnotbeallowed“whetherornotthewaresor
servicesareofthesamegeneralclass”,pursuanttosubsection6(2).
AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,thecorrecttestwasstatedbythemajority
inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.whenitwroteatparagraph33:“Thetotalityof
thecircumstanceswilldictatehoweachconsiderationshouldbetreated”;
moreover,theportionofthereasonsinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.requiringa
“connection”betweenareasoftradeinordertoestablishlikelihoodof
confusionwereonlydictaandshouldthereforenotbefollowed.
52
ClarificationofthePinkPantherBeautyCorp.testdidnot,however,help
plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardininitsowncase;theSupremeCourt
affirmedthetrialjudge’soverallassessmentofthesituationandBinnieJ.
concludedthatshecorrectlyweighedthecompetingfactorswhenshe
wrote:
[75]Subsection6(5)oftheActprovidesthatacourtshouldlookatall
therelevantfactorslistedandmakeadecisionwhichtakeseachone
appropriatelyintoaccount.AlthoughIhavefoundthatthemark
“Clicquot”iswellknownandunique,anddeservesextensiveprotection,
thatisnotconclusive.Thefactofbeingwellknowndoesnotbyitself
provideabsoluteprotectionforatrademark.Itisonefactorwhichmust
beassessedtogetherwithalltheothers.
53

AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththetrialjudge’ssearchfora
“connection”betweenchampagneandwomen’sfashion–anddespite
plaintiff’sevidencewhichpurportedtoestablishsuchconnectioni.e.the

50VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.27.51Mattel,Inc.v3894207CanadaInc.,2006SCC22,atpara.63.52Id.,atparas.63,67and71.53VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.75.

14
advertisingofplaintiff’sproductsinfashionmagazinesdirectedatwomen
andthesponsorshipoffashionshows–itnonethelessstatedthatthe
evidencedidnotrevealthattheVEUVECLICQUOTmarkwouldbeassociated
byordinaryconsumerswithmid-pricedwomen’sclothing.Withthiskey
finding,theCourtdismissedplaintiff’sappeal.
Whilehavingsetasidethesearchfora“connection”betweenareasoftrade
whenapplyingthelikelihoodofconfusiontest,theSupremeCourtseemsto
havecraftedanewtest,atleastwhendealingwithfamoustrade-marks,
namelywhetherafamousmarkwouldbeassociatedbyordinaryconsumers
tothenewcomer’sareaoftrade.
Examinationofthesenioruser’smarkanditsauraappearstobeadeparture
fromthetraditionalapproachastotheassessmentoflikelihoodofconfusion
whereattentionisusuallydirectedtotheimpressionleftbythenewcomer’s
mark.Forexample,in1967,inTheRowntreeCompanyLimitedv.Paulin
ChambersCompanyLimited,
54theSupremeCourtofCanadastatedthat
whenappreciatinglikelihoodofconfusion,emphasisshouldbeplacedonthe
newcomer’smark.Thus,inacasewheretheowneroftheSMARTIEStrade-
markforconfectioneryopposedregistrationofthewordSMOOTHIESforsimilar
wares,theSupremeCourtconcludedthatitwasthenewcomer’smarkwhich
meritedattentiontodeterminewhetheritwaslikelytosuggestthatitswares
wouldbeassociatedwiththesenioruser:
(…)Iam,asIhavestated,ofopinionthattheessentialquestiontobe
determinediswhethertheuseofthewordSMOOTHIESbythe
respondentwouldbelikelytoleadtotheinferencethatthewares
associatedwiththatwordandthoseassociatedwiththeregistered
trademarksoftheappellantwereproducedormarketedbythesame
companyandIdonotthinkthatthisnecessarilyinvolvesaresemblance
betweenthedictionarymeaningofthewordusedinthetrademark
appliedforandthoseusedintheregisteredtrademarks.Itisenough,in
myview,ifthewordsusedintheregisteredandunregisteredtrademarks
arelikelytosuggesttheideathatthewareswithwhichtheyare
associatedwereproducedormarketedbythesameperson.
55[Emphasis
added.]

Anotherexampleconfirmingthatemphasisshouldusuallybeplacedonthe
newcomer’smarkisfoundintheU.S.caseofDallasCowboysCheerleaders,
Inc.v.PussycatCinema,Ltd.
56whichwasreferredtobyBinnieJ.inhisreasons.

54TheRowntreeCompanyLimitedv.PaulinChambersCompanyLimited,[1968]S.C.R.134.55Id.,atpage138.56DallasCowboysCheerleaders,Inc.v.PussycatCinema,Ltd.,604F.2d200(2dCir.1979).

15
InDallasCowboysCheerleaders,wherethenewcomerhadusedforits
pornographicfilm“costumes”whichreproducedthetrade-markindicia
ownedbythesenioruser’scheerleadingsquad,theUnitedStatesCourtof
Appeal,SecondCircuit,assessedconfusionbyexaminingwhatthe
newcomer’smarksuggested,notbyrequiringthatthesenioruser’smarkbe
knowninthenewcomer’sfield:

Thepublic’sbeliefthatthemark’sownersponsoredorotherwise
approvedtheuseofthetrademarksatisfiestheconfusionrequirement.In
theinstantcase,theuniformdepictedin“DebbieDoesDallas”
unquestionablybringstomindtheDallasCowboysCheerleaders.
Indeed,itishardtobelievethatanyonewhohadseendefendant’s
sexuallydepravedfilmcouldeverthereafterdisassociateitfrom
plaintiff’scheerleaders.
57
ItwasnotsuggestedbytheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealthatthetestfor
confusionshouldbewhethertheDallasCowboysCheerleaders’trade-mark
indiciawouldbeassociatedbyconsumerswithpornographicfilms.
However,apossiblerationaleforthespecialattentionthatmustbegiventoa
senioruser’sfamoustrade-markwhenexaminingtheissueoflikelihoodof
confusionmaysimplybetheSupremeCourt’sacknowledgementofthe
varyingdegreesoffamewhichdifferentindividualtrade-marksmayclaim
andthedifficultyincraftinga“onesizefitsall”testforfamoustrade-marks.
Sometrade-marksmaybefamousforawiderangeofproductstovirtuallyall
membersoftheconsumingpublic;othersmaybefamousonlywithinacircle
ofconnoisseursinaparticularfield;othersareuniversallyfamousbutonlyin
associationwithaspecificproduct.BinnieJ.describedthesituationinthe
followingterms:

[32](…)Famousmarksdonotcomeinonesize.Sometrade-marksmay
bewellknownbuthaveveryspecificassociations(Buckley’scough
mixtureisadvertisedaseffectivedespiteitsterribletaste,not,onewould
think,abrandimagedesirableforrestaurants).Otherfamousmarks,like
WaltDisney,mayindeedhavelargelytranscendedproductline
differences.58
InthecompanionMattelcase,BinnieJ.alsoemphasizedthepoint:

57Id.,atpage205.58VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara32.

16
[70](…)Thejurisprudenceisclearthatdifferentfactorsmaybegiven
differentweightindifferentsituations.Forexample,ProfessorMostert
pointsoutthat

Collectorsofengraved,highqualityshotgunsmay,forinstance,be
fewandfarbetweeninanygivencountrybutthePURDEYmarkis
undoubtedlyexceptionallywell-knownamongthecircleofsuch
shotguncognoscenti.

(F.W.Mostert,FamousandWell-KnownMarks:AnInternationalAnalysis
(1997),atp.26).

Evenso,Idoubtthateventhecognoscentiwouldthinktheworldfamous
shotgunspecialistislikelyassociatedwiththewell-knownVancouver
purveyorofchocolates,suchisthedivergenceinthetypeofwaresand
channelsoftrade.59
Ifoneiscorrectinrecognizingthatindividualtrade-markshavedifferent
degreesoffame,aslearnedauthorRobinsonwrotenearlyhalfacentury
ago,supra,thenonemustagreethatdifferencesindegreesoffamewill
warrantatreatmentadaptedaccordinglywhenassessinglikelihoodof
confusion.Thisiswhywhendecidingsuchanissue,theSupremeCourt
appearstohaverequiredthatspecialattentionbegiventothefamous
trade-mark–andwhattypeoffameitcanclaim–whenanalyzinglikelihood
ofconfusion.
Ifitisclearthatthereisnolongeranyneedtolookfora“connection”
betweenareasoftradeintheprotectionoffamoustrade-marks,ownersof
famoustrade-marks–andattorneysrepresentingthem–shouldbemindful
thatevidenceconcerningafamoustrade-mark’sspecificaura–andits
associationtothenewcomer’sfieldoftrade–shouldnowbecontemplated
inordertomeetwhatseemstobethenewcriteriasetoutbytheSupreme
CourtinVeuveClicquotPonsardin.
B.TheLikelihoodofDepreciationClaim
Inadditiontoitsclaimoflikelihoodofconfusion,plaintiffVeuveClicquot
Ponsardinalsoraisedtheissueoflikelihoodofdepreciationundersection22
oftheTrade-marksActwhichreadsinpart:

59Mattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.,2006SCC22,atpara.70.

17
22.(1)Nopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanotherpersonin
amannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthevalueofthe
goodwillattachingthereto.
Plaintiff’smostrelevanttrade-markregistrationwasforVEUVECLICQUOTwhile
defendantsusedthetrade-marksCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀ
PART”.OverthedecadessinceitsintroductiononJuly1,1954,therehad
beenmuchdebateastowhethersection22requiredthatadefendantusea
trade-markidenticaltotheoneregisteredbyaplaintiffinorderforittofind
application.
60TheSupremeCourthasnowsettledthisissueandindicated
thatdefendant’strade-markneednotbeidenticalbutonly“sufficiently
similar.”
61
Asforthetestitselfundersection22,theSupremeCourtindicatedthat
plaintiffneedonlyshowthatdefendantshadmadeuseofmarkssufficiently
similartoVEUVECLICQUOTtoevokeinarelevantuniverseofconsumersa
mentalassociationofthetwomarksthatislikelytodepreciatethevalueof
thegoodwillattachingtotheplaintiff’smark.
62Astothescopeofaclaim
undersection22,theCourtendorsedtheviewsofauthorswhohadwritten
contemporaneouslytothecominginforceoftheTrade-marksAct:

[39]Thes.22remedywasintroducedbythe1953amendmentstothe
Trade-marksAct,andwasbasedontheReportofTrade-markLaw
RevisionCommitteetotheSecretaryofStateofCanada(1953),chaired
byDr.HaroldG.Fox.Amemberofthatcommittee,Christopher
Robinson,Q.C.,aleadingintellectualpropertypractitioner,wroteby
wayofexplanation:

ThetrademarkKODAKwouldbelikelytobeconsiderablyless
valuabletoitsownerifitwereusedbyothersinconnectionwitha
widevarietyofotherwareseveniftheseweresounrelatedto

60Forexample,inLesRôtisseriesSaint-HubertLtéev.LeSyndicatdestravailleurs(euses)dela
RôtisserieSaint-HubertdeDrummondville(C.S.N.),[1987]R.J.Q.443(S.C.,Montreal)[appeal
launchedbeforetheQuebecCourtofAppealinfile500-09-000068-874onJanuary19,1987;
discontinuancefiledonFebruary20,1987],LesykJ.oftheQuebecSuperiorCourtconsidered
thatdefendantmustuseatrade-markidenticaltotheoneregisteredbyplaintiffforsection
22toapply,whileinCompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.
NationalAutomobile,Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionofCanada
(CAW-Canada),[1997]2F.C.306(F.C.T.D.)[appeallaunchedbeforetheFederalCourtof
AppealinfileA-38-97onJanuary17,1997;discontinuancefiledonNovember12,1997],
TeitlebaumJ.oftheFederalCourtheldthataninfringerdidnothavetouseatrade-mark
identicaltotheregisteredmarktolikelycausedepreciationtoitsgoodwill.
61VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.38.62Id.

18
photographicequipmentthatnobodywouldthinkthatthey
originatedwiththetrademarkowner.

(C.Robinson,“TheCanadianTradeMarksActof1954–AReviewof
SomeofItsFeatures”(1959),32C.P.R.45,atp.61)

[40]Dr.Foxhimselfcommentedonthenewdepreciationremedyinthe
1956editionofhistextTheCanadianLawofTradeMarksandUnfair
Competition,(2nded.1956),Vol.1,notingthats.22addressed

…thedepreciationofthevalueofthegoodwillattachingtothe
trademarkor,expressedindifferentterms,thedilutionofthe
distinctivenessoruniquecharacterofthetrademark.Thisisquite
differentfromtheorthodoxtypeofinfringement…[p.507]

…Whereawellknowntrademarkistakenbyanotherforusein
associationwithwares….inthecourseoftime,andwithrepeated
use,thetrademarkdiminishesinvaluejustasitdiminishesin
distinctiveness.[Emphasisadded;p.508.]63
Moreover,theCourtoutlinedthefourelementswhichmustbeestablishedifa
section22claimistobeallowed:
1.Aclaimant’sregisteredtrade-markwasusedbyadefendantin
connectionwithwaresorservices–whetherornotsuchwaresor
servicesarecompetitivewiththoseoftheclaimant;
2.Theclaimant’sregisteredmarkissufficientlywellknowntohave
significantgoodwillattachedtoit–althoughitneednotbefamous;
3.Theclaimant’smarkwasusedinamannerlikelytohavean
effectonthegoodwill(i.e.linkagebyconsumersbetweenthe
claimant’sgoodwillandadefendant’suse);
4.Thelikelyeffectwouldbetodepreciatethevalueofthegoodwill
attachedtothetrade-mark(i.e.damage).
64
BinnieJ.affirmedthetrialjudge’sfindingsthatplaintiff’ssection22claimhad
notbeenmadeout.Theplaintiffhadledevidencethat“CLICQUOT”wasthe
mostdistinctivepartoftheVEUVECLICQUOTmarkandthiswasrecognized
bythetrialjudge;sheheldhoweverthataconsumerwhosawtheword
“CLIQUOT”usedindefendants’storeswouldnotmakeanylinkorconnection
withplaintiff’smark.
65

63Id.,atparas.39and40.64Id.,atpara.46.65VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.96.Thetrialjudgedismissedplaintiff’ssection22claimwithoutdiscussingwhether

19
AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,whoaffirmedthetrialjudge’sfinding,
plaintiff’sclaimundersection22failedatthefirstelementofthetest:VEUVE
CLICQUOTwasnot“sufficientlysimilar”toCLIQUOTinthataconsumerbeing
acquaintedwithdefendants’markwouldnotrecognizeplaintiff’sregistered
mark;therefore,defendantswerenotmakinguseofplaintiff’sregisteredmark
i.e.VEUVECLICQUOT.Inotherwords,thementalassociationbetweenthe
newcomer’smarkandtheoneregisteredbythesenioruserwasmissinginthis
case.
66Hadplaintiff’sregisteredmarkbeenthesinglewordCLICQUOT,the
Courtsuggestedthatthefirstelementofthetestwouldhavebeensatisfied
67
(asCLIQUOTcouldbeconsidered“sufficientlysimilar”toCLICQUOT).Finally,
asthesecircumstancesdemonstrate,markscanhaveagreatdegreeof
resemblance,ashere,supra,whenoneconsiderstheissueoflikelihoodof
confusion,butcanstillnotbe“sufficientlysimilar”forasection22claim.
VI.CONCLUSION

InVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtofCanadahassetasidethe
mostcontroversialpassagesfoundinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,namely
thoserequiringthata“connection”beestablishedbetweenareasoftradein
orderforlikelihoodofconfusiontobeestablished.Whenlikelihoodof
confusionistobeexamined–includinganysituationinvolvingafamous
trade-mark–considerationshouldbegiventoallthesurrounding
circumstances,fromwhichthetrialjudgemustthenweighvariouscompeting
factors.Moreover,becausefamoustrade-marksdonotcomeinonesize,as
BinnieJ.wrote,
68considerationmustbegiventothefamoustrade-mark’s
auratodeterminewhetherconsumerswillassociatethefamoustrade-mark
toanewcomer’sfieldoftrade.However,withitsemphasisuponthe
examinationofthesenioruser’smark,timewilltellifthisnewtestwilllimitinits
ownwaytheprotectionoffamoustrade-marksinCanada.

defendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sregistrationsforthetrade-marksCLIQUOTand
CLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”constitutedananswertoplaintiff’sclaim(consideringthat
plaintiffhadnotmadeitscaseforconfusionandwasthereforenotabletoobtain
expungementofthosetworegistrations).Onthisissue,theSupremeCourtwroteatpara.16
thatregistrationisnoanswerifthevalidityoftheregistrationisputatissuebyplaintiff–which
wasdonehere.Asplaintiffwasnotsuccessfulinobtainingexpungementandthe
defendant’sregistrationsremainedvalid,itappearsthatplaintiff’ssection22claimwould
havebeendismissedforthisadditionalreason,namelythatdefendantswereshieldedby
MademoiselleCharmanteInc.’svalidregistrations(see,however,thecommentsofLindenJ.
inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,atpara.55,onthelimitsofregistrationasa“shield”).
66VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23,atpara.49.67Id.,atpara.48.68Id.,atpara.32.

20
AlthoughplaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardinwasunsuccessfulinitsownclaim,
theattentiongiventofamoustrade-marksbytheSupremeCourtofCanada
ultimatelydemonstratesacontinuingconcern,namelythatconsumer
confusionmustbeavoided.Thismustbeachieved,whetherornotthe
parties’waresorservicesareofthesamegeneralclass,asParliamentwisely
legislatedmorethanfiftyyearsago.

21
ROBIC,ungroupedavocatsetdagentsdebrevetsetdemarquesde
commercevouédepuis1892àlaprotectionetàlavalorisationdela
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appellationsdorigine;droitsdauteur,propriétélittéraireetartistique,droits
voisinsetdelartisteinterprète;informatique,logicielsetcircuitsintégrés;
biotechnologies,pharmaceutiquesetobtentionsvégétales;secretsde
commerce,know-howetconcurrence;licences,franchisesettransfertsde
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marquage,publicitéetétiquetage;poursuite,litigeetarbitrage;vérification
diligenteetaudit.ROBIC,agroupoflawyersandofpatentandtrademark
agentsdedicatedsince1892totheprotectionandthevalorizationofall
fieldsofintellectualproperty:patents,industrialdesignsandutilitypatents;
trademarks,certificationmarksandindicationsoforigin;copyrightand
entertainmentlaw,artistsandperformers,neighbouringrights;computer,
softwareandintegratedcircuits;biotechnologies,pharmaceuticalsand
plantbreeders;tradesecrets,know-how,competitionandanti-trust;
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THETRADEMARKERGROUP
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