Not just about famous trade-marks : A review of other issues raised by the supreme court of Canada in the Veuve Clicot Ponsardin and mattels decisions

N
OTJUSTABOUTFAMOUSTRADE-MARKS:AREVIEWOFOTHERISSUES
RAISEDBYTHESUPREMECOURTOFCANADAINTHEVEUVECLICQUOT
PONSARDINANDMATTELDECISIONS

BARRYGAMACHE*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,
LLP
L
AWYERS,PATENT&TRADE-MARKAGENTS

Abstract

OnJune2,2006,theSupremeCourthandeddownitstwomuchanticipated
companiondecisionsinMattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.,[2006]1S.C.R.772and
VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,[2006]1S.C.R.824onthe
protectionoffamoustrade-marksinCanada.Ontheissueoflikelihoodofconfusion
involvingafamoustrade-mark,theSupremeCourtseemstohavecraftedanewtest
–atleastwhendealingwiththesituationofafamoustrade-markbeingcarriedover
byanewcomerintoadifferentfieldoftrade–namely,willthefamousmarkbe
associatedbyordinaryconsumerswiththenewcomer’sareaoftrade?TheSupreme
Court’sdecisionsalsoaddressedotherissues:Forexample,registrationwas
describedasashieldagainstdamageclaims;astringenttesthasnowbeendetailed
fors.22claimsundertheTrade-marksAct;finally,importantpointsapplicableto
oppositionproceedingswereoutlined,mostnotablytheonusapplicabletherein.
Résumé

Le2juin2006,laCoursuprêmearendupubliquessesdeuxdécisionstantattendues
surlaprotectiondesmarquesdecommercecélèbresauCanadadansMattel,Inc.c.
3894207CanadaInc.,[2006]1R.C.S.772etVeuveClicquotPonsardinc.Boutiques
CliquotLtée,[2006]1R.C.S.824.Surlaquestiondelaprobabilitédeconfusion
impliquantunemarquedecommercecélèbre,laCoursuprêmesembleavoircrééun
nouveautest–dumoinslorsqu’ils’agitdelasituationoùunemarquedecommerce
célèbreestrepriseparunnouveauvenudansundomained’activitédifférent–en

©CIPS,2008*BarryGamacheisamemberofLEGERROBICRICHARD,L.L.P.,amultidisciplinaryfirmoflawyers,
patentandtrade-markagents;hewasoneofthelawyersappearingforVeuveClicquotPonsardin,
maisonfondéeen1772beforetheFederalCourt,TrialDivision(nowtheFederalCourtofCanada),
theFederalCourtofAppealandtheSupremeCourtofCanada.Ashewasinvolvedintheprosecution
ofVeuveClicquotPonsardin’sclaims,referencewillbemademorespecificallyinthispapertothe
factualcircumstancesoftheVeuveClicquotPonsardincase.Paperpresentedtothe80
thAnnual
MeetingoftheIntellectualPropertyInstituteofCanada,September27-30,2006,St.Andrews-by-the-
Sea,New-Brunswick..Publication380.

2
l’occurrence,lamarquecélèbreserait-elleassociéeparlesconsommateurs
ordinairesaudomained’activitédunouveauvenu?LesdécisionsdelaCour
suprêmeontégalementabordéd’autrespoints:parexemple,l’enregistrementd’une
marquepourraitmaintenantêtreconsidérécommeunedéfenseàl’encontred’une
réclamationpourdommages;untestrigoureuxaétédétaillépourlesréclamations
envertudel’article22delaLoisurlesmarquesdecommerce;finalement,des
indicationsontétédonnéesrelativementaufardeauapplicablelorsdeprocédures
d’opposition.
1.0INTRODUCTION
OnJune2,2006,theSupremeCourtofCanadahandeddownitsmuchanticipated
decisionsinMattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.
1andinVeuveClicquotPonsardinv.
BoutiquesCliquotLtée.2AunanimousCourtaffirmedthelowercourts’rejectionof
Mattel,Inc.’soppositiontotheregistrationofthetrade-markBARBIE’S(&Design)for
restaurantservices;italsoconfirmedthedismissalofVeuveClicquotPonsardin’s
variousclaims(includingitsrequestforinjunctiverelief)underCanada’sTrade-marks
Act
3(the“Act”)againstachainofwomen’sretailclothingstoresusingtheservice
markCLIQUOT.Attheheartofeachtrade-markcasewasthescopeofprotectionto
begrantedtofamoustrade-marksandintheseparticularinstances,toboththe
famousandlongstandingBARBIEandVEUVECLICQUOTmarks,owned
respectivelybytheAmericantoymanufacturerandtheFrenchChampagnehouse.
AlthoughtheCourtconfirmedthelowercourts’findingsthatbothBARBIEand
VEUVECLICQUOTwerefamousmarks,itconcludedthattheevidenceineachcase
didnotsupportafindingoflikelihoodofconfusion,whereonenewcomerhadapplied
toregisteraBARBIE’Stypetrade-markforrestaurantservices,whiletheotherhad
adoptedthemarkCLIQUOTforitswomen’sretailclothingstores.
Inbothsetsofreasons,however,theCourtagreedwithappellantsthatthecaselaw
4
whichhadbeenrelieduponbythelowercourtshadputtoomuchemphasisonthe
similaritiesanddissimilaritiesinthenatureofthewares,servicesorbusinesswhen
analysinglikelihoodofconfusioninvolvingafamoustrade-mark.Onemaysaythat
theCourt’sdecisionsinbothcaseshaveclarifiedthelikelihoodofconfusiontest
regardingfamoustrade-marks,firstreviewedin1998bytheFederalCourtofAppeal
inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.
5andfurtherdescribedin2000

1Mattel,Inc.v.3894207CanadaInc.,[2006]1S.C.R.772;2006SCC22.2VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée,[2006]1S.C.R.824;2006SCC23.3Trade-marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.T-13.4PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.)[applicationforleaveto
appealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadagrantedonNovember19,1998infile26689;discontinuance
filedonJune21,1999];ToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,[2001]2F.C.15
(F.C.A.)[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadadismissedonJuly12,2001in
file28376].
5PinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(F.C.A.).

3
bythesameappellatecourtinToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.6
TheSupremeCourt’sclarificationofthePinkPantherBeautyCorp.test–whichwill
beanalyzed–ispartoftheMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardinlegacy.
However,inbothdecisions,theCourtdidraiseotherissuesofinteresttotrade-mark
practitioners,suchastheextentoftherightsconferredbyregistration,the
interpretationofs.22oftheActandthecharacterizationoftheonusinopposition
proceedings.Yetallthesepointsappearedtohavebeenovershadowedbythe
debateontheextentoftheprotectiongrantedtofamoustrade-marks.Thispaperwill
attempttoaddresstheseotherimportant,iflessdiscussedissuesandtheirtreatment
bycaselawsincetheSupremeCourt’scompaniondecisions.
2.0HOWLIKELIHOODOFCONFUSIONISTOBEMEASURED:THE
CASEINVOLVINGFAMOUSTRADE-MARKVEUVECLICQUOT
2.1Background
“Amongthosewithchampagnetastes,thebrandofVeuveClicquotPonsardinis
consideredamongtheverybest.”
7Withthesekindwords,BinnieJ.oftheSupreme
CourtofCanadaintroducestheplaintiffChampagnehouseanditsmuchappreciated
sparklingdrink.TracingitsoriginstothelastyearsofFrance’sancienrégime,plaintiff
VeuveClicquotPonsardinowesitswell-deservedreputationpartlytotheimpressive
achievementsofNicoleClicquotPonsardin(1777-1866)who,asayoungveuve,in
1805,succeededherlatehusbandattheheadofathensmallChampagnehouse.
MadameClicquotwaskeyinthedevelopmentofherchampagne’smuchappreciated
qualities.Toher,weowethepupitrederemuage(orriddlingrack)whoseinnovative
useintheearly1800sallowsustodaytoenjoytranslucentchampagne–as
comparedtoitslessaestheticallypleasinglate18
thcenturypredecessor,which
presentedasomewhatcloudyappearance.VEUVECLICQUOTchampagnewasfirst
distributedinCanadaduringthelastdaysofthe1890s.Ithasfoundfameand
acclaimincirclesofconnoisseursandinlargeronesofoccasionalusers.Veuve
ClicquotPonsardinregistereditsfirsttrade-mark–oneofitslabels–inCanadain
1909,whileamorerecentapplicationforthewordmarkVEUVECLICQUOTmatured
toregistrationin1980forchampagnewineswithaclaimofuseofthemarkin
Canadasinceatleast1899.
DefendantsBoutiquesCliquotLtée,MademoiselleCharmanteInc.and3017320
CanadaInc.aremuchyounger,“NewWorld”,corporateentitieswhooperateinthe
provincesofQuebecandOntarioachainofmid-pricedwomen’sretailclothingstores
undervarioustradenamessuchasMademoiselleCharmante,Colette,Cadance

6ToyotaJidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,[2001]2F.C.15(F.C.A.).7Supra,note2,atpara.1.

4
PetiteandCharmantePetite.8In1995,defendantschosetwonewtrade-marks,
CLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”forsixoftheirboutiques.9On
August20,1996,defendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.appliedtoregisterthe
trade-marksCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”(the“CLIQUOTmarks”
or“CLIQUOTregistrations”),bothfortheoperationofretailclothingstoreswith
respectofladies’wearandaccessoriesonthebasisofuseofeachtrade-markin
CanadasinceasearlyasMarch1995.Bothapplicationswerepublishedfor
oppositionpurposesonMarch5,1997and,intheabsenceofanyobjection,
proceededtoregistrationonAugust1,1997.
OnNovember5,1998,afterlearningoftheexistenceoftheCLIQUOTboutiques
throughitsCanadianagent,
10plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardininitiatedlegal
proceedingsbeforetheFederalCourtofCanadaagainstthethreeaforementioned
defendants.PlaintiffsoughtaninjunctiontoendtheuseofthemarksCLIQUOTand
CLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”;additionally,itrequestedthatbothofthe1997
registrationsofthesemarksbestruckout.
11
Plaintiff’sactionbeforetheFederalCourtwasbased,interalia,ons.20oftheAct,
whichsetsouttherightoftheownerofaregisteredtrade-marktostoptheuseofany
confusingtrade-mark.Aswillbefullyoutlinedlater,thegroundsforexpungement
werealsofoundedonallegedconfusion.Finally,plaintiff’srequestforaninjunction
wasfurtherbasedons.22oftheAct,whichstatesthatnopersonshalluseatrade-
markregisteredbyanotherpersoninamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectof
depreciatingthevalueofthegoodwillattachedthereto.
ThetrialinthismatterwasheldfromNovember18toNovember21,2002.On
January30,2003,Tremblay-LamerJ.oftheFederalCourtdismissedallofplaintiff’s
claims.
12OnApril22,2004,plaintiff’sappealbeforetheFederalCourtofAppealwas
alsodismissed.13
Theallegationoflikelihoodofconfusion,whichwasbroughtforwardbyVeuve
ClicquotPonsardin–andwhichformedpartofitsbasisforaninjunctionandwas
crucialtoitsclaimforexpungement–wasdismissedbythelowercourtsinlargepart
duetotherulesgoverningtheprotectionoffamoustrade-marksinCanada,
describedbytheFederalCourtofAppealinMarch1998inPinkPantherBeauty

8VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2003),28C.P.R.(4th)520(F.C.T.D.),at
para.6.
9Ibid.,atparas.4and60.10Ibid.,atpara.39.11Ibid.,atpara.12.12Ibid.,atparas.80,87,97and107.13VeuveClicquotPonsardinv.BoutiquesCliquotLtée(2004),35C.P.R.(4th)1(F.C.A.).

5
Corp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.14andrestatedtwoandahalfyearslaterinToyota
JidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.15
2.2TheSearchforaConnection
OnMarch30,1998,theFederalCourtofAppealhandeddownitsmuchdebated
decisioninPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.UnitedArtistsCorp.,
16anoppositioncase
whichhadoriginatedfromtheTrade-MarksOppositionBoardwhereUnitedArtists
Corporation,ownerofthefamoustrade-markTHEPINKPANTHER(associatedto
thecomedyfilmswithPeterSellersasInspectorClouseau),wasunsuccessfulinits
oppositionagainsttheregistrationofthetrade-markPINKPANTHERforhaircare
andbeautyproductsuppliesandtheoperationofabusinessdealingintheir
distribution.AdividedFederalCourtofAppealtackledtheissueastothescopeof
protectiontobegrantedtofamoustrade-marksinCanadawhenapplyingthetestof
likelihoodofconfusionunders.6oftheAct.
ThereasonsofLindenJ.,whowroteforthemajority,wereseenasrequiringa
“connection”betweentheparties’areasoftradeiflikelihoodofconfusionistobe
foundbetweenasenioruser’sfamoustrade-markandanewcomer’ssimilarmark.
Absentsuchaconnection,asenioruserwouldfaceanuphillbattleinchallenginga
newcomerwhohadcarriedoveritsfamousmarkintoanewfieldoftrade.This
apparentsearchfora“connection”wasunderlinedmorethanoncebyLindenJ.:
[44]
…Thewidescopeofprotectionaffordedbythefameofthe
appellant’smarkonlybecomesrelevantwhenapplyingittoa
connectionbetweentheapplicant’sandtheopponent’stradeand
services.Nomatterhowfamousamarkis,itcannotbeusedto
createaconnectionthatdoesnotexist.
17
…
[46]
Anumberofothercaseshavecometomyattentioninvolvingfamous
trade-markssuchas“Coca-Cola”,“Cartier”and“Wedgwood”.Ineach
ofthesecasesthefamousmarkprevailed,butineachcasea
connectionorsimilarityintheproductsorserviceswasfound.Where
nosuchconnectionisestablished,itisverydifficulttojustifythe
extensionofpropertyrightsintoareasofcommercethatdonot

14Supra,note5.15Supra,note6.16Supra,note5.17Ibid.,atpara.44.

6
remotelyaffectthetrade-markholder.Onlyinexceptional
circumstances,ifever,shouldthisbethecase.18
…
[51]
.
..WhattheTrialJudgedidnotgivesufficientweighttoisthat,not
onlywerethewaresineachcasecompletelydisparate,butthereis
noconnectionwhatsoeverbetweenthem.AsIstatedearlier,where
nosuchconnectionexistsafindingofconfusionwillberare.
19
Theimportanceofa“connection”wasagainhighlightedbyaunanimousbenchofthe
FederalCourtofAppealonNovember20,2000,inthesubsequentcaseofToyota
JidoshaKabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,
20anotheroppositioncasewherethe
Japanesecarmanufacturerunsuccessfullyopposedregistrationofthetrade-mark
LEXUSfor,interalia,cannedfruitsandvegetables.WritingagainfortheCourt,
LindenJ.emphasized:
[7]…Theuseofthephrase”whetherornotthewaresorservicesare
ofthesamegeneralclass”asusedinsubsections6(2),6(3)and6(4)
doesnotmeanthatthenatureofthewaresisirrelevantin
determiningconfusion;theysuggestonlythatconfusionmay
be
generatedwithgoodsthatarenotinthe”samegeneralclass”,but
stillhavesomeresemblanceorlinkagetothewaresinquestion.
21…
[emphasisinoriginaltext.]
InlightofthisemphasisbytheFederalCourtofAppealuponasearchfora
connectionbetweenareasoftradebeforeafindingoflikelihoodofconfusionistobe
made,theneedfora“connection”betweenachampagnemanufacturer’sbusiness
andtheworldoffashionwasverymuchaconcernforbothplaintiffVeuveClicquot
PonsardinandthetrialjudgewhenthelatterheardthecaseinNovember2002.
VeuveClicquotPonsardinintroducedevidencewhichpurportedtoestablishsucha
connection,i.e.,theadvertisingofplaintiff’sproductsinfashionmagazinesdirectedat
womenandthesponsorshipoffashionshows,alongwiththeeverimportant
presenceinplaintiff’spromotionalactivitiesofreferencestoMadameClicquot,a
pioneerinherownrightasabusinessperson,atatimewhenfewwomenexercised
suchresponsibilities-whichexplainswhyplaintiffaimstosellitsproducttowomen.
Afterreviewingtheevidence,thetrialjudgemadeseveralfindingsfavourableto
plaintiff.Shewrotethatwhileplaintiff’sregisteredtrade-markwasVEUVE

18Ibid.,atpara.46–endnotesomitted.19Ibid.,atpara.51.20Supra,note6.21Ibid.,atpara.7.

7
CLICQUOT,22itsdistinctivepartwasCLICQUOT,whichshealsodescribedasoneof
plaintiff’smarks;23sheconcludedthatplaintiff’sVEUVECLICQUOTandCLICQUOT
markshadsignificantinherentdistinctivenessanddeservedextensiveprotection;she
alsofoundthattherewasnoothersimilarmarkonthemarketinCanada.
24She
recognizedthegreatdegreeofresemblancebetweentheparties’marks25astheir
dominantfeatureswererespectivelyCLICQUOT(forplaintiff)andCLIQUOT(for
defendants).Shenotedthatthelengthoftimeduringwhichtheparties’trade-marks
hadbeeninuseinCanadafavouredplaintiffasthetrade-markVEUVECLICQUOT
hadbeenusedinCanadasinceatleast1899.
26Finally,shemadethecrucialfinding
thatplaintiff’smarkwasfamous.27
However,onthefactsbeforeher,thetrialjudgewasnotconvincedthatVeuve
ClicquotPonsardin’sadvertisinginwomen’smagazinesanditsinvolvementin
fashionshowsweresufficienttoestablishabridgebetweenVeuveClicquot
Ponsardin’sprincipalactivityandthatofthedefendants.Inherview,theevidence
establishedthatwomenwerebutonemarkettargetedbyplaintiffasconsumersofits
champagne.
28Indismissingplaintiff’sallegationoflikelihoodofconfusion,thetrial
judgereferredspecificallytotheprinciplesofPinkPantherBeautyCorp.andwrotein
herreasonsaboutfindingsmadeinthatcase:“TheCourtfoundnoconnection
betweentheparties’productsandservices,andconsequentlyheldthattherewasno
riskofconfusion”.
29Inthetrialjudge’sview,theabsenceofaconnectionbetweenthe
parties’areasoftradeinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.consequentlyleadtoafindingof
absenceoflikelihoodofconfusioninthatcase.Accordingly,a“connection”orbridge
betweenchampagneandwomen’sfashionappearedtobeapreconditionforany
findingoflikelihoodofconfusion;intheabsenceofsuchconnection,plaintiff’sclaim
wasdismissed.ThisdecisionwasconfirmedbytheFederalCourtofAppeal.
30
2.3WhattheSupremeCourtdecided
WritingfortheCourtinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,BinnieJ.affirmedthetrialjudge’s
findingthatVEUVECLICQUOTisa“famous”mark.
31Thiscircumstanceisimportant
becausefamepresupposesthatthemarktranscendsatleasttosomeextentthe

22VEUVECLICQUOTwasoneofseveralregisteredtrade-marksrelieduponbyplaintiff;itwas
howeverthemostrelevantasbeingtheonehavingthegreatestdegreeofresemblancewith
defendants’marks.
23Supra,note8,atparas.8,44,58and63.24Ibid.,atpara.58.25Ibid.,atparas.44and62to66.26Ibid.,atpara.60.27Ibid.,atpara75(intheoriginalFrenchversionofherreasons,thetrialjudgeusedtheword“célèbre”
todescribeplaintiff’smark).
28Ibid.,atpara.69.29Ibid.,atpara.78.30Supra,note13.31Supra,note2,atpara.26.

8
wareswithwhichitisnormallyassociated.Inthiscase,theevidencerevealedthat
VEUVECLICQUOTevokedabroadassociationwithluxurygoods.However,onthe
factsofthiscase,wastherearequirementtolookfora“connection”between
plaintiff’sproductsandwomen’sfashion?
Onthisissue,BinnieJ.agreedthatthesearchforaconnectionoutlinedinPink
PantherBeautyCorp.puttoomuchemphasisonthesimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesin
“thenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness”–i.e.thesecircumstancesdescribed
inpara.6(5)(c)oftheAct–andtothatextentstrayedfromthestatutory“allthe
surroundingcircumstances”test.
32InthecompanionMattelcase,BinnieJ.wrotethat
the“exceptionalcircumstances…ifever”testoutlinedatpara.46ofthemajority’s
reasonsinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,quotedsupra,putsthebartoohighandmay
beseenasanattempttoimposerigiditywherenoneexists.
33Therefore,iftheresult
oftheuseofanewtrade-markwouldbetointroduceconfusioninthemarketplace,
thisshouldnotbeallowed“whetherornotthewaresorservicesareofthesame
generalclass”,pursuanttoss.6(2).However,accordingtotheSupremeCourt,the
correcttestwasstatedbythemajorityelsewhereinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,when
itwroteatpara.33:“thetotalityofthecircumstanceswilldictatehoweach
considerationshouldbetreated”;finally,theportionofthereasonsinPinkPanther
BeautyCorp.requiringa“connection”or“resemblance”betweenareasoftradein
ordertoestablishlikelihoodofconfusionwereonlydictaandshouldthereforenotbe
followed.
34
ClarificationofthePinkPantherBeautyCorp.testdidnot,however,helpplaintiff
VeuveClicquotPonsardininitsowncase;theSupremeCourtaffirmedthetrial
judge’soverallassessmentofthesituationandBinnieJ.concludedthat,inthe
circumstancesofthecasebeforeher,shecorrectlyweighedallthecompetingfactors
whenshewrotethatdespitethefameassociatedwith“CLICQUOT”,auniquemark
deservingextensiveprotection,therewasnolikelihoodofconfusionbetweenthe
parties’respectivetrade-marksbecauseofthegreatdifferenceintheparties’areasof
trade.
35AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,itwasnotthesearchforaconnectionthat
determinedtheoutcomeofthiscase;rather,itwastheassessmentofthetotalityof
thecircumstanceswhichwascorrectlycarriedout,inthiscase,bythetrialjudge.
AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththeviewthatasearchfora“connection”
betweenchampagneandwomen’sfashionwasrequired–anddespiteplaintiff’s
evidencewhichpurportedtoestablishsuchconnectioni.e.theadvertisingof
plaintiff’sproductsinfashionmagazinesdirectedatwomenandthesponsorshipof
fashionevents–itnonethelessstatedthattheevidencedidnotrevealthatthe
VEUVECLICQUOTmarkwouldbeassociatedbyordinaryconsumerswithmid-
pricedwomen’sclothing.Withthiskeyfinding,theCourtdismissedplaintiff’sappeal.

32Ibid.,atpara.27.33Supra,note1,atpara.63.34Ibid.,atparas.63,67and71.35Supra,note8,atparas.78and80.

9
AsimilarresultwasachievedintheMattelcasewheretheCourtaffirmedthe
rejectionofMattel,Inc.’soppositiontotheregistrationofthetrade-markBARBIE’S(&
Design)forrestaurantservices;there,applyingthereasonablenessstandardof
review,
36theCourtconfirmedthatthe“allofthesurroundingcircumstances”testhad
alsoappropriatelybeentakenintoconsiderationbytheOppositionBoard(whose
decisionwasreasonable)andthatincasessuchastheoneinvolvingMattel,Inc.’s
opposition,somecircumstances(suchasthedifferenceinwares)willcarrygreater
weightthanothers.
37
Whilehavingsetasidetherequirementfora“connection”or“resemblance”between
areasoftradewhenapplyingthelikelihoodofconfusiontest,theSupremeCourt
seemstohavecraftedanewtest–atleastwhendealingwiththesituationofa
famoustrade-markbeingcarriedoverbyanewcomerintoadifferentfieldoftrade–
namely,willthefamousmarkbeassociatedbyordinaryconsumerswiththe
newcomer’sareaoftrade?
Examinationofthesenioruser’smarkanditsauraappearstobeadeparturefrom
thetraditionalapproachregardingtheassessmentoflikelihoodofconfusionwhere
attentionisusuallydirectedtotheimpressionleftbythenewcomer’smark.For
example,inDallasCowboysCheerleaders,Inc.v.PussycatCinema,Ltd.
38which
wasreferredtobyBinnieJ.inhisreasons,thenewcomerhadusedforits
pornographicfilm“costumes”thatreproducedthetrade-markindiciaownedbythe
senioruser’scheerleadingsquad.There,theUnitedStatesCourtofAppeal,Second
Circuit,measuredconfusionbyexaminingwhatthenewcomer’smarksuggested,not
byrequiringthatthesenioruser’smarkbeknowninthenewcomer’sfield:
Thepublic’sbeliefthatthemark’sownersponsoredorotherwise
approvedtheuseofthetrademarksatisfiestheconfusion
requirement.Intheinstantcase,theuniformdepictedin“Debbie
DoesDallas”unquestionablybringstomindtheDallasCowboys
Cheerleaders.Indeed,itishardtobelievethatanyonewhohadseen
defendants’sexuallydepravedfilmcouldeverthereafterdisassociate
itfromplaintiff’scheerleaders.
39
ItwasnotsuggestedbytheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealthatthetestforconfusion
shouldbewhethertheDallasCowboysCheerleaders’trade-markindiciawouldbe
associatedbyconsumerswithpornographicfilms.
Thissaid,alikelyrationaleforthespecialattentionthatmustbegiventoasenior
user’sfamoustrade-markwhenexaminingtheissueoflikelihoodofconfusionmay
betheSupremeCourt’sacknowledgementofthevaryingdegreesoffamewhich

36Supra,note1,atpara.40.37Ibid.,atpara.73.38DallasCowboysCheerleaders,Inc.v.PussycatCinema,Ltd.,604F.2d200(2dCir.1979).39Ibid.,atp.205.

10
differentindividualtrade-marksmayclaimandthedifficultyincraftinga“onesizefits
all”testforfamoustrade-marks.Sometrade-marksmaybefamousforawiderange
ofproductstovirtuallyallmembersoftheconsumingpublic;othersmaybefamous
onlywithinacircleofconnoisseursinaparticularfield;othersareuniversallyfamous
butonlyinassociationwithaspecificproduct.BinnieJ.describedthesituationinthe
followingterms:
32…Famousmarksdonotcomeinonesize.Sometrade-marksmay
bewellknownbuthaveveryspecificassociations(Buckley’scough
mixtureisadvertisedaseffectivedespiteitsterribletaste,not,one
wouldthink,abrandimagedesirableforrestaurants).Otherfamous
marks,likeWaltDisney,mayindeedhavelargelytranscended
productlinedifferences.
40

Itisnowclearthatthereisnolongerarequirementtolookfora“connection”–which
mayproveelusiveinmanycircumstances–betweenareasoftradeintheprotection
offamoustrade-marks.However,ownersoffamoustrade-marksandtheirattorneys
shouldbemindfulthatevidenceconcerningafamoustrade-mark’sspecificaura–
anditsassociationtothenewcomer’sfieldoftrade–shouldnowbecontemplatedin
ordertomeetwhatseemstobethenewcriteriafortheprotectionoffamoustrade-
marksassetoutbytheSupremeCourtofCanadainVeuveClicquotPonsardin.
3.0THEEXTENTOFTHERIGHTSCONFERREDBYREGISTRATION
Whileconcernedwiththeprotectionoffamoustrade-marks,thecaseofVeuve
ClicquotPonsardinalsotouchesupontheissueoftherightsconferredbyregistration
undertheAct.Indeed,defendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.hadsecured
registrationofitstrade-marksCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”on
August1,1997(morethanayearbeforeplaintifflauncheditssuitforinjunctiverelief)
andthereforehadexclusiverightsunders.19oftheAct.Thegroundsofeach
remedysoughtbyplaintiffareimportantasdefendantsarguedbeforetheFederal
Courtthatplaintiffmustfirstovercomeapreliminaryhurdleandobtainthe
expungementoftheCLIQUOTmarks–andthesettingasideoftherightsconferred
byregistrationundertheAct–beforeitcanarguethatitisentitledtoobtaininjunctive
reliefagainstthem(beforetheSupremeCourt,defendantspushedthisargument
furtherandarguedthattheAugust1,1997registrationoftheCLIQUOTmarkswasa
completeanswertoplaintiff’sclaims).Inordertodeterminewhetherexpungement
mustprecedeinjunctiverelief,considerationwillbegiventothevariousgroundsof
actionraisedbyplaintiff.
3.1Plaintiff’svariousclaims

40Supra,note2,atpara.32.

11
Asownerofmanyregisteredtrade-marks–includingthetrade-markVEUVE
CLICQUOT–plaintiff’srequestforinjunctivereliefwasfounded,interalia,ons.20of
theActwhichprovidesinpart:
20.(1)Therightoftheownerofaregisteredtrade-marktoits
exclusiveuseshallbedeemedtobeinfringedbyapersonnot
entitledtoitsuseunderthisActwhosells,distributesoradvertises
waresorservicesinassociationwithaconfusingtrade-markortrade-
name…
Plaintiff’sclaimthatdefendantswereusinga“confusingtrade-mark”unders.20
obviouslyrequiredconsiderationofpartofs.6oftheAct,whichmeritedmuch
attentioninBinnieJ.’sdiscussiononfamoustrade-marks:
6.
…
(2)Theuseofatrade-markcausesconfusionwithanothertrade-
markiftheuseofbothtrade-marksinthesameareawouldbelikely
toleadtotheinferencethatthewaresorservicesassociatedwith
thosetrade-marksaremanufactured,sold,leased,hiredor
performedbythesameperson,whetherornotthewaresorservices
areofthesamegeneralclass.
…
(5)Indeterminingwhethertrade-marksortrade-namesare
confusing,thecourtortheRegistrar,asthecasemaybe,shallhave
regardtoallthesurroundingcircumstancesincluding
(a)theinherentdistinctivenessofthetrade-marksortrade-names
andtheextenttowhichtheyhavebecomeknown;
(b)thelengthoftimethetrade-marksortrade-nameshavebeenin
use;
(c)thenatureofthewares,servicesorbusiness;
(d)thenatureofthetrade;and
(e)thedegreeofresemblancebetweenthetrade-marksortrade-
namesinappearanceorsoundorintheideassuggestedbythem.
Plaintiff’sclaimforaninjunctionwasalsofoundedons.22oftheAct,whichprohibits,
initsrelevantpart,theuseofaregisteredtrade-mark(here,VEUVECLICQUOT,
amongothers)inamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthevalueof
itsgoodwill:
22.(1)Nopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanother
personinamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthe
valueofthegoodwillattachingthereto.
Plaintiff’sgroundsforexpungement(foundedons.18oftheAct)weremore
numerousbutnarrowerinscopeinasmuchastheyallraisedtheissueof“confusion”

12
ortherelatedissueoflackofdistinctivenessoftheCLIQUOTmarks,albeitallat
differentdates.
PlaintiffarguedthattheCLIQUOTmarkswereinvalidbecauseatthedateoftheir
registration(here,August1,1997),theycreatedconfusionwithplaintiff’sregistered
marks(includingVEUVECLICQUOT),onthebasisofparas.12(1)(d)and18(1)(a)of
theActwhichprovideinpart:
18.(1)Theregistrationofatrade-markisinvalidif
(a)thetrade-markwasnotregistrableatthedateofregistration…
12.(1)Subjecttosection13,atrade-markisregistrableifitisnot
…
(d)confusingwitharegisteredtrade-mark…
Accordingtoplaintiff,defendants’markswerealsoinvalidastheywerenotdistinctive
ofthedefendants’servicesatthetimeproceedingsbringingthevalidityofthe
registrationsintoquestionwerecommenced(here,November5,1998),onthebasis
ofpara.18(1)(b)ands.2oftheAct:
18.(1)Theregistrationofatrade-markisinvalidif
…
(b)thetrade-markisnotdistinctiveatthetimeproceedingsbringing
thevalidityoftheregistrationintoquestionarecommenced,or…
2.…“distinctive”,inrelationtoatrade-mark,meansatrade-mark
thatactuallydistinguishesthewaresorservicesinassociationwith
whichitisusedbyitsownerfromthewaresorservicesofothersoris
adaptedsotodistinguishthem…
Finally,plaintiffallegedthatdefendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.wasnotthe
personentitledtoregistrationoftheCLIQUOTmarksbecauseatthetimethese
markswereallegedlyusedforthefirsttime(here,March1995),theywereconfusing
withplaintiff’spreviouslyusedtrade-marksinCanada,onthebasisofparas.18(1)in
fineand16(1)(a)oftheAct:
18.(1)Theregistrationofatrade-mark…
isinvalidiftheapplicantforregistrationwasnotthepersonentitledto
securetheregistration.
16.(1)Anyapplicantwhohasfiledanapplicationinaccordancewith
section30forregistrationofatrade-markthatisregistrableandthat
heorhispredecessorintitlehasusedinCanadaormadeknownin
Canadainassociationwithwaresorservicesisentitled,subjectto
section38,tosecureitsregistrationinrespectofthosewaresor
services,unlessatthedateonwhichheorhispredecessorintitlefirst
souseditormadeitknownitwasconfusingwith
(a)atrade-markthathadbeenpreviouslyusedinCanadaormade
knowninCanadabyanyotherperson;
…

13
Thegroundsforexpungementdidnotmirrorthoseforinjunctiverelief,aslikelihoodof
depreciationisnotagroundforexpungementunders.18,alegalpointconfirmedby
the2007FederalCourtofAppealdecisioninRemoImportsLtd.v.JaguarCarsLtd.
41
Thisdifferenceinscopeofthevariousgroundsforeachremedyisimportant.Indeed,
ifinlaw,expungementmustfirstbesoughtandobtainedbeforeanyclaimfor
injunctivereliefagainsttheuseprotected(uptillthen)byregistrationistobe
considered,thenanyevidenceoflikelihoodofdepreciationofplaintiff’sregistered
markcausedbydefendantswouldnotallowplaintifftoobtainaninjunctiontostop
anyuseallowedbyregistrationifMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’smarksarestillon
theregister.Therefore,iftheCLIQUOTmarksremainontheregister–andthis
decisionbythetrialjudgewasultimatelyconfirmedbytheSupremeCourt–thentheir
ownerwillretaintherighttotheiruseanddefeatclaimsforaninjunctiontostopsuch
use.Theseareamongtheimportant–butimplicit–rulingsmadebytheSupreme
Court.
3.2RightsconferredbySection19
OnAugust1,1997,defendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.securedregistrationfor
itstwoCLIQUOTmarks.Assuch,fromthatdate,itwasgrantedtherightsconferred
bys.19oftheAct:
19.Subjecttosections21,32and67,theregistrationofatrade-mark
inrespectofanywaresorservices,unlessshowntobeinvalid,gives
totheownerofthetrade-marktheexclusiverighttotheuse
throughoutCanadaofthetrade-markinrespectofthosewaresor
services.
NoneofMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’srightswerelimitedinanywaybyss.21,32
and67,whichprovideexceptionstothemonopolisticrightsconferredbys.19ofthe
Act.Section21concernstherightofatrade-markownertotheuseofitsmarkina
definedterritorialareaconcurrentlywiththeusebyanotherpartyofaregistered
trade-markprotectedunderss.17(2)oftheActifsuchownerhadingoodfaithused
itsmarkinCanadabeforethedateoffilingoftheapplicationoftheregisteredmark;
unders.21,theFederalCourtmaysetthetermsforsuchconcurrentuse.Section32
outlinestheRegistrar’sjurisdictiontorestrictaregistrationtoadefinedterritorialarea
inCanadawithinwhichanotherwiseunregistrabletrade-mark–undercertain
conditions–isshowntohavebecomedistinctive.Finally,s.67affirms,withinthe

41RemoImportsLtd.v.JaguarCarsLtd.,[2008]2F.C.R.132(F.C.A.);onbehalfoftheCourt,
LétourneauJ.indicatedthefollowingatpara.56:
[56]Subsection22(1)providesaremedy,evenwhenthereisnoevidenceofconfusion,bywhichthe
respondentsinthiscasemayseekrelieffromtheappellant’suseofamarksufficientlysimilartotheirs
“toevokeinarelevantuniverseofconsumersamentalassociationofthetwomarksthatislikelyto
depreciatethevalueofthegoodwillattachingtothe[respondents’]mark”:seeVeuveClicquot
Ponsardin,atparagraph38.Thatremedyisnotagroundofinvalidityoftheregistrationofthe
appellant’strade-markcontrarytowhattheJudgefoundatparagraph331ofhisreasonsforjudgment.

14
provinceofNewfoundland,thefulleffectoftrade-marksregisteredundertheLawsof
NewfoundlandpriortoApril1,1949.
Registrationofatrade-markcanbeusedastheproverbialswordtocounterany
unauthorizeduseofsuchmarkanywhereinCanada.Forexample,in1969,GibsonJ.
oftheExchequerCourtwroteinOldDutchFoodsLtd.v.W.H.MalkinLtd.
42that“…
registrationofatrade-markbyreasonofsection19…givestosuchowneran
absoluterighttostopothersfromusingthattrade-mark…”
43Anowner’sexclusive
righttotheusethroughoutCanadaofitsregisteredtrade-markwasalsounderlined
morerecently,in2003,byMartineauJ.oftheFederalCourtinBacardi&Co.v.
HavanaClubHoldingS.A.
44Finally,in2005,inKirkbiAGv.RitvikHoldingsInc.,45the
SupremeCourtdescribedtherightsofaholderofaregisteredtrade-mark:
30…Theprimarydifferencebetweenregisteredandunregistered
trade-marksundertheActisthattherightsofaholderofaregistered
trade-markaremoreextensive:
…
Registrationofatrade-markgivestheregistranttheexclusiverightto
theusethroughoutCanadaofthetrade-markandarightofactionto
remedyanyinfringementofthatright:ss.19-20.
46…
WritingfortheCourt,LeBelJ.alsoemphasizedthatregistrationgrantsmoreeffective
rightsagainstthirdparties:
58…Registrationdoesnotchangethenatureofthemark;itgrants
moreeffectiverightsagainstthirdparties.Nevertheless,registeredor
not,markssharecommonlegalattributes.Theygrantexclusiverights
totheuseofadistinctivedesignationorguise(Ciba-GeigyCanada
Ltd.v.ApotexInc.,[1992]3S.C.R.120,atp.134;GillandJolliffe,at
pp.4-13and4-14).Indeed,theTrade-marksAct,byallowingforthe
assignmentofunregisteredtrade-marks,recognizestheexistenceof
goodwillcreatedbythesemarksaswellasthepropertyinterestsin
them.Registrationjustfacilitatesproofoftitle.…
47
InKirkbiAG,LeBelJ.wasconcernedwiththeextentofexclusiverightsgrantedto
unregisteredtrade-marks;however,itisclearthatregistrationgrantsaregistrant“the
exclusiverighttotheuse”ofitsmarkthroughoutCanada.
Althoughregistrationcanbeusedasasword,canitalsobeusedasashield,
protectingitsowneragainstanyclaiminvolvingtheuseofthetrade-markaslongas

42OldDutchFoodsLtd.v.W.H.MalkinLtd.,[1969]2Ex.C.R.316.43Ibid.,atp.325–footnoteomitted.44Bacardi&Co.v.HavanaClubHoldingS.A.(2003),32C.P.R.(4th)366(F.C.T.D.),atpara.22
[affirmedbyBacardi&Co.v.HavanaClubHoldingS.A.(2004),32C.P.R.(4th)306(F.C.A.)].
45KirkbiAGv.RitvikHoldingsInc.,[2005]3S.C.R.302.46Ibid.,atpara.30.47Ibid.,atpara.58.

15
itisontheregister,asdefendantsarguedinVeuveClicquotPonsardinonthebasis
oftheirCLIQUOTregistrations?
BeforeturningtotheSupremeCourt’scommentsontherightsconferredbys.19of
theAct,itisworthrememberingthatthemonopoly-grantingprovisionoftheActdoes
notprovideabsoluteprotectioninallcircumstances,foralltypesofuse;forexample,
inpenalproceedings,whentheuseofaregisteredtrade-markisfoundtoviolatethe
prohibitionsofanotherstatute,itsownercannotshielditselfbehindtherightsgranted
bys.19.Suchwasthecasein1976,inR.v.DiscountBroadloomCentreLtd.,
48
whereHoustonJ.oftheCountyCourtofOntario(DistrictofYork)foundthatthe
enablingprovisionsoftheActandtherestrictiveprovisionsofthethen–Combines
InvestigationAct
49didnotoperatetocreate,betweenthem,anirreconcilableconflict;
theCourtconsequentlyfoundthattheregisteredtrade-markFACTORYCARPET
OUTLETwasmisleadingundertheprovisionsoftheCombinesInvestigationAct–as
theaccuseddidnotoperateanyfactory–anditsownerwasconvictedaccordingly.
50
However,itcanbearguedthats.19rightswerenotatissueinsuchacasebutrather
themannerinwhichagivenusewascarriedout.Forexample,hadtheownerofthe
registeredtrade-markFACTORYCARPETOUTLEToperatedafactory,hewouldnot
havebeenvisitedbyaconvictionunderapenalstatute.Theissueinthistypeof
scenarioisnottherightsconferredbys.19butratherthespecificmannerinwhich
useofthoserightsiscarriedout.
Withthiscaveatinmind,canregistrationunders.19beusedasashield?Acautious
“yes”seemstobetheanswerprovidedbytheSupremeCourtwhichwrote:“Unders.
19oftheAct,therespondents’marksarepresumptivelyvalid,andentitlesthemto
usethemarksasdescribedabove”.
51[emphasisadded.]Bothregistrationsfor
MademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sCLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”
markscoveredservicesdescribedastheoperationofretailclothingstoresinrespect
ofladies’wearandaccessories.Theusetowhichthesetworegistrationsentitled
defendantswasearlieralludedtobyBinnieJ.inthefollowingterms:“Theword
Cliquotappearsontheexteriorsignateachofthese[six]locations[inQuebecand

48R.v.DiscountBroadloomCentreLtd.(1976),31C.P.R.(2d)110(Ont.Co.Ct.).49CombinesInvestigationsAct,R.S.C.1970,c.C-23.50Infact,theTrade-marksOfficecautionsanyapplicantthatthetrade-markregistrationitwill
eventuallysecuredoesnotimplyconformitywithanotherstatute:“TheTrade-marksActprovidesa
systemforregistrationoftrade-marks.Itisimportanttonotethattheregistrationofamarkunderthe
Trade-marksActdoesnotimplythatitsusewillcomplywiththerequirementsofotherstatutes,orthat
suchusewillnotconstituteacontraventionofotherstatutes”(fromafilingnoticedatedJuly6,2005).
Ontheotherhand,theallegation–andeventheproof–ofanactivityinCanadabytheownerofa
trade-markinfringingtheprovisionsofsomeotherlegislationthantheTrade-marksActdoesnotcause
theownerofthatmarktolosehisorherrightstoit:CreametteCo.v.FamousFoodsLtd.,[1933]Ex.
C.R.200,atp.204;S.A.Jetstreamv.R.D.InternationalStyleCollectionsLtd.(1993),49C.P.R.(3d)
336(F.C.T.D.)atp.341.
51Supra,note2,atpara.5.

16
Ottawa],onbagsandwrappingsaswellasonbusinesscardsandinvoices,butnot
ontheclothingitself”.52
BinnieJ.’sassessmentofthescopeofdefendants’rightsgrantedbyregistrationdid
notspecificallyaddresstheissueoftheexclusiverightsconferredbyregistrationbut
touchedratherupontherighttousearegisteredmark.Thismatterwasalso
mentionedinthecompanionMattelcasewhereBinnieJ.specificallyunderlinedthat
securingaregistrationauthorizesapartytouseitstrade-markinassociationwith
thosespecificwaresand/orservicesdescribedtherein:
53Theappellantarguedthatthecourtsbelowerredinlookingatthe
respondent’sactualoperationsratherthanatthetermssetoutinits
applicationfortheproposedtrade-mark.Itisquitetruethatthe
properfocusisthetermsoftheapplication,becausewhatisatissue
iswhattheregistrationwouldauthorizetherespondenttodo,not
whattherespondenthappenstobedoingatthemoment.…The
termsoftherespondent’sapplication(“restaurantservices,take-out
services,cateringandbanquetservices”)werereferredtobyboththe
Boardandtheapplicationsjudge,andreadingtheirrespective
reasonsasawhole,Idonotthinktheymisapprehendedthequestion
beforethem.53[emphasisadded.]
Theabovepassageappearstobearestatement(albeitwithoutreferencetoany
exclusivity)oftheoftenquotedcommentsofThurlowC.J.oftheFederalCourtof
Appealinthe1987Mr.SubmarineLtd.v.AmandistaInvestmentsLtd.
54case
regardingaregisteredtrade-markowner’swideentitlementtotheuseofitsmark:
Beforeaddressingtheseconsiderationsitshouldbenotedthatthe
appellant’srighttotheexclusiveuseof“Mr.Submarine”isnot
confinedtothosepartsofCanadainwhichtheappellantandits
licenseeshavecarriedonbusinessbutextendsthroughoutCanada.
Theappellantisthusentitledtoitsexclusiveuseinanyadditional
outletsforitssandwichesthatitmayseefittoestablish.Noristhe
appellant’sexclusiverightconfinedtothesaleofsandwichesbythe
methodsitnowemploysorhasemployedinthepast.Nothing
restrictstheappellantfromchangingthecolourofitssignsorthe
styleofletteringof“Mr.Submarine”orfromengaginginatelephone
anddeliverysystemsuchasthatfollowedbytherespondentorany
othersuitablesystemforthesaleofitssandwiches.Wereittomake
anyofthesechangesitsexclusiverighttotheuseof“Mr.Submarine”
wouldapplyjustasitappliestoitsuseintheappellant’sbusinessas
presentlycarriedon.
55

52Ibid.53Supra,note1,atpara.53.54Mr.SubmarineLtd.v.AmandistaInvestmentsLtd.,[1988]3F.C.91(F.C.A.).55Ibid,atp.102.

17
BothinVeuveClicquotPonsardinandinMattel,theSupremeCourtseemedto
endorsetheviewthatregistrationunders.19oftheActisnotonlyaswordwhichcan
beusedagainstthirdpartiesbutalsoashieldwhichenablesaregisteredtrade-mark
ownertocarryoutitsactivitiesinassociationwiththewaresand/orservicesspecified
intheregistration,unlessthelatterisshowntobeinvalid.Atpara.16ofhisreasons
inVeuveClicquotPonsardin,BinnieJ.wrotethatregistrationofMademoiselle
CharmanteInc.’smarkswasnotacompleteanswertoplaintiff’sclaimasthevalidity
ofthoseregisteredmarkswaschallenged.
56Thiswouldappeartomeanthatif
plaintiffisunabletoobtaintheexpungementofdefendants’marks(aswasthecase
here),itsclaimforinjunctivereliefunders.22wouldfailbecausethispreliminary
hurdlewasnotovercomesincetheregistrationremainedvalid.
However,thisgeneralprincipleshouldslightlybenuanced,ashintedabove.Although
registrationentitlesitsownertotheuseofthetrade-marksoregistered,themanner
inwhichsuchuseiscarriedoutmaybesanctionedbyotherprovisionsoftheActor
byanotherstatuteifthecircumstancesinwhichtheuseiscarriedoutviolatethese
otherprovisionsorthirdpartyrights(albeitinspecificcircumstances,detailed
hereafter).ThisisclearlywhatLinden,J.hadinmindwhenheofferedthefollowing
wordsofcautiontothesuccessfulpartyinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.United
ArtistsCorp.:
57
[55]However,theappellantshouldkeepinmindthattheTrade-
marksActcanbeatoughtask-master.Havingobtainedthe
registrationofitstrade-mark,itmustusethatmarkasindicatedinits
application.Anydeviationfromthisproposedusemayjeopardizeits
rights.Linkingthewordstoamovietheme,todrawingsormusic,or
eventoHollywoodingeneralmayprovokeinfringementor
expungementproceedings.InRegistrarofTradeMarksv.
CompagnieInternationalepourl©InformatiqueCIIHoneywellBullthe
usebytherespondentof”CIIHoneywellBull”washeldnotto
constituteuseforthemark”Bull”,andthemarkwasexpungedfrom
theregister.Aswell,theappellantshouldnotignoretheexistenceof
theothertrade-marksregisteredbytherespondentinvolvingthe
cartoondrawingswhichmaycomeintoplaywhenitdevelopsits
marketingstrategyforthebeautyproducts.Inotherwords,victoryin
this
case,doesnotgivetheappellantcarteblanchetoexploitallof
thetrade-marksoftherespondentinsellingallproductsinanywayit
chooses.ItisstillsubjecttorestrictionsoftheTrade-marksActand
thecommonlaw.
58
AspointedoutbyLindenJ.,registrationobviouslycannotbearesponsetoas.45
expungementproceedingasthelatterhasbeenenactedtoverifytheusebehindthe

56Supra,note2,atpara.16.57Supra,note5.58Ibid.,atpara.55-endnoteomitted.

18
registration;moreimportantly,mannerofusewhichcreateslikelihoodofconfusion–
suchas,torestatetheexamplegivenbyLindenJ.,linkingthemarkregisteredby
PinkPantherBeautyCorp.tothethemesongforPINKPANTHERmovies–cannot
bebeyondacourt’sreachbecauseofs.19.Moreaccurately,however,itcanbe
statedthatrightsunders.19arenotatissueinthistypeofscenario;rather,itisa
registrant’sabuseofcircumstancesnotcontemplatedbytherightsconferredby
registrationthatwouldentitleacourttointerveneagainstsuchabuse,notagainstthe
specificrightsconferredbyregistration.Inotherwords,shouldthecircumstancesnot
contemplatedbytherightsconferredbyregistrationcease,followingacourtorderor
otherwise,aregistrantwouldstillbeentitledtouseitsregisteredtrade-markin
associationwiththewaresand/orservicesspecifiedintheregistration.Insome
cases,thiscouldoccurfurthertoaclaimunders.22ifwhatisbeingcontestedisa
mannerofuse(referredtoins.22)andnotuseperse.
ItisworthnotingthatinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,thetrialjudgerejectedallof
plaintiff’sclaimswithoutraisingtheissuewhetherexpungementwasaprerequisite
foraclaimforinjunctiverelief.Infact,thetrialjudgerejectedplaintiff’sclaimfor
expungementaftersherejecteditsclaimsforaninjunction.However,asallclaims
wererejected,sheprobablyconsideredthatthisissueneednotbedecided.In
dismissingplaintiff’sappeal,theFederalCourtofAppealadoptedthesame
approach.
WhileBinnieJ.affirmedthelowercourts’dismissalofplaintiff’sclaims,italsorejected
defendants’positionthatMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’s1997registrationofits
trade-markswasacompleteanswertoplaintiff’sclaimbecause,here,thevalidityof
thoseregistrationswaschallengedbyplaintiffinitsquesttoobtainaninjunction;he
alsoprovidedaninterestingcharacterizationofatrade-markregistrationasa“shield”
duringitslifetime:
16Therespondentssaythatthe1997registrationoftheirtrade-
markCliquotandCliquot«Unmondeàpart»isacompleteanswer
totheappellant’sclaim.Idonotagree.Theappellanthasputthe
validityoftheregistrationsinissueandseeksexpungement.Were
theappellanttosucceedinobtainingexpungement,nodoubtthe
respondentscouldarguethattheyoughtnottobeliabletopay
compensationattributabletotheperiodduringwhichtheirown
registrationswereineffect.However,astheappellanthasnot
succeededonthisappeal,thescopeofcompensationisnotanissue
thatarisesfordeterminationinthiscase.59

TheSupremeCourt’sfindingthatregistrationcannotbeacompleteanswertoa
plaintiff’sclaimwhenthevalidityoftheregistrationisputinissueseemstobean
endorsementofthepositionexpressedin2002bytheOntarioCourtofAppealin

59Supra,note2,atpara.16.

19
MolsonCanadav.OlandBreweriesLtd.60whereitwasheldthattheownerofa
registeredtrade-markhastheexclusiverighttoitsusethroughoutCanadauntilsuch
timeasthemarkisshowntobeinvalid.61Thus,ifacompetitortakesexceptiontothat
use,itssolerecourseistoattackthevalidityoftheregistration,62whichwasdone
here(albeitunsuccessfully)byplaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardin.

Ofcourse,therightsconferredbyregistrationunders.19protectanowner’s
exclusiverighttousethetrade-markasregistered.DifferentpanelsoftheFederal
CourtofAppeal,forexample,inMr.SubmarineLtd.v.AmandistaInvestmentsLtd.63
andmorerecentlyinTraditionFineFoodsLtd.v.TheOshawaGroupLimited64have
emphasizedthepoint.Inthe2005TraditionFineFoodscase,MaloneJ.wrote:“A
breachofsection19onlyoccurswhentheallegedinfringerusestheidenticaltrade-
markfortheidenticalwaresorservicesasregistered.”65Thus,theuseofatrade-
markinaformwhichdeviatesfromitsregistrationwouldnotputitsownerbeyonda
claimforinjunctivereliefasHugessenJ.oftheFederalCourtdecidedin2003in
Jonathan,BoutiquePourHommesInc.v.Jay-GurInternationalInc.66whenhe
dismisseddefendant’smotionforsummaryjudgmentinacasewhereplaintiffwas
challengingdefendant’sspecificuseofatrade-markinaformwhichdifferedfromthe
onecoveredbydefendant’sdesignregistration.Equally,anowner’suseofits
registeredtrade-markandunregisteredtradedressdoesnotprotectitagainst
injunctiverelieftostoptheuseofitsunregisteredtradedresswhichisnotprotected
bys.19asGasconJ.oftheQuebecSuperiorCourtdeterminedin2003inAgropur
Cooperativev.SaputoInc.67

Additionally,inthespecificcontextofaninterlocutoryinjunction,ithasbeenheldthat
theActshouldnotbereadaspreventingtheFederalCourtfromenjoiningtheuseof
aregisteredtrade-markwhenthevalidityofthemarkisunderattack68andthatissue
hasyettobeadjudicated.Althoughhestatedhewasnotdefinitelydecidingthe
issue,O’ReillyJ.oftheFederalCourtconcludedin2005inAdvantageCar&Truck
Rentalsv.1611864OntarioInc.69thattoholdthatregisteredtrade-markownersare
immunefrominjunctionbecausetheActprotectstheirrightsuntilthemarkhasbeen
definitelydeclaredinvalidconstrictstheCourt’spowertoissueinjunctionstoogreatly
andbroadenstheprotectionprovidedbytheActtoofar.Whenconsideringwhether

60MolsonCanadav.OlandBreweriesLtd.(2002),19C.P.R.(4th)201(Ont.C.A.).61Ibid.,atpara.12.62Ibid.,atpara.16.63Supra,note54,atp.98.64TraditionFineFoodsLtd.v.TheOshawaGroupLimited(2005),44C.P.R.(4th)81(F.C.A.)
[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadadismissedonMarch23,2006infile
31261].
65Ibid.,p.86.66Jonathan,BoutiquePourHommesInc.v.Jay-GurInternationalInc.(2003),23C.P.R.(4th)492
(F.C.T.D.).
67AgropurCooperativev.SaputoInc.(2003),32C.P.R.(4th)157(Que.S.C.).68AdvantageCar&TruckRentalsv.1611864OntarioInc.(2005),39C.P.R.(4th)135(F.C.).69Ibid.,atpara.9.

20
tograntaninterlocutoryinjunction,itisworthrememberingthatcourtswillusuallybe
reluctanttomakeanyfindingastothevalidityofanycontestedregistration.70

AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdidnotspecificallystatethatexpungementmustbe
obtainedifaninjunctionistoissueagainsttheownerofsuchregisteredtrade-markto
stoptheusepermittedbyregistration,thisconclusionappearsirresistible.Indeed,a
challengetothevalidityofaregistration,whichisdismissed,wouldnotleadtoan
injunctionbeingissuedagainsttheowneroftheregistrationtostoptheusepermitted
byregistration,ifsuchownerretainsitsexclusiverightsgrantedbys.19foravalid
registrationandisstillentitledtouseitsmark(barring,ofcourse,anycircumstances
ofusenotcontemplatedbythemarkspecificallyregisteredorbythewaresand/or
servicesoutlinedintheregistration(i.e.ifthedefendantisusingadifferentmarkor
differentwaresand/orservicesthanspecifiedintheregistrationorcarryingoutany
activitynotcontemplatedbyregistration)).Moreover,registrationdoesnotdispensea
registrantfromrespectingotherstatutes.Finally,ifwhatisbeingcontestedisa
manneroftrade-markuse(andnotuseperse),aninjunctioncouldissuetostoponly
suchmannerofuse;s.22doesrefertoamannerofuseandcouldformthebasisfor
aninjunctiontostopsuchmannerofusewithoutaffectingtherighttousea
registeredmark.InVeuveClicquotPonsardin,thiswasnotthecaseasplaintiff’s
claimwastoendallusesoftheCLIQUOTmarks.

Oneotherinterestingaspectconcerningtherightsconferredbyregistrationand
mentionedasanobiterbyBinnieJ.inpara.16ofhisreasonsinVeuveClicquot
Ponsardinishisallusiontothefactthataregistration,duringitslifetime,would
protectaregistrantfromanymonetaryclaimfortheperiodduringwhichthe
registrationwasineffect.Ontheotherhand,itcouldbearguedthatifatrade-mark
registrationisinvalid,thens.19givesitsownernoprotectiononcethisinvalidityhas
beendeclaredsinceprotectionappliesonlytoregistrationoftrade-marks“unless
showntobeinvalid”,not“until”showntobeinvalid.71Thelatterviewwasadoptedby
JackettJ.in1968inGattusov.GattusoCorporationLimited72wherehewroteina
footnote:
Bywrittennotesfiledsincethesereasonswereprepared,counselfor
theplaintiffsarguesthattherecanbenoclaimundersection7(b)as
longastheregisteredtrademarkisregisteredintheindividual
plaintiff’sname.Thisargumentseemstobebasedonaviewof
section19thatitconfersanexclusiverightontheownerofthe
registeredmarkuntiltheCourtdeliversajudgmentdeclaringit
invalid.Itseemsclearthatthisviewisfallacious.Whatsection19
saysisthattheregistrationofatrademarkgivestheexclusiveright

70SeeforexampleSyntexInc.v.NovopharmLtd.(1991),36C.P.R.(3d)129(F.C.A.)atp.138
[applicationforleavetoappealtotheSupremeCourtofCanadadismissedonDecember12,1991in
file22588];DoleFoodCo.v.NabiscoLtd.(2000),8C.P.R.(4th)367(F.C.T.D.).
71ThispointwasarguedinPVRCo.Ltd.v.Decosol(Canada)Ltd.(1972),10C.P.R.(2d)203
(F.C.T.D.)atpp.212-213.
72Gattusov.GattusoCorporationLimited,[1968]2Ex.C.R.609.

21
ofusertotheowner“unlessshowntobeinvalid”.Iftheregistrationis
“invalid”,it,ofcourse,confersnorights.73

Inthe1972caseofPVRCo.Ltd.v.Decosol(Canada)Ltd.,74WalshJ.oftheFederal
Courtconsidered(butdidnotdecide)theissueofthepossibleretroactiveeffectofan
orderexpungingaregistrationandtherelatedissueofthestartingpointintimefor
thedeterminationofdamages:
Inparticularthereisasubstantialissuefordeterminationonthe
meritsinthisCourtastowhetherthemarkDECOSOLREGD,the
propertyofdefendantinthepresent[p]roceedings,shouldorshould
notbeexpungedfromtheregisteroftrademarks.Ifitissoexpunged
followingfinaljudgmentonthemeritsitwillremaintobedetermined
whetherplaintiffPVRisentitledtodamagesoranaccountingfor
profits
(a)
f
romthetimedefendantDecosolfirstcommencedsellingthis
productunderthemarkDECOSOLREGD;
(b)
f
romthetimeDecosolwasformallywarnedtodesistfromusing
themarkDECOSOLREGDbyletterofPVR’sattorneydated
April14,1971;
(c)
f
romthedateofinstitutionofthepresentproceedingson
October29,1971;or
(d)

onlyfromthedateoffinaljudgmentexpungingthetrademark
DECOSOLREGD.75

BinnieJ.’scommentsinpara.16ofhisreasonsdonotappeartomakeanydistinction
betweenthevariousgroundsofexpungementandtheirpossibleaffectonany
protectionaregistrantmightclaimduringthelifetimeoftheregistration.Forexample,
itcouldbearguedthatanexpungedtrade-markwhichshouldneverhavebeen
registeredinthefirstplace(forexample,ifitwasnotregistrableatthedateof
registrationunderpara.18(1)(a))andavalidlyregisteredtrade-markwhichbecomes
invalidmanyyearsafteritsregistration(forexample,forlackofdistinctivenessunder
para.18(1)(b))mighteachrequireadifferenttreatmentwhenconsideringtheissueof
protectionduringthelifetimeoftheregistration.AsplaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardin

73Ibid.,atp.618.74PVRCo.Ltd.v.Decosol(Canada)Ltd.(1972),10C.P.R.(2d)203(F.C.T.D.).75Ibid.,atp.210.

22
hadallegedthatdefendantMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sregistrationsshouldnot
havebeenregisteredatthedateofregistrationandshouldnolongerbemaintained
ontheregisteratalaterdate,BinnieJ.’scommentsseemtobeanendorsementof
thepositionwhichconsidersregistrationasashieldduringitslifetime,whateverthe
groundsforsuccessfulexpungement.

BinnieJ.’sobiterregardingcompensationwasreferredtobytheFederalCourtof
Appealinits2007decisioninRemoImportsLtd.v.JaguarCarsLtd.76Ineffect,this
obiterprovidedashieldforanappellant(whoseOctober30,1981JAGUAR
registrationforbagswasexpungedonJanuary16,2006onthebasisof“likelihoodof
confusionatthetimeoftheproceedingsin1991”77)againstaclaimfordamages
broughtbytherespondentcarmanufacturerfortheusecarriedoutbytheappellant
duringtheperiodprotectedbyregistration(1981–2006).OnbehalfoftheCourt,
LétourneauJ.wroteinhisreasons:
[110]Inthecaseatbar,theappellanthadavalidregistrationuntil
foundinvalidandexpungedbytheJudgein2006.Therewereno
misrepresentationsmadebytheappellantatthetimeofregistration.
ThereisnofindingbytheJudgethattheappellantwasactinginbad
faithatthattimealthoughnosatisfactoryexplanationwasgivenasto
whytheappellantchangedthenames“BeauSac”and“Sacsibo”of
itsbagsandmovedtoregisteritstrade-mark“Jaguar”in1981.The
Judgeconcludedthattherewasevidenceoflikelihoodofconfusionat
thetimeoftheproceedingsin1991andthatthislikelihoodof
confusionwouldremainiftheappellant’strade-markwereallowedto
stayontheregistry.Ithinkthat,inthecircumstances,theappellantis
entitledtothebenefitofsection19oftheAct…
[111]Thecaselawstandsfortheproposition“thattheuseofa
registeredtrade-markisanabsolutedefencetoanactioninpassing
off”wherethereisnosignificantdifferencebetweenthemarkas
registeredandthemarkasused:seeJonathan,BoutiquesPour
HommesInc.v.Jay-GurInternationalInc.(2003),23C.P.R.(4th)492
(F.C.T.D.),atparagraphs4and6.

[112]AsimilarconclusionwasreachedbytheBritishColumbia
CourtofAppealinChemicalsInc.andOverseasCommoditiesLtd.v.
Shanahan’sLtd.(1951),15C.P.R.1,atpage13andbytheOntario
CourtofAppealinMolsonCanadav.OlandBreweriesLtd.(2002),9
O.R.(3d)607…

[113]Thislegalconclusionalsofindssupportinthefollowingobiter
fromBinnieJ.,atparagraph16ofhisreasonsforjudgmentinthe
VeuveClicquotPonsardincase:

76Supra,note41.77Ibid.,atpara.110.

23
Therespondentssaythatthe1997registrationoftheir
trade-markCliquotandCliquot“UnMondeàpart”isacomplete
answertotheappellant’sclaim.Idonotagree.Theappellant
hasputthevalidityoftheregistrationsinissueandseeks
expungement.Weretheappellanttosucceedinobtaining
expungement,nodoubttherespondentscouldarguethatthey
oughtnottobeliabletopaycompensationattributabletothe
periodduringwhichtheirownregistrationswereineffect.
However,astheappellanthasnotsucceededonthisappeal,
thescopeofcompensationisnotanissuethatarisesfor
determinationinthiscase.[Emphasisadded.]

[114]Inmyrespectfulview,therespondentsareentitledtodamages
orprofitsforinfringement,butonlyasofJanuary16,2006whichis
thedateofthejudgmentoftheJudge.78

Despiteafindingbythetrialjudgeof“likelihoodofconfusionatthetimeofthe
proceedingsin1991”,aparty’sregistrationwasabletodefeataclaimfordamages
forthetimeitwasinforce,i.e.October30,1981-January16,2006.Inthatcase,
registrationwasconsideredashieldduringitswholelifetime,irrespectiveofthe
groundsraisedforexpungement(andtherelevantdatesassociatedtherewith);
however,LétourneauJ.appearstohaveconsideredthattheappellant’sgoodfaith
wasrelevanttothisquestion,acircumstancenotmentionedbyBinnieJ.inparagraph
16ofhisreasons;infact,inVeuveClicquotPonsardin,althoughthetrialjudgedid
notcommentonthedefendant’sintent,shemadeafindingthattheadvertisement
thatinspiredthedefendant’schoiceforitsCLIQUOTmarkcouldnothavebeenany
otherthantheChampagnehouse’s.79Yet,BinnieJ.didnotmentioninhisobiterat
paragraph16ofhisreasonsanyqualifyingstatementwhenconsideringadefendant’s
actions.Despitethetrialjudge’sfinding,theCLIQUOTstorescouldstillhaveargued
thattheyoughtnottobeliabletopaycompensationattributabletotheperiodduring
whichtheirownregistrationswereineffect,shouldVeuveClicquotPonsardinhave
succeededinobtainingtheirexpungement.

4.0PLAINTIFF’SCLAIMFORLIKELIHOODOFDEPRECIATION

DespitethefactthatVeuveClicquotPonsardinwasunsuccessfulinestablishing
likelihoodofconfusionanditsrelatedclaimforexpungement–leavingMademoiselle
CharmanteInc.withvalidregistrationswhichentitleddefendantstousethe
CLIQUOTmarksinassociationwithwomen’sretailclothingstores–plaintiff’sclaim
forlikelihoodofdepreciationunders.22wasthoroughlyanalyzedbytheSupreme
Court.

78Ibid.,atparas.110,111,112,113and114.79Supra,note2,atparas.7and10;seealsosupranote8,atparas.37and43.

24

4.1Section22asaremedyagainstdilution
Section22readsinpart:
22.(1)Nopersonshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanother
personinamannerthatislikelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthe
valueofthegoodwillattachingthereto.

Section22hasbeenineffectsincethecomingintoforceofthecurrentActonJuly1,
1954.Overtheyears,ithasattractedmuchlessjudicialattentionthanitssoughtafter
richcousin,likelihoodofconfusion.In1968,ThurlowJ.oftheExchequerCourtmade
commentstothateffectinClairolInternationalCorporationv.ThomasSupply&
EquipmentCo.Ltd.80Inthedecadessince1968,thislackofprecedentsregardings.
22hasnotchangedmuch,afactwhichBinnieJ.tookcaretonoteinpara.46ofhis
reasons.81

InClairol,ThurlowJ.wroteaboutthescopeofapplicationofs.22inthefollowing
terms:
Section22isanewsectioninthe1952-53statuteandthusfar,sofar
asIamaware,therehavebeennodecidedcasesinwhichithas
beenapplied.NoramIawareofanysimilarprovisionshavingbeen
enactedinanyothercountry.TherewouldbeIthinknodifficultyin
concludingthatthesectionwouldfindapplicationincasesoftheuse
ofawellknowntrademarkbysomeoneotherthanitsregistered
ownerbutinanon-competingfieldoftradeorinassociationwith
waresorservicesinrespectofwhichitisnotregistered.Itmaybe
observedofthistypeofcasethattheuseofthetrademarkmight,
thoughitwouldnotnecessarily,bedeceptive.Deception,however,is
notthetestprescribedbysection22,ratherthetestisthelikelihood
ofdepreciatingthevalueofthegoodwillattachingtothetrademark,
aresultwhichwouldnotnecessarilyflowfromdeceptionandwhich
mightresultwithoutdeceptionbeingpresent.
…
Thenwhatismeantby“depreciatethevalue”ofsuchgoodwill.Tomy
mindthismeanssimplytoreduceinsomewaytheadvantageofthe
reputationandconnectiontowhichIhavejustreferred,totakeaway
thewholeorsomeportionofthecustomotherwisetobeexpected
andtomakeitlessextensiveandthuslessadvantageous.AsIseeit
goodwillhasvalueonlytotheextentoftheadvantageofthe
reputationandconnectionwhichitsownerenjoysandwhatever
reducesthatadvantagereducesthevalueofit.Depreciationofthat

80ClairolInternationalCorporationv.ThomasSupply&EquipmentCo.Ltd.,[1968]2Ex.C.R.552.81Supra,note2,atpara.46.

25
valueinmyopinionoccurswhetheritarisesthroughreductionofthe
esteeminwhichthemarkitselfisheldorthroughthedirect
persuasionandenticingofcustomerswhocouldotherwisebe
expectedtobuyorcontinuetobuygoodsbearingthetrademark.It
doesnot,however,asIseeit,arise,assubmittedbyMr.Henderson,
fromdangeroflossofexclusiverightsasaresultofusebyothersas
thisinmyviewrepresentspossiblelossofexclusiverightsinthe
trademarkitselfratherthanreductionofthegoodwillattachingtoit.82

AccordingtoThurlowJ.,confusionisnotrelevantwhenexaminingaclaimunders.
22.BinnieJ.inVeuveClicquotPonsardinagreedandwrotethatnothingins.22
requiresademonstrationthatuseofbothmarksinthesamegeographicareawould
likelyleadtoconfusion.83Onthisissue,BinnieJ.seemedtodisagreewiththetrial
judgewhohadwrittenthatalthoughconfusionisnotthetestlaiddownins.22itis
stillnecessaryfortheretobeanassociationbetweenthetwomarks.84Thissubjectof
“association”betweenthemarks–animportantaspectofaclaimunders.22–was
dealtwithbyBinnieJ.whoofferedadifferentcharacterizationoftheissue,aswewill
seelater.

In1968,ThurlowJ.rejectedtheviewthatdepreciationarisesfromthedangerofloss
ofexclusiverightsasaresultofusebyothers.TheSupremeCourtappearedtohave
takenadifferentapproachbyreferringtolearnedauthorswhohadwritten
contemporaneouslytothecominginforceoftheActandhighlightedthefactthat
depreciationcanariseincircumstancesofdilutionofthedistinctivenessorunique
characterofthetrade-mark:
39Thes.22remedywasintroducedbythe1953amendmentsto
theTrade-marksAct,andwasbasedontheReportofTrade-mark
LawRevisionCommitteetotheSecretaryofStateofCanada(1953),
chairedbyDr.HaroldG.Fox.Amemberofthatcommittee,
ChristopherRobinson,Q.C.,aleadingintellectualproperty
practitioner,wrotebywayofexplanation:
ThetrademarkKODAKwouldbelikelytobeconsiderablyless
valuabletoitsownerifitwereusedbyothersinconnectionwith
awidevarietyofotherwareseveniftheseweresounrelatedto
photographicequipmentthatnobodywouldthinkthatthey
originatedwiththetrademarkowner.
(C.Robinson,“TheCanadianTradeMarksActof1954–A
ReviewofSomeofItsFeatures”(1959),32C.P.R.45,atp.61)

40Dr.Foxhimselfcommentedonthenewdepreciationremedyin
the1956editionofhistextTheCanadianLawofTradeMarksand

82Supra,note80,atpp.569and573.83Supra,note2,atpara.38.84Supra,note8,atpara.94.

26
UnfairCompetition,(2nded.1956),Vol.1,notingthats.22
addressed
…thedepreciationofthevalueofthegoodwillattachingtothe
trademarkor,expressedindifferentterms,thedilutionofthe
distinctivenessoruniquecharacterofthetrademark.Thisis
quitedifferentfromtheorthodoxtypeofinfringement…
[p.507]
…Whereawellknowntrademarkistakenbyanotherforuse
inassociationwithwares….inthecourseoftime,andwith
repeateduse,thetrademarkdiminishesinvaluejustasit
diminishesindistinctiveness.[Emphasisadded;p.508.]85

AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,depreciationcanoccurinatleasttwosituations,
firstlybyloweringthevalueofthetrade-mark’sgoodwill,acircumstancewhich
ThurlowJ.hadalludedtoin1968bywriting“thismeanssimplytoreduceinsome
waytheadvantageofthereputation…”;86depreciationalsocanoccurwhenthe
distinctivenessoruniquenessofthemarkisattacked,acircumstanceThurlowJ.did
notacceptinClairol.BothsituationswerehighlightedbyBinnieJ.whenheanalyzed
themeaningoftheword“depreciate”:
63Theword“depreciate”isusedinitsordinarydictionarymeaning
of“lowerthevalueof”aswellasto“disparage,belittle,underrate”:
TheNewShorterOxfordEnglishDictionary(5thed.2002),atp.
647.Inotherwords,disparagementisapossiblesourceof
depreciation,butthevaluecanbeloweredinotherways,asbythe
lesserdistinctivenessthatresultswhenamarkisbandiedaboutby
differentusers.Althoughtheappellantmakesmuchofthelicencing
provisionsintheAct,thefactisthatatrade-markownercan
depreciateitsvaluebyspreadingthemarktoothinlyovertoomany
productsofdifferingquality.MadameAbitbolgavetheexampleof
PierreCardinwhichshesaidhadmoveddownmarketthrough
overuseoflicencingandexpandingtherangeandvarietyofdifferent
productscarryingitsname,whichhadledtoalossofdistinctiveness,
prestigeandcredibility.87

However,theSupremeCourtcautionedthatthesecircumstancesofapplicationofs.
22werenotexhaustiveandcourtsinCanadahadyettoexplorethelimitsofthis
provision.88

4.2Defendant’smarkmustbe«sufficientlysimilar»

85Supra,note2,atparas.39and40.86Supra,note80,atp.573.87Supra,note2,atpara.63.88Ibid.,atpara.67.

27
Initslikelihoodofdepreciationclaim,plaintiffreliedonitsmostrelevantregistered
trade-marki.e.VEUVECLICQUOTtoattackdefendants’useofthetrade-marks
CLIQUOTandCLIQUOT“UNMONDEÀPART”.Overthedecadessinceits
introductiononJuly1,1954,therehadbeenmuchdebateastowhethers.22
requiredthatadefendantuseatrade-markidenticaltotheoneregisteredbya
plaintiffinorderforittofindapplication.Forexample,in1986,inLesRôtisseries
Saint-HubertLtéev.LeSyndicatdestravailleurs(euses)delaRôtisserieSaint-Hubert
deDrummondville(C.S.N.),
89LesykJ.oftheQuebecSuperiorCourtconsideredthat
adefendantmustuseatrade-markidenticaltotheoneregisteredbyaplaintifffors.
22toapply,whilein1997,inCompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-
Michelin&Ciev.NationalAutomobile,Aerospace,TransportationandGeneral
WorkersUnionofCanada(CAW-Canada),
90TeitlebaumJ.oftheFederalCourtheld
thataninfringerdidnothavetouseatrade-markidenticaltotheregisteredmarkto
likelycausedepreciationofitsgoodwill.TheSupremeCourthasnowsettledthe
issueandindicatedthatdefendant’strade-markneednotbeidenticaltoaplaintiff’s
registeredmarkbutatleast“sufficientlysimilar”.
91
BinnieJ.affirmedthetrialjudge’sfindingsthatplaintiff’ss.22claimhadnotbeen
madeout.Theplaintiffpresentedevidencethat“CLICQUOT”wasthemostdistinctive
partoftheVEUVECLICQUOTmarkandthiswasrecognizedbythetrialjudge,who
heldhoweverthataconsumerwhosawtheword“CLIQUOT”usedindefendants’
storeswouldnotmakeanylinkorconnectionwithplaintiff’smark.
92Withthelatter
finding,theSupremeCourtconcludedthatVEUVECLICQUOTwasnotsufficiently
similartoCLIQUOTinthataconsumerbeingacquaintedwithdefendants’mark
wouldnotrecognizeplaintiff’sregisteredmark;therefore,defendantswerenot

89LesRôtisseriesSaint-HubertLtéev.LeSyndicatdestravailleurs(euses)delaRôtisserieSaint-
HubertdeDrummondville(C.S.N.),[1987]R.J.Q.443(S.C.,Montreal)[appeallaunchedbeforethe
QuebecCourtofAppealinfile500-09-000068-874onJanuary19,1987;discontinuancefiledon
February20,1987].
90CompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.NationalAutomobile,
Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionofCanada(CAW-Canada),[1997]2F.C.306
(F.C.T.D.)[appeallaunchedbeforetheFederalCourtofAppealinfileA-38-97onJanuary17,1997;
discontinuancefiledonNovember12,1997].
91Supra,note2,atpara.38.92Supra,note8,atpara.96.Itisworthnotingthatthetrialjudgemadethesecommentsafterwriting
thatconfusionwasanelementofas.22claim.Shewroteatparas.94and96:
[94]…Althoughconfusionisnotthetestlaiddownins.22,Iconsiderthatitisstillnecessaryfor
theretobeanassociationbetweenthetwomarks.Inotherwords,aconsumerhastobeabletomake
aconnectionbetweenthepartiesinorderfortheretobedepreciationofthegoodwillattachingtothe
trademark.
…
[96]Inthecaseatbartheevidencewasthattheplaintiffssolepurposewasthesaleof
champagne,andthatitwasnotinterestedingettingintootherareas.Inmyviewaconsumerwhosaw
theword”Cliquot”usedinthedefendantsstoreswouldnotmakeanylinkorconnectiontotheplaintiff.
Consequently,therewillbenoassociationbetweenthe”Clicquot”luxurymarkandthedefendants
“non-luxury”wares.

28
makinguseofplaintiff’sregisteredmarki.e.VEUVECLICQUOT.Inotherwords,the
mentalassociationbetweenthenewcomer’smarkandtheoneregisteredbythe
senioruserwasmissinginthiscase.
93However,theSupremeCourtinsistedthatthis
findingconcerningthe“link”or“association”betweentheparties’marksmustbe
madewithoutanyreferencetotheparties’areasoftrade,whichisnotarelevant
considerationinas.22claim.
94Thelatterpointisimportantasthetrialjudgehad
madereferenceto“confusion”whenanalyzings.22,aviewnotsharedbythe
SupremeCourt.
Theconceptof“sufficientlysimilar”appearstobemuchnarrowerinscopethanany
“degreeofresemblance”analysisbetweentrade-markswhenconsideringlikelihood
ofconfusion;here,thetrialjudgewroteontheissueoflikelihoodofconfusionthat
therewas“agreatdegreeofresemblance”
95betweenVEUVECLICQUOTand
CLIQUOT,afindingwhichBinnieJ.sharedwhenhewrotethatforconfusiontoexist,
itisnotnecessarythatthetrade-marksbeidentical,onlythatthe“sameidea”is
sufficientlyconveyedtothemindofthesomewhathurriedconsumertoinducea
mistakeininference.
96Yet,this“greatdegreeofresemblance”wasnotsufficientfor
VeuveClicquotPonsardin’ss.22claim.Whenapplyings.22,amuchstronger
degreeofresemblance(i.e.“sufficientlysimilar”)isrequired.
The“sufficientlysimilar”testisnotunliketheonedescribedbytheRegistrarin1984
inNightingaleInterlocLtd.v.ProdesignLtd.
97andoftenreferredtoins.45cases
whentheRegistrar,andonappeal,theFederalCourt,mustdecideinsummary
expungementproceedingsifatrade-markinuseisnotsubstantiallydifferentfromits
registeredform:
Aparticulartrademarkwillbeconsideredasbeingusedifthetrade
markactuallyusedisnotsubstantiallydifferentandthedeviationsare
notsuchastodeceiveorinjurethepublicinanyway…
98[emphasis
added.]

WhenBinnieJ.wrotethefollowingaboutahypotheticalCLICQUOTregistrationin
plaintiff’sname:“Ifthecasualobserverwouldrecognizethemarkusedbythe
respondentsasthemarkoftheappellant(aswouldbethecaseifKleenexwere
spelledKlenex),theuseofamisspelledCliquotwouldsuffice”,
99heusedthesame
typeofanalysisfoundindecisionsconcernings.45proceedingswheretheRegistrar
ortheFederalCourt,onappeal,mustdecideifmembersofthepublicwould
recognizethemarkinuseasthemarkregistered,incircumstanceswherethe
registrantdoesnotuseamarkidenticaltotheoneprotectedbyregistration.For

93Supra,note2,atpara.49.94Ibid.,atpara.46.95Supra,note8,atpara.66.96Supra,note2,atpara.35.97NightingaleInterlocLtd.v.ProdesignLtd.(1984),2C.P.R.(3d)535(T.M.O.B.).98Ibid.,atp.538.99Supra,note2,atpara.48.

29
example,in2002,in88766CanadaInc.v.NationalCheeseCo.,100theRegistrar
describedthefollowingtest:“Theuseofatrade-markincombinationwithadditional
wordsorfeaturesconstitutesuseoftheregisteredmarkifthepublicasamatterof
firstimpression,wouldperceivethetrade-mark“perse”asbeingused.”
101
Tocompletethecomparisonwithsummaryexpungementproceedings,itisworth
notingthatBinnieJ.’sdescriptionofthetrialjudge’ss.22assessmentthata
consumerwhosawthewordCLIQUOTwouldnotmakeanylinkorconnectionto
VEUVECLICQUOTissimilartotheappreciationmadeunders.45whenthe
RegistrarortheFederalCourt,onappeal,mustdecideifaregisteredtrade-markis
usedinamannerwhichmaintainsconsumerrecognizability.Forexample,inthe
1985caseofRegistrarofTradeMarksv.CompagnieInternationalepour
l’InformatiqueCIIHoneywellBull,SociétéAnonyme,
102PratteJ.oftheFederalCourt
ofAppealwroteabouttheregisteredownerofthetrade-markBULLwho,ins.45
proceedings,hadpresentedproofofuseofthecompositemarkCIIHONEYWELL
BULL:
Therealandonlyquestioniswhether,byidentifyingitsgoodsasit
did,CIImadeuseofitstrademark“Bull”.Thatquestionmustbe
answeredinthenegativeunlessthemarkwasusedinsuchaway
thatthemarkdidnotloseitsidentityandremainedrecognizablein
spiteofthedifferencesbetweentheforminwhichitwasregistered
andtheforminwhichitwasused.
103[emphasisadded.]
Ins.45expungementproceedings,thequestionwhethertheuseofatrade-markin
combinationwithadditionalwordsordifferentfeaturesconstitutesuseofaregistered
markisaquestionoffact.Whetheracasualobserverwouldrecognizeamarkused
bythedefendantasthemarkoftheplaintiffinas.22claimcanalsobedescribedas
aquestionoffact.Bothtestsarebasedonconsumerrecognitionofatrade-markina
specificform;ifsmallvariationsarepossibleunderbothtests,thetrade-markinuse
(thetrade-markactuallyusedins.45proceedings;thetrade-markusedbythe
defendantinas.22claim)mustbeperceivedastheregisteredmark(theowner’s
registeredtrade-markinas.45proceeding;theplaintiff’sregisteredmarkinas.22
claim),asbothprovisionsareconcernedwithconsumerrecognizability.However,as
willbeseen,thisisonlypartofas.22analysis.
4.3Afourparttest

10088766CanadaInc.v.NationalCheeseCo.(2002),24C.P.R.(4th)410(SeniorTrade-marks
HearingOfficer).
101Ibid.,atp.414.102RegistrarofTradeMarksv.CompagnieInternationalepourl’InformatiqueCIIHoneywellBull,
SociétéAnonyme,[1985]1F.C.406(F.C.A.).
103Ibid.,atpp.408-409.

30
InitsreasonsinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtoutlinedthefour
elementsthatmustbeestablishedifas.22claimistobeallowed.104In2007,the
FederalCourtofAppealdescribedthistestasa“stringent”one.105
1)
Aplaintiff’sregisteredtrade-markwasusedbyadefendantinconnection
withwaresorservices–whetherornotsuchwaresorservicesare
competitivewiththoseoftheplaintiff;
2)
Theplaintiff’sregisteredmarkissufficientlywell-knowntohavesignificant
goodwillattachedtoit–althoughitneednotbefamous;
3)
Theplaintiff’smarkwasusedinamannerlikelytohaveaneffectonthe
goodwill(i.e.linkagebyconsumersbetweentheplaintiff’sgoodwillanda
defendant’suse);
4)
Thelikelyeffectwouldbetodepreciatethevalueofthegoodwillattached
tothetrade-mark(i.e.damage).
4.3.1Useoftheplaintiff’sregisteredmark
Foritslikelihoodofdepreciationclaimunders.22tobeconsidered,aplaintiffmust
betheholderofaregisteredtrade-mark.Aswehavejustseen,themarkusedbya
defendantneednotbeidenticaltoplaintiff’sregisteredmark;however,itmustbe
sufficientlysimilarsothatthecasualobserverwouldrecognizethemarkusedbythe
defendantastheplaintiff’smark.Arequirementthatadefendantuseatrade-mark
identicaltoaplaintiff’smarkwoulddefeatthepurposeofs.22sinceitwouldbetoo
easyforadefendanttomodifyanonessentialfeatureofaregisteredtrade-markto
escapeas.22claim.
Additionally,foras.22claimtobeconsidered,plaintiffmustestablishthatdefendant
hasuseditstrade-markinaccordancewiths.4oftheAct.Onthisimportantissue
whichwasthesubjectofmuchdebateinClairolInternationalCorp.v.ThomasSupply
&EquipmentCo.Ltd.
106andeversince,107theSupremeCourtonlyreproducedthe
provisionsofss.4(1)and4(2)oftheAct.108

104Supra,note2,atpara.46.105Supra,note41,atpara97.106Supra,note80.107Forexample,inCompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.National
Automobile,Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionofCanada(CAW-Canada),supra,
note90,whereplaintiffsoughttorevisittheprinciplesofClairol;seealsoJ.A.Léger,“‘Article22’Loi

31
Infairness,therelevancyofanyrequirementof“use”(asdefinedins.4)aspartofa
s.22claimwasnotarguedbythepartiesinVeuveClicquotPonsardinasdefendants’
usewasclearly“use”unders.4and,inthisspecificinstance,nothingturnedonthis
issue.Thissaid,theSupremeCourt’srequirementofuse–asdefinedins.4–bya
defendantaspartofs.22claim,alongwiththeabsenceofanyrequirementthata
defendant’susemustbeuse“asatrade-mark”,seemstobeanendorsementofthe
positionadoptedin1968byThurlowJ.inClairol.InthemorerecentCompagnie
GénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciecase,TeitelbaumJ.offeredthe
followingbriefcharacterizationoftherequirementsofaclaimunders.22as
describedbyThurlowJ.inClairol.
[31]…InClairol,JusticeThurlowarrivedataslightlydifferent
characterizationoftheelementsofproofforuseundersection22.In
contrasttosection19,heheldatpages569-570thatsection22only
requiresproofof“useinassociationwithwaresorservices”underthe
specificsection4criteria.
RatherIthinktheverb“use”insection22istobeinterpretedby
referencetothedefinitionofthenoun“use”insection2(v)the
effectofwhichistoconfinetheapplication,andthereforethe
prohibition,ofsection22toausewhichanypersonmaymake,
inassociationwithgoodsorserviceswithinthemeaningofthe
subsectionsofsection4,ofanother’sregisteredtrademarkin
suchamannerastodepreciatethevalueofthegoodwill
attachingthereto.
Thereisnoneedundersection22toprovetheadditionalelementof
proofofuseofthemarkasatrade-markforthepurposeof
distinguishingwaresorservices.TheplaintiffsinClairolwere
successfulincitingsection22asagroundofinfringementforuseof
theirtrade-marksonthedefendants’packagessincesection22does
notrequireproofofuseofthetrade-marksastrade-marks
forthe
purposeofdistinguishinggoodsandservices.[emphasisinoriginal
text.]
109
Inshort,accordingtoThurlowJ.,inClairol,s.22onlyrequiresproofof“usein
associationwithwaresorservices”underthespecifics.4criteria;itdoesnotrequire
proofofuse,bythedefendant,ofthemark“asatrade-mark”forthepurposeof
distinguishingwaresorservices.ThurlowJ.’s1968positionregardingthe

surlesmarquesdecommerce;deClairolàIt’sNot:lemiroirauxalouettes”,(1987)4C.I.P.R.385;F.
Guay,“Pourenfiniravecl’affaireClairol:l’article22delaLoisurlesmarquesdecommerceprévient-il
lapublicitécomparative?”,(1998)11C.P.I.441.
108Supra,note2,atpara.47.109Supra,note90,atpara.31.

32
requirementsofs.22wasagainadoptedmorerecentlyin2005byBeaudryJ.ofthe
FederalCourtinTommyHilfigerLicensingInc.v.ProduitsdeQualitéI.M.D.Inc.:110
[126]Inordertoprovethedepreciationofthevalueofitsgoodwill,a
plaintiffneedstoshowthatthedefendantused,withinthemeaningof
useunders.4,theplaintiff’sregisteredtrade-mark.…Asstatedin
ClairolInternationalCorp.v.ThomasSupply&EquipmentCo.,[1968]
2Ex.C.R.552,55C.P.R.176(Ex.Ct.)atpara.37,andinCie
GénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Ciev.CAW-
Canada,[1997]2F.C.306,71C.P.R.(3d)348(T.D.)atpara.31,
thereisnorequirementthatthetrade-markbe“usedasatrade-mark”
unders.4(2).
111
InCompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Cie,
112Teitelbaum
J.notedthatClairolhadnotyetbeendefinitelyinterpretedbyanappellatecourt.113
Thisisnolongerthecase.Byreferringonlyto“use”unders.4andbyomittingany
requirementthatadefendantusethetrade-markatissue“asatrade-mark”forthe
purposeofdistinguishingwaresorservices,theSupremeCourtseemstohave
implicitlyruledthatClairolwascorrectlydecidednearlyfourdecadesago.
4.3.2Proofofgoodwill
Fortheretobelikelihoodofdepreciationofthevalueofthegoodwillattachingtoa
registeredtrade-mark,theremustbesignificantgoodwillcapableofbeing
depreciatedbyanon-confusinguse.
114
BinnieJ.adoptedthedefinitionof“goodwill”putforwardbyThurlowJ.inClairol:
[T]hegoodwillattachingtoatrademarkisIthinkthatportionofthegoodwillof
thebusinessofitsownerwhichconsistsofthewholeadvantage,whateverit
maybe,ofthereputationandconnection,whichmayhavebeenbuiltupby
yearsofhonestworkorgainedbylavishexpenditureofmoneyandwhichis
identifiedwiththegoodsdistributedbytheownerinassociationwiththetrade
mark.115
Althoughfameisnotacomponentofas.22claim,theSupremeCourtoutlinedalist
offactorstobeconsideredtoensurethatgoodwilldoesexist:

110TommyHilfigerLicensingInc.v.ProduitsdeQualitéI.M.D.Inc.(2005),37C.P.R.(4th)1(F.C.)
[appeallaunchedbeforetheFederalCourtofAppealinfileA-45-05onFebruary7,2005;appeal
dismissedonconsentonAugust11,2005].
111Ibid.,atpara.126.112Supra,note90.113Ibid.,atpara.36.114Supra,note2,atparas.53and54.115Supra,note80atp.573.

33
1)
Thedegreetowhichthemarktranscendsthewaresorserviceswithwhich
itisusuallyassociated;
2)
Thedegreeofrecognitionofthemarkwithintherelevantuniverseof
consumers;
3)
Thevolumeofsalesandthedepthofmarketpenetrationofproducts
associatedwiththeplaintiff’smark;
4)
Theextentanddurationofadvertisingandpublicityaccordedtheplaintiff’s
mark;
5)
Thegeographicalreachoftheplaintiff’smark;
6)
I
tsdegreeofinherentoracquireddistinctiveness;
7)
Whetherproductsassociatedwithplaintiff’smarkareconfinedtoanarrow
orspecializedchanneloftradeormoveinmultiplechannels;
8)
Theextenttowhichthemarkisidentifiedwithaparticularquality.
4.3.3Thelikelyconnectionorlinkagemadebyconsumersbetweena
plaintiff’sgoodwillandthedefendant’suse.
Thisthirdelementofas.22claimisnotunrelatedtothefirst,discussedabove;there
mustbeanassociationbythesomewhathurriedconsumerbetweenwhatis
displayedinadefendant’scommercialestablishmentandtheplaintiff’smark.Inother
words,inthedefendant’suse,membersofthepublicmustrecognizeplaintiff’smark.
Ifnosuchassociationoccurs,thendefendant’susewillhavenoimpact–positiveor
negative–onthegoodwillattachedtotheplaintiff’smark.
116
Thiselementmustbeexaminedinadditiontotheconsiderationofwhetheramarkis
“sufficientlysimilar”,asindicatedearlier,sinceeveninthecaseofanidenticalmark,

116Supra,note2,atpara.56.

34
theremustbealink,connectionormentalassociationbetweentheparties’
respectivemarks.Forexample,inRemoImportsLtd.v.JaguarCarsLtd.,117the
FederalCourtofAppealindicatedthatthecarmanufacturerhadnotmadeoutitss.
22claim(inacasewherebothparties’respectivemarkswerecomposedofthesame
wordi.e.JAGUAR):
[98]Theexistenceofthelinkageormentalassociationisnottobe
assumed.Atparagraph56,BinnieJ.wrote:
Ifthesomewhat-hurriedconsumerdoesnotassociatewhatis
displayedintherespondents’storewiththemarkofthe
venerablechampagnemaker,therecanbenoimpact—positive
ornegative—onthegoodwillattachedtoVEUVECLICQUOT.
[99]Thesameistruehere.IfthehurriedconsumeratZellers,
K-Mart,GiantTigerandSears,wheretheappellantissellingits
[bags],doesnotassociatewhatisdisplayedtherewiththe“Jaguar”
markforautomobiles,thenthereisnoimpactonthegoodwill
attachedtoJaguarcars.118
Thismentalassociation–somethingdifferentthanmistakeninferenceastothe
sourceofwaresorservices–mustthereforebeestablishedinanys.22claim.
4.3.4Thelikelihoodofdepreciation
TheSupremeCourtreferredtothefollowingexpressionstoexplaintheword
“depreciate”:“lowerthevalueof”;“disparage,belittle,underrate”;creatinga“negative
associationforthemark”.Moreimportantly,asnotedearlier,theCourtindicatedthat
depreciationmayoccurasaresultofaweakeneddistinctiveness,whenamarkis
bandiedaboutbydifferentusers.
119
Unders.22,proofofdepreciationisnotrequired,onlyproofoflikelihoodof
depreciation(whichisobviouslymorethanonlythepossibilityofdepreciation).Again,
creatinganegativeassociationforthemarkordiminishingitscapacitytorefer
uniquelytoaplaintiff’sproductspresupposesalinkbymembersofthepublic
betweenwhatisusedbydefendantandaplaintiff’smark.
Finally,aslikelihoodofdepreciationisanelementoftheclaimunders.22,itcannot
betheobjectofareference
120(asopposedtotheextentofactualdepreciation).
4.4ConclusiononSection22

117Supra,note41.118Supra,note41,atparas.98and99.119Supra,note2,atparas.63and65.120Ibid.,atpara.69;seealsoRemoImportsLtd.v.JaguarCarsLtd.,supra,note41,atpara.105.

35
AlthoughitwasnotrequiredtodealwithVeuveClicquotPonsardin’ss.22claimin
lightofthefactthatthelatterwasnotsuccessfulinitsrequestforexpungement
againstMademoiselleCharmanteInc.’sregistrations,theSupremeCourthasnow
providedimportantguidelinesforthisrarelyrelieduponprovision.Theimportant
pointtokeepinmindisthats.22presupposesaregisteredmark(notnecessarilya
famousone)used(unders.4)byadefendant(oratleasta“sufficientlysimilar”one
whichmaintainsconsumerrecognizability)andwhoseusecreatesalinkunderstood
byconsumersbetweenaplaintiff’sgoodwillanddefendant’suseinawaythatislikely
todepreciatethevalueofthegoodwillattachingtoplaintiff’smark.
5.0OTHERISSUESOFINTEREST
TheSupremeCourt’sdecisionsinMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardinhaveraised
otherissuesofinteresttotrade-markpractitionerswhomightbemindfulofthem.
5.1Thecharacterizationoflikelihoodofconfusion
Inthe1968oppositioncaseofBenson&Hedges(Canada)Limitedv.St.Regis
TobaccoCorporation,
121RitchieJ.oftheSupremeCourtofferedthefollowing
characterizationofthedecisionprocessthatdetermineswhetherornotatrade-mark
islikelytobeconfusingwithinthemeaningofsection6oftheAct(inthisparticular
instance,duringoppositionproceedingsconductedbytheRegistrarofTrade-marks):
“Inmyview,thedecisionastowhetherornotatrademarkisconfusingwithinthe
meaningofs.6oftheActinvolvesajudicialdeterminationofapracticalquestionof
factanddoesnotinvolvetheexerciseoftheRegistrar’sdiscretion”.
122
Thischaracterizationisimportantasitdescribestheapplicationoflegalnorms–
outlinedins.6oftheAct–toapracticalquestionoffact.Thisdescriptionisnot
unliketheonefoundearlierinthe1967decisioninTheRowntreeCompanyLimited
v.PaulinChambersCompanyLimited,
123whereRitchieJ.alsowrotefortheSupreme
Court:
Theeffectofs.12(1)(d)oftheTradeMarksAct,1952-53(Can.),c.
49,(hereaftercalled“theAct”)isthatatrademarkisnotregisterable
ifitis“confusingwitharegisteredtrademark”andthequestionof
whetheritisconfusingornotistobedeterminedinaccordancewith
thestandardfixedbys.6(2)oftheActwhichreadsasfollows:
6(2)Theuseofatrademarkcausesconfusionwithanother
trademarkiftheuseofbothtrademarksinthesamearea
wouldbelikelytoleadtotheinferencethatthewaresor
servicesassociatedwithsuchtrademarksaremanufactured,

121Benson&Hedges(Canada)Limitedv.St.RegisTobaccoCorporation,[1969]S.C.R.192.122Ibid.,atp.199.123TheRowntreeCompanyLimitedv.PaulinChambersCompanyLimited,[1968]S.C.R.134.

36
sold,leased,hiredorperformedbythesameperson,whether
ornotsuchwaresorservicesareofthesamegeneralclass.124
InMattel,theSupremeCourtdidconfirmthattheissueoflikelihoodofconfusionis
“essentially”aquestionofmixedfactandlaw:
32TheBoardfoundtherespondenthaddemonstratedthatif
granted,itstrade-markwouldbeunlikelytocreateconfusionwiththat
oftheappellant.Whilethisisessentiallyaquestionofmixedfactand
law,theappellantsaystheBoard’sconsiderationwasfundamentally
flawedbytheerroneousinterpretationgiventos.6oftheActbythe
FederalCourtofAppealinPinkPantherandToyotaJidosha
KabushikiKaishav.LexusFoodsInc.,[2001]2F.C.15(“Lexus”).125
[emphasisadded.]
Interestinglyenough,inVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtoffereda
slightlydifferentcharacterizationoftheissueoflikelihoodofconfusionwhenitwrote
thatitis“largely”aquestionoffact:
14Thiscaseisallabout“FAMOUS”trade-marks.Whileless-
than-famoustrade-markslargelyoperateintheircircumscribedfield
ofwares,servicesandbusinesses,itisarguedthat“famous”marks
transcendsuchlimitations,andthatbroadeffectmustbegiventothe
owner’sremediesinrespectoflikelyconfusioninthemarketplace
(s.20)andlikelydepreciationofthevalueofthegoodwill(s.22)with
thattranscendenceinmind.Withrespecttothes.20infringement
claim,thefameofVEUVECLICQUOTissuch,theappellantsays,
thatconsumerswhowalkintotherespondents’women’sclothing
shopswilllikelybeconfusedintobelievingthedressesandfashion
apparelcomefromthesamesourceasthechampagne,eventhough
thetypeofproductisverydifferent,theproductsflowindifferent
channelsoftradeandtheregisteredtrade-marksdonotappearon
therespondents’garments.Regardlessofthesedifferences,fame
conquersall,andtheappellantseeksexpungementofthe
respondents’marksandaninjunction.Whetherornotthereexistsa
likelihoodofconfusionislargelyaquestionoffact.Asthisisan
infringementclaim(ratherthananoppositionproceedingbeforethe
Trade-marksOppositionBoard),theonuswasontheappellantto
provesuchlikelihoodonabalanceofprobabilities.126[emphasis
added.]
Thisdifferenceincharacterizationsuggeststhatappreciationoflikelihoodof
confusioncanbeseenbothasamixedquestionoffactandlawandaquestionof

124Ibid.,atp.136.125Supra,note1,atpara.32.126Supra,note2,atpara.14.

37
fact.Todelineatebothissues,itisproposedthattheconductbyacourtorthe
Registrarofanyinquiryintolikelihoodofconfusioncanbedescribedasamixed
questionoffactandlawwhilethedeterminationoflikelihoodofconfusioninaspecific
caseisaquestionoffact–whichiswhatBinnieJ.hadinmindwhenhewrote
elsewhereinMattel:
30…TheBoard’sconclusionthatBARBIE’sfameislimitedtodolls
anddolls’accessoriesdoesnotatallmeanthatBARBIE’saura
cannottranscendthoseproducts,butwhetheritislikelytodosoor
notinthecontextofoppositionproceedingsinrelationtorestaurant,
cateringandbanquetservicesisaquestionoffactthatdependson
“allthesurroundingcircumstances”(s.6(5))…
127[emphasisadded.]

5.2“Doubt”asastandard
Inoppositionproceedings,anapplicantmustestablishitsrighttoregistrationand
thereforethatconfusionisunlikely,onabalanceofprobabilities.AsDécaryJ.
cautionedin2002,inthecaseofChristianDior,S.A.v.DionNeckwearLtd.,
128any
referencetothenotionof“doubt”shouldbeavoidedwhenanalyzingtheonus
imposedonanapplicantinoppositionproceedings:
[4]…TheRegistrardeniedtheregistrationofthe“DionCollection&
Design”markessentiallyforthefollowingreasons:
Inviewoftheabove,andevenbearinginmindtheinherent
weaknessoftheopponent’sDIORtrade-marks,Iamstillleftin
doubtastowhethertherewouldbeareasonablelikelihoodof
confusionbetweentheapplicant’strade-markDION
COLLECTION&DesignandtheOpponent’sregisteredtrade-
marksDIORinviewofthedegreeofvisualsimilaritybetween
thetrade-marksasappliedtooverlappingwarestravelling
throughthesamechannelsoftrade.Ihaveconcluded,
therefore,thattheapplicanthasfailedtomeetthelegalburden
uponitinrespectoftheissueofconfusioninrelationtothe
Section12(1)(d)groundofopposition.
…
[10]Inmyview,theRegistrarerredinapplyinga“stillindoubt”
standard,therebyimposingaburdenontheapplicantwhichismore
onerousthantheoneapplicableincivilproceedings.Iappreciatethat
thereishighauthorityforthepropositionthatdoubtshouldbe
resolvedinfavouroftheopponent(seeEnov.Dunn(1890),15App.
Cas.252(H.L.),perLordWatson,atpage257;Freed&FreedLtd.v.
RegistrarofTradeMarksetal.,[1950]Ex.C.R.431,perThorsonP.,
atpage24,25;SunshineBiscuits,Inc.v.CorporateFoodsLtd.

127Supra,note1,atpara.30.128ChristianDior,S.A.v.DionNeckwearLtd.,[2002]3F.C.405.

38
(1982),61C.P.R.(2d)53(F.C.T.D.),perCattanachJ.,atpage55ff.;
CondeNastPublicationsInc.v.Uniondeséditionsmodernes(1979),
46C.P.R.(2d)183(F.C.T.D.),perCattanachJ.,atpage188;Effem
FoodsLtd.v.Export/ImportClicInc.(1993),53C.P.R.(3d)200
(F.C.T.D.),perPinardJ.,atpages77,78).Butthatproposition,
startingwithLordWatsoninEno,hasalwaysbeencouchedin
generalterms,asacorollarytotheprinciplethattheonuswasonthe
applicant;noone,tomyknowledge,hassuggestedthatthestandard
applicableincivilproceedingswasnottoapplyorthatanapplicant
hadtodemonstratebeyonddoubtthatconfusionwasunlikely.Inthat
regard,InotethatwhenLindenJ.A.inPinkPantherBeautyCorp.v.
UnitedArtistsCorp.,[1998]3F.C.534(C.A.),atparagraph12,
referredtoEnoandtoSunshineBiscuits,itwasinsupportofthe
propositionthattheonuswasontheapplicant,notinsupportofthe
ancillarypropositionthatanydoubtistoberesolvedinfavourofthe
opponent.
[11]Infact,Ihavenotbeenshownanycasewherea“beyonddoubt”
standardwasappliedassuchbyacourt,asopposedtothestandard
ofbalanceofprobabilitiesgenerallyapplicableincivilmatters.AsI
readthejurisprudence,andinparticularthecommentsofCattanach
J.inSunshineBiscuits,thedifferencebetweenopposition
proceedingsandcivilproceedingsisnottheapplicablestandard,i.e.
balanceofprobabilities,buttheonus,whichisnotonthepartywho
assertsanallegation(theopponent),butonthepartywhoseeks
registration(theapplicant).
…
[15]TheRegistrarmustthereforebereasonablysatisfiedthat,ona
balanceofprobabilities,theregistrationisunlikelytocreate
confusion;heneednotbesatisfiedbeyonddoubtthatconfusionis
unlikely.Shouldthe“beyonddoubt”standardbeapplied,applicants
would,inmostcases,faceanunsurmountableburdenbecause
certaintyinmattersoflikelihoodofconfusionisararecommodity.At
best,itisonlywheretheprobabilitiesareequalthataformofdoubt
maybesaidtoarise,whichistoberesolvedinfavourofthe
opponent.Buttheconceptofdoubtisatreacherousandconfusing
oneincivilproceedingsandaregistrarshouldavoidresortingtoit.
129

TheSupremeCourtdidnotappeartoharbourconcernsabouttheconceptofdoubt
andreferred,inMattel,toa“leftindoubt”standard(applied,however,onabalanceof
probabilities)inoppositionproceedings:
31Therespondentisnotentitledtoregistrationofitstrade-mark
unlessitcandemonstratethatuseofbothtrade-marksinthesame

129Ibid.,atparas.4,10,11and15.

39
geographicareawillnotcreatethelikelihoodofconfusion,i.e.
mistakeninferencesinthemarketplace.If,onabalanceof
probabilities,theBoardisleftindoubt,theapplicationmustbe
rejected.130

AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdidrefertoa“leftindoubt”standard,itseemsclearfrom
acompletereviewofthereasonsofBinnieJ.thatnoapprovalwasgiventoa
“beyonddoubt”standardwhichwouldcastaquasi-insurmountableonuson
applicantsinoppositionproceedings.Indeed,atpara.54,BinnieJ.adoptedthe
followingclassicformulation:“Inoppositionproceedings,asstated,theonusisonthe
applicant(heretherespondent)toshowonabalanceofprobabilitiesthatthereisno
likelihoodofconfusion.”131

5.3Likelihoodofconfusionandactualconfusion
Initsclaimunders.20,plaintiffVeuveClicquotPonsardinhadtoestablishlikelihood
ofconfusiononabalanceofprobabilities,
132notactualconfusion.Theinquiryinto
whetherthereisanylikelihoodthatconsumerswilldrawamistakeninferenceasto
thesourceofwaresand/orservicesmustbemeasuredthroughtheeyesofthe
averagehurriedconsumer.BothinMattelandinVeuveClicquotPonsardin,BinnieJ.
affirmedthelongstandingnormofthismythicalconsumer.
InMattel,hewrote:
56What,then,istheperspectivefromwhichthelikelihoodofa
“mistakeninference”istobemeasured?Itisnotthatofthecareful
anddiligentpurchaser.Nor,ontheotherhand,isitthe“moronina
hurry”sobelovedbyelementsofthepassing-offbar:MorningStar
Co-OperativeSocietyLtd.v.ExpressNewspapersLtd.,[1979]F.S.R.
113(Ch.D.),atp.117.Itisratheramythicalconsumerwhostands
somewhereinbetween,dubbedina1927Ontariodecisionof
MeredithC.J.asthe“ordinaryhurriedpurchasers”:Klotzv.Corson
(1927),33O.W.N.12(Sup.Ct.),atp.13.SeealsoBarsalouv.
Darling(1882),9S.C.R.677,atp.693.InDelisleFoodsLtd.v.Anna
BethHoldingsLtd.(1992),45C.P.R.(3d)535(T.M.O.B.),the
Registrarstatedatp.538:
Whenassessingtheissueofconfusion,thetrademarksat
issuemustbeconsideredfromthepointofviewoftheaverage
hurriedconsumerhavinganimperfectrecollectionofthe
opponent’smarkwhomightencounterthetrademarkofthe

130Supra,note1,atpara.31;seealsothecommentsofSniderJ.inWranglerApparelCorp.v.
TimberlandCompany(2005),41C.P.R.(4th)223(F.C.),atparas.26-31.
131Supra,note1,atpara.54.132Supra,note2,atpara.14.

40
applicantinassociationwiththeapplicant’swaresinthemarket-
place.

AndseeAmericanCyanamidCo.RecordChemicalCo.,[1972]F.C.
1271(T.D.),atp.1276,aff’d(1973),14C.P.R.(2d)127(F.C.A.).As
CattanachJ.explainedinCanadianSchenleyDistilleries,atp.5.
Thatdoesnotmeanarash,carelessorunobservantpurchaser
ontheonehand,norontheotherdoesitmeanapersonof
highereducation,onepossessedofexpertqualifications.Itis
theprobabilityoftheaveragepersonendowedwithaverage
intelligenceactingwithordinarycautionbeingdeceivedthatis
thecriterionandtomeasurethatprobabilityofconfusion.The
RegistrarofTradeMarksortheJudgemustassessthenormal
attitudesandreactionsofsuchpersons.133

InVeuveClicquotPonsardin,heindicated:
20Thetesttobeappliedisamatteroffirstimpressioninthemind
ofacasualconsumersomewhatinahurrywhoseesthename
Cliquotontherespondents’storefrontorinvoice,atatimewhenhe
orshehasnomorethananimperfectrecollectionoftheVEUVE
CLICQUOTtrade-marks,anddoesnotpausetogivethematterany
detailedconsiderationorscrutiny,nortoexaminecloselythe
similaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthemarks.AsstatedbyPigeon
J.inBenson&Hedges(Canada)Ltd.v.St.RegisTobaccoCorp.,
[1969]S.C.R.192,atp.202:
Itisnodoubttruethatifoneexaminesbothmarkscarefully,he
willreadilydistinguishthem.However,thisisnotthebasison
whichoneshoulddecidewhetherthereisanylikelihoodof
confusion.
…themarkswillnotnormallybeseensidebysideand[the
Courtmust]guardagainstthedangerthatapersonseeingthe
newmarkmaythinkthatitisthesameasonehehasseen
before,oreventhatitisaneworassociatedmarkofthe
proprietoroftheformermark.
(CitinginpartHalsbury’sLawsofEngland,3rded.,vol.38,
para.989,atp.590.)134

IfacourtortheRegistrarconductsaninquiryintolikelihoodofconfusionbyreferring
tothereactionofacasualconsumerinahurryinagivensetofcircumstances,what
placedorealinstancesofconfusion–orthelackthereof–haveinevaluating
likelihoodofconfusion?

133Supra,note1,atpara.56.134Supra,note2,atpara.20.

41
Inpara.55ofhisreasonsinMattel,BinnieJ.wrotethatproofofactualconfusion
wouldbearelevant“surroundingcircumstance”butthatthistypeofevidenceisnot
necessary;however,anadverseinferencemaybedrawnfromthelackofsuch
evidenceincircumstanceswhereitwouldreadilybeavailableiftheallegationoflikely
confusionwerejustified.135Inpara.89,BinnieJ.concludedthat,inthecasebefore
theCourt,evidenceofactualconfusion,thoughnotnecessary,wouldhavebeen
helpfulbutwasnotpresentedbyMattel,Inc.Thelackofanyevidenceofactual
confusionwasaccordinglyanotherofthe“surroundingcircumstances”thattheCourt
considered.

Ontheissueofactualconfusion(orlackthereof)asasurroundingcircumstance,
BinnieJ.referredtocommentsmadebyDécaryJ.inChristianDior,referredtosupra,
whoconcludedthatanadverseinferencemaybedrawnwhenconcurrentuseonthe
evidenceisextensive,yetnoevidenceofconfusionhasbeengivenbyaplaintiff.136
Theissueoflackofevidenceofactualconfusionbecomesrelevantandmayleadto
anegativeinferenceincircumstanceswhenconcurrentuseontheevidenceis
extensive.InlightofthecaselawreferredtobyBinnieJ.,itwouldappearthatitis
onlywhencoexistencehasbeenongoingforalongperiodoftimeandwheremarks
havecoexistedonthesamemarketthatanegativeinferencemaybedrawn.Itis
withinthisspecificcontextthatthecourtortheRegistrarshouldconsideralackof
actualconfusion.

Forexample,inConAgra,Inc.v.McCainFoodsLtd.,137BlaisJ.wrote:
[80]ThereisnoevidencebeforethisCourtofanyinstancesofactual
confusion.ThisentitlestheCourttodrawnegativeconclusionsabout
theallegationsoflikelihoodofconfusionwheretherehasbeena
substantialperiodofcoexistenceinthemarketplaceandnoinstances
ofactualconfusionhavebeenestablished.138[emphasisadded.]

InPanavision,Inc.v.MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo.,Ltd.139JoyalJ.indicated:
“Thetwocompetingmarks,aswellasothersimilarmarks,appeartohavebeen
survivingsidebysideandneithertheRegistrarnorthiscourthavebeenprovided
withanyevidenceofactualconfusionoverthepast10years.”[emphasisadded.]140

InPepsi-ColaofCanadaLtd.v.Coca-ColaCo.ofCanadaLtd.,141DavisJ.wrote:
“Whereadefendant’stradeisofsomestanding,theabsenceofanyinstanceof

135Supra,note1,atpara.55.136Ibid.,atpara.89.137ConAgraInc.v.McCainFoodsLtd.(2001),14C.P.R.(4th)288(F.C.T.D.).[appeallaunchedbefore
theFederalCourtofAppealinfileA-510-01onSeptember10,2001;appealdismissedonJune21,
2002].
138Ibid.,atpara.80.139Panavision,Inc.v.MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo.,Ltd.(1992),40C.P.R.(3d)486(F.C.T.D.).140Ibid.,atp.492.141Pepsi-ColaofCanadaLtd.v.Coca-ColaCo.ofCanadaLtd.,[1940]S.C.R.17.

42
actualconfusionmaybeconsideredassomeevidencethatinterferenceis
unnecessary.”142[emphasisadded.]

InGeneralMotorsCorp.v.Bellows,143CameronJ.wrote:“Butthefactthatsuch
confusionhasnotoccurredoveraperiodofmanyyearsisacircumstancetobe
takenintoconsiderationandisofsomeimportanceindeterminingwhetherconfusion
islikelytooccur.144[emphasisadded.]

InFreed&FreedLtd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarks,145itwasheld:
Thatwheretherehasbeenalongcontemporaneoususeoftwo
marksinthesameareainassociationwithwaresofthesamekind
thelackofevidenceofconfusionthroughsuchusewouldafford
supportfortheconclusionthatthetwomarksarenotconfusingly
similarbutwheretherehasbeennosubstantialcontemporaneous
useofthetwomarksthefactthatthereisnoevidenceofactual
confusionisnotofmuchimportance.146[emphasisadded.]

InMonsportInc.v.LesVêtementsdeSportBonnie(1978)Ltée,147AddyJ.indicated:
Itisimportanttonotehowever,thatthecourtisentitledtodraw
negativeconclusionsabouttheplaintiff’scaseif,despiteasubstantial
periodofco-existenceinthemarket-place,noinstancesofactual
confusionareestablished:Freed&FreedLtd.v.RegistrarofTrade
Marks(1950),14C.P.R.19,[1951]2D.L.R.7,[1950]Ex.C.R.
431.148[emphasisadded.]

Finally,inMultiplicantInc.v.PetitBateauValtonS.A.,149JoyalJ.wrote:
Thefactthatusereducesthelikelihoodofconfusionisconfirmedby
thelackofevidenceinthecaseatbarofanyconfusionovernearly
20years.[emphasisadded.]
…
Theabsenceofsuchevidenceisanimportantpointtoconsider:150

Itshouldonlybeinthespecificcircumstancesoutlinedabovethatevidenceoflackof
actualconfusionmaybeconsideredbyacourtortheRegistrar.Absentthese,lackof
actualconfusionshouldnotbearelevantfactorinsituations,forexample,wherea

142Ibid.,atp.30.143GeneralMotorsCorp.v.Bellows,[1947]Ex.C.R.568[affirmedbyGeneralMotorsCorp.v.
Bellows,[1949]S.C.R.678].
144Ibid,atp.577.145Freed&FreedLtd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarks,[1950]Ex.C.R.431.146Ibid.,atp.432.147MonsportInc.v.LesVêtementsdeSportBonnie(1978)Ltée(1988),22C.P.R.(3d)356(F.C.T.D.).148Ibid.,atp.560.149MultiplicantInc.v.PetitBateauValtonS.A.(1994),55C.P.R.(3d)372(F.C.T.D.).150Ibid.,atp.379.

43
defendanthasonlystarteduseofanallegedlyconfusingtrade-mark,doesnothave
significantuse,hasfiledanapplicationforregistrationonthebasisofproposeduse
ofitstrade-mark,wherethepartiesarenotgeographicallyinthesamemarketor
havenotbeeninthesamemarketforalongperiodoftime.Finally,itmustbe
consideredthatactualconfusionmayhaveoccurredinagivensetofcircumstances,
butthatthosewhowereitsvictimswerenevermadeawareoftheirincorrect
inferenceorneverbotheredtocomplain–bearinginmindthatthecasualconsumer
isoneinahurry(inthelikelihoodofconfusiontestandinreallife…).Cautionshould
thereforealwaysbeexercisedwhenevaluatingthiscircumstancethatParliament
chosenottospecificallyincludeins.6.

6.0CONCLUSION

InMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theSupremeCourtofCanadahassetaside
themostcontroversialpassagesfoundinPinkPantherBeautyCorp.,namelythose
seenasrequiringthata“connection”beestablishedbetweenareasoftradeinorder
forlikelihoodofconfusiontobeestablished.Whenlikelihoodofconfusionistobe
examined–includinginanysituationinvolvingafamoustrade-mark–consideration
shouldbegiventoallthesurroundingcircumstances,fromwhichthetrialjudgemust
thenweighthevariouscompetingfactors.Moreover,becausefamoustrade-marksdo
notcomeinonesize,asBinnieJ.wrote,considerationmustbegiventothefamous
trade-mark’sauratodeterminewhetherconsumerswillassociatethefamoustrade-
markwithanewcomer’sfieldoftrade.151However,withitsemphasisuponthe
examinationofthesenioruser’smark,timewilltellifthisnewtestwilllimitinitsown
waytheprotectionoffamoustrade-marksinCanada.

DespitetheunsuccessfuloutcomeforVeuveClicquotPonsardin,theattentiongiven
tofamoustrade-marksbytheSupremeCourtofCanadaultimatelydemonstratesa
continuingconcern,namelythatconsumerconfusionmustbeavoided.Thismustbe
achieved,whetherornottheparties’waresorservicesareofthesamegeneralclass,
asParliamentwiselylegislatedmorethanfifty(50)yearsago.

TheSupremeCourt’sdecisionsinMattelandVeuveClicquotPonsardinalsoprovide
importantguidelinesonothertopicssuchastherightsconferredbyregistration,the
interpretationofs.22oftheActandthecharacterizationoftheonusinopposition
proceedings.ConsideringthattheSupremeCourthadnotanalysedprovisionsofthe
Actsince1984,152itcancertainlybestatedthatthesetwin2006decisions–andall

151Supra,note2,atpara33.152SeeConsumersDistributingCo.v.Seiko,[1984]1S.C.R.583.WhentheMattelandVeuve
ClicquotPonsardincaseswereheardbytheSupremeCourt,thelatterhadnotyetissueditsreasons
inKirkbiAGv.RitvikHoldingsInc.,supra,note45.ItmustbeacknowledgedthattheSupremeCourt
didrefertosomeprovisionsoftheTrade-marksActinCanada(DeputyMinisterofNationalRevenue)
v.MattelCanadaInc.,[2001]2S.C.R.100andinLawSocietyofBritishColumbiav.Mangat,[2001]3
S.C.R.113butthesedecisionsdidnotpurporttodealexclusivelywithtrade-markmatters.

44
theimportantissuesraisedtherein–werewellworththewaitandpavethewayfor
theheightenedawarenessoftheimportanceofprotectingtrade-marks–andthe
legaltoolsassociatedtherewith–atthebeginningofthisnewcentury.

45
ROBIC,ungrouped’avocatsetd’agentsdebrevetsetdemarquesde
commercevouédepuis1892àlaprotectionetàlavalorisationdela
propriétéintellectuelledanstouslesdomaines:brevets,dessinsindustrielset
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