Reflections on Competition and Antitrust Laws: Joint Ventures and the Canadian and American Markets



REFLECTIONSONCOMPETITIONANDANTITRUSTLAWS:JOINTVENTURESAND
THECANADIANANDAMERICANMARKETS

by
BobH.Sotiriadis
*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers,
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.(514)9876242-Fax(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com

GenerallyspeakingtheCanadaUnited-Statesfulltradeagreementwas
executedwithaviewtoremovingthemanybarrierstotradewhichexist
betweenCanadaandtheUnited-States.Thereisaconsensusinthebusiness
andlegalcommunitythatthefreetradeagreementoncefullyimplemented,
willencouragemoretradebetweenthecontriesandincreasetheintegration
oftheeconomyofCanadaandtheeconomyoftheUnited-Statesinthe
comingyears.
Thebusinessworldhaswitnessedanincreaseinbusinessrelatedalliances
designedtocompeteinincreasinglycompetitiveworldmarkets.Inthishighly
competitivecontextithasbecomemorecommonplaceforbusinessesto
combineeffortswithaviewtoquicklyandeffectivelyenternewandrapidly
changingmarkets.
Thereareofcourse,manywaysinwhichcompaniesmayjoinstrengthsin
ordertocompete,however,oneofthemorepopularformsofsuch
cooperationwhichhasevolvedisthatofthejointventure.
Theverynatureofmostjointventuresbringstolightacentralissue
confrontingcompetitionpolicy.Dependingonthearragement,such
transactionsmayeitherhandicapcompetitionorpromoteeconomic
efficiencyandinnovation.Oneoftheproblems,therefore,inanalysingjoint
ventureinthecontextofcompetitionlaw,isthelackofacleardefinition



















































*©LEGERROBICRICHARD,1991.
Lawyer,BobH.SotiriadisisaseniorpartnerinthelawfirmLEGERROBICRICHARD,g.p.andin
thepatentandtrademarkagencyfirmROBIC,g.p.Cedocument,d’informationgénérale,a
étépréparépourlesfinsd’uneconférencedonnéedanslecadreducolloqueLescontrats
decoentreprisetenuàMontréalle1991.10.16parTheCanadianInstitute:ilnereflètepas
nécessairementlesopinionsdesesauteursoudesmembresdeleursCabinetsetneprétend
pasnonplusexposerl’étatcompletdudroit.Publication129.



whichmaydistinguishjointventuresfromothertypesofcorporate
contractualagreements.Thereareawidevarietyofjointventuresandno
onedefinitionwilleverclearlyencompassallofthepotentialagreements
partieshavetosuchadocument.
Forthepuposesofcompetitionlaw,however,itisnotnecessarytoventure
intoeverydefinitionfromalegalstandpointorotherwiseofwhatajoint
ventureis.Theelementsofajointventurewhichareofinteresttothepresent
discussionandwhichmakethemadistinctsubjectofconcernunder
competitionlaw,arethepotentialefficiencygainsandanti-competitiverisks
createdbysuchjointenterprises.
Weshallseelateroninthispaper,thatitisthesetwo(2)characteristicswhich
willattractthemostscrutinybyenforcementagenciesundertheCanadian
CompetitionActandU.S.anti-trustlaws.
Ontheonehand,itcangenerallybearguedthattheintegrationofcertain
operationsbyparticipatingfirmsallowssuchfirmstocreateadditional
productivecapacitythroughtheformationofanewproducingorganisation
orperhapsthedevelopmentofanewproductortechnology.Thiswilloften
allowthecreationofthejointventuretoenterintoanewmarket.When
consideredinsuchalight,ajointventurewillbeseenasaintegrationof
operationswhichactuallyincreaseproduction.Itwillbeincasessuchasthis,
thattheenforcementagenciesinboththeUnited-StatesandCanadawillbe
likelytojudgetheeffectsoncompetitionofsuchajointventureinamore
lenientmanner.
Ontheotherhandthereisinherentinthejointventurearrangementariskof
anti-competitiveeffectsonthemarket.Oneelementofajointventurewhich
distinguishesitfromotherformsofcontractualarrangementsbetweenfirms,is
thatitcreatesaseparatebusinessentityfromtheparentcorporations.There
isinfactaunificationofinterestsbetweentheparents,whichcanhavea
distortingeffectontheincentiveoftheparentstocompeteinthemarketin
whichtheoffspringofthejointventureistooperate.
Itisinthecontextofthetwo(2)previouslymentioneddistinctionsthatwe
shallanalysethecompetitionallawconsiderationswhicharetobeapplyto
jointventures,thatisthepotentialforthenewenterprisetoincrease
productivecapacity,increasenewtechnologyandtoenterintonew
marketswheretheparentswouldnothaveenteredhadtheoffspringnot
beencreated,andtheobviousanti-competitiveriskscausedbyvirtueofthe
jointventurearrangement.
Weknowthatajointventurediffersfromamergersincenormallyitinvolves
thecreationofseparate,limitedpurposecompanyasopposedtoan



amalgamationoftwo(2)previouslyexistingfirms.Manyofthedisavantages
ofmergersareavoidedinthecreationofajointventure,giventhatjoint
venturestendtoprotecttheparticipantsfromopportunismandinformationin
balanceofteninherentinmergeragreements.
Theimportanceofkeepinganti-trustandcompetitionprinciplesinmindwhen
enteringintoajointventureagreementisasstatedabove,inherentinthe
anti-competitiveeffectsofthatthejointventuremaycreate.Asalso
mentionedabove,thenewentitymayincreaseproductiveeconomic
activityandfostercompetitionwherenonepreviouslyexisted.Inmayalso
allowtheparentsandtheoffspringofthejointventuretoenterintonew
marketswhichneitheroronlyonecouldhaveenteredindividually.Andmost
importantly,thejointventuremayresultinaneconomyofscaleandthereby
allowthepartiestoproducealevelofcapacityofproductionwhichwould
havebeenimpossibletomaintain,hadeachparticipanttothejointventure
attemptedtoperformthesamefonctionseparately.
Wherethecompetitionactwishestocurbtheactivitiesofbusinessesentering
intoarrangementssuchasjointventures,iswherethejointventurereduces
evenpotentialcompetitionandcreatesbarrierstotheentryofagiven
market.Youmustkeepinmindthatoneorbothoftheparentcompaniesto
ajointventuremayhaveenteredthefieldoccupiedoftheoffspringofthe
venture,hadtheventureitselfnotevenbeenformed.Itisobviousthatthe
parentstothejointventurewouldbecomelesswillingandlessabletoactas
usualharmslenghtcompetitiorsinspheresofactivitywhicharenotrelatedto
thatoftheoffspring.Inotherwords,thecloseracompanyistightinwith
anothercompanyduetoajointventurehasexecutedwiththesaid
company,thelessitwouldbewillinginotherareasofmarketparticipationto
competewiththatcompany.Theyhave,inasensebecomefriends.We
maysaythatthecompetitionactdoesnotwishtofindinthemarketplaceto
manyoversizedfriendscontrollingsignificantblocsoftheCanadian
economy.
Furthermore,theparentcompaniesmayrestrainthepotentialoftheoffspring
companytocompeteinthemarketinordertoprotecttheexistingmarketsof
theparentcompaniesortheircustomers.
Anotherproblemwhichmaybecausedbyajointventure,wouldbethe
effectivethatithasonathirdpartyfirmwhichisnotinvolvedinthejoint
ventureandwhichwishestoenterthemarketinwhichtheoffspringofthe
jointventurewillbecompeting.Thismaybeimpossibleforthisthirdpartyfirm
toactuallydueifthejointventuresstrengthisoverbearinginthemarketor
wheretheoffspringofthejointventureisrestrictedfromdealingwiththird
partycompanybytheparentstothejointventure.



Moreobviousanti-competitiveeffectofajointventureaswheretheparties
haveenteredintotheventureexpresslywithaviewtofixingpricesordividing
geographicmarkets.
AsweshallseeinbothU.S.andCanadiancompetitionlegislationthereis
expressedthedesiretoefficientlydetermineforthepurposesofestablishing
whetheracontractualarrangementbetweentwo(2)firmsasunacceptable
anti-competitiveeffects,atwhatpointthebenefitsofincreasedefficiency,
growthofproductivecapacity,andentryintonewmarketswhichmaybe
broughtaboutbyajointventureamongstseparatecorporateparentsare
outweighedbytheanti-competitiveeffectsofsame.
ANOVERVIEWOFCANADA’SCOMPETITIONACT
Priortothe1986CanadianCompetitionLawconsistedofprimarilycriminal
law.ThecombinesinvestigationacthadbeenCanadabasicanti-truststatut
sincethebeginningofthecentury.TheActwasentirelycriminallawuntil
1976,whencertaincivilremedyprovisionswereaddedtotheAct.Thenew
competitionActof1986continuedtowardscivilproceedingsbyestablishing
recourseswithrespecttomergers,monopolies(abusivedominantposition),
specialisationagreementsanddeliveredpricing.
Thenewlegislation,therefore,consistedofadramaticchangeinCanada’s
competitionLaws.Numerouscriminalandcivilfeatureswhereaddedtothe
legislationofrelevantstothepresentpaper,wewouldliketositethefollowing
changes:
1.Theestablishingofanewcivilproceduretodealwithmergers
thatrestrictcompetition;
2.EstablishmentofnewTribunalcalledtheCompetitionTribunal
todealwithmergersandmonopolies;
3.EstablishmentofanewprocedurebywhichtheCompetition
Tribunalconcertifiedandexemptsspecialisationagreements,
amendsproceduresrelatingtoinvestigationsbytheDirectorof
investigationandresearch;
Thecriminalprovisionofthenewlegislationofmostrelevancetothepresent
essay,isthatwhichconcernsagreementstolimitcompetitionunduly.Asto
provisionswithrespecttocivilproceedingsthosewhicharemostrelevanceto
thepresentessay,concerntheabuseofadominantpositionoranti-
competitivepractisesinmergerswhichsubstantiallylessincompetition.



AGREEMENTSTORESTRICTCOMPETITION
Asnotedabove,thetwo(2)sectionsoftheActwhicharemorerelevantto
thepresentpaperarethoseconcerningagreementstorestrictcompetition
whichweshalldiscusshereandthoseconcerningmergers.
Theprohibitionagainstconspiracies,agreementsandarrangementsthatless
incompetitionundulyhasbeencarriedoverfromtheoldcombines
investigationActanditisoneoftheoldestprohibitionsofCanadian
CompetitionLaw.Theoffenceisstillcriminalinnature.
TheconspiracysectionoftheCompetitionAct,atsection45thereofstates
thatanyonewhocombines,agreesorarrangeswithanotherpersontolessen,
restrainorinjurecompetitionindulyisguiltyofanoffenceandmaybesueon
thatbasisforactualdamagessufferedbyanyotherpersonorpersons.
Ajointventuremaybesubjecttothissectionintheeventthatithasthe
effectofrestrainingcompetition.
Finesunderthissectionraisefrom$1,000,000.00to$10,000,000.00.
Furthermore,theconvinctionsmaybeobtainedbytheCrownonthebasisof
circumstancialevidence.ItisnotnecessaryfortheCrowntoprovethatthe
accusedintendedtolessencompetitionunduly,itisonlynecessarythat
Crownprovesthatanaccusedintendedt2oenterintotheagreement,and
thattheagreement,ifcarriedintoeffectwouldlessencompetitionunduly.
Section45furthersetsoutthree(3)defencesavailabletotheaccusedin
proceedingstakenundersection45.Whethereachdefenceisfollowedby
anexceptiontothedefencewhenthesubjectmatterraisedinthedefence
touchesononeofthesubjectmattersstatedintheacception.
Aparticularinteresttothepresentdiscussionisthedefencewithrespectto
ccoperationandresearchindevelopment,sinceofternjointventureareset
upspecificallyforthatpurpose.Ifsuchanagreementrelatesonlyto
cooperationandresearchindevelopmentanditsnotlikelytolessen
competitionundulyinrespectofprices,quantityorqualityofproduction,
marketsorcustomersorchanelsormethodsofdistributionoraslikelyto
restrictanypersonfromenteringintoorexpendingbusinessinatradeindustry
orprofession,thenthedefencewillbeupheld,itisoftheutmostimportance
toanalysetheacceptionstothedefencewithrespecttocooperationand
researchindevelopmentwhicharefoundatsub-section4ofparagraph45
oftheAct.
WeshallseethatthetestappliedbytheActinthecaseofmergersand
abusivedominantpositionisthatof”substantiallessenofcompetition”,



whereasunderthecriminalsectionpresentlybeingdiscussed,theoldtestof
“undulylimitingcompetition”hasbeenmaintained.
Finally,itisimportanttosetoutthatthedirectorisbroadfromtakingan
applicationunderthemergerprovisionswhichweshallbestudyinginthe
nextsection,againstthepersonagainswhomproceedingshavebeen
commencedundersection45thatisthecriminalprovisionwithrespectto
agreementstorestrictcompetition.
JOINTVENTURESASMERGERS
ItisbyfartheprovisionsofthecompetitionActwithrespecttomergerswhich
areofthemostrelevanttoadiscussionoftheanti-competitiveeffectsofjoint
ventures.Thebroaddefinitionofthetermmergerintherelevantprovisionsof
theActfullyencompassesthefeaturesinherentinjointventurecontractual
arrangements.Asweshallseelater,thisisalsothecaseintheUnited-States.
Infact,ajointventureinvolvingcompanieswithsignificantoperationsinboth
CanadaandtheUnited-Statescanpotentiallyinvolveallofthecompetition
andanti-trustlawimplicationsapplicabletomurdersinbothcontries.
UndertheAct,thetermmergerisdefinedas:
“Theacquisitionorestablishment,directorindirect,byoneor
morepersons,whetherbypurchaseorleaseofsharesorassets,
byamalgamationorbycombinationorotherwise,ofcontrol
overorsignificantinterestinthewholeorapartofabusinessofa
competitor,supplier,customerorotherperson.”
Thisverygeneraldefinitioniscurbedonlybyvarylimitedexceptionforcertain
jointventuresdescribedatsection95oftheCompetitionAct.
Onceajointventureisdefinedasconstitutingamergerforthepurposesof
theAct,severalofthemostimportantprovisionsoftheLawwillreceive
application.Boththoseconcerningsubstantivequestionsanddoeswith
respecttoproceduralaspectsoftheAct.
SUBSTANTIVEELEMENTSOFMERGERPROVISIONS
OncetheCanadianauthoritiesarenotifiedofamergerorwhenaproposed
mergerotherwisecomestotheirattention,areviewofthetransactionis
carriedoutwithaviewtoestablishingwhetherthemergerorproposed
mergerpreventsorlessens,orislikelytopreventorlessencompetition
substantiallyinthemarket(section92oftheAct).



ThecompetitionlawsofCanadaandtheUnited-Statesweredraftedinorder
toprotectmarketswhichmaybedefinedastheUnited-StatesorCanada,or
evensmalleroriginalmarketswithineachcountry,thewholeforthebenefitof
consumersinthereleventjurisdictions.
TheauthorityforsuchreviewinCanadaistheBureauofCompetitionPolicy.
Itisestablishingwhetheramergershouldbeblock,onceithasbeendecided
thatitpreventsorlessensorislikelytopreventorlessencompetition
substantiallythatwenowreturninmoredetailtothediscussioncommenced
inanintroductorywayinarepriliminaryremarks.
SinceundertheCanadianActamerger,althoughjudgedtobelikelyto
lesencompetitionsubstantially,maynotbeblockifitisdeterminethat
efficiencygainswillresultfromthemergerthatarelikelytobegreaterthan
andwilloffsettheeffectsoflessenofcompetition,andthatefficiencygains
willnotlikelybeachievedifthemergerisblock,furthermoretheAct
specificallyforeseesthatthetribunalisnotentitledtofindthatamergeror
proposedmergerpreventsorlessens,orislikelytopreventorlessen
competitionsubstantiallysolelybasedonevidenceofconcentrationor
marketshare.
Itisevidentthatthislatterconsiderationalongwithefficiencygainsdefence
shallconstitutethemajorargumentofjointventuresagainstwhomarecourse
underthemergersectionoftheActisdirectedbythecompetition
authorities.
Indecidingwhetheraparticularmergeror,ofcourse,jointventureoffends
therelevantprovisionsoftheAct,thetribunalmayconsiderinteraliathe
followingfactors:
1.theextenttowhichforeignproductsorforeigncompetitors
provideorlikelytoprovideeffectivecompetition;
2.whetherthebusinessorapartofbusinessofapartytothe
mergeorporposedmergerhasfailedorislikelytofail;
3.theextenttowhichacceptablesubstituteforproductsapplied
bythepartiestothemergerareavailableorarelikelytobe
available;
4.anybarrierstoentryinthemarket,includingtariffsandnone
tariffbarriers,inter-provisionalbarrierstotradeandregularin
controlofaentry;

OtherconsiderationsareforeseenintheActthemostinglobingbeingthe
sub-sectionwhichallowsthetribunaltoquoteanyotherfactorthatitis
relevanttocompetitioninthemarketthatisorwouldbeeffectedbythe
mergerorproposedmerger.
EXCEPTIONFORJOINTVENTURES
JOINTVENTURESEXEMPTIONUNDERTHEACT
Inprincipaljointventuresmaybeconsideredmergersunderthecompetition
Act,giventhefactthattheymayforeclosedpotentialcompetition.
However,section95oftheActcreatesanexceptionforjointventureswhich
maybedescribedasbeingverylimitedinscope.
Theexceptioninquestionislimitedtounincorporatedcombinationsfora
specificprojectorprogramofresearchindevelopmentthatonlyifallfive(5)
conditionssetoutatsection95arerespected.
Itwouldappearfromaliteralreadingofthesaidsectionthatitcouldonlybe
madetoapplywithrespecttoveryextraordinaryanduniqueprojetsor
programsofresearchindevelopmentnototherwiseattainablewithoutthe
cooperationofoneormorelargesizefirms.IngenerallyspeakingtheAct,
therefore,givesthetribunaldiscretiontoexemptthejointventure
notwithstandingthefactthatitwouldsubtantiallylessencompetition.

Beforegoingontothequestionofpre-mergernotificationundertheAct,we
wishtoremindthereadernottoconfusetheexceptionsdiscussedunderthe
presentsectionwiththosewhichwouldbediscussedunderthepre-
notificationsectionofthispaper.Jointventureswhichmayexemptfromthe
pre-notificationrequirementstobediscussednext,maystillbesubjecttothe
provisionsoftheActwhichconcerntheregulationofmergers.
UNITED-STATESLAWANDPRACTICEONTRANSNATIONALJOINTVENTURES
ThemajorprincipleguidingU.S.anti-trustpolicymaybesaidtobesimilarto
thatofCanada’stradepolicyinthatU.S.Lawprohibitsamergeriftheeffect
maybesubtantiallytolessencompetitionortotendtocreateamonopoly.
AsinCanada,itmaybesaidthattheU.S.anti-trustLawappliestojoint
ventures,asitisforeseenspecificallyatsection7oftheClaytonAct,the

legalityofjointventuresinanti-trustlegislationintheUnited-Statesinvolves
essentiallythesameconsiderationasmergers.TheUnited-Stateslawand
practiceonthequestionofjointventuresinthecontextofanti-trustregulation
wasreviewedindetailintheUnited-StatesdecisionoftheUnited-States-vs-
PenOilandChemicalCompanytowhichwewillreferinmoredetaillateron
onthispaper.
TheUnited-StatesLawforeseespre-mergernotificationtobebasedonthe
natureofthemergeronacasebycasebasisandmaybesaidtoencompass
jointventures.IthasbeennotedthatthedetailedrequiredinU.S.filings,for
pre-notification,areconsiderablymoreextensivethaninCanadianfilings.
TheAuthorityintheUnited-Statesforquestionsofanti-trustpolicyarethe
FederaltradeCommissionandtheanti-trustdivisionoftheDepartmentof
Justice.Weshallnotgointothedetailsofthejurisdictionofeachdepartment
inthispaper.

WenotedearlierthatthecompetitionActspecificallydeclaresthatthe
decisionastowhetheramergerorproposedmergerpreventsorlessensoris
likelytopreventorlessencompetitionsubstantiallymaynotbebasedsolely
ondatarelatingtomarketsharesorconcentrationratios.Thisisnotnecessary
thecaseintheUnited-Stateslawinpracticewherestrongderivedfromthe
anti-competitiveeffectsofmergersinindustrieswheretheyexistshigh
concentrationratios,andundercircumstanceswhereamergerwould
causedsignificantincreasesinthoseratios.
ThejointventureswearediscussinghereinthecontextoftheUnited-States
lawinpracticearethosewhichhaveacompetitiveeffectonU.S.foreignor
interstatecommerce,ifaventureeffectsonlythecommerceofforeign
countrytheconductisnotwithinthesubjectmatteroftheU.S.anti-trustlaws.
Ineffect,U.S.anti-trustlawapplywhenaventurehasasubstantialand
foreseeableeffectoncommerceinsidetheUnited-StatesoronU.S.exportsor
imports.
IntheUnited-Statesanti-trustauthoritiesmust,asisthecaseinCanada,
doggedandbalancethepossiblecompetitiveeffectsofjointventures,
whethertheybepro-competitiveeffectsoranti-competitiveeffects.
AsinCanada,U.S.authoritiesmusttacklethepolicyproblemofdetermining
atwhatpointthebenefitsofincreaseefficiency,growthofproductive
capacity,inenteringtonewmarketsbroughtaboutbycooperativeventures
amongstseparatecorporateparentsoroutwaybytheanti-competitive
effectsofjointaction.



Inreasonreason,theU.S.Courtsandtheanti-trustenforceshavedeveloped
aforcestepinanalysisofjointventure.1988anti-trustenforcementguide
linesforinternationaloperationsstatedthatthedepartmentwouldbe
judgingthelikelycompetitiveeffectsofjointventuresunderaruleofreason,
duetothefactthatjointventurestypicallyachieveintegrativeefficiencies.
Thefirstquestioninaforcestepanalysisofajointventureiswhetherthejoint
venturewouldlikelyhaveanti-competitiveeffectinthemarketormarketsin
whichthejointventureproposedtooperate.
Thesecondquestionwouldbewhetherthejointventureoranyofits
restrenghtwouldlikelyhaveananti-competitiveeffectinanyothermarketor
marketsinwhichthejointventuremembersareactualorpretential
competitorsoutsideofthejointventure.
Thethirdquestionwouldbewhetheranylikelyanti-competitiveeffects
associatedwithanynonepriceverticalrestrenghtopposeinconnectionwith
thejointventuremayexist.
Evidently,ajointventurewillnotbechallengedifunderthefirstthreestamps
itisconcludedthatthejointventurewillnotlikelytohaveanysignificantanti-
competitiveofeffects.However,intheeventthatthethreefirststepsreveal
significantanti-competitiverisks,thenafourstepisinvokedwithrespecttoa
considerationofpro-competitiveefficienciesthatwouldbeachievebythe
jointventureorwhethertheywouldoutwaytheriskofanti-competitiveharm,
thisjoinstheCanadianexceptionforefficiencyreferredtointheprevious
sectiononmergersunderCanadiancompetitionlaw.
AsunderCanadianLaw,thebasicquestionintheUnited-Stateswithrespect
tothecompetitiveeffectsoftheformationofajointventure,iswhetherthe
venturepartnersareinorwouldenterthemarketinwhichtheoffspringwill
operate.Thisisespeciallyimportantwheretheparentsareactualorpotential
competitorsinthatmarket.
Typically,thequestionthatwouldbeaskedunderU.S.Lawandwhichissurely
similartothatasunderCanadianLawishowsignificantthiscompetitionin
thatparticularmarketdiminishedbytheventure.
Thefactorsarerelevanttothistypeofanalysisparalleltothosesustained
specificallyintheCanadiancompetitionActandincludethesizeofthe
partners,theirmarketshare,thecontributionofeachparenttotheventure,
andthelikelyhoodthatintheabsenceoftheventure,oneorbothparents
wouldundertakeasimilarprojecteitheraloneorwithasmallerfirm.



Asmentionedearlierinthisessay,theleadingauthorityontheeffectofjoint
venturesoncompetitionconsistsofthePenOilCase,inwhichjusticeClark
listednolessthanfifteen(15)separatefactorswhichthetrialCourtshould
havetakenintoaccountinassessingwhethersection7oftheKletonAct
hadbeenviolatedbyjointventure,whileitisnotnecessarytoexhaustorlist
allfifteen(15)factorslistedbytheHonourableJusticeClarkinhisdecision
sufficetosaythatthefactorsspecificallystatedintheCanadianCompetition
Actaremorethancoveredbythislistandinanycase,thesub-sectionofthe
CanadianActwhichstatesthatanyotherfactorsthatisrelevantto
competitioninamarketthatisorwouldbeeffectivebythemergeror
proposedmergeristobetakenintoconsiderationiseffectivelycoveredby
thelistingoftheHonourableJusticeClark.
Itis,however,partofUnitedStatesanti-trustpolicytorecognizethatmany
jointventuresfacestiffcompetitionfromforeignfirmsandthattheymaybe
createdforvarietyofgoodbusinessreasons.Oftentimesjointventuresare
createdtotakeadvantageofcomplimentaryskillsoreconomyofskillin
productionmarketingorresearchindevelopmentortospreadrisk.
ItisacommonpolicyofCanadaandtheUnitied-Statestoassurefuture
competitivenesstorespecttomarketsconcerningnewtecnologiesinareas
suchassuperconductoractivity,highdefinitiontelevision,roboticsand
computerizeddesigninmanufacturing.Itisobviousthatthepoliciesofboth
countriesintheanti-trustfieldwillunlikelyacttorestraintheabilityof
CanadianandAmericanfirmsfromenteringthesemarketsevenatthe
expenseofacertainlesseningofcompetition.
Finally,inarecentattemptblockajointventurebetweenWestinghouseand
AseaBrownBoveratheU.S.justicedepartmentallowedthepartiestothejoint
ventureunderscrutinytorestructuresameinamanneracceptabletothe
department.
ANNEXE”I”
CERTIFICATDEDÉCISIONPRÉALABLE
L’article102delaLoisurlaconcurrencepermetàdespartiesquicomplètent
unetransaction,dedemanderaudirecteurl’émissiond’uncertificatde
décisionpréalable.Lespartiesdoiventconvaincreledirecteurqu’iln’aura
pasdemotifssuffisantspourfaireunedemandeautribunalenvertude
l’article92delaLoi.Cetarticlepermetautribunaldelaconcurrence
d’émettredesordonnanceslorsqu’unfusionnementréaliséouproposé
empêcheoudiminuesensiblementlaconcurrenceouaura
vraisemblablementceteffet.



Cependant,l’émissiond’untelcertificatn’empêchepasledirecteurde
pouvoirattaquerultérieurementlatransactionainsicomplétéepuisquecelui-
ciconservetoujourslafacultéd’attaquertoutestransactionsdansundélai
detrois(3)ans.Laseulecertitudequeconfèrel’obtentiond’uncertificatde
décisionpréalableestqueledirecteurnepourrapasattaquerlatransaction
surlabasedesrenseignementsqu’ilauraobtenuspourémettreuntel
certificat.Remarquonsnéanmoinsquel’obtentiond’uncertificatpermetaux
parties,siellesremplissentlesconditionsprévuesauxarticles108etsuivants
surlapré-notification,denepassesoumettreàcelle-ci.
Enoutre,bienquecetteobligationdepré-notificationconstitueunnouvel
interventionnismeétatiquedanslesmilieuxcommerciaux,onpeutnéanmoins
conclurequ’unetelleinterventionestsansdoutepréférableàdesprocédures
dirigéescontreunefusiondéjàréalisée.
ANNEXE”II”
L’OBLIGATIONDEPRÉ-NOTIFICATION
AUCANADA
1)INTRODUCTION
L’obligationdepré-notificationestsansdoutel’unedesdispositionsmajeures
desamendementsapportésàLoisurlaconcurrenceen1986.Elleconstitue
uneimportanteformedecontrôlepotentieldel’économieauCanada.
Cetteobligationnousaétéinspiréeparlalégislationaméricaineetplus
particulièrementparlesdispositionsHart-Scott-RodinointroduitesdanslaLoi
anti-trusten1976auxÉtats-Unis.
Avantd’étudierplusendétailscetteobligation,quelquesremarques
préliminairess’imposent.Toutd’abord,lapré-notificationenmatièredefusion
n’estobligatoirequesicettedernièreaunecertaineimportancequantàsa
valeur,commenousleverronsunpeuplusloin.Ceciestvraiparcequ’ilest
plusprobablequ’unefusiondetailleentraîneuneréductiondeconcurrence
plusimportanteetaussiparcequ’ilestplusdifficilededéfaire,aprèscoup,
unefusionimportante.
LeParlementadoncjugénécessaired’introduireauxarticles108à124dela
Loisurlaconcurrenceuneobligation,pourlespartiesquiparticipentàune
fusionimportante,depréaviserledirecteuravantd’effectuerleurtransaction.



Ensuite,etbienquel’obligationdepré-notificationsoitliéeàl’importance
d’unetransaction,ellen’aenelle-mêmerienàvoiraveclaquestionde
réductiondelaconcurrence.Eneffet,l’obligationdepré-notificationest
totalementindépendantedel’existenceounond’uneréductionde
concurrence.Atitred’exemple,sideux(2)partiesàunefusionneremplissent
paslescritèresédictésparlaLoisurlaconcurrencelesobligeantàpré-
notifier,cetteabsencedepré-notificationn’empêchepaslaréductiondela
concurrence.
Enfin,nousn’envisageronsiciquelesdispositionslespluspertinentes
concernantlapré-notification.Eneffet,ilnenoussemblepasnécessairede
présenterlesdispositionsdelaloiquiénoncentlecontenudupréavisqueles
partiesdoiventfaireparveniraudirecteurdesenquêtesetdesrecherches
(articles114etsuivants).

2)OBLIGATIONDEPRÉ-NOTIFICATION
Quandl’obligationdepré-notifierexiste-t-elle?Lapré-notificationest
imposéeàl’égarddestransactionsquipeuventounonconstituerunefusion
ausensdel’article91delaLoisurlaconcurrence.Maisenpratique,nous
noustrouveronsgénéralementfaceàdestransactionsquiserontenfaitdes
fusions.Detoutefaçon,ilnepeutyavoirobligationdepréaviserques’ilya
acquisitiond’uneentrepriseenexploitation,c’est-à-dired’uneentreprise
activeoùdesemployéssontaffectésàsonexploitation.
Commenousl’avonsdéjàmentionnéplushaut,l’obligationdepré-
notificationn’estapplicablequ’auxtransactionsquisontimportantesdupoint
devuedeleursvaleurs.Cesontlesarticles109et110delaLoisurla
concurrencequidéfinissentqueltypedetransactionsestvisé.Cesarticles
définissentdeux(2)conditionspréalablesetcumulativesquidevrontêtre
réaliséespourqu’ilyaitobligationdepré-notifier.
Lapremièredecesconditionsconcernelespartiesencause.Lespartiesàla
fusionprojetée,incluantleurscompagniesaffiliéeslecaséchéant,doivent,
ensemble,avoirdesactifsoudesrevenusannuelsauCanadadeplusde
$400,000,000.00.
Lasecondecondition,quantàelle,estrelativedirectementàlatransaction.
Celle-cidoitviserdesactifsoudesactionsvalantaumoins$35,000,000.00.
Danslecasd’acquisitiond’actionsavecdroitdevote,ilfaudraquelesactifs
oulesventesannuellesdel’entrepriseacquiseoudel’entreprisecontrôlée
parl’entrepriseacquisedépassentauCanada$35,000,000.00.Deplus,il
faudra,commerésultatdelatransaction,quelapartieacquéranteaitplus
devingtpourcent(20%)desactionsavecdroitdevotes’ils’agitd’une



compagniepublique,oudeplusdetrente-cinqpourcent(35%)s’ils’agit
d’unecompagnieprivée.Danslecasd’uneamalgamation,cechiffrede
$35,000,000.00estportéà$70,000,000.00.
Ajoutonsenfinquemêmesilespartiesàunetransactionremplissentles
conditionsénuméréesci-dessus,laLoisurlaconcurrenceprévoit,auxarticles
111,112et113,desexceptionsàlapré-notificationdontlesprincipalessont
lestransactionsimpliquantexclusivementdespartiesquisonttoutesaffiliées
entreelles;lestransactionsàl’égarddesquellesledirecteuraremisun
certificatdedécisionpréalabletelqueprévuàl’article102delaLoi(voir
Annexe”I”);enfinlesentreprisesàrisquepartagéou(jointventure)etce,sous
certainesconditions.
Signalonsdèsàprésent,maissansrentrerdanslesdétails,qu’unefoisqueles
partiesaurontremplilesdocumentsauxfinsdepréaviserledirecteur,celui-ci
devrarépondredansuncertaindélaiquantàsavoirsilatransaction
envisagéeréduiraounonsensiblementlaconcurrence(voir”INFRA”).
Onpeut,àpremièrevue,considérerquelavaleurdesmontantsprévusparla
Loiestassezélevée.Iln’estcependantpasrarequedesentreprises
canadiennesatteignentcesseuils.Enoutre,bienquecetteobligationde
pré-notificationconstitueunnouvelinterventionnismeétatiquedansles
milieuxcommerciaux,onpeutnéanmoinsconclurequ’unetelleintervention
estsansdoutepréférableàdesprocéduresdirigéescontreunefusiondéjà
réalisée.
3)DÉLAIINHÉRENTÀLAPROCÉDUREDEPRÉ-NOTIFICATION
Lorsquenousnoustrouvonsdanslecadred’unepré-notification,lesparties
doiventfourniruncertainnombred’informationsrelativesàlatransaction
proposée.LaLoi,auxarticles121et122,permetauxpartiesdeproduiredeux
(2)typesderenseignements,soitceuxdel’article121ouceuxdel’article122.
C’estenfonctionduchoixentrecesdeux(2)catégoriesdeprocéduresqu’il
fautseplacerpourcalculerlesdélaisderéponsedelapartdudirecteur.
Ilnousfautdistinguertrois(3)calculsdedélaideréponsepossibles.
Premièrement,lorsquelespartiesontchoisidefournirlesrenseignementssous
l’article121,ledirecteurauraalorsundélaidesept(7)joursdepuislejourde
laréceptiondesrenseignementspouraviserlespartiesqu’iln’envisagerapas,
pourlemoment,dedemanderautribunall’émissiond’uneordonnace
prévueàl’article92delaLoi.Cependantledirecteurauralapossibilité
durantcemêmedélaid’exigerlesrenseignementsquisontprévusàl’article
122.



Deuxièmement,silespersonnesimpliquéesdansunetransactionfournissent
lesrenseignementsprévusàl’article122etce,qu’elleslefassent
volontairementousurdemande,ledirecteurseverral’obligationde
répondre,dansundélaide21jours,surlapossibilitéd’uneéventuelle
demandeautribunaldelaconcurrencepourquecedernierémetteune
ordonnaceenvertudel’article92delaLoisurlaconcurrence.
Troisièmement,lorsquenousavonsàfairefaceàunetransactionproposée
concernantuneacquisitiond’actionscomportantdroitdevote,et
relativementàlaquellelesrenseignementsfournissontceuxprévusàl’article
122,ilestnécessairequ’ilsesoitécouléaumoinsundélaide10jours
d’activitédebourseouundélaipluslong,maissansquecelui-cinedépasse
21joursetce,parrapportàcequiestprévuparlesrèglementsdelabourse
quirégit.Iciencoreledélais’imputeàpartirdeladatederéceptiondes
renseignementsparledirecteurquiconservetoujourslapossibilitédedonner
unavisavantl’expirationdecedélai.
Àlalecturedecetarticle,nouspouvonsdirequ’ilseraitsouhaitable,lorsque
despartiesàunetransactiondoiventfournirdesrenseignementssurcelle-ci
danslecadredelaprocéduredepré-notification,delefairedirectement
sousl’article122.Eneffet,ledélaidesept(7)joursprévuàl’article121dela
Loientraînerasansaucundoutel’exigence,delapartdudirecteur,d’obtenir
lesrenseignementsprévusàl’article122.L’exercicedecettefacultéparle
directeurentraîneradonclaprolongationdesdélaisdesept(7)jours
initialementescomptésparlespartiesmaissansdoute,serontsupérieursà
celuide21joursprévuàl’article123delaLoipuisqu’iln’estindiquénullepart
queledélaiquiauraitétéécouléenfonctiondelaprésentationdes
renseignementssurl’article121,s’imputeraitautomatiquementdudélaide21
joursprévulorsquelesrenseignementssontdonnéssousl’article122.
ANNEXE”III”
APPLICABILITÉDELALOISURLACONCURRENCEAUXCOMPAGNIESDELA
COURONNEETAUXINDUSTRIESRÉGLEMENTÉES
LaLoisurlaconcurrences’appliqueàtouteslespersonnesetentreprisesqui
laviolentetce,danstouslessecteursdel’activitécanadienne.C’estuneloi
denatureéconomique,c’est-à-direqu’elles’appliqueaussibienauxproduits
etqu’auxservices(voirlaloiàl’article2sousproduitsetservices).
IlestprévudanslesLoisd’interprétation,l’article16(f)delaLoifédéraleet
l’article45(p)delaLoiprovincialequelescorporationsdelaCouronne
bénéficientd’uneexemptiongénéraleàl’applicationdelaloilorsqu’elles
agissentpourcelle-cisaufsilaloileprévoitautrement.Or,l’article2.1dela



Loisurlaconcurrenceprévoitexpressémentl’applicabilitédelaLoiaux
corporationsdelaCouronneàl’égarddesactivitéscommercialesqu’elles
exercentenconcurrenceréelleoupotentielleavecd’autrespersonnes.
Soulignonsquel’existencedecetarticlen’enlèvepasl’immunitéàla
Couronneentantquetelle,parexemplelorsqu’uneactivitécontraireàlaLoi
surlaconcurrenceémanedirectementd’uneautoritégouvernementale,
provincialeoufédérale.
Qu’enest-ildesindustriesréglementées?Uneindustrieestconsidéréecomme
réglementéelorsque,parexemple,l’étatfixelesprix(bièreenOntariooulait
auQuébec)oubien,lorsquel’étatfixedesnormessurlapublicité(industrie
dutabac)oubienencoredesnormesconcernantl’hygiènepublique,etc….
Danssonsoucideprotégerleconsommateur,l’étatpeutprendredes
mesuresdirectementencontradictionaveclalibreconcurrence,par
exemple,lafixationdesprix.Lesquestionsquiseposentdèslorssontde
savoirsi:premièrementlorsquel’onposeungestecontraireàlaLoisurla
concurrencemaisautoriséparunrèglement,cegesteviole-t-illaLoisurla
concurrence?Deuxièmentlorsqu’uneactivitéestréglementéepartiellement,
cetteréglementationentraîne-t-ellelanon-applicabilitédelaLoisurla
concurrenceàtouteslesautresactivitésdecettemêmeindustrie?

Pourrépondreàlapremièrequestion,soulignonsquelaCoursuprêmedans
l’affaireInRe:FarmProductMarketingAct
(1957)R.C.S.198,aconsidéré
qu’uneactivitéautoriséeparuneloivalidenepouvaitêtrecontraireàlaLoi
surlaconcurrence,cesdeux(2)Loisétantadoptéesdansl’intérêtpublic.
Laréponseàladeuxièmequestionaétépréciséetoutd’aborddansl’affaire
R.-vs-CanadianBreweriesLtd.
(1976)QR.601,oùlaCouraconcluquece
quiétaitexemptéétaitseulementcequiétaitautoriséparuneloivalide.
Enconclusionsurcesujet,nouspouvonsdirequel’exemptionpourles
industriesréglementéesn’estqu’unedéfenseàportéelimitée,quecette
exemptionn’estapplicablequelorsquelerèglementaétéautoriséparune
Loiprovincialeoufédéralevalide,etqu’ilaeffectivementréglementation,
c’est-à-direexercicedurèglement.Enfin,cettedéfensenes’appliquepas
auxactivitésnonréglementées,parcequec’estunedéfenserelativeàdes
conduitesetnonàl’industrieengénéral.



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ROBIC,agroupoflawyersandofpatentandtrademarkagentsdedicatedsince1892tothe
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LEGERROBICRICHARD
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R
ROBIC
ROBIC+DROIT+AFFAIRES+SCIENCES+ARTS
ROBIC++++
ROBIC+LAW+BUSINESS+SCIENCE+ART
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