Not Just About Famous Trade-Marks: a Review of Other Issues Raised by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin and Mattel Decisions

1
NOTJUSTABOUTFAMOUSTRADE-MARKS:AREVIEWOFOTHERISSUESRAISEDBY
THESUPREMECOURTOFCANADAINTHEVEUVECLICQUOTPONSARDINAND
MATTELDECISIONS

BarryGamache*
LEGERROBICRICHARD
,L.L.P.
Lawyers,Patent&TrademarksAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria–BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal(Quebec)H2Z2B7
Tel:514-987-6242-Fax:514-845-7874
info@robic.com–www.robic.ca

1.0INTRODUCTION
OnJune2,2006,theSupremeCourtofCanadahandeddownitsmuch
anticipateddecisionsinMattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.
1andinVeuve
ClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée.
2AunanimousCourtaffirmedthe
lowercourts’rejectionofMattel,Inc.’soppositiontotheregistrationofthe
trade-markBARBIE’S(&Design)forrestaurantservices;italsoconfirmedthe
dismissalofVeuveClicquotPonsardin’svariousclaims(includingitsrequestfor
injunctiverelief)underCanada’sTrade-marksAct
3(the“Act”)againstachain
ofwomen’sretailclothingstoresusingtheservicemarkCLIQUOT.Attheheart
ofeachtrade-markcasewasthescopeofprotectiontobegrantedto
famoustrade-marksandintheseparticularinstances,toboththefamousand
longstandingBARBIEandVEUVECLICQUOTmarks,ownedrespectivelybythe
AmericantoymanufacturerandtheFrenchChampagnehouse.Althoughthe
Courtconfirmedthelowercourts’findingsthatbothBARBIEandVEUVE
CLICQUOTwerefamousmarks,itconcludedthattheevidenceineachcase
didnotsupportafindingoflikelihoodofconfusion,whereonenewcomerhad
appliedtoregisteraBARBIE’Stypetrade-markforrestaurantservices,while

©CIPS2006.*BarryGamacheisamemberofLEGERROBICRICHARD,L.L.P.,amultidisciplinaryfirmof
lawyers,patentandtrademarkagents;hewasoneofthelawyersappearingforVeuve
ClicquotPonsardin,maisonfondéeen1772beforetheFederalCourt,TrialDivision(nowthe
FederalCourtofCanada),theFederalCourtofAppealandtheSupremeCourtofCanada.
AshewasinvolvedintheprosecutionofVeuveClicquotPonsardin’sclaims,referencewillbe
mademorespecificallyinthispapertothefactualcircumstancesoftheVeuveClicquot
Ponsardincase.Paperpresentedtothe80
thAnnualMeetingoftheIntellectualProperty
InstituteofCanada,September27-30,2006,St.Andrews-by-the-Sea,New-Brunswick.357.
1Mattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.,2006SCC22.2VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,2006SCC23.3Trade-marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.T-13.

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theotherhadadoptedthemarkCLIQUOTforitswomen’sretailclothing
stores.
Inbothsetsofreasons,however,theCourtagreedwithappellantsthatthe
caselaw
4whichhadbeenrelieduponbythelowercourtshadputtoomuch
emphasisonthesimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesinthenatureofthewares,
servicesorbusinesswhenanalysinglikelihoodofconfusioninvolvingafamous
trade-mark.OnemaysaythattheCourt’sdecisionsinbothcaseshave
clarifiedthelikelihoodofconfusiontestregardingfamoustrade-marks,first
reviewedin1998bytheFederalCourtofAppealinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.
v.UnitedArtistsCorp.
5andfurtherdescribedin2000bythesameappellate
courtinToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.
6TheSupreme
Court’sclarificationofthePinkPantherBeautyCorp.test–whichwillbe
analyzed–ispartoftheMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardinlegacy.
However,aswewillsee,inbothdecisions,theSupremeCourtdidraiseother
issuesofinteresttotrade-markpractitioners.
2.0HOWLIKELIHOODOFCONFUSIONISTOBEMEASURED:THECASE
INVOLVINGFAMOUSTRADE-MARKVEUVECLICQUOT
2.1Background
“Amongthosewithchampagnetastes,thebrandofVeuveClicquot
Ponsardinisconsideredamongtheverybest.”
7Withthesekindwords,BinnieJ.
oftheSupremeCourtofCanadaintroducestheplaintiffChampagnehouse
anditsmuchappreciatedsparklingdrink.Tracingitsoriginstothelastyearsof
France’sancienrégime,plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardinowesitswell-
deservedreputationpartlytotheimpressiveachievementsofNicoleClicquot
Ponsardin(1777-1866)who,asayoungveuve,in1805,succeededherlate
husbandattheheadofathensmallChampagnehouse.MadameClicquot
waskeyinthedevelopmentofherchampagne’smuchappreciated
qualities.Toher,weowethepupitrederemuage(orriddlingrack)whose
innovativeuseintheearly1800sallowsustodaytoenjoytranslucent
champagne–ascomparedtoitslessaestheticallypleasinglate18
thcentury
predecessor,whichpresentedasomewhatcloudyappearance.VEUVE

4PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.)[applicationfor
leavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadagrantedonNovember19,1998infile
26689;discontinuancefiledonJune21,1999];ToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoods
Inc.,[2001]2F.C.15(F.C.A.)[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtof
CanadadismissedonJuly12,2001infile28376].
5PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.).6ToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,[2001]2F.C.15(F.C.A.).7Supra,note2,atpara.1.

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CLICQUOTchampagnewasfirstdistributedinCanadaduringthelastdaysof
the1890s.Ithasfoundfameandacclaimincirclesofconnoisseursandin
largeronesofoccasionalusers.VeuveClicquotPonsardinregistereditsfirst
trade-mark–oneofitslabels–inCanadain1909,whileamorerecent
applicationforthewordmarkVEUVECLICQUOTmaturedtoregistrationin
1980forchampagnewineswithaclaimofuseofthemarkinCanadasinceat
least1899.
DefendantsBoutiquesCliquotLtée,MademoiselleCharmanteInc.and
3017320CanadaInc.aremuchyounger,“NewWorld”,corporateentitieswho
operateintheprovincesofQuebecandOntarioachainofmid-priced
women’sretailclothingstoresundervarioustradenamessuchas
MademoiselleCharmante,Colette,CadancePetiteandCharmantePetite.
8
In1995,defendantschosetwonewtrade-marks,CLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UN
MONDEÀPART”forsixoftheirboutiques.
9OnAugust20,1996,defendant
MademoiselleCharmanteInc.appliedtoregisterthetrade-marksCLIQUOT
andCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”(the“CLIQUOTmarks”or“CLIQUOT
registrations”),bothfortheoperationofretailclothingstoreswithrespectof
ladies’wearandaccessoriesonthebasisofuseofeachtrade-markin
CanadasinceasearlyasMarch1995.Bothapplicationswerepublishedfor
oppositionpurposesonMarch5,1997and,intheabsenceofanyobjection,
proceededtoregistrationonAugust1,1997.
OnNovember5,1998,afterlearningoftheexistenceoftheCLIQUOT
boutiquesthroughitsCanadianagent,
10plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardin
initiatedlegalproceedingsbeforetheFederalCourtofCanadaagainstthe
threeaforementioneddefendants.Plaintiffsoughtaninjunctiontoendthe
useofthemarksCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”;additionally,it
requestedthatbothofthe1997registrationsofthesemarksbestruckout.
11
Plaintiff’sactionbeforetheFederalCourtwasbased,interalia,ons.20ofthe
Act,whichsetsouttherightoftheownerofaregisteredtrade-marktostop
theuseofanyconfusingtrade-mark.Aswillbefullyoutlinedlater,thegrounds
forexpungementwerealsofoundedonallegedconfusion.Finally,plaintiff’s
requestforaninjunctionwasfurtherbasedons.22oftheAct,whichstates
thatnopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanotherpersonina
mannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthevalueofthe
goodwillattachedthereto.

8VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.6.
9Ibid.,atparas.4and60.10Ibid.,atpara.39.11Ibid.,atpara.12.

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ThetrialinthismatterwasheldfromNovember18toNovember21,2002.On
January30,2003,Tremblay-LamerJ.oftheFederalCourtdismissedallof
plaintiff’sclaims.
12OnApril22,2004,plaintiff’sappealbeforetheFederalCourt
ofAppealwasalsodismissed.
13
Theallegationoflikelihoodofconfusion,whichwasbroughtforwardbyVeuve
ClicquotPonsardin–andwhichformedpartofitsbasisforaninjunctionand
wascrucialtoitsclaimforexpungement–wasdismissedbythelowercourtsin
largepartduetotherulesgoverningtheprotectionoffamoustrade-marksin
Canada,describedbytheFederalCourtofAppealinMarch1998inPink
PantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.
14andrestatedtwoandahalf
yearslaterinToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.
15
2.2TheSearchforaConnection
OnMarch30,1998,theFederalCourtofAppealhandeddownitsmuch
debateddecisioninPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,
16an
oppositioncasewhichhadoriginatedfromtheTrade-MarksOppositionBoard
whereUnitedArtistsCorporation,ownerofthefamoustrade-markTHEPINK
PANTHER(associatedtothecomedyfilmswithPeterSellersasInspector
Clouseau),wasunsuccessfulinitsoppositionagainsttheregistrationofthe
trade-markPINKPANTHERforhaircareandbeautyproductsuppliesandthe
operationofabusinessdealingintheirdistribution.AdividedFederalCourtof
Appealtackledtheissueastothescopeofprotectiontobegrantedto
famoustrade-marksinCanadawhenapplyingthetestoflikelihoodof
confusionunders.6oftheAct.
ThereasonsofLindenJ.,whowroteforthemajority,wereseenasrequiringa
“connection”betweentheparties’areasoftradeiflikelihoodofconfusionis
tobefoundbetweenasenioruser’sfamoustrade-markandanewcomer’s
similarmark.Absentsuchaconnection,asenioruserwouldfaceanuphill
battleinchallenginganewcomerwhohadcarriedoveritsfamousmarkinto
anewfieldoftrade.Thisapparentsearchfora“connection”wasunderlined
morethanoncebyLindenJ.:
[44]…Thewidescopeofprotectionaffordedbythe
fameoftheappellant’smarkonlybecomesrelevantwhen
applyingittoaconnectionbetweentheapplicant’sandthe
opponent’stradeandservices.Nomatterhowfamousamark

12Ibid.,atparas.80,87,97and107.13VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2004),35C.P.R.(4th)1(F.C.A.).14Supra,note5.15Supra,note6.16Supra,note5.

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is,itcannotbeusedtocreateaconnectionthatdoesnot
exist.
17
…
[46]Anumberofothercaseshavecometomyattention
involvingfamoustrade-markssuchas“Coca-Cola”,“Cartier”
and“Wedgwood”.Ineachofthesecasesthefamousmark
prevailed,butineachcaseaconnectionorsimilarityinthe
productsorserviceswasfound.Wherenosuchconnectionis
established,itisverydifficulttojustifytheextensionofproperty
rightsintoareasofcommercethatdonotremotelyaffectthe
trade-markholder.Onlyinexceptionalcircumstances,ifever,
shouldthisbethecase.
18
…
[51]…WhattheTrialJudgedidnotgivesufficientweight
toisthat,notonlywerethewaresineachcasecompletely
disparate,butthereisnoconnectionwhatsoeverbetween
them.AsIstatedearlier,wherenosuchconnectionexistsa
findingofconfusionwillberare.
19
Theimportanceofa“connection”wasagainhighlightedbyaunanimous
benchoftheFederalCourtofAppealonNovember20,2000,inthe
subsequentcaseofToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,
20
anotheroppositioncasewheretheJapanesecarmanufacturer
unsuccessfullyopposedregistrationofthetrade-markLEXUSfor,interalia,
cannedfruitsandvegetables.WritingagainfortheCourt,LindenJ.
emphasized:
[7]…Theuseofthephrase”whetherornotthewaresor
servicesareofthesamegeneralclass”asusedinsubsections
6(2),6(3)and6(4)doesnotmeanthatthenatureofthewares
isirrelevantindeterminingconfusion;theysuggestonlythat
confusionmay
begeneratedwithgoodsthatarenotinthe
“samegeneralclass”,butstillhavesomeresemblanceor
linkagetothewaresinquestion.
21…[emphasisinoriginaltext.]
InlightofthisemphasisbytheFederalCourtofAppealuponasearchfora
connectionbetweenareasoftradebeforeafindingoflikelihoodofconfusion
istobemade,theneedfora“connection”betweenachampagne
manufacturer’sbusinessandtheworldoffashionwasverymuchaconcern
forbothplaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardinandthetrialjudgewhenthelatter

17Ibid.,atpara.44.18Ibid.,atpara.46–endnotesomitted.19Ibid.,atpara.51.20Supra,note6.21Ibid.,atpara.7.

6
heardthecaseinNovember2002.VeuveClicquotPonsardinintroduced
evidencewhichpurportedtoestablishsuchaconnection,i.e.,theadvertising
ofplaintiff’sproductsinfashionmagazinesdirectedatwomenandthe
sponsorshipoffashionshows,alongwiththeeverimportantpresencein
plaintiff’spromotionalactivitiesofreferencestoMadameClicquot,apioneer
inherownrightasabusinessperson,atatimewhenfewwomenexercised
suchresponsibilities-whichexplainswhyplaintiffaimstosellitsproductto
women.
Afterreviewingtheevidence,thetrialjudgemadeseveralfindingsfavourable
toplaintiff.Shewrotethatwhileplaintiff’sregisteredtrade-markwasVEUVE
CLICQUOT,
22itsdistinctivepartwasCLICQUOT,whichshealsodescribedas
oneofplaintiff’smarks;
23sheconcludedthatplaintiff’sVEUVECLICQUOTand
CLICQUOTmarkshadsignificantinherentdistinctivenessanddeserved
extensiveprotection;shealsofoundthattherewasnoothersimilarmarkon
themarketinCanada.
24Sherecognizedthegreatdegreeofresemblance
betweentheparties’marks
25astheirdominantfeatureswererespectively
CLICQUOT(forplaintiff)andCLIQUOT(fordefendants).Shenotedthatthe
lengthoftimeduringwhichtheparties’trade-markshadbeeninusein
Canadafavouredplaintiffasthetrade-markVEUVECLICQUOThadbeen
usedinCanadasinceatleast1899.
26Finally,shemadethecrucialfindingthat
plaintiff’smarkwasfamous.
27
However,onthefactsbeforeher,thetrialjudgewasnotconvincedthat
VeuveClicquotPonsardin’sadvertisinginwomen’smagazinesandits
involvementinfashionshowsweresufficienttoestablishabridgebetween
VeuveClicquotPonsardin’sprincipalactivityandthatofthedefendants.In
herview,theevidenceestablishedthatwomenwerebutonemarket
targetedbyplaintiffasconsumersofitschampagne.
28Indismissingplaintiff’s
allegationoflikelihoodofconfusion,thetrialjudgereferredspecificallytothe
principlesofPinkPantherBeautyCorp.andwroteinherreasonsabout
findingsmadeinthatcase:“TheCourtfoundnoconnectionbetweenthe
parties’productsandservices,andconsequentlyheldthattherewasnorisk
ofconfusion”.
29Inthetrialjudge’sview,theabsenceofaconnection

22VEUVECLICQUOTwasoneofseveralregisteredtrade-marksrelieduponbyplaintiff;itwas
howeverthemostrelevantasbeingtheonehavingthegreatestdegreeofresemblancewith
defendants’marks.
23Supra,note8,atparas.8,44,58and63.24Ibid.,atpara.58.25Ibid.,atparas.44and62to66.26Ibid.,atpara.60.27Ibid.,atpara75(intheoriginalFrenchversionofherreasons,thetrialjudgeusedtheword
“célèbre”todescribeplaintiff’smark).
28Ibid.,atpara.69.29Ibid.,atpara.78.

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betweentheparties’areasoftradeinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.
consequentlyleadtoafindingofabsenceoflikelihoodofconfusioninthat
case.Accordingly,a“connection”orbridgebetweenchampagneand
women’sfashionappearedtobeapreconditionforanyfindingoflikelihood
ofconfusion;intheabsenceofsuchconnection,plaintiff’sclaimwas
dismissed.ThisdecisionwasconfirmedbytheFederalCourtofAppeal.
30
2.3WhattheSupremeCourtdecided
WritingfortheCourtinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,BinnieJ.affirmedthetrial
judge’sfindingthatVEUVECLICQUOTisa“famous”mark.
31Thiscircumstance
isimportantbecausefamepresupposesthatthemarktranscendsatleastto
someextentthewareswithwhichitisnormallyassociated.Inthiscase,the
evidencerevealedthatVEUVECLICQUOTevokedabroadassociationwith
luxurygoods.However,onthefactsofthiscase,wastherearequirementto
lookfora“connection”betweenplaintiff’sproductsandwomen’sfashion?
Onthisissue,BinnieJ.agreedthatthesearchforaconnectionoutlinedinPink
PantherBeautyCorp.puttoomuchemphasisonthesimilaritiesand
dissimilaritiesin“thenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness”–i.e.these
circumstancesdescribedinpara.6(5)(c)oftheAct–andtothatextent
strayedfromthestatutory“allthesurroundingcircumstances”test.
32Inthe
companionMattelcase,BinnieJ.wrotethatthe“exceptional
circumstances…ifever”testoutlinedatpara.46ofthemajority’sreasonsin
PinkPantherBeautyCorp.,quotedsupra,putsthebartoohighandmaybe
seenasanattempttoimposerigiditywherenoneexists.
33Therefore,ifthe
resultoftheuseofanewtrade-markwouldbetointroduceconfusioninthe
marketplace,thisshouldnotbeallowed“whetherornotthewaresorservices
areofthesamegeneralclass”,pursuanttoss.6(2).However,accordingtothe
SupremeCourt,thecorrecttestwasstatedbythemajorityelsewhereinPink
PantherBeautyCorp.,whenitwroteatpara.33:“thetotalityofthe
circumstanceswilldictatehoweachconsiderationshouldbetreated”;finally,
theportionofthereasonsinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.requiringa
“connection”or“resemblance”betweenareasoftradeinordertoestablish
likelihoodofconfusionwereonlydictaandshouldthereforenotbefollowed.
34
ClarificationofthePinkPantherBeautyCorp.testdidnot,however,help
plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardininitsowncase;theSupremeCourtaffirmed

30Supra,note13.31Supra,note2,atpara.26.32Ibid.,atpara.27.33Supra,note1,atpara.63.34Ibid.,atparas.63,67and71.

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thetrialjudge’soverallassessmentofthesituationandBinnieJ.concluded
that,inthecircumstancesofthecasebeforeher,shecorrectlyweighedall
thecompetingfactorswhenshewrotethatdespitethefameassociatedwith
“CLICQUOT”,auniquemarkdeservingextensiveprotection,therewasno
likelihoodofconfusionbetweentheparties’respectivetrade-marksbecause
ofthegreatdifferenceintheparties’areasoftrade.
35Accordingtothe
SupremeCourt,itwasnotthesearchforaconnectionwhichdeterminedthe
outcomeofthiscase;rather,itwastheassessmentofthetotalityofthe
circumstanceswhichwascorrectlycarriedout,inthiscase,bythetrialjudge.
AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththeviewthatasearchfora
“connection”betweenchampagneandwomen’sfashionwasrequested–
anddespiteplaintiff’sevidencewhichpurportedtoestablishsuchconnection
i.e.theadvertisingofplaintiff’sproductsinfashionmagazinesdirectedat
womenandthesponsorshipoffashionevents–itnonethelessstatedthatthe
evidencedidnotrevealthattheVEUVECLICQUOTmarkwouldbeassociated
byordinaryconsumerswithmid-pricedwomen’sclothing.Withthiskeyfinding,
theCourtdismissedplaintiff’sappeal.Asimilarresultwasachievedinthe
MattelcasewheretheCourtaffirmedtherejectionofMattel,Inc.’sopposition
totheregistrationofthetrade-markBARBIE’S(&Design)forrestaurant
services;there,applyingthereasonablenessstandardofreview,
36theCourt
confirmedthatthe“allofthesurroundingcircumstances”testhadalso
appropriatelybeentakenintoconsiderationbytheOppositionBoard(whose
decisionwasreasonable)andthatincasessuchastheoneinvolvingMattel,
Inc.’sopposition,somecircumstances(suchasthedifferenceinwares)will
carrygreaterweightthanothers.
37
Whilehavingsetasidetherequirementfora“connection”or“resemblance”
betweenareasoftradewhenapplyingthelikelihoodofconfusiontest,the
SupremeCourtseemstohavecraftedanewtest–atleastwhendealingwith
thesituationofafamoustrade-markbeingcarriedoverbyanewcomerinto
adifferentfieldoftrade–namely,willthefamousmarkbeassociatedby
ordinaryconsumerswiththenewcomer’sareasoftrade?
Examinationofthesenioruser’smarkanditsauraappearstobeadeparture
fromthetraditionalapproachregardingtheassessmentoflikelihoodof
confusionwhereattentionisusuallydirectedtotheimpressionleftbythe
newcomer’smark.Forexample,inDallasCowboysCheerleaders,Inc.v.
PussycatCinema,Ltd.
38whichwasreferredtobyBinnieJ.inhisreasons,the

35Supra,note8,atparas.78and80.36Supra,note1,atpara.40.37Ibid.,atpara.73.38DallasCowboysCheerleaders,Inc.v.PussycatCinema,Ltd.,604F.2d200(2dCir.1979).

9
newcomerhadusedforitspornographicfilm“costumes”whichreproduced
thetrade-markindiciaownedbythesenioruser’scheerleadingsquad.There,
theUnitedStatesCourtofAppeal,SecondCircuit,measuredconfusionby
examiningwhatthenewcomer’smarksuggested,notbyrequiringthatthe
senioruser’smarkbeknowninthenewcomer’sfield:
Thepublic’sbeliefthatthemark’sownersponsoredor
otherwiseapprovedtheuseofthetrademarksatisfiesthe
confusionrequirement.Intheinstantcase,theuniform
depictedin“DebbieDoesDallas”unquestionablybringsto
mindtheDallasCowboysCheerleaders.Indeed,itishardto
believethatanyonewhohadseendefendants’sexually
depravedfilmcouldeverthereafterdisassociateitfrom
plaintiff’scheerleaders.
39
ItwasnotsuggestedbytheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealthatthetestfor
confusionshouldbewhethertheDallasCowboysCheerleaders’trade-mark
indiciawouldbeassociatedbyconsumerswithpornographicfilms.
Thissaid,alikelyrationaleforthespecialattentionthatmustbegiventoa
senioruser’sfamoustrade-markwhenexaminingtheissueoflikelihoodof
confusionmaybetheSupremeCourt’sacknowledgementofthevarying
degreesoffamewhichdifferentindividualtrade-marksmayclaimandthe
difficultyincraftinga“onesizefitsall”testforfamoustrade-marks.Some
trade-marksmaybefamousforawiderangeofproductstovirtuallyall
membersoftheconsumingpublic;othersmaybefamousonlywithinacircle
ofconnoisseursinaparticularfield;othersareuniversallyfamousbutonlyin
associationwithaspecificproduct.BinnieJ.describedthesituationinthe
followingterms:
32…Famousmarksdonotcomeinonesize.Sometrade-marks
maybewellknownbuthaveveryspecificassociations
(Buckley’scoughmixtureisadvertisedaseffectivedespiteits
terribletaste,not,onewouldthink,abrandimagedesirablefor
restaurants).Otherfamousmarks,likeWaltDisney,mayindeed
havelargelytranscendedproductlinedifferences.
40
Itisnowclearthatthereisnolongerarequirementtolookfora“connection”
–whichmayproveelusiveinmanycircumstances–betweenareasoftradein
theprotectionoffamoustrade-marks.However,ownersoffamoustrade-
marksandtheirattorneysshouldbemindfulthatevidenceconcerninga
famoustrade-mark’sspecificaura–anditsassociationtothenewcomer’s

39Ibid.,atp.205.

40Supra,note2,atpara.32.

10
fieldoftrade–shouldnowbecontemplatedinordertomeetwhatseemsto
bethenewcriteriafortheprotectionoffamoustrade-marksassetoutbythe
SupremeCourtofCanadainVeuveClicquotPonsardin.
3.0THEEXTENTOFTHERIGHTSCONFERREDBYREGISTRATION
Whileconcernedwiththeprotectionoffamoustrade-marks,thecaseof
VeuveClicquotPonsardinalsotouchesupontheissueoftherightsconferred
byregistrationundertheAct.Indeed,defendantMademoiselleCharmante
Inc.hadsecuredregistrationofitstrade-marksCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UN
MONDEÀPART”onAugust1,1997(morethanayearbeforeplaintiff
launcheditssuitforinjunctiverelief)andthereforehadexclusiverightsunders.
19oftheAct.Thegroundsofeachremedysoughtbyplaintiffareimportantas
defendantsarguedbeforetheFederalCourtthatplaintiffmustfirstovercome
apreliminaryhurdleandobtaintheexpungementoftheCLIQUOTmarks–
andthesettingasideoftherightsconferredbyregistrationundertheAct–
beforeitcanarguethatitisentitledtoobtaininjunctivereliefagainstthem
(beforetheSupremeCourt,defendantspushedthisargumentfurtherand
arguedthattheAugust1,1997registrationoftheCLIQUOTmarkswasa
completeanswertoplaintiff’sclaims).Inordertodeterminewhether
expungementmustprecedeinjunctiverelief,considerationwillbegivento
thevariousgroundsofactionraisedbyplaintiff.
3.1Plaintiff’svariousclaims
Asownerofmanyregisteredtrade-marks–includingthetrade-markVEUVE
CLICQUOT–plaintiff’srequestforinjunctivereliefwasfounded,interalia,ons.
20oftheActwhichprovidesinpart:
20.(1)Therightoftheownerofaregisteredtrade-marktoits
exclusiveuseshallbedeemedtobeinfringedbyapersonnot
entitledtoitsuseunderthisActwhosells,distributesor
advertiseswaresorservicesinassociationwithaconfusing
trade-markortrade-name…
Plaintiff’sclaimthatdefendantswereusinga“confusingtrade-mark”unders.
20obviouslyrequiredconsiderationofpartofs.6oftheAct,whichmerited
muchattentioninBinnieJ.’sdiscussiononfamoustrade-marks:
6.…
(2)Theuseofatrade-markcausesconfusionwithanother
trade-markiftheuseofbothtrade-marksinthesamearea
wouldbelikelytoleadtotheinferencethatthewaresor
servicesassociatedwiththosetrade-marksaremanufactured,

11
sold,leased,hiredorperformedbythesameperson,whether
ornotthewaresorservicesareofthesamegeneralclass.
…
(5)Indeterminingwhethertrade-marksortrade-namesare
confusing,thecourtortheRegistrar,asthecasemaybe,shall
haveregardtoallthesurroundingcircumstancesincluding
(a)theinherentdistinctivenessofthetrade-marksortrade-
namesandtheextenttowhichtheyhavebecomeknown;
(b)thelengthoftimethetrade-marksortrade-nameshave
beeninuse;
(c)thenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness;
(d)thenatureofthetrade;and
(e)thedegreeofresemblancebetweenthetrade-marksor
trade-namesinappearanceorsoundorintheideassuggested
bythem.
Plaintiff’sclaimforaninjunctionwasalsofoundedons.22oftheAct,which
prohibits,initsrelevantpart,theuseofaregisteredtrade-mark(here,VEUVE
CLICQUOT,amongothers)inamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectof
depreciatingthevalueofitsgoodwill:
22.(1)Nopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanother
personinamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectof
depreciatingthevalueofthegoodwillattachingthereto.
Plaintiff’sgroundsforexpungement(foundedons.18oftheAct)weremore
numerousbutnarrowerinscopeinasmuchastheyallraisedtheissueof
“confusion”ortherelatedissueoflackofdistinctivenessoftheCLIQUOT
marks,albeitallatdifferentdates.
PlaintiffarguedthattheCLIQUOTmarkswereinvalidbecauseatthedateof
theirregistration(here,August1,1997),theycreatedconfusionwithplaintiff’s
registeredmarks(includingVEUVECLICQUOT),onthebasisofparas.12(1)(d)
and18(1)(a)oftheActwhichprovideinpart:
18.(1)Theregistrationofatrade-markisinvalidif
(a)thetrade-markwasnotregistrableatthedateof
registration…
12.(1)Subjecttosection13,atrade-markisregistrableifitisnot
…
(d)confusingwitharegisteredtrade-mark…
Accordingtoplaintiff,defendants’markswerealsoinvalidastheywerenot
distinctiveofthedefendants’servicesatthetimeproceedingsbringingthe
validityoftheregistrationsintoquestionwerecommenced(here,November
5,1998),onthebasisofpara.18(1)(b)ands.2oftheAct:

12
18.(1)Theregistrationofatrade-markisinvalidif
…
(b)thetrade-markisnotdistinctiveatthetimeproceedings
bringingthevalidityoftheregistrationintoquestionare
commenced,or…
2.…“distinctive”,inrelationtoatrade-mark,meansatrade-
markthatactuallydistinguishesthewaresorservicesin
associationwithwhichitisusedbyitsownerfromthewaresor
servicesofothersorisadaptedsotodistinguishthem…
Finally,plaintiffallegedthatdefendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.wasnot
thepersonentitledtoregistrationoftheCLIQUOTmarksbecauseatthetime
thesemarkswereallegedlyusedforthefirsttime(here,March1995),they
wereconfusingwithplaintiff’spreviouslyusedtrade-marksinCanada,onthe
basisofparas.18(1)infineand16(1)(a)oftheAct:
18.(1)Theregistrationofatrade-mark…
isinvalidiftheapplicantforregistrationwasnottheperson
entitledtosecuretheregistration.
16.(1)Anyapplicantwhohasfiledanapplicationin
accordancewithsection30forregistrationofatrade-mark
thatisregistrableandthatheorhispredecessorintitlehasused
inCanadaormadeknowninCanadainassociationwith
waresorservicesisentitled,subjecttosection38,tosecureits
registrationinrespectofthosewaresorservices,unlessatthe
dateonwhichheorhispredecessorintitlefirstsouseditor
madeitknownitwasconfusingwith
(a)atrade-markthathadbeenpreviouslyusedinCanadaor
madeknowninCanadabyanyotherperson;
…
Thegroundsforexpungementdidnotmirrorthoseforinjunctiverelief,as
likelihoodofdepreciationisnotagroundforexpungementunders.18.This
differenceinscopeofthevariousgroundsforeachremedyisimportant.
Indeed,ifinlaw,expungementmustfirstbesoughtandobtainedbeforeany
claimforinjunctivereliefistobeconsidered,anyevidenceoflikelihoodof
depreciationofplaintiff’sregisteredmarkcausedbydefendantswouldnot
allowplaintifftoobtainaninjunctionshouldMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’s
CLIQUOTmarksremainontheRegister.Suchisoneoftheimportant–but
implicit–rulingsmadebytheSupremeCourt.
3.2RightsconferredbySection19

13
OnAugust1,1997,defendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.secured
registrationforitstwoCLIQUOTmarks.Assuch,fromthatdate,itwasgranted
therightsconferredbys.19oftheAct:
19.Subjecttosections21,32and67,theregistrationofatrade-
markinrespectofanywaresorservices,unlessshowntobe
invalid,givestotheownerofthetrade-marktheexclusiveright
totheusethroughoutCanadaofthetrade-markinrespectof
thosewaresorservices.
NoneofMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’srightswerelimitedinanywaybyss.
21,32and67,whichprovideexceptionstothemonopolisticrightsconferred
bys.19oftheAct.Section21concernstherightofatrade-markownertothe
useofitsmarkinadefinedterritorialareaconcurrentlywiththeuseby
anotherpartyofaregisteredtrade-markprotectedunderss.17(2)oftheActif
suchownerhadingoodfaithuseditsmarkinCanadabeforethedateof
filingoftheapplicationoftheregisteredmark;unders.21,theFederalCourt
maysetthetermsforsuchconcurrentuse.Section32outlinestheRegistrar’s
jurisdictiontorestrictaregistrationtoadefinedterritorialareainCanada
withinwhichanotherwiseunregistrabletrade-mark–undercertainconditions
–isshowntohavebecomedistinctive.Finally,s.67affirms,withintheprovince
ofNewfoundland,thefulleffectoftrade-marksregisteredundertheLawsof
NewfoundlandpriortoApril1,1949.
Registrationofatrade-markcanbeusedastheproverbialswordtocounter
anyunauthorizeduseofsuchmarkanywhereinCanada.Forexample,in
1969,GibsonJ.oftheExchequerCourtwroteinOldDutchFoodsLtd.v.W.H.
MalkinLtd.
41that“…registrationofatrade-markbyreasonofsection19…
givestosuchowneranabsoluterighttostopothersfromusingthattrade-
mark…”
42Anowner’sexclusiverighttotheusethroughoutCanadaofits
registeredtrade-markwasalsounderlinedmorerecently,in2003,by
MartineauJ.oftheFederalCourtinBacardi&Co.v.HavanaClubHolding
S.A.
43Finally,in2005,inKirkbiAGv.RitvikHoldingsInc.,44theSupremeCourt
describedtherightsofaholderofaregisteredtrade-mark:
30…Theprimarydifferencebetweenregisteredand
unregisteredtrade-marksundertheActisthattherightsofa
holderofaregisteredtrade-markaremoreextensive:
…
Registrationofatrade-markgivestheregistranttheexclusive
righttotheusethroughoutCanadaofthetrade-markanda

41OldDutchFoodsLtd.v.W.H.MalkinLtd.,[1969]2Ex.C.R.316.42Ibid.,atp.325–footnoteomitted.43Bacardi&Co.v.HavanaClubHoldingS.A.(2003),32C.P.R.(4th)366(F.C.T.D.),atpara.22
[affirmedbyBacardi&Co.v.HavanaClubHoldingS.A.(2004),32C.P.R.(4th)306(F.C.A.)].
44KirkbiAGv.RitvikHoldingsInc.,[2005]3S.C.R.302.

14
rightofactiontoremedyanyinfringementofthatright:ss.19-
20.
45…
WritingfortheCourt,LeBelJ.alsoemphasizedthatregistrationgrantsmore
effectiverightsagainstthirdparties:
58…Registrationdoesnotchangethenatureofthemark;it
grantsmoreeffectiverightsagainstthirdparties.Nevertheless,
registeredornot,markssharecommonlegalattributes.They
grantexclusiverightstotheuseofadistinctivedesignationor
guise(Ciba-GeigyCanadaLtd.v.ApotexInc.,[1992]3S.C.R.
120,atp.134;GillandJolliffe,atpp.4-13and4-14).Indeed,the
Trade-marksAct,byallowingfortheassignmentofunregistered
trade-marks,recognizestheexistenceofgoodwillcreatedby
thesemarksaswellasthepropertyinterestsinthem.
Registrationjustfacilitatesproofoftitle.…
46
InKirkbiAG,LeBelJ.wasconcernedwiththeextentofexclusiverightsgranted
tounregisteredtrade-marks;however,itisclearthatregistrationgrantsa
registrant“theexclusiverighttotheuse”ofitsmarkthroughoutCanada.
Althoughregistrationcanbeusedasasword,canitalsobeusedasashield,
protectingitsowneragainstanyclaiminvolvingtheuseofthetrade-markas
longasitisontheregister,asdefendantsarguedinVeuveClicquotPonsardin
onthebasisoftheirCLIQUOTregistrations?
BeforeturningtotheSupremeCourt’scommentsontherightsconferredbys.
19oftheAct,itisworthrememberingthatthemonopoly-grantingprovisionof
theActdoesnotprovideabsoluteprotectioninallcircumstances,foralltypes
ofuse;forexample,inpenalproceedings,whentheuseofaregisteredtrade-
markisfoundtoviolatetheprohibitionsofanotherstatute,itsownercannot
shielditselfbehindtherightsgrantedbys.19.Suchwasthecasein1976,inR.
v.DiscountBroadloomCentreLtd.,
47whereHoustonJ.oftheCountyCourtof
Ontario(DistrictofYork)foundthattheenablingprovisionsoftheActandthe
restrictiveprovisionsofthethen–CombinesInvestigationAct
48didnotoperate
tocreate,betweenthem,anirreconcilableconflict;theCourtconsequently
foundthattheregisteredtrade-markFACTORYCARPETOUTLETwasmisleading
undertheprovisionsoftheCombinesInvestigationAct–astheaccuseddid
notoperateanyfactory–anditsownerwasconvictedaccordingly.
49

45Ibid.,atpara.30.46Ibid.,atpara.58.47R.v.DiscountBroadloomCentreLtd.(1976),31C.P.R.(2d)110(Ont.Co.Ct.).48CombinesInvestigationsAct,R.S.C.1970,c.C-23.49Infact,theTrade-marksOfficecautionsanyapplicantforregistrationthattheregistrationit
willeventuallysecuredoesnotimplyconformitywithanotherstatute:“TheTrade-marksAct

15
However,itcanbearguedthats.19rightswerenotatissueinsuchacase
butratherthemannerinwhichagivenusewascarriedout.Forexample,had
theowneroftheregisteredtrade-markFACTORYCARPETOUTLEToperateda
factory,hewouldnothavebeenvisitedbyaconvictionunderapenal
statute.Theissueinthistypeofscenarioisnottherightsconferredbys.19but
ratherthespecificmannerinwhichuseofthoserightsiscarriedout.
Withthiscaveatinmind,canregistrationunders.19beusedasashield?A
cautious“yes”seemstobetheanswerprovidedbytheSupremeCourtwhich
wrote:“Unders.19oftheAct,therespondents’marksarepresumptively
valid,andentitlesthemtousethemarksasdescribedabove”.
50[emphasis
added.]BothregistrationsforMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sCLIQUOTand
CLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”markscoveredservicesdescribedasthe
operationofretailclothingstoresinrespectofladies’wearandaccessories.
Theusetowhichthesetworegistrationsentitleddefendantswasearlier
alludedtobyBinnieJ.inthefollowingterms:“ThewordCliquotappearson
theexteriorsignateachofthese[six]locations[inQuebecandOttawa],on
bagsandwrappingsaswellasonbusinesscardsandinvoices,butnotonthe
clothingitself”.
51
BinnieJ.’sassessmentofthescopeofdefendants’rightsgrantedby
registrationdidnotspecificallyaddresstheissueoftheexclusiverights
conferredbyregistrationbuttouchedratherupontherighttousearegistered
mark.ThismatterwasalsomentionedinthecompanionMattelcasewhere
BinnieJ.specificallyunderlinedthatsecuringaregistrationauthorizesaparty
touseitstrade-markinassociationwiththosespecificwaresand/orservices
describedtherein:
53Theappellantarguedthatthecourtsbelowerredinlooking
attherespondent’sactualoperationsratherthanattheterms
setoutinitsapplicationfortheproposedtrade-mark.Itisquite
truethattheproperfocusisthetermsoftheapplication,
becausewhatisatissueiswhattheregistrationwouldauthorize
therespondenttodo,notwhattherespondenthappenstobe
doingatthemoment.…Thetermsoftherespondent’s
application(“restaurantservices,take-outservices,catering
andbanquetservices”)werereferredtobyboththeBoardand
theapplicationsjudge,andreadingtheirrespectivereasonsas

providesasystemforregistrationoftrade-marks.Itisimportanttonotethattheregistrationof
amarkundertheTrade-marksActdoesnotimplythatitsusewillcomplywiththe
requirementsofotherstatutes,orthatsuchusewillnotconstituteacontraventionofother
statutes”(fromafilingnoticedatedJuly6,2005).
50Supra,note2,atpara.5.51Ibid.

16
awhole,Idonotthinktheymisapprehendedthequestion
beforethem.52[emphasisadded.]
Theabovepassageappearstobearestatement(albeitwithoutreferenceto
anyexclusivity)oftheoftenquotedcommentsofThurlowC.J.oftheFederal
CourtofAppealinthe1987Mr.SubmarineLtd.v.AmandistaInvestments
Ltd.
53caseregardingaregisteredtrade-markowner’swideentitlementtothe
useofitsmark:
Beforeaddressingtheseconsiderationsitshouldbenotedthat
theappellant’srighttotheexclusiveuseof“Mr.Submarine”is
notconfinedtothosepartsofCanadainwhichtheappellant
anditslicenseeshavecarriedonbusinessbutextends
throughoutCanada.Theappellantisthusentitledtoits
exclusiveuseinanyadditionaloutletsforitssandwichesthatit
mayseefittoestablish.Noristheappellant’sexclusiveright
confinedtothesaleofsandwichesbythemethodsitnow
employsorhasemployedinthepast.Nothingrestrictsthe
appellantfromchangingthecolourofitssignsorthestyleof
letteringof“Mr.Submarine”orfromengaginginatelephone
anddeliverysystemsuchasthatfollowedbytherespondentor
anyothersuitablesystemforthesaleofitssandwiches.Wereit
tomakeanyofthesechangesitsexclusiverighttotheuseof
“Mr.Submarine”wouldapplyjustasitappliestoitsuseinthe
appellant’sbusinessaspresentlycarriedon.
54
BothinVeuveClicquotPonsardinandinMattel,theSupremeCourtseemed
toendorsetheviewthatregistrationunders.19oftheActisnotonlyasword
whichcanbeusedagainstthirdpartiesbutalsoashieldwhichenablesa
registeredtrade-markownertocarryoutitsactivitiesinassociationwiththe
waresand/orservicesspecifiedintheregistration,unlessthelatterisshownto
beinvalid.Atpara.16ofhisreasons,BinnieJ.wrotethatregistrationof
MademoiselleCharmanteInc.’smarkswasnotacompleteanswerto
plaintiff’sclaimasthevalidityofthoseregisteredmarkswaschallenged.
55This
wouldappeartomeanthatifplaintiffisunabletoobtaintheexpungementof
defendants’marks(aswasthecasehere),itsclaimforinjunctivereliefunders.
22wouldfailbecausethispreliminaryhurdlewasnotovercomesincethe
registrationremainedvalid.

52Supra,note1,atpara.53.53Mr.SubmarineLtd.v.AmandistaInvestmentsLtd.,[1988]3F.C.91(F.C.A.).54Ibid,atp.102.55Supra,note2,atpara.16.

17
However,thisgeneralprincipleshouldslightlybenuanced,ashintedabove.
Althoughregistrationentitlesitsownertotheuseofthetrade-markso
registered,themannerinwhichsuchuseiscarriedoutmaybesanctionedby
otherprovisionsoftheActorbyanotherstatuteifthecircumstancesinwhich
theuseiscarriedoutviolatetheseotherprovisionsorthirdpartyrights(albeitin
specificcircumstances,detailedhereafter).ThisisclearlywhatLinden,J.had
inmindwhenheofferedthefollowingwordsofcautiontothesuccessfulparty
inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.:
56
[55]However,theappellantshouldkeepinmindthatthe
Trade-marksActcanbeatoughtask-master.Havingobtained
theregistrationofitstrade-mark,itmustusethatmarkas
indicatedinitsapplication.Anydeviationfromthisproposed
usemayjeopardizeitsrights.Linkingthewordstoamovie
theme,todrawingsormusic,oreventoHollywoodingeneral
mayprovokeinfringementorexpungementproceedings.In
RegistrarofTradeMarksv.CompagnieInternationalepour
l©InformatiqueCIIHoneywellBulltheusebytherespondentof
“CIIHoneywellBull”washeldnottoconstituteuseforthemark
“Bull”,andthemarkwasexpungedfromtheregister.Aswell,
theappellantshouldnotignoretheexistenceoftheother
trade-marksregisteredbytherespondentinvolvingthecartoon
drawingswhichmaycomeintoplaywhenitdevelopsits
marketingstrategyforthebeautyproducts.Inotherwords,
victoryinthis
case,doesnotgivetheappellantcarteblanche
toexploitallofthetrade-marksoftherespondentinsellingall
productsinanywayitchooses.Itisstillsubjecttorestrictionsof
theTrade-marksActandthecommonlaw.
57
AspointedoutbyLindenJ.,registrationobviouslycannotbearesponsetoas.
45expungementproceedingasthelatterhasbeenenactedtoverifytheuse
behindtheregistration;moreimportantly,mannerofusewhichcreates
likelihoodofconfusion–suchas,torestatetheexamplegivenbyLindenJ.,
linkingthemarkregisteredbyPinkPantherBeautyCorp.tothethemesongfor
PINKPANTHERmovies–cannotbebeyondacourt’sreachbecauseofs.19.
Moreaccurately,however,itcanbestatedthatrightsunders.19arenotat
issueinthistypeofscenario;rather,itisaregistrant’sabuseofcircumstances
notcontemplatedbytherightsconferredbyregistrationthatwouldentitlea
Courttointerveneagainstsuchabuse,notagainstthespecificrights
conferredbyregistration.Inotherwords,shouldthecircumstancesnot
contemplatedbytherightsconferredbyregistrationcease,followingacourt

56Supra,note5.57Ibid.,atpara.55-endnoteomitted.

18
orderorotherwise,aregistrantwouldstillbeentitledtouseitsregisteredtrade-
markinassociationwiththewaresand/orservicesspecifiedintheregistration.
ItisworthnotingthatinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,thetrialjudgerejectedall
ofplaintiff’sclaimswithoutraisingtheissuewhetherexpungementwasa
prerequisiteforaclaimforinjunctiverelief.Infact,thetrialjudgerejected
plaintiff’sclaimforexpungementaftersherejecteditsclaimsforaninjunction.
However,asallclaimswererejected,sheprobablyconsideredthatthisissue
neednotbedecided.Indismissingplaintiff’sappeal,theFederalCourtof
Appealadoptedthesameapproach.
WhileBinnieJ.affirmedthelowercourts’dismissalofplaintiff’sclaims,italso
rejecteddefendants’positionthatMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’s1997
registrationofitstrade-markswasacompleteanswertoplaintiff’sclaim
because,here,thevalidityofthoseregistrationswaschallenged;healso
providedaninterestingcharacterizationofatrade-markregistrationasa
“shield”duringitslifetime:
16Therespondentssaythatthe1997registrationoftheirtrade-
markCliquotandCliquot«Unmondeàpart»isacomplete
answertotheappellant’sclaim.Idonotagree.Theappellant
hasputthevalidityoftheregistrationsinissueandseeks
expungement.Weretheappellanttosucceedinobtaining
expungement,nodoubttherespondentscouldarguethat
theyoughtnottobeliabletopaycompensationattributable
totheperiodduringwhichtheirownregistrationswerein
effect.However,astheappellanthasnotsucceededonthis
appeal,thescopeofcompensationisnotanissuethatarises
fordeterminationinthiscase.58

TheSupremeCourt’sfindingthatregistrationcannotbeacompleteanswerto
aplaintiff’sclaimwhenthevalidityoftheregistrationisputinissueseemsto
beanendorsementofthepositionexpressedin2002bytheOntarioCourtof
AppealinMolsonCanadav.OlandBreweriesLtd.59whereitwasheldthatthe
ownerofaregisteredtrade-markhastheexclusiverighttoitsusethroughout
Canadauntilsuchtimeasthemarkisshowntobeinvalid.60Thus,ifa
competitortakesexceptiontothatuse,itssolerecourseistoattackthe
validityoftheregistration,61whichwasdonehere(albeitunsuccessfully)by
plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardin.

58Supra,note2,atpara.16.

59MolsonCanadav.OlandBreweriesLtd.(2002),19C.P.R.(4th)201(Ont.C.A.).60Ibid.,atpara.12.61Ibid.,atpara.16.

19
Ofcourse,therightsconferredbyregistrationunders.19protectanowner’s
exclusiverighttousethetrade-markasregistered.Differentpanelsofthe
FederalCourtofAppeal,forexample,inMr.SubmarineLtd.v.Amandista
InvestmentsLtd.62andmorerecentlyinTraditionFineFoodsLtd.v.The
OshawaGroupLimited63haveemphasizedthepoint.Inthe2005TraditionFine
Foodscase,MaloneJ.wrote:“Abreachofsection19onlyoccurswhenthe
allegedinfringerusestheidenticaltrade-markfortheidenticalwaresor
servicesasregistered.”64Thus,theuseofatrade-markinaformwhich
deviatesfromitsregistrationwouldnotputitsownerbeyondaclaimfor
injunctivereliefasHugessenJ.oftheFederalCourtdecidedin2003in
Jonathan,BoutiquePourHommesInc.v.Jay-GurInternationalInc.65whenhe
dismisseddefendant’smotionforsummaryjudgmentinacasewhereplaintiff
waschallengingdefendant’sspecificuseofatrade-markinaformwhich
differedfromtheonecoveredbydefendant’sdesignregistration.Equally,an
owner’suseofitsregisteredtrade-markandunregisteredtradedressdoesnot
protectitagainstinjunctiverelieftostoptheuseofitsunregisteredtradedress
whichisnotprotectedbys.19asGasconJ.oftheQuebecSuperiorCourt
determinedin2003inAgropurCooperativev.SaputoInc.66

Additionally,inthespecificcontextofaninterlocutoryinjunction,ithasbeen
heldthattheActshouldnotbereadaspreventingtheFederalCourtfrom
enjoiningtheuseofaregisteredtrade-markwhenthevalidityofthemarkis
underattack67andthatissuehasyettobeadjudicated.Althoughhestated
hewasnotdefinitelydecidingtheissue,O’ReillyJ.oftheFederalCourt
concludedin2005inAdvantageCar&TruckRentalsv.1611864OntarioInc.68
thattoholdthatregisteredtrade-markownersareimmunefrominjunction
becausetheActprotectstheirrightsuntilthemarkhasbeendefinitely
declaredinvalidconstrictstheCourt’spowertoissueinjunctionstoogreatly
andbroadenstheprotectionprovidedbytheActtoofar.Whenconsidering
whethertograntaninterlocutoryinjunction,itisworthrememberingthat
courtswillusuallybereluctanttomakeanyfindingastothevalidityofany
contestedregistration.69

62Supra,note53,atp.98.63TraditionFineFoodsLtd.v.TheOshawaGroupLimited(2005),44C.P.R.(4th)81(F.C.A.)
[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadadismissedonMarch23,
2006infile31261].
64Ibid.,p.86.65Jonathan,BoutiquePourHommesInc.v.Jay-GurInternationalInc.(2003),23C.P.R.(4th)
492(F.C.T.D.).
66AgropurCooperativev.SaputoInc.(2003),32C.P.R.(4th)157(Que.S.C.).67AdvantageCar&TruckRentalsv.1611864OntarioInc.(2005),39C.P.R.(4th)135(F.C.).68Ibid.,atpara.9.69SeeforexampleSyntexInc.v.NovopharmLtd.(1991),36C.P.R.(3d)129(F.C.A.)atp.138
[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadadismissedonDecember
12,1991infile22588];DoleFoodCo.v.NabiscoLtd.(2000),8C.P.R.(4th)367(F.C.T.D.).

20

AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdidnotspecificallystatethatexpungementmust
beobtainedifaninjunctionistoissueagainsttheownerofsuchregistered
trade-mark,thisconclusionappearsirresistible.Indeed,achallengetothe
validityofaregistrationwhichisdismissedwouldnotleadtoaninjunction
beingissuedagainsttheowneroftheregistrationifsuchownerretainsits
exclusiverightsgrantedbys.19foravalidregistrationandisstillentitledtouse
itsmark(barring,ofcourse,anycircumstancesofusenotcontemplatedby
themarkspecificallyregisteredorbythewaresand/orservicesoutlinedinthe
registration(i.e.ifthedefendantisusingadifferentmarkordifferentwares
and/orservicesthanspecifiedintheregistrationorcarryingoutanyactivity
notcontemplatedbyregistration)).Moreover,registrationdoesnotdispensea
registrantfromrespectingotherstatutes.

Oneotherinterestingaspectconcerningtherightsconferredbyregistration
andmentionedbyBinnieJ.inpara.16ofhisreasonsinVeuveClicquot
Ponsardinishisallusiontothefactthataregistration,duringitslifetime,would
protectaregistrantfromanymonetaryclaimfortheperiodduringwhichthe
registrationwasineffect.Ontheotherhand,itcouldbearguedthatifa
trade-markregistrationisinvalid,thens.19givesitsownernoprotectiononce
thisinvalidityhasbeendeclaredsinceprotectionappliesonlytoregistrationof
trade-marks“unlessshowntobeinvalid”,not“until”showntobeinvalid.70The
latterviewwasadoptedbyJackettJ.in1968inGattusov.Gattuso
CorporationLimited71wherehewroteinafootnote:
Bywrittennotesfiledsincethesereasonswereprepared,
counselfortheplaintiffsarguesthattherecanbenoclaim
undersection7(b)aslongastheregisteredtrademarkis
registeredintheindividualplaintiff’sname.Thisargument
seemstobebasedonaviewofsection19thatitconfersan
exclusiverightontheowneroftheregisteredmarkuntilthe
Courtdeliversajudgmentdeclaringitinvalid.Itseemsclear
thatthisviewisfallacious.Whatsection19saysisthatthe
registrationofatrademarkgivestheexclusiverightofuserto
theowner“unlessshowntobeinvalid”.Iftheregistrationis
“invalid”,it,ofcourse,confersnorights.72

Inthe1972caseofPVRCo.Ltd.v.Decosol(Canada)Ltd.,73WalshJ.ofthe
FederalCourtconsidered(butdidnotdecide)theissueofthepossible

70ThispointwasarguedinPVRCo.Ltd.v.Decosol(Canada)Ltd.(1972),10C.P.R.(2d)203
(F.C.T.D.)atpp.212-213.
71Gattusov.GattusoCorporationLimited,[1968]2Ex.C.R.609.72Ibid.,atp.618.73PVRCo.Ltd.v.Decosol(Canada)Ltd.(1972),10C.P.R.(2d)203(F.C.T.D.).

21
retroactiveeffectofanorderexpungingaregistrationandtherelatedissueof
thestartingpointintimeforthedeterminationofdamages:
Inparticularthereisasubstantialissuefordeterminationonthe
meritsinthisCourtastowhetherthemarkDECOSOLREGD,the
propertyofdefendantinthepresent[p]roceedings,shouldor
shouldnotbeexpungedfromtheregisteroftrademarks.Ifitis
soexpungedfollowingfinaljudgmentonthemeritsitwill
remaintobedeterminedwhetherplaintiffPVRisentitledto
damagesoranaccountingforprofits
(a)fromthetimedefendantDecosolfirstcommencedselling
thisproductunderthemarkDECOSOLREGD;
(b)fromthetimeDecosolwasformallywarnedtodesistfrom
usingthemarkDECOSOLREGDbyletterofPVR’sattorney
datedApril14,1971;
(c)fromthedateofinstitutionofthepresentproceedingson
October29,1971;or
(d)onlyfromthedateoffinaljudgmentexpungingthetrade
markDECOSOLREGD.74

BinnieJ.’scommentsinpara.16ofhisreasonsdonotappeartomakeany
distinctionbetweenthevariousgroundsofexpungementandtheirpossible
affectonanyprotectionaregistrantmightclaimduringthelifetimeofthe
registration.Forexample,itcouldbearguedthatanexpungedtrade-mark
whichshouldneverhavebeenregisteredinthefirstplace(forexample,ifit
wasnotregistrableatthedateofregistrationunderpara.18(1)(a))anda
validlyregisteredtrade-markwhichbecomesinvalidmanyyearsafterits
registration(forexample,forlackofdistinctivenessunderpara.18(1)(b))might
eachrequireadifferenttreatmentwhenconsideringtheissueofprotection
duringthelifetimeoftheregistration.AsplaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardin
hadallegedthatdefendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sregistrations
shouldnothavebeenregisteredatthedateofregistrationandshouldno
longerbemaintainedontheregisteratalaterdate,BinnieJ.’scomments
seemtobeanendorsementofthepositionwhichconsidersregistrationasa
shieldduringitslifetime,whateverthegroundsforsuccessfulexpungement.

4.0PLAINTIFF’SCLAIMFORLIKELIHOODOFDEPRECIATION

DespitethefactthatVeuveClicquotPonsardinwasunsuccessfulin
establishinglikelihoodofconfusionanditsrelatedclaimforexpungement–
leavingMademoiselleCharmanteInc.withvalidregistrationswhichentitled
defendantstousetheCLIQUOTmarksinassociationwithwomen’sretail

74Ibid.,atp.210.

22
clothingstores–plaintiff’sclaimforlikelihoodofdepreciationunders.22was
thoroughlyanalyzedbytheSupremeCourt.

4.1Section22asaremedyagainstdilution
Section22readsinpart:
22.(1)Nopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanother
personinamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectof
depreciatingthevalueofthegoodwillattachingthereto.

Section22hasbeenineffectsincethecomingintoforceofthecurrentAct
onJuly1,1954.Overtheyears,ithasattractedmuchlessjudicialattention
thanitssoughtafterrichcousin,likelihoodofconfusion.In1968,ThurlowJ.of
theExchequerCourtmadecommentstothateffectinClairolInternational
Corporationv.ThomasSupply&EquipmentCo.Ltd.75Inthedecadessince
1968,thislackofprecedentsregardings.22hasnotchangedmuch,afact
whichBinnieJ.tookcaretonoteinpara.46ofhisreasons.76

InClairol,ThurlowJ.wroteaboutthescopeofapplicationofs.22inthe
followingterms:
Section22isanewsectioninthe1952-53statuteandthusfar,
sofarasIamaware,therehavebeennodecidedcasesin
whichithasbeenapplied.NoramIawareofanysimilar
provisionshavingbeenenactedinanyothercountry.There
wouldbeIthinknodifficultyinconcludingthatthesection
wouldfindapplicationincasesoftheuseofawellknowntrade
markbysomeoneotherthanitsregisteredownerbutinanon-
competingfieldoftradeorinassociationwithwaresorservices
inrespectofwhichitisnotregistered.Itmaybeobservedof
thistypeofcasethattheuseofthetrademarkmight,thoughit
wouldnotnecessarily,bedeceptive.Deception,however,is
notthetestprescribedbysection22,ratherthetestisthe
likelihoodofdepreciatingthevalueofthegoodwillattaching
tothetrademark,aresultwhichwouldnotnecessarilyflow
fromdeceptionandwhichmightresultwithoutdeception
beingpresent.
…
Thenwhatismeantby“depreciatethevalue”ofsuch
goodwill.Tomymindthismeanssimplytoreduceinsomeway

75ClairolInternationalCorporationv.ThomasSupply&EquipmentCo.Ltd.,[1968]2Ex.C.R.
552.
76Supra,note2,atpara.46.

23
theadvantageofthereputationandconnectiontowhichI
havejustreferred,totakeawaythewholeorsomeportionof
thecustomotherwisetobeexpectedandtomakeitless
extensiveandthuslessadvantageous.AsIseeitgoodwillhas
valueonlytotheextentoftheadvantageofthereputation
andconnectionwhichitsownerenjoysandwhateverreduces
thatadvantagereducesthevalueofit.Depreciationofthat
valueinmyopinionoccurswhetheritarisesthroughreduction
oftheesteeminwhichthemarkitselfisheldorthroughthe
directpersuasionandenticingofcustomerswhocould
otherwisebeexpectedtobuyorcontinuetobuygoods
bearingthetrademark.Itdoesnot,however,asIseeit,arise,
assubmittedbyMr.Henderson,fromdangeroflossofexclusive
rightsasaresultofusebyothersasthisinmyviewrepresents
possiblelossofexclusiverightsinthetrademarkitselfrather
thanreductionofthegoodwillattachingtoit.77

AccordingtoThurlowJ.,confusionisnotrelevantwhenexaminingaclaim
unders.22.BinnieJ.inVeuveClicquotPonsardinagreedandwrotethat
nothingins.22requiresademonstrationthatuseofbothmarksinthesame
geographicareawouldlikelyleadtoconfusion.78Onthisissue,BinnieJ.
seemedtodisagreewiththetrialjudgewhohadwrittenthatalthough
confusionisnotthetestlaiddownins.22itisstillnecessaryfortheretobean
associationbetweenthetwomarks.79Thissubjectof“association”between
themarks–animportantaspectofaclaimunders.22–wasdealtwithby
BinnieJ.whoofferedadifferentcharacterizationoftheissue,aswewillsee
later.

In1968,ThurlowJ.rejectedtheviewthatdepreciationarisesfromthedanger
oflossofexclusiverightsasaresultofusebyothers.TheSupremeCourt
appearedtohavetakenadifferentapproachbyreferringtolearnedauthors
whohadwrittencontemporaneouslytothecominginforceoftheActand
highlightedthefactthatdepreciationcanariseincircumstancesofdilutionof
thedistinctivenessoruniquecharacterofthetrade-mark:
39Thes.22remedywasintroducedbythe1953amendments
totheTrade-marksAct,andwasbasedontheReportofTrade-
markLawRevisionCommitteetotheSecretaryofStateof
Canada(1953),chairedbyDr.HaroldG.Fox.Amemberof
thatcommittee,ChristopherRobinson,Q.C.,aleading
intellectualpropertypractitioner,wrotebywayofexplanation:

77Supra,note75,atpp.569and573.78Supra,note2,atpara.38.79Supra,note8,atpara.94.

24
ThetrademarkKODAKwouldbelikelytobeconsiderably
lessvaluabletoitsownerifitwereusedbyothersin
connectionwithawidevarietyofotherwaresevenif
theseweresounrelatedtophotographicequipmentthat
nobodywouldthinkthattheyoriginatedwiththetrade
markowner.
(C.Robinson,“TheCanadianTradeMarksActof1954–A
ReviewofSomeofItsFeatures”(1959),32C.P.R.45,atp.
61)
40Dr.Foxhimselfcommentedonthenewdepreciation
remedyinthe1956editionofhistextTheCanadianLawof
TradeMarksandUnfairCompetition,(2nded.1956),Vol.1,
notingthats.22addressed
…thedepreciationofthevalueofthegoodwillattaching
tothetrademarkor,expressedindifferentterms,the
dilutionofthedistinctivenessoruniquecharacterofthe
trademark.Thisisquitedifferentfromtheorthodoxtypeof
infringement…[p.507]
…Whereawellknowntrademarkistakenbyanotherfor
useinassociationwithwares….inthecourseoftime,and
withrepeateduse,thetrademarkdiminishesinvaluejust
asitdiminishesindistinctiveness.[Emphasisadded;p.
508.]80

AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,depreciationcanoccurinatleasttwo
situations,firstlybyloweringthevalueofthetrade-mark’sgoodwill,a
circumstancewhichThurlowJ.hadalludedtoin1968bywriting“thismeans
simplytoreduceinsomewaytheadvantageofthereputation…”;81
depreciationalsocanoccurwhenthedistinctivenessoruniquenessofthe
markisattacked,acircumstanceThurlowJ.didnotacceptinClairol.Both
situationswerehighlightedbyBinnieJ.whenheanalyzedthemeaningofthe
word“depreciate”:
63Theword“depreciate”isusedinitsordinarydictionary
meaningof“lowerthevalueof”aswellasto“disparage,
belittle,underrate”:TheNewShorterOxfordEnglishDictionary
(5thed.2002),atp.647.Inotherwords,disparagementisa
possiblesourceofdepreciation,butthevaluecanbelowered
inotherways,asbythelesserdistinctivenessthatresultswhena
markisbandiedaboutbydifferentusers.Althoughthe
appellantmakesmuchofthelicencingprovisionsintheAct,
thefactisthatatrade-markownercandepreciateitsvalueby

80Supra,note2,atparas.39and40.81Supra,note75,atp.573.

25
spreadingthemarktoothinlyovertoomanyproductsof
differingquality.MadameAbitbolgavetheexampleofPierre
Cardinwhichshesaidhadmoveddownmarketthrough
overuseoflicencingandexpandingtherangeandvarietyof
differentproductscarryingitsname,whichhadledtoalossof
distinctiveness,prestigeandcredibility.82

However,theSupremeCourtcautionedthatthesecircumstancesof
applicationofs.22werenotexhaustiveandcourtsinCanadahadyetto
explorethelimitsofthisprovision.83

4.2Defendant’smarkmustbe«sufficientlysimilar»
Initslikelihoodofdepreciationclaim,plaintiffreliedonitsmostrelevant
registeredtrade-marki.e.VEUVECLICQUOTtoattackdefendants’useofthe
trade-marksCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”.Overthedecades
sinceitsintroductiononJuly1,1954,therehadbeenmuchdebateasto
whethers.22requiredthatadefendantuseatrade-markidenticaltotheone
registeredbyaplaintiffinorderforittofindapplication.Forexample,in1986,
inLesRôtisseriesSaint-HubertLtéev.LeSyndicatdestravailleurs(euses)dela
RôtisserieSaint-HubertdeDrummondville(C.S.N.),
84LesykJ.oftheQuebec
SuperiorCourtconsideredthatadefendantmustuseatrade-markidentical
totheoneregisteredbyaplaintifffors.22toapply,whilein1997,in
CompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.National
Automobile,Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionof
Canada(CAW-Canada),
85TeitlebaumJ.oftheFederalCourtheldthatan
infringerdidnothavetouseatrade-markidenticaltotheregisteredmarkto
likelycausedepreciationofitsgoodwill.TheSupremeCourthasnowsettled
theissueandindicatedthatdefendant’strade-markneednotbeidenticalto
aplaintiff’sregisteredmarkbutatleast“sufficientlysimilar”.
86
BinnieJ.affirmedthetrialjudge’sfindingsthatplaintiff’ss.22claimhadnot
beenmadeout.Theplaintiffpresentedevidencethat“CLICQUOT”wasthe

82Supra,note2,atpara.63.83Ibid.,atpara.67.84LesRôtisseriesSaint-HubertLtéev.LeSyndicatdestravailleurs(euses)delaRôtisserieSaint-
HubertdeDrummondville(C.S.N.),[1987]R.J.Q.443(S.C.,Montreal)[appeallaunchedbefore
theQuebecCourtofAppealinfile500-09-000068-874onJanuary19,1987;discontinuance
filedonFebruary20,1987].
85CompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.NationalAutomobile,
Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionofCanada(CAW-Canada),[1997]2
F.C.306(F.C.T.D.)[appeallaunchedbeforetheFederalCourtofAppealinfileA-38-97on
January17,1997;discontinuancefiledonNovember12,1997].
86Supra,note2,atpara.38.

26
mostdistinctivepartoftheVEUVECLICQUOTmarkandthiswasrecognizedby
thetrialjudge,whoheldhoweverthataconsumerwhosawtheword
“CLIQUOT”usedindefendants’storeswouldnotmakeanylinkorconnection
withplaintiff’smark.
87Withthelatterfinding,theSupremeCourtconcluded
thatVEUVECLICQUOTwasnotsufficientlysimilartoCLIQUOTinthata
consumerbeingacquaintedwithdefendants’markwouldnotrecognize
plaintiff’sregisteredmark;therefore,defendantswerenotmakinguseof
plaintiff’sregisteredmarki.e.VEUVECLICQUOT.Inotherwords,themental
associationbetweenthenewcomer’smarkandtheoneregisteredbythe
senioruserwasmissinginthiscase.
88However,theSupremeCourtinsistedthat
thisfindingconcerningthe“link”or“association”betweentheparties’marks
mustbemadewithoutanyreferencetotheparties’areasoftrade,whichis
notarelevantconsiderationinas.22claim.
89Thelatterpointisimportantas
thetrialjudgehadmadereferenceto“confusion”whenanalyzings.22,a
viewnotsharedbytheSupremeCourt.
Theconceptof“sufficientlysimilar”appearstobemuchnarrowerinscope
thanany“degreeofresemblance”analysisbetweentrade-markswhen
consideringlikelihoodofconfusion;here,thetrialjudgewroteontheissueof
likelihoodofconfusionthattherewas“agreatdegreeofresemblance”
90
betweenVEUVECLICQUOTandCLIQUOT,afindingwhichBinnieJ.shared
whenhewrotethatforconfusiontoexist,itisnotnecessarythatthetrade-
marksbeidentical,onlythatthe“sameidea”issufficientlyconveyedtothe
mindofthesomewhathurriedconsumertoinduceamistakeininference.
91
Yet,this“greatdegreeofresemblance”wasnotsufficientforVeuveClicquot
Ponsardin’ss.22claim.Whenapplyings.22,amuchstrongerdegreeof
resemblance(i.e.“sufficientlysimilar”)isrequired.

87Supra,note8,atpara.96.Itisworthnotingthatthetrialjudgemadethesecommentsafter
writingthatconfusionwasanelementofas.22claim.Shewroteatparas.94and96:
[94]…Althoughconfusionisnotthetestlaiddownins.22,Iconsiderthatitisstillnecessary
fortheretobeanassociationbetweenthetwomarks.Inotherwords,aconsumerhastobe
abletomakeaconnectionbetweenthepartiesinorderfortheretobedepreciationofthe
goodwillattachingtothetrademark.
…
[96]Inthecaseatbartheevidencewasthattheplaintiffssolepurposewasthesaleof
champagne,andthatitwasnotinterestedingettingintootherareas.Inmyviewaconsumer
whosawtheword”Cliquot”usedinthedefendantsstoreswouldnotmakeanylinkor
connectiontotheplaintiff.Consequently,therewillbenoassociationbetweenthe”Clicquot”
luxurymarkandthedefendants”non-luxury”wares.
88Supra,note2,atpara.49.89Ibid.,atpara.46.90Supra,note8,atpara.66.91Supra,note2,atpara.35.

27
The“sufficientlysimilar”testisnotunliketheonedescribedbytheRegistrarin
1984inNightingaleInterlocLtd.v.ProdesignLtd.
92andoftenreferredtoins.45
caseswhentheRegistrar,andonappeal,theFederalCourt,mustdecidein
summaryexpungementproceedingsifatrade-markinuseisnotsubstantially
differentfromitsregisteredform:
Aparticulartrademarkwillbeconsideredasbeingusedifthe
trademarkactuallyusedisnotsubstantiallydifferentandthe
deviationsarenotsuchastodeceiveorinjurethepublicinany
way…
93[emphasisadded.]
WhenBinnieJ.wrotethefollowingaboutahypotheticalCLICQUOT
registrationinplaintiff’sname:“Ifthecasualobserverwouldrecognizethe
markusedbytherespondentsasthemarkoftheappellant(aswouldbethe
caseifKleenexwerespelledKlenex),theuseofamisspelledCliquotwould
suffice”,
94heusedthesametypeofanalysisfoundindecisionsconcernings.
45proceedingswheretheRegistrarortheFederalCourt,onappeal,must
decideifmembersofthepublicwouldrecognizethemarkinuseasthemark
registered,incircumstanceswheretheregistrantdoesnotuseamark
identicaltotheoneprotectedbyregistration.Forexample,in2002,in88766
CanadaInc.v.NationalCheeseCo.,
95theRegistrardescribedthefollowing
test:“Theuseofatrade-markincombinationwithadditionalwordsorfeatures
constitutesuseoftheregisteredmarkifthepublicasamatteroffirst
impression,wouldperceivethetrade-mark“perse”asbeingused.”
96
Tocompletethecomparisonwithsummaryexpungementproceedings,itis
worthnotingthatBinnieJ.’sdescriptionofthetrialjudge’ss.22assessment
thataconsumerwhosawthewordCLIQUOTwouldnotmakeanylinkor
connectiontoVEUVECLICQUOTissimilartotheappreciationmadeunders.
45whentheRegistrarortheFederalCourt,onappeal,mustdecideifa
registeredtrade-markisusedinamannerwhichmaintainsconsumer
recognizability.Forexample,inthe1985caseofRegistrarofTradeMarksv.
CompagnieInternationalepourl’InformatiqueCIIHoneywellBull,Société
Anonyme,
97PratteJ.oftheFederalCourtofAppealwroteaboutthe
registeredownerofthetrade-markBULLwho,ins.45proceedings,had
presentedproofofuseofthecompositemarkCIIHONEYWELLBULL:

92NightingaleInterlocLtd.v.ProdesignLtd.(1984),2C.P.R.(3d)535(T.M.O.B.).93Ibid.,atp.538.94Supra,note2,atpara.48.9588766CanadaInc.v.NationalCheeseCo.(2002),24C.P.R.(4th)410(SeniorTrade-marks
HearingOfficer).
96Ibid.,atp.414.97RegistrarofTradeMarksv.CompagnieInternationalepourl’InformatiqueCIIHoneywellBull,
SociétéAnonyme,[1985]1F.C.406(F.C.A.).

28
Therealandonlyquestioniswhether,byidentifyingitsgoodsas
itdid,CIImadeuseofitstrademark“Bull”.Thatquestionmust
beansweredinthenegativeunlessthemarkwasusedinsuch
awaythatthemarkdidnotloseitsidentityandremained
recognizableinspiteofthedifferencesbetweentheformin
whichitwasregisteredandtheforminwhichitwasused.
98
[emphasisadded.]
Ins.45expungementproceedings,thequestionwhethertheuseofatrade-
markincombinationwithadditionalwordsordifferentfeaturesconstitutesuse
ofaregisteredmarkisaquestionoffact.Whetheracasualobserverwould
recognizeamarkusedbythedefendantasthemarkoftheplaintiffinas.22
claimcanalsobedescribedasaquestionoffact.Bothtestsarebasedon
consumerrecognitionofatrade-markinaspecificform;ifsmallvariationsare
possibleunderbothtests,thetrade-markinuse(thetrade-markactuallyused
ins.45proceedings;thetrade-markusedbythedefendantinas.22claim)
mustbeperceivedastheregisteredmark(theowner’sregisteredtrade-mark
inas.45proceeding;theplaintiff’sregisteredmarkinas.22claim),asboth
provisionsareconcernedwithconsumerrecognizability.
4.3Afourparttest
InitsreasonsinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtoutlinedthefour
elementsthatmustbeestablishedifas.22claimistobeallowed:
99
1)Aplaintiff’sregisteredtrade-markwasusedbyadefendantin
connectionwithwaresorservices–whetherornotsuchwaresor
servicesarecompetitivewiththoseoftheplaintiff;
2)Theplaintiff’sregisteredmarkissufficientlywell-knowntohave
significantgoodwillattachedtoit–althoughitneednotbefamous;
3)Theplaintiff’smarkwasusedinamannerlikelytohaveaneffecton
thegoodwill(i.e.linkagebyconsumersbetweentheplaintiff’s
goodwillandadefendant’suse);
4)Thelikelyeffectwouldbetodepreciatethevalueofthegoodwill
attachedtothetrade-mark(i.e.damage).
4.3.1Useoftheplaintiff’sregisteredmark
Foritslikelihoodofdepreciationclaimunders.22tobeconsidered,aplaintiff
mustbetheholderofaregisteredtrade-mark.Aswehavejustseen,themark

98Ibid.,atpp.408-409.99Supra,note2,atpara.46.

29
usedbyadefendantneednotbeidenticaltoplaintiff’sregisteredmark;
however,itmustbesufficientlysimilarsothatthecasualobserverwould
recognizethemarkusedbythedefendantastheplaintiff’smark.A
requirementthatadefendantuseatrade-markidenticaltoaplaintiff’smark
woulddefeatthepurposeofs.22sinceitwouldbetooeasyforadefendant
tomodifyanonessentialfeatureofaregisteredtrade-marktoescapeas.22
claim.
Additionally,foras.22claimtobeconsidered,plaintiffmustestablishthat
defendanthasuseditstrade-markinaccordancewiths.4oftheAct.Onthis
importantissuewhichwasthesubjectofmuchdebateinClairolInternational
Corp.v.ThomasSupply&EquipmentCo.Ltd.
100andeversince,101the
SupremeCourtonlyreproducedtheprovisionsofss.4(1)and4(2)ofthe
Act.
102
Infairness,therelevancyofanyrequirementof“use”(asdefinedins.4)as
partofas.22claimwasnotarguedbythepartiesinVeuveClicquot
Ponsardinasdefendants’usewasclearly“use”unders.4and,inthisspecific
instance,nothingturnedonthisissue.Thissaid,theSupremeCourt’s
requirementofuse–asdefinedins.4–byadefendantaspartofs.22claim,
alongwiththeabsenceofanyrequirementthatadefendant’susemustbe
use“asatrade-mark”,seemstobeacompleteendorsementoftheposition
adoptedin1968byThurlowJ.inClairol.InthemorerecentCompagnie
GénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciecase,TeitelbaumJ.
offeredthefollowingbriefcharacterisationoftherequirementsofaclaim
unders.22asdescribedbyThurlowJ.inClairol.
[31]…InClairol,JusticeThurlowarrivedataslightlydifferent
characterizationoftheelementsofproofforuseundersection
22.Incontrasttosection19,heheldatpages569-570that
section22onlyrequiresproofof“useinassociationwithwares
orservices”underthespecificsection4criteria.
RatherIthinktheverb“use”insection22istobe
interpretedbyreferencetothedefinitionofthenoun
“use”insection2(v)theeffectofwhichistoconfinethe
application,andthereforetheprohibition,ofsection22to

100Supra,note75.101Forexample,inCompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.
NationalAutomobile,Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionofCanada
(CAW-Canada),supra,note85,whereplaintiffsoughttorevisittheprinciplesofClairol;see
alsoJ.A.Léger,“‘Article22’Loisurlesmarquesdecommerce;deClairolàIt’sNot:lemiroir
auxalouettes”,(1987)4C.I.P.R.385;F.Guay,“Pourenfiniravecl’affaireClairol:l’article22de
laLoisurlesmarquesdecommerceprévient-illapublicitécomparative?”,(1998)11C.P.I.
441.
102Supra,note2,atpara.47.

30
ausewhichanypersonmaymake,inassociationwith
goodsorserviceswithinthemeaningofthesubsectionsof
section4,ofanother’sregisteredtrademarkinsucha
mannerastodepreciatethevalueofthegoodwill
attachingthereto.
Thereisnoneedundersection22toprovetheadditional
elementofproofofuseofthemarkasatrade-markforthe
purposeofdistinguishingwaresorservices.Theplaintiffsin
Clairolweresuccessfulincitingsection22asagroundof
infringementforuseoftheirtrade-marksonthedefendants’
packagessincesection22doesnotrequireproofofuseofthe
trade-marksastrade-marks
forthepurposeofdistinguishing
goodsandservices.[emphasisinoriginaltext.]
103
Inshort,accordingtoThurlowJ.,inClairol,s.22onlyrequiresproofof“usein
associationwithwaresorservices”underthespecifics.4criteria;itdoesnot
requireproofofuse,bythedefendant,ofthemark“asatrade-mark”forthe
purposeofdistinguishingwaresorservices.ThurlowJ.’s1968positionregarding
therequirementsofs.22wasagainadoptedmorerecentlyin2005by
BeaudryJ.oftheFederalCourtinTommyHilfigerLicensingInc.v.Produitsde
QualitéI.M.D.Inc.:
104
[126]Inordertoprovethedepreciationofthevalueofits
goodwill,aplaintiffneedstoshowthatthedefendantused,
withinthemeaningofuseunders.4,theplaintiff’sregistered
trade-mark.…AsstatedinClairolInternationalCorp.v.Thomas
Supply&EquipmentCo.,[1968]2Ex.C.R.552,55C.P.R.176(Ex.
Ct.)atpara.37,andinCieGénéraledesÉtablissements
Michelin-Michelin&Ciev.CAW-Canada,[1997]2F.C.306,71
C.P.R.(3d)348(T.D.)atpara.31,thereisnorequirementthat
thetrade-markbe“usedasatrade-mark”unders.4(2).
105
InCompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Cie,
106
TeitelbaumJ.notedthatClairolhadnotyetbeendefinitelyinterpretedbyan
appellatecourt.
107Thisisdefinitelynolongerthecase.Byreferringonlyto
“use”unders.4andbyomittinganyrequirementthatadefendantusethe
trade-markatissue“asatrade-mark”forthepurposeofdistinguishingwares

103Supra,note85,atpara.31.104TommyHilfigerLicensingInc.v.ProduitsdeQualitéI.M.D.Inc.(2005),37C.P.R.(4th)1(F.C.)
[appeallaunchedbeforetheFederalCourtofAppealinfileA-45-05onFebruary7,2005;
appealdismissedonconsentonAugust11,2005].
105Ibid.,atpara.126.106Supra,note85.107Ibid.,atpara.36.

31
orservices,theSupremeCourtseemstohaveimplicitlyruledthatClairolwas
correctlydecidednearlyfourdecadesago.
4.3.2Proofofgoodwill
Fortheretobelikelihoodofdepreciationofthevalueofthegoodwill
attachingtoaregisteredtrade-mark,theremustbesignificantgoodwill
capableofbeingdepreciatedbyanon-confusinguse.
108
BinnieJ.adoptedthedefinitionof“goodwill”putforwardbyThurlowJ.in
Clairol:
[T]hegoodwillattachingtoatrademarkisIthinkthatportionof
thegoodwillofthebusinessofitsownerwhichconsistsofthe
wholeadvantage,whateveritmaybe,ofthereputationand
connection,whichmayhavebeenbuiltupbyyearsofhonest
workorgainedbylavishexpenditureofmoneyandwhichis
identifiedwiththegoodsdistributedbytheownerinassociation
withthetrademark.109
Althoughfameisnotacomponentofas.22claim,theSupremeCourt
outlinedalistoffactorstobeconsideredtoensurethatgoodwilldoesexist:
1)Thedegreetowhichthemarktranscendsthewaresorserviceswith
whichitisusuallyassociated;
2)Thedegreeofrecognitionofthemarkwithintherelevantuniverseof
consumers;
3)Thevolumeofsalesandthedepthofmarketpenetrationof
productsassociatedwiththeplaintiff’smark;
4)Theextentanddurationofadvertisingandpublicityaccordedthe
plaintiff’smark;
5)Thegeographicalreachoftheplaintiff’smark;
6)Itsdegreeofinherentoracquireddistinctiveness;
7)Whetherproductsassociatedwithplaintiff’smarkareconfinedtoa
narroworspecializedchanneloftradeormoveinmultiplechannels;
8)Theextenttowhichthemarkisidentifiedwithaparticularquality.

4.3.3Thelikelyconnectionorlinkagemadebyconsumersbetweena
plaintiff’sgoodwillandthedefendant’suse.

108Supra,note2,atparas.53and54.109Supra,note75atp.573.

32
Thisthirdelementofas.22claimisnotunrelatedtothefirst,discussedabove;
theremustbeanassociationbythesomewhathurriedconsumerbetween
whatisdisplayedinadefendant’scommercialestablishmentandthe
plaintiff’smark.Inotherwords,inthedefendant’suse,membersofthepublic
mustrecognizeplaintiff’smark.Ifnosuchassociationoccurs,then
defendant’susewillhavenoimpact–positiveornegative–onthegoodwill
attachedtotheplaintiff’smark.
110
4.3.4Thelikelihoodofdepreciation
TheSupremeCourtreferredtothefollowingexpressionstoexplaintheword
“depreciate”:“lowerthevalueof”;“disparage,belittle,underrate”;creating
a“negativeassociationforthemark”.Moreimportantly,asnotedearlier,the
Courtindicatedthatdepreciationmayoccurasaresultofaweakened
distinctiveness,whenamarkisbandiedaboutbydifferentusers.
111
Unders.22,proofofdepreciationisnotrequired,onlyproofoflikelihoodof
depreciation(whichisobviouslymorethanonlythepossibilityof
depreciation).Again,creatinganegativeassociationforthemarkor
diminishingitscapacitytoreferuniquelytoaplaintiff’sproductspresupposes
alinkbymembersofthepublicbetweenwhatisusedbydefendantanda
plaintiff’smark.
Finally,aslikelihoodofdepreciationisanelementoftheclaimunders.22,it
cannotbetheobjectofareference
112(asopposedtotheextentofactual
depreciation).
4.4ConclusiononSection22
AlthoughitwasnotrequiredtodealwithVeuveClicquotPonsardin’ss.22
claiminlightofthefactthatthelatterwasnotsuccessfulinitsrequestfor
expungementagainstMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sregistrations,the
SupremeCourthasnowprovidedimportantguidelinesforthisrarelyrelied
uponprovision.Theimportantpointtokeepinmindisthats.22presupposesa
registeredmark(notnecessarilyafamousone)used(unders.4)bya
defendant(oratleasta“sufficientlysimilar”onewhichmaintainsconsumer
recognizability)inawaythatislikelytodepreciatethevalueofthegoodwill
attachingthereto.

110Supra,note2,atpara.56.111Ibid.,atparas.63and65.112Ibid.,atpara.69.

33
5.0OTHERISSUESOFINTEREST
TheSupremeCourt’sdecisionsinMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardinhave
raisedotherissuesofinteresttotrade-markpractitionerswhomightbemindful
ofthem.
5.1Thecharacterizationoflikelihoodofconfusion
Inthe1968oppositioncaseofBenson&Hedges(Canada)Limitedv.St.Regis
TobaccoCorporation,
113RitchieJ.oftheSupremeCourtofferedthefollowing
characterizationofthedecisionprocessthatdetermineswhetherornota
trade-markislikelytobeconfusingwithinthemeaningofsection6oftheAct
(inthisparticularinstance,duringoppositionproceedingsconductedbythe
RegistrarofTrade-marks):“Inmyview,thedecisionastowhetherornota
trademarkisconfusingwithinthemeaningofs.6oftheActinvolvesajudicial
determinationofapracticalquestionoffactanddoesnotinvolvethe
exerciseoftheRegistrar’sdiscretion”.
114
Thischaracterizationisimportantasitdescribestheapplicationoflegalnorms
–outlinedins.6oftheAct–toapracticalquestionoffact.Thisdescriptionis
notunliketheonefoundearlierinthe1967decisioninTheRowntree
CompanyLimitedv.PaulinChambersCompanyLimited,
115whereRitchieJ.
alsowrotefortheSupremeCourt:
Theeffectofs.12(1)(d)oftheTradeMarksAct,1952-53(Can.),
c.49,(hereaftercalled“theAct”)isthatatrademarkisnot
registerableifitis“confusingwitharegisteredtrademark”and
thequestionofwhetheritisconfusingornotistobe
determinedinaccordancewiththestandardfixedbys.6(2)of
theActwhichreadsasfollows:
6(2)Theuseofatrademarkcausesconfusionwith
anothertrademarkiftheuseofbothtrademarksinthe
sameareawouldbelikelytoleadtotheinferencethat
thewaresorservicesassociatedwithsuchtrademarksare
manufactured,sold,leased,hiredorperformedbythe
sameperson,whetherornotsuchwaresorservicesareof
thesamegeneralclass.
116

113Benson&Hedges(Canada)Limitedv.St.RegisTobaccoCorporation,[1969]S.C.R.192.114Ibid.,atp.199.115TheRowntreeCompanyLimitedv.PaulinChambersCompanyLimited,[1968]S.C.R.134.116Ibid.,atp.136.

34
InMattel,theSupremeCourtdidconfirmthattheissueoflikelihoodof
confusionis“essentially”aquestionofmixedfactandlaw:
32TheBoardfoundtherespondenthaddemonstratedthat
ifgranted,itstrade-markwouldbeunlikelytocreateconfusion
withthatoftheappellant.Whilethisisessentiallyaquestionof
mixedfactandlaw,theappellantsaystheBoard’s
considerationwasfundamentallyflawedbytheerroneous
interpretationgiventos.6oftheActbytheFederalCourtof
AppealinPinkPantherandToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.
LexusFoodsInc.,[2001]2F.C.15(“Lexus”).117[emphasis
added.]
Interestinglyenough,inVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtoffered
aslightlydifferentcharacterizationoftheissueoflikelihoodofconfusionwhen
itwrotethatitis“largely”aquestionoffact:
14Thiscaseisallabout“FAMOUS”trade-marks.Whileless-
than-famoustrade-markslargelyoperateintheircircumscribed
fieldofwares,servicesandbusinesses,itisarguedthat
“famous”markstranscendsuchlimitations,andthatbroad
effectmustbegiventotheowner’sremediesinrespectoflikely
confusioninthemarketplace(s.20)andlikelydepreciationof
thevalueofthegoodwill(s.22)withthattranscendencein
mind.Withrespecttothes.20infringementclaim,thefameof
VEUVECLICQUOTissuch,theappellantsays,thatconsumers
whowalkintotherespondents’women’sclothingshopswill
likelybeconfusedintobelievingthedressesandfashion
apparelcomefromthesamesourceasthechampagne,even
thoughthetypeofproductisverydifferent,theproductsflow
indifferentchannelsoftradeandtheregisteredtrade-marks
donotappearontherespondents’garments.Regardlessof
thesedifferences,fameconquersall,andtheappellantseeks
expungementoftherespondents’marksandaninjunction.
Whetherornotthereexistsalikelihoodofconfusionislargelya
questionoffact.Asthisisaninfringementclaim(ratherthanan
oppositionproceedingbeforetheTrade-marksOpposition
Board),theonuswasontheappellanttoprovesuchlikelihood
onabalanceofprobabilities.118[emphasisadded.]
Thisdifferenceincharacterizationsuggeststhatappreciationoflikelihoodof
confusioncanbeseenbothasamixedquestionoffactandlawanda

117Supra,note1,atpara.32.118Supra,note2,atpara.14.

35
questionoffact.Todelineatebothissues,itisproposedthattheconductbya
courtortheRegistrarofanyinquiryintolikelihoodofconfusioncanbe
describedasamixedquestionoffactandlawwhilethedeterminationof
likelihoodofconfusioninaspecificcaseisaquestionoffact–whichiswhat
BinnieJ.hadinmindwhenhewroteelsewhereinMattel:
30…TheBoard’sconclusionthatBARBIE’sfameislimitedtodolls
anddolls’accessoriesdoesnotatallmeanthatBARBIE’saura
cannottranscendthoseproducts,butwhetheritislikelytodo
soornotinthecontextofoppositionproceedingsinrelationto
restaurant,cateringandbanquetservicesisaquestionoffact
thatdependson“allthesurroundingcircumstances”(s.
6(5))…
119[emphasisadded.]
5.2“Doubt”asastandard
Inoppositionproceedings,anapplicantmustestablishitsrighttoregistration
andthereforethatconfusionisunlikely,onabalanceofprobabilities.As
DécaryJ.cautionedin2002,inthecaseofChristianDior,S.A.v.Dion
NeckwearLtd.,
120anyreferencetothenotionof“doubt”shouldbeavoided
whenanalyzingtheonusimposedonanapplicantinoppositionproceedings:
[4]…TheRegistrardeniedtheregistrationofthe“DionCollection
&Design”markessentiallyforthefollowingreasons:
Inviewoftheabove,andevenbearinginmindthe
inherentweaknessoftheopponent’sDIORtrade-marks,I
amstillleftindoubtastowhethertherewouldbea
reasonablelikelihoodofconfusionbetweenthe
applicant’strade-markDIONCOLLECTION&Designand
theOpponent’sregisteredtrade-marksDIORinviewofthe
degreeofvisualsimilaritybetweenthetrade-marksas
appliedtooverlappingwarestravellingthroughthesame
channelsoftrade.Ihaveconcluded,therefore,thatthe
applicanthasfailedtomeetthelegalburdenuponitin
respectoftheissueofconfusioninrelationtotheSection
12(1)(d)groundofopposition.
…
[10]Inmyview,theRegistrarerredinapplyinga“stillindoubt”
standard,therebyimposingaburdenontheapplicantwhichis
moreonerousthantheoneapplicableincivilproceedings.I
appreciatethatthereishighauthorityforthepropositionthat
doubtshouldberesolvedinfavouroftheopponent(seeEnov.

119Supra,note1,atpara.30.120ChristianDior,S.A.v.DionNeckwearLtd.,[2002]3F.C.405.

36
Dunn(1890),15App.Cas.252(H.L.),perLordWatson,atpage
257;Freed&FreedLtd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarksetal.,[1950]
Ex.C.R.431,perThorsonP.,atpage24,25;SunshineBiscuits,
Inc.v.CorporateFoodsLtd.(1982),61C.P.R.(2d)53(F.C.T.D.),
perCattanachJ.,atpage55ff.;CondeNastPublicationsInc.
v.Uniondeséditionsmodernes(1979),46C.P.R.(2d)183
(F.C.T.D.),perCattanachJ.,atpage188;EffemFoodsLtd.v.
Export/ImportClicInc.(1993),53C.P.R.(3d)200(F.C.T.D.),per
PinardJ.,atpages77,78).Butthatproposition,startingwith
LordWatsoninEno,hasalwaysbeencouchedingeneral
terms,asacorollarytotheprinciplethattheonuswasonthe
applicant;noone,tomyknowledge,hassuggestedthatthe
standardapplicableincivilproceedingswasnottoapplyor
thatanapplicanthadtodemonstratebeyonddoubtthat
confusionwasunlikely.Inthatregard,InotethatwhenLinden
J.A.inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3
F.C.534(C.A.),atparagraph12,referredtoEnoandto
SunshineBiscuits,itwasinsupportofthepropositionthatthe
onuswasontheapplicant,notinsupportoftheancillary
propositionthatanydoubtistoberesolvedinfavourofthe
opponent.
[11]Infact,Ihavenotbeenshownanycasewherea“beyond
doubt”standardwasappliedassuchbyacourt,asopposed
tothestandardofbalanceofprobabilitiesgenerally
applicableincivilmatters.AsIreadthejurisprudence,andin
particularthecommentsofCattanachJ.inSunshineBiscuits,
thedifferencebetweenoppositionproceedingsandcivil
proceedingsisnottheapplicablestandard,i.e.balanceof
probabilities,buttheonus,whichisnotonthepartywhoasserts
anallegation(theopponent),butonthepartywhoseeks
registration(theapplicant).
…
[15]TheRegistrarmustthereforebereasonablysatisfiedthat,
onabalanceofprobabilities,theregistrationisunlikelyto
createconfusion;heneednotbesatisfiedbeyonddoubtthat
confusionisunlikely.Shouldthe“beyonddoubt”standardbe
applied,applicantswould,inmostcases,facean
unsurmountableburdenbecausecertaintyinmattersof
likelihoodofconfusionisararecommodity.Atbest,itisonly
wheretheprobabilitiesareequalthataformofdoubtmaybe
saidtoarise,whichistoberesolvedinfavouroftheopponent.

37
Buttheconceptofdoubtisatreacherousandconfusingonein
civilproceedingsandaregistrarshouldavoidresortingtoit.
121
TheSupremeCourtdidnotappeartoharbourconcernsabouttheconcept
ofdoubtandreferred,inMattel,toa“leftindoubt”standard(applied,
however,onabalanceofprobabilities)inoppositionproceedings:
31Therespondentisnotentitledtoregistrationofitstrade-
markunlessitcandemonstratethatuseofbothtrade-marksin
thesamegeographicareawillnotcreatethelikelihoodof
confusion,i.e.mistakeninferencesinthemarketplace.If,ona
balanceofprobabilities,theBoardisleftindoubt,the
applicationmustberejected.122

AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdidrefertoa“leftindoubt”standard,itseems
clearfromacompletereviewofthereasonsofBinnieJ.thatnoapprovalwas
giventoa“beyonddoubt”standardwhichwouldcastaquasi-
insurmountableonusonapplicantsinoppositionproceedings.Indeed,at
para.54,BinnieJ.adoptedthefollowingclassicformulation:“Inopposition
proceedings,asstated,theonusisontheapplicant(heretherespondent)to
showonabalanceofprobabilitiesthatthereisnolikelihoodofconfusion.”123

5.3Likelihoodofconfusionandactualconfusion
Initsclaimunders.20,plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardinhadtoestablish
likelihoodofconfusiononabalanceofprobabilities,
124notactualconfusion.
Theinquiryintowhetherthereisanylikelihoodthatconsumerswilldrawa
mistakeninferenceastothesourceofwaresand/orservicesmustbe
measuredthroughtheeyesoftheaveragehurriedconsumer.BothinMattel
andinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,BinnieJ.affirmedthelongstandingnormof
thismythicalconsumer.
InMattel,hewrote:
56What,then,istheperspectivefromwhichthelikelihoodof
a“mistakeninference”istobemeasured?Itisnotthatofthe
carefulanddiligentpurchaser.Nor,ontheotherhand,isitthe
“moroninahurry”sobelovedbyelementsofthepassing-off
bar:MorningStarCo-OperativeSocietyLtd.v.Express
NewspapersLtd.,[1979]F.S.R.113(Ch.D.),atp.117.Itisrather

121Ibid.,atparas.4,10,11and15.122Supra,note1,atpara.31;seealsothecommentsofSniderJ.inWranglerApparelCorp.v.
TimberlandCompany(2005),41C.P.R.(4th)223(F.C.),atparas.26-31.
123Supra,note1,atpara.54.124Supra,note2,atpara.14.

38
amythicalconsumerwhostandssomewhereinbetween,
dubbedina1927OntariodecisionofMeredithC.J.asthe
“ordinaryhurriedpurchasers”:Klotzv.Corson(1927),33O.W.N.
12(Sup.Ct.),atp.13.SeealsoBarsalouv.Darling(1882),9
S.C.R.677,atp.693.InDelisleFoodsLtd.v.AnnaBethHoldings
Ltd.(1992),45C.P.R.(3d)535(T.M.O.B.),theRegistrarstatedat
p.538:
Whenassessingtheissueofconfusion,thetrademarksat
issuemustbeconsideredfromthepointofviewofthe
averagehurriedconsumerhavinganimperfect
recollectionoftheopponent’smarkwhomightencounter
thetrademarkoftheapplicantinassociationwiththe
applicant’swaresinthemarket-place.
AndseeAmericanCyanamidCo.RecordChemicalCo.,[1972]
F.C.1271(T.D.),atp.1276,aff’d(1973),14C.P.R.(2d)127
(F.C.A.).AsCattanachJ.explainedinCanadianSchenley
Distilleries,atp.5.
Thatdoesnotmeanarash,carelessorunobservant
purchaserontheonehand,norontheotherdoesitmean
apersonofhighereducation,onepossessedofexpert
qualifications.Itistheprobabilityoftheaverageperson
endowedwithaverageintelligenceactingwithordinary
cautionbeingdeceivedthatisthecriterionandto
measurethatprobabilityofconfusion.TheRegistrarof
TradeMarksortheJudgemustassessthenormalattitudes
andreactionsofsuchpersons.125

InVeuveClicquotPonsardin,heindicated:
20Thetesttobeappliedisamatteroffirstimpressioninthe
mindofacasualconsumersomewhatinahurrywhoseesthe
nameCliquotontherespondents’storefrontorinvoice,ata
timewhenheorshehasnomorethananimperfect
recollectionoftheVEUVECLICQUOTtrade-marks,anddoesnot
pausetogivethematteranydetailedconsiderationorscrutiny,
nortoexaminecloselythesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetween
themarks.AsstatedbyPigeonJ.inBenson&Hedges
(Canada)Ltd.v.St.RegisTobaccoCorp.,[1969]S.C.R.192,at
p.202:
Itisnodoubttruethatifoneexaminesbothmarks
carefully,hewillreadilydistinguishthem.However,thisis
notthebasisonwhichoneshoulddecidewhetherthereis
anylikelihoodofconfusion.

125Supra,note1,atpara.56.

39
…themarkswillnotnormallybeseensidebysideand
[theCourtmust]guardagainstthedangerthataperson
seeingthenewmarkmaythinkthatitisthesameasone
hehasseenbefore,oreventhatitisaneworassociated
markoftheproprietoroftheformermark.
(CitinginpartHalsbury’sLawsofEngland,3rded.,vol.38,
para.989,atp.590.)126

IfacourtortheRegistrarconductsaninquiryintolikelihoodofconfusionby
referringtothereactionofacasualconsumerinahurryinagivensetof
circumstances,whatplacedorealinstancesofconfusion–orthelackthereof
–haveinevaluatinglikelihoodofconfusion?

Inpara.55ofhisreasonsinMattel,BinnieJ.wrotethatproofofactual
confusionwouldbearelevant“surroundingcircumstance”butthatthistype
ofevidenceisnotnecessary;however,anadverseinferencemaybedrawn
fromthelackofsuchevidenceincircumstanceswhereitwouldreadilybe
availableiftheallegationoflikelyconfusionwerejustified.127Inpara.89,Binnie
J.concludedthat,inthecasebeforetheCourt,evidenceofactual
confusion,thoughnotnecessary,wouldhavebeenhelpfulbutwasnot
presentedbyMattel,Inc.Thelackofanyevidenceofactualconfusionwas
accordinglyanotherofthe“surroundingcircumstances”thattheCourt
considered.

Ontheissueofactualconfusion(orlackthereof)asasurrounding
circumstance,BinnieJ.referredtocommentsmadebyDécaryJ.inChristian
Dior,referredtosupra,whoconcludedthatanadverseinferencemaybe
drawnwhenconcurrentuseontheevidenceisextensive,yetnoevidenceof
confusionhasbeengivenbyaplaintiff.128Theissueoflackofevidenceof
actualconfusionbecomesrelevantandmayleadtoanegativeinferencein
circumstanceswhenconcurrentuseontheevidenceisextensive.Inlightof
thecaselawreferredtobyBinnieJ.,itwouldappearthatitisonlywhen
coexistencehasbeenongoingforalongperiodoftimeandwheremarks
havecoexistedonthesamemarketthatanegativeinferencemaybedrawn.
ItiswithinthisspecificcontextthatthecourtortheRegistrarshouldconsidera
lackofactualconfusion.

Forexample,inConAgra,Inc.v.McCainFoodsLtd.,129BlaisJ.wrote:

126Supra,note2,atpara.20.127Supra,note1,atpara.55.128Ibid.,atpara.89.129ConAgraInc.v.McCainFoodsLtd.(2001),14C.P.R.(4th)288(F.C.T.D.).[appeallaunched
beforetheFederalCourtofAppealinfileA-510-01onSeptember10,2001;appealdismissed
onJune21,2002].

40
[80]ThereisnoevidencebeforethisCourtofanyinstancesof
actualconfusion.ThisentitlestheCourttodrawnegative
conclusionsabouttheallegationsoflikelihoodofconfusion
wheretherehasbeenasubstantialperiodofcoexistencein
themarketplaceandnoinstancesofactualconfusionhave
beenestablished.130[emphasisadded.]

InPanavision,Inc.v.MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo.,Ltd.131JoyalJ.
indicated:“Thetwocompetingmarks,aswellasothersimilarmarks,appear
tohavebeensurvivingsidebysideandneithertheRegistrarnorthiscourt
havebeenprovidedwithanyevidenceofactualconfusionoverthepast10
years.”[emphasisadded.]132

InPepsi-ColaofCanadaLtd.v.Coca-ColaCo.ofCanadaLtd.,133DavisJ.
wrote:“Whereadefendant’stradeisofsomestanding,theabsenceofany
instanceofactualconfusionmaybeconsideredassomeevidencethat
interferenceisunnecessary.”134[emphasisadded.]

InGeneralMotorsCorp.v.Bellows,135CameronJ.wrote:“Butthefactthat
suchconfusionhasnotoccurredoveraperiodofmanyyearsisa
circumstancetobetakenintoconsiderationandisofsomeimportancein
determiningwhetherconfusionislikelytooccur.136[emphasisadded.]

InFreed&FreedLtd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarks,137itwasheld:
Thatwheretherehasbeenalongcontemporaneoususeof
twomarksinthesameareainassociationwithwaresofthe
samekindthelackofevidenceofconfusionthroughsuchuse
wouldaffordsupportfortheconclusionthatthetwomarksare
notconfusinglysimilarbutwheretherehasbeennosubstantial
contemporaneoususeofthetwomarksthefactthatthereis
noevidenceofactualconfusionisnotofmuchimportance.138
[emphasisadded.]

130Ibid.,atpara.80.131Panavision,Inc.v.MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo.,Ltd.(1992),40C.P.R.(3d)486(F.C.T.D.).132Ibid.,atp.492.133Pepsi-ColaofCanadaLtd.v.Coca-ColaCo.ofCanadaLtd.,[1940]S.C.R.17.134Ibid.,atp.30.135GeneralMotorsCorp.v.Bellows,[1947]Ex.C.R.568[affirmedbyGeneralMotorsCorp.v.
Bellows,[1949]S.C.R.678].
136Ibid,atp.577.137Freed&FreedLtd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarks[1950]Ex.C.R.431.138Ibid.,atp.432.

41
InMonsportInc.v.LesVêtementsdeSportBonnie(1978)Ltée,139AddyJ.
indicated:
Itisimportanttonotehowever,thatthecourtisentitledtodraw
negativeconclusionsabouttheplaintiff’scaseif,despitea
substantialperiodofco-existenceinthemarket-place,no
instancesofactualconfusionareestablished:Freed&Freed
Ltd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarks(1950),14C.P.R.19,[1951]2
D.L.R.7,[1950]Ex.C.R.431.140[emphasisadded.]

Finally,inMultiplicantInc.v.PetitBateauValtonS.A.,141JoyalJ.wrote:
Thefactthatusereducesthelikelihoodofconfusionis
confirmedbythelackofevidenceinthecaseatbarofany
confusionovernearly20years.[emphasisadded.]
…
Theabsenceofsuchevidenceisanimportantpointto
consider:142

Itshouldonlybeinthespecificcircumstancesoutlinedabovethatevidence
oflackofactualconfusionmaybeconsideredbyacourtortheRegistrar.
Absentthese,lackofactualconfusionshouldnotbearelevantfactorin
situations,forexample,whereadefendanthasonlystarteduseofan
allegedlyconfusingtrade-mark,doesnothavesignificantuse,hasfiledan
applicationforregistrationonthebasisofproposeduseofitstrade-mark,
wherethepartiesarenotgeographicallyinthesamemarketorhavenot
beeninthesamemarketforalongperiodoftime.Finally,itmustbe
consideredthatactualconfusionmayhaveoccurredinagivensetof
circumstances,butthatthosewhowereitsvictimswerenevermadeawareof
theirincorrectinferenceorneverbotheredtocomplain–bearinginmindthat
thecasualconsumerisoneinahurry(inthelikelihoodofconfusiontestandin
reallife…).Cautionshouldthereforealwaysbeexercisedwhenevaluatingthis
circumstancethatParliamentchosenottospecificallyincludeins.6.

6.0CONCLUSION

InMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtofCanadahas
setasidethemostcontroversialpassagesfoundinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,
namelythoseseenasrequiringthata“connection”beestablishedbetween
areasoftradeinorderforlikelihoodofconfusiontobeestablished.When

139MonsportInc.v.LesVêtementsdeSportBonnie(1978)Ltée(1988),22C.P.R.(3d)356(F.C.T.D.).140Ibid.,atp.560.141MultiplicantInc.v.PetitBateauValtonS.A.(1994),55C.P.R.(3d)372(F.C.T.D.).142Ibid.,atp.379.

42
likelihoodofconfusionistobeexamined–includinginanysituationinvolving
afamoustrade-mark–considerationshouldbegiventoallthesurrounding
circumstances,fromwhichthetrialjudgemustthenweighthevarious
competingfactors.Moreover,becausefamoustrade-marksdonotcomein
onesize,asBinnieJ.wrote,considerationmustbegiventothefamoustrade-
mark’sauratodeterminewhetherconsumerswillassociatethefamoustrade-
markwithanewcomer’sfieldoftrade.143However,withitsemphasisuponthe
examinationofthesenioruser’smark,timewilltellifthisnewtestwilllimitinits
ownwaytheprotectionoffamoustrade-marksinCanada.

DespitetheunsuccessfuloutcomeforVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theattention
giventofamoustrade-marksbytheSupremeCourtofCanadaultimately
demonstratesacontinuingconcern,namelythatconsumerconfusionmust
beavoided.Thismustbeachieved,whetherornottheparties’waresor
servicesareofthesamegeneralclass,asParliamentwiselylegislatedmore
thanfifty(50)yearsago.

143Supra,note2,atpara33.

43
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