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Limitation Period for Civil Remedies-Some Comments on Section 41 of the Canadian Copyright Act

2003-01-01

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LIMITATIONPERIODFORCIVILREMEDIES
SOMECOMMENTSONSECTION41OFTHECANADIAN
COPYRIGHTACT

LAURENTCARRIÈRE*
ROBIC,
LLP
L
AWYERS,PATENT&TRADEMARKAGENTS

TextofSection
1.0RelatedSections
2.0RelatedRegulations
3.0PriorLegislation3.1CorrespondingSectioninPriorLegislation
3.2LegislativeHistory3.2.1S.C.1921,c.24,s.23.
3.2.2R.S.C.1927,c.32,s.24.
3.2.3R.S.C.1952,c.55,s.24.
3.2.4R.S.C.1970,c.C-30,s.24.
3.2.5S.C.1988,c.15,s.9.
3.2.6R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,s.41.
3.3Transitional
4.0Purpose
5.0Commentary5.1History
5.2General5.2.1Civilremedies
5.2.2Criminalremedies
5.2.3Licencesundersection77
5.2.4Licences
5.3TriggeringoftheLimitationPeriod5.3.1Generalapplication
5.3.2Continuingoffence
5.3.3Laches
5.3.4Conversion
5.3.5Breachoftrustorconfidence
5.3.6Fraudorconcealment
5.4Pleadings

©CIPS,2003.*Lawyerandtrade-markagent,LaurentCarrièreisapartnerwithROBIC,LLP,amultidisciplinaryfirm
oflawyers,patentandtrademarkagents.PublishedaspartofaRobic’sCanadianCopyrightAct
Annotated(Carswell).Publication301

5.5NegativeandNotPositivePrescription
5.6Construction
5.6.1Interpretation
5.6.2Computationoftime
6.0CaseLaw6.1Canada
6.1.1CopyrightIssues
6.1.2LimitationCases
6.2UnitedKingdom
6.3UnitedStates
6.4Varia
7.0ListofCases7.1Canada7.1.1Copyright
7.1.2LimitationsIssues
7.1.3Patent
7.1.4Varia
7.2UnitedKingdom7.2.1Copyright
7.2.2Varia
7.3UnitedStates
7.4ListofCases-Varia
8.0Authors8.1Canada8.1.1LimitationinGeneral
8.1.2ProceduralIssues
8.1.3InterpretationIssues
8.1.4CopyrightIssues
8.2UnitedKingdom
8.3UnitedStates
8.4France
8.5Australia

LIMITATIONPERIODFORCIVIL
REMEDIESPRESCRIPTION

41.(1)Subjecttosubsection(2),a
courtmaynotawardaremedyin
relationtoaninfringementunless41.(1)Sousréserveduparagraphe
(2),letribunalsaisid’unrecoursen
violationnepeutaccorderde
réparationsquesi:

(a)inthecasewheretheplaintiff
knew,orcouldreasonablyhave
beenexpectedtoknow,ofthe
infringementatthetimeit
occurred,theproceedingsfor(a)ledemandeurengagedes
procéduresdanslestroisansqui
suiventlemomentoùlaviolation
aeulieu,s’ilavaitconnaissance
delaviolationaumomentoùelle

infringementarecommenced
withinthreeyearsafterthe
infringementoccurred;or

aeulieuous’ilestraisonnable
des’attendreàcequ’ilenaiteu
connaissanceàcemoment;

(b)inthecasewheretheplaintiffdid
notknow,andcouldnot
reasonablyhavebeenexpected
toknow,oftheinfringementat
thetimeitoccurred,the
proceedingsforinfringementare
commencedwithinthreeyears
afterthetimewhentheplaintiff
firstknew,orcouldreasonably
havebeenexpectedtoknowof
theinfringement.
(b)ledemandeurengagedesprocéduresdanslestroisansqui
suiventlemomentoùilapris
connaissancedelaviolationou
lemomentoùilestraisonnable
des’attendreàcequ’ilenaitpris
connaissance,s’iln’enavaitpas
connaissanceaumomentoùelle
aeulieuous’iln’estpas
raisonnabledes’attendreàce
qu’ilenaiteuconnaissanceàce
moment.

RESTRICTIONRESTRICTION

(2)Thecourtshallapplythelimitation
periodsetoutinparagraph(1)(a)or
(b)onlyinrespectofapartywho
pleadsalimitationperiod.(2)Letribunalnefaitjouerla
prescriptionviséeauxalinéas(1)
a)ou
b)qu’àl’égarddelapartiequil’a
invoquée.
R.S.C.1985(4thSupp.),c.10,s.9;S.C.1997,c.24,s.22

§1.0RelatedSections

Section2—Definitions:“infringing”,“plaintiff”;section3—Copyrightinworks;section
15—Copyrightinperformer’sperformance;section18—Copyrightinsoundrecordings;
section21—Copyrightincommunicationsignals;section27—Infringementgenerally;
section27.1—Importationofbooks;section32.4—Certainrightsandinterestsprotected
[compensationforactsdonebeforerecognitionofcopyrightofperformers];section
32.5—Certainrightsandinterestsprotected[compensationforactsdonebefore
recognitionofcopyrightofperformersandbroadcasters];section33—Certainrightsand
interestsprotected[compensationforactsdonebeforerecognitionofcopyrightormoral
rights];section34—Copyright[civilremedies];section35—Liabilityforinfringement;
section38—Recoveryofpossessionofcopies,plates;section38.1—Statutory
damages;section39.1—Wideinjunction;section77—Circumstancesinwhichlicence
maybeissuedbytheBoard[unlocatableowners];section89—Nocopyright,etc.,
exceptbystatute.
§2.0RelatedRegulations

PeriodforRoyaltyEntitlementsforNon-membersof
CollectingBodies—Regulations
Establishing,SOR/97-164.

§3.0PriorLegislation

§3.1CorrespondingSectioninPriorLegislation

Section23from1924.01.01to1928.01.31;section24from1928.02.01to1988.12.11;
section41from1988.12.12topresent.
§3.2LegislativeHistory

§3.2.1S.C.1921,c.24,s.23.

PRESCRIPTIONOFACTIONPRESCRIPTION
23.Anactioninrespectofinfringement
ofcopyrightshallnotbecommenced
aftertheexpirationofthreeyearsnext
aftertheinfringement.23.L’actionenviolationdudroitd’auteur
nepourraplusêtreintentéeaprès
l’expirationd’undélaidetroisansà
compterdecetteviolation.

§3.2.2R.S.C.1927,c.32,s.24.

PRESCRIPTIONOFACTIONPRESCRIPTION
24.Anactioninrespectofinfringement
ofcopyrightshallnotbecommenced
aftertheexpirationofthreeyearsnext
aftertheinfringement.24.L’actionenviolationdudroitd’auteur
nepourraplusêtreintentéeaprès
l’expirationd’undélaidetroisansà
compterdecetteviolation.

§3.2.3R.S.C.1952,c.55,s.24.

PRESCRIPTIONOFACTIONPRESCRIPTION
24.Anactioninrespectofinfringement
ofcopyrightshallnotbecommenced
aftertheexpirationofthreeyearsnext
aftertheinfringement.24.Uneactionpourviolationdudroit
d’auteurnepeutplusêtreintentéeaprès
l’expirationd’undélaidetroisansà
compterdecetteviolation.

§3.2.4R.S.C.1970,c.C-30,s.24.

PRESCRIPTIONOFACTIONPRESCRIPTION
24.Anactioninrespectofinfringement
ofcopyrightshallnotbecommenced
aftertheexpirationofthreeyearsnext
aftertheinfringement.24.Uneactionpourviolationdudroit
d’auteurnepeutplusêtreintentéeaprès
l’expirationd’undélaidetroisansà
compterdecetteviolation.

§3.2.5S.C.1988,c.15,s.9.

TIMELIMITFORACTIONSPRESCRIPTION
24.Anactioninrespectofinfringement
shallnotbecommencedafterthe
expirationofthreeyearsnextafterthe
infringement.24.Lesactionspourviolationse
prescriventpartroisansàcompterdela
violation.

§3.2.6R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,s.41.

LIMITATIONPERIODPRESCRIPTION
41.Anactioninrespectofinfringement
ofcopyrightshallnotbecommenced
aftertheexpirationofthreeyears
immediatelyfollowingtheinfringement.41.Lesactionspourviolationdudroit
d’auteurseprescriventpartroisansà
compterdelaviolation.

§3.3Transitional

S.C.1997,c.24,s.22(2).
Subsection[41](1)appliesinrespectof
(a)proceedingscommencedbutnot
concludedbeforethissectioncomesinto
force[i.e.1997.01.01];andLeparagraphe[42](1)s’appliqueaux
procéduresengagéesaprèsladate
d’entréeenvigueurduprésentarticle[
i.e.1997.09.01]demêmequ’aux
procéduresencoursàcettedate.
(b)proceedingscommencedafterthis
sectioncomesintoforce[i.e.
1997.09.01].

§4.0Purpose

Section41providesforageneralstatutorylimitationofthreeyearsforcivilremedies
arisingfromtheinfringementofaprovisionoftheCopyrightAct.

§5.0Commentary

§5.1History

ThissectionfirstappearedintheCopyrightAct,1921whereitfaithfullyreproduced
section10oftheUnitedKingdomcopyrightAct,1911.Itestablishedathree-year
prescriptionperiodforcommencinganactionincopyrightinfringement,inplaceofthe
shorterlimitationperiodoftwoyearswhichhadappliedunderearlierCanadian
copyrightstatutes.Seeforinstance:S.C.1832,c.53,s.11;S.C.1841,c.61,s.12;S.C.
1859,c.81,s.13;S.C.1868,c.54,s.18;S.C.1875,c.88,s.27;R.S.C.1886,c.62,s.
34;andR.S.C.1906,c.70,s.44.
Theword“copyright”wasremovedfromthetextofsection41intheCopyright
AmendmentAct(S.C.1988,c.15,s.9;R.S.C.1985,(4thSupp.),c.10,s.9).Theuseof
theall-encompassingword“infringement”insteadoftheterm“copyrightinfringement”or
“infringementofcopyright”mayhavebeenintendedtopreventthecourtsfrom
concludingthatthelimitationperiodofthreeyearssetforthinsection41doesnotapply
toanactionforinfringementofmoralrightspursuanttosubsection34(1.1).
Interestingly,incertainforeignjurisdictions,notablyFrance,anactionbasedonthe
infringementofmoralrightsisimprescriptible.
The1997amendmenttotheCopyrightAct(S.C.1997,c.24,s.22)putsanendtothe
controversyastowhetherfraudorconcealmentshouldbegivenconsiderationinthe
computationofthethreeyearlimitationperiod:itnowshould.SeeCARRIÈRE(Laurent),
Prescriptionetpropriétéintellectuelle—Laprescriptionextinctivecommefindenon-
recevoirenmatièredepropriétéinte
lectuelle(1993),10CanadianIntellectualProperty
Review357,atp.380andVAVER(David),LimitationsinIntellectualProperty“The
TimeIsOutofJoint”(1994),73CanadianBarReview451,atpp.462-463.

§5.2General

§5.2.1Civilremedies

Sections34to41oftheCopyrightActfallundertheheading“CivilRemedies”.Section
41isthecodaofthispartoftheCopyrightActandappliestoallcivilremediesavailable
toacopyrightowner(orwhoeverhasacopyrightinterest)inrespectofcopyright

infringementofawork;aperformer’sperformance,
asoundrecordingora
communicationsignal,tothecompleteexclusionofanyprovincialstatutegoverning
limitationperiods(seesection89:“NocopyrightunlessunderthisAct”).

§5.2.2Criminalremedies

The“CriminalRemedies”setforthinsections42and43oftheCopyrightActarenot
subjecttothethree-yearlimitationperiodofsection41:seeR.v.Harris(1990),34
C.P.R.(3d)392(Nfld.Prov.Ct.).
Criminalproceedingstakenbyindictmentasprovidedforunderparagraphs42(1)(g)
and42(2)(d)oftheCopyrightActareimprescriptible:seeSALHANY(RogerE.),
CanadianCriminalProcedure,5thed.(Agincourt,CanadaLawBook,1989),atpp.18-
19and314-315;MORTON(JamesC.),LimitationofCivilActions(Toronto,Carswell,
1988),atpp.59-62.
Proceedingstakenbysummaryconvictioninrespectofsubsections43(1)and43(2)of
theCopyrightActaresubjecttothegenerallimitationapplicabletosummaryoffences,
which,pursuanttosubsection786(2)oftheCriminalCodeissixmonths.However,
proceedingstakenbysummaryconvictionunderparagraphs42(1)(f)and43(2)(c)ofthe
CopyrightAct,aresubjecttothelimitationspecificallysetforthbysubsection42(4),
namelytwoyears.
§5.2.3Licencesundersection77

Thesection41limitationperioddoesnotapplytoanactionlaunchedbyacopyright
ownertocollectroyaltypaymentssetbytheCopyrightBoardintheowner’sabsence.
Thelattercasehoweverwouldbesubjecttothefive-yearlimitationprovidedforin
subsection77(3)oftheCopyrightAct.

§5.2.4Licences

Inthecasesofroyaltiesowedpursuanttoalicenceorotheragreement,thetime
limitationforinstitutinganactionforthecollectionofroyaltiesorotheramountsdue
undertheagreementwillbegovernedbythegeneralcivillawoftheprovince.

§5.3TriggeringoftheLimitationPeriod

§5.3.1Generalapplication

Theplainmeaningofsection41dictatesthateachdistinctactofinfringementwillsetin
motionitsownlimitationperiodofthreeyears.Proceedingstakenoutsidethethree-year
periodarebarred.However,iftheproceedingssotakencoverdistinctactsof

infringementfallingbothinsideandoutsidetheli
mitationperiod,theactionwillbe
receivablewithrespecttoactshavingoccurredlessthanthreeyearsbeforetheaction
wascommencedandbeconsideredstaleinrespectoftheearlieracts.

Thefilingofproperlegalproceedingsinthecompetentcourtwillhavetheeffectof
interruptingtheprescription:seeCanada(A.G.)Delaurier,(1979),93D.L.R.(3d)434
(Man.Q.B.),andarticles2224and2225oftheCivilCodeofLowerCanadaandarticles
2892and2895oftheCivilCodeofQuebec.Thisissoevenifthepleadingsmustbe
amendedsubsequently:seeLarochellev.R.(1974),2N.R.494(F.C.A.);Leesona
Corp.v.ConsolidatedTextilesMillsLtd.(1977),[1978]2S.C.R.2.

Furthermore,everyactwhichinterruptsprescriptionagainstoneofseveraldebtors
wouldinterruptitwithrespecttoall:seeMartelv.Hôtel-DieuSt-Vallier,[1969]S.C.R.
745;DeJongP.Z.v.FalconMaritimeManagementS.A.(Panama)(1988),[1989]2F.C.
63(F.C.T.D.).
§5.3.2Continuingoffence

Acontinuingoffenceisonewhichiscommittedoveraspanoftime.AsfoundinBLACK
(HenryCampbell)etal.,Black’sLawDictionary,6thed.(St.Paul,West,1990),atpp.
321-322:Astoperiodofstatuteoflimitation,thelastactoftheoffensecontrols
forcommencementoftheperiod.A“continuingoffense”,suchthatonly
thelastactthereofwithintheperiodofthestatuteoflimitationsneedbe
allegedintheindictmentorinformation,isonewhichmayconsistof
separateactsoracourseofconductbutwhicharisesfromthat
singlenessofthought,purposeoractionwhichmaybedeemeda
singleimpulse;

ReferencecouldalsobemadetotheAmericandecisionofTaylorv.Merrick,219
U.S.P.Q.2d420,PosnerJ.(7thCir.1983).[7]ThenextquestioniswhetherTaylorcancomplainaboutinfringing
salesthatoccurredmorethanthreeyearsbeforehesued.Heinvokes
thesupposedrulethatonlythelastinfringingactneedbewithinthe
statutoryperiod.Oddly,consideringhowoftentheissuemustarise,we
havefoundlittlementionofsucharuleinthecases.Twodistrictcourt
casesupholdtherule(nonerejectit),seeBaxterv.CurtisIndustries,
Inc.,201F.Supp.100,133USPQ78(N.D.Ohio1962);Cainv.
UniversalPicturesCo.,47F.Supp.1013,1018,56USPQ8,12
(S.D.Cal.1942),butCainisnotveryexplicit.However,thereisno
doubtoftherule’svalidityifitisregardednotassomethingpeculiarto
copyrightlawbutastheapplicationtothatlawofthegeneralprinciple
thatthestatuteoflimitationdoesnotbegintorunonacontinuing
wrongtillthewrongisoveranddonewith(thisseemstobethe

approachinCain).See,e.g.,BerkeyPhoto,Inc.v.
EastmanKodak
Co.,603F.2d263,295(2dCir.1979);Railingv.UnitedMineWorkers
ofAmerica,429F.2d780,783(4thCir.1970).
Theprinciplestrikesabalancebetweentheplaintiff’sinterestinbeing
sparedhavingtobringsuccessivesuits,andthetwodistinctinterests,
GatesRubberCo.v.USMCorp.,508F.2d603,611(7thCir.1975),
thatstatutesoflimitationsserve.Oneisevidentiary—toreducethe
errorrateinlegalproceedingsbybarringlitigationoverclaimsrelating
tothedistantpast.Theotherisrepose—togivepeopletheassurance
thatafterafixedtimetheycangoabouttheirbusinesswithoutfearof
havingtheirlibertyorpropertytakenthroughthelegalprocess.Apart
fromtheharmfuleffectofuncertaintyonplanning,itismorepainfulto
losewhatyouhavecometothinkofasyourownthanitisgratifyingto
getbacksomethingyouwroteoffmanyyearsagoandhavegrown
accustomedtodoingwithout.SeeHolmes,ThePathoftheLaw,10
Harv.L.Rev.457,477(1897);cf.Hirshleifer,PriceTheoryand
Applications61(1976).Whenthefinalactofanunlawfulcourseof
conductoccurswithinthestatutoryperiod,thesepurposesare
adequatelyserved,inbalancewiththeplaintiff’sinterestinnothaving
tobringsuccessivesuits,byrequiringtheplaintifftosuewithinthe
statutoryperiodbutlettinghimreachbackandgetdamagesforthe
entiredurationoftheallegedviolation.Someoftheevidence,atleast,
willbefresh.Andthedefendant’suncertaintyastowhetherhewillbe
suedatallwillbeconfinedtothestatutoryperiod.Hisuncertaintyabout
theextentofthisliabilitymaybegreater,butthatisoftentruein
litigation.[atpp.423-424]

SeealsoSALHANY(RogerE.),CanadianCriminalProcedure,5thed.(Toronto,
CanadaLawBook,1989),atp.316;R.v.Bell,[1983]2S.C.R.471,McIntyreJ.,atp.
488.
Therefore,“[w]heretheoffenceisacontinuingone,andcontinuesuptowithinlessthan
thestatutorylimitationperiodbeforeinstitutionofproceedings,itismaterialifitwasfirst
committedatatimeanteriortotheperiod”:seeR.v.BelgalHoldingsLtd.(1966),[1967]
3C.C.C.34,StewartJ.,atp.36(Ont.H.C.).
However,iftheinfringementison-goingbutconsistsofaseriesofdiscreteacts,a
separatelimitationperiodwillapplytoeachsuchact.Itremainsopentotheperson
whosecopyrighthasbeeninfringedbyacontinuousactofinfringementtofileatimely
claimwithinthreeyearsofthecompletionoftheact.

§5.3.3Laches

Thesimplefactthatacopyrightownertoleratestheinfringementofhiscopyrightwillnot

abridgethelimitationperiod.However,unreasonabl
edelayinpursuingthelegal
remediesprovidedforbytheCopyrightActmayamounttolachesand,undernormal
circumstances,shoulddeprivetheplaintifffromseekingequitableremedies,including
interimandinterlocutoryinjunctionsagainsttheinfringer:SHARPE(RobertJ.),
InjunctionsandSpecificPerformance,2nded.(Toronto,CanadaLawBook,1992),at
nos.1.990-1.1020;WILLIAMS(JeremyS.),LimitationofActionsinCanada,2nded.
(Toronto,Butterworths,1980),atpp.29-39.AsputbyCollierJ.inSandvik,A.B.v.
WindsorMachineCo.(1986),8C.P.R.(3d)433(F.C.T.D.),at443:“Apatenteeisnot
requiredtosueatthefirstdropofthehat”.Thismaximshouldalsoapplytoacopyright
owner.
§5.3.4Conversion

EversincethedecisionrenderedbytheSupremeCourtofCanadainUnderwriters’
SurveyBureauLtd.v.Massie&RenwickLtd.,[1937]S.C.R.265,ithasbeensettledlaw
thataclaimforconversionundersection38oftheCopyrightActissubjecttothesame
three-yearlimitationperiodwhichgenerallyappliestoinfringement.SeealsoSutherland
PublishingCo.v.CaxtonPublishingCo.,(1938),[1939]A.C.178(H.L.)forthesame
conclusionundertheUnitedKingdomCopyrightAct,1911withrespecttoconversion
provisions.
§5.3.5Breachoftrustorconfidence

Section89oftheCopyrightActstatesthatentitlementtocopyrightisgoverned
exclusivelybythetermsoftheAct“oranyotherstatutoryenactmentforthetimebeing
inforce.”Accordingly,theremediesavailableforinfringementofcopyrightandthe
limitationperiodforseekingrelieffrominfringementarealsosubjecttotheprovisionsof
theAct.
Yet,section89concludesbystatingthatnothinginthesectionabrogates“anyrightor
jurisdictiontorestrainabreachoftrustorconfidence.”Anysuchclaimwouldtherefore
besubjectnottothelimitationperiodsetforthinsection41buttothelawsofthe
provinceinwhichthebreachoftrustorconfidenceoccurred:seeVAVER(David),Civil
LiabilityforTakingorUsingTradeSecretsinCanada(1980-81),5CanadianBusiness
LawJournal253;BOURGEOIS(Marie),Laprotectionjuridiquedel’informationcon
fidentielleéconomique:étudededroitquébécoisetfrançais(1988),1Cahiersde
propriétéintellectuelle1.
§5.3.6Fraudorconcealment

Paragraph41(1)(b)oftheCopyrightAct(asintroducedbyS.C.1997,c.24,s.22(1)),
providesthatwheretheplaintiff

i)
didnotknowand

ii)couldnotreasonablyhavebeenexpectedtoknow

oftheinfringementatthetimeitoccurred,thelimitationperiodwillstarttorunfromthe
datetheplaintiff
i)firstknewor

ii)couldhavebeenreasonablyexpectedtoknowoftheinfringement.

Forinstance,wheretherehasbeenfraudulentconcealmentoftheexistenceofacause
ofaction,thelimitationperiodwillbegintorunonlywheretheplaintiffdiscoversthe
fraudwithreasonablediligence:seeUnderwriters’SurveyBureauLtd.v.Massie&
RenwickLtd.(1939),[1940]S.C.R.218(S.C.C.)DuffJ.,atp.244;Guérinv.R.(1984),
[1984]2S.C.R.335(S.C.C.)DicksonJ.,atp.390;Krugerv.R.(1985),17D.L.R.(4th)
591(F.C.A.)HealdJ.,atp.624.
Itisopentothecourttoapplythetestofknowledgeofconcealedinfringementonan
objectivebasis,andtherebyconcludethat,hadthecopyrightownernowappearing
beforeitasplaintiffexercisedreasonablediligence,hewouldhavediscoveredthe
unauthorizedconcealmentorfraudulentuseoftheworkinwhichheownsthecopyright:
seeMORTON(JamesC.),LimitationofCivilActions(Toronto,Carswell,1988),atpp.
101-103;WILLIAMS(JeremyS.),LimitationofActionsinCanada,2nded.(Toronto,
Butterworths,1980),atpp.210-213.
Inconductingthisassessment,thecourtmay,ofcourse,takeintoaccounttheinherent
difficultythatwouldbeencounteredbyadiligentcopyrightownerasin,forexample,the
infringementofarchitecturaldrawingswhoseunauthorizedreproductioncouldnot
readilybediscovereduntilthebuildingdescribedthereinwereconstructed.

Nospecialconsiderationisgiven,however,toforeigncopyrightownerswhomaynotbe
aslikelytodiscoveractsofinfringementwhetherconcealedornot.Theforeign
copyrightownerisrequiredtobeasvigilantintheenforcementofhiscopyrightinterests
asacopyrightownerwhoresidesinCanada.
§5.4Pleadings

Whetherstatutesoflimitationswereproceduralinnatureorsubstantivewaslong
debatedbutfinallyheldsubstantive:seeTolofsonv.Jensen,[1994]2S.C.R.1022
(S.C.C.)LaForestJ.,atpp.1070-1073andCASTEL(Jean-G.),CanadianConflictof
Laws,3rded.(Toronto,Butterworths,1994)1stSupplementatp.20;comparewith
Sommersv.R.,[1959]S.C.R.678,FauteuxJ.,atp.688;CÔTÉ(Pierre-André),The
InterpretationofLegislationinCanada,2nded.(Cowansville,Blais,1992),atpp.158-
166and174-187.Asaproceduralmeasurewherebyasubstantiverightisrendered

nugatory,thepartywhointendstorelyuponalimi
tationperiodmustspecificallypleadit,
withthematerialfactswhichgiverisetothelimitationperiod:seeConsolboardInc.v.
MacMi
lanBloedel(Saskatchewan)Ltd.(1982),63C.P.R.(2d)1,CattanachJ.,atpp.
26-28(F.C.T.D.-Reference);Sandvik,A.B.v.WindsorMachineCo.(1986),8C.P.R.
(3d)433(F.C.T.D.),CollierJ.,atp.443.However,sincethesecasesdealtwithpatent
infringementforwhichthereisnospecificprovisionastolimitationsinthePatentAct
(R.S.C.1985,c.P-4),recoursehadtobemadetosection39oftheFederalCourtAct
(R.S.C.1985,c.F-7,asamendedS.C.1990,c.8,s.10).

Inasmuchastheprescriptionsetforthinsection41beconstruedasabsolutely
extinguishingthecauseofactionsothatnoactioncouldbemaintainedafterthedelay
fortheprescriptionexpired,aproperapproachwouldhavetobethatthecourtcould,of
itsownmotion,supplythedefenceresultingfromprescription:Corpex(1977)Inc.v.
Canada,[1982]2S.C.R.643(S.C.C.)BeetzJ.,atp.661.However,thelegislator
preferredtoaccordtheCopyrightActwiththeprevailingpracticeandsubsection41(2),
asintroducedbyS.C.1997,c.24,s.22,nowspecificallyprovidesthatthecourtshall
applythelimitationperiodonlyinrespectofapartywhopleadsit.

§5.5NegativeandNotPositivePrescription

Thelimitationperiodsetforthinsection41isameansbywhichcivilliabilityforcopyright
infringementcanbedischargedbylapseoftime.Inthisregard,section41createsan
extinctiveornegativeprescriptionwhichisabartoanaction,removingtherightof
actionfrominfringementotherwisegrantedundertheCopyrightAct.

Theprescriptionundersection41isnotameansforaninfringertoacquirerights.The
merefactthattheinfringementoccurredmorethanthreeyearspriortotheactiondoes
notentitletheinfringertocontinuehisinfringement.Injunctiveremedieswillthenlieas
wellasthoseotherremedieswhichsection34providesfor.

Furthermore,inviewofthenegativenatureofcopyright,itmightwellbethatsomeacts
ofinfringementareprescribedbutnotothers.Forinstance,aworkmighthavebeen
reproduced(contrarytosubsection3(1)introductiveoftheCopyrightAct)morethan
threeyearsbeforethecommencementoftheactionbutcommunicatedtothepublic
(contrarytoparagraph3(1)(f)oftheCopyrightAct)ordistributed(contrarytoparagraph
27(2)(b)oftheCopyrightAct)thereafter.Insuchacase,thecopyrightownerwillstillbe
entitledtoinstituteinfringementproceedingswithrespecttotheinfringementunder
paragraphs3(1)(f)and27(2)(b)oftheCopyrightActbutnotundersubsection3(1)
introductiveoftheCopyrightAct.

§5.6Construction
§5.6.1Interpretation

Incasesofambiguity,section41,asaprovisionr
estrictingtherighttotakeaction,
shouldbeinterpretedrestrictively:seeCÔTÉ(Pierre-André),TheInterpretationof
LegislationinCanada,2nded.(Cowansville,Blais,1992),atp.392;DRIEDGER(Elmer
A.),ConstructionofStatutes,2nded.(Toronto,Butterworths,1983),atp.185.In
supportofastrictconstructiontobegiventolimitationstatutes,referenceshouldbe
madetoBerardinelliv.OntarioHousingCorp.(1978),[1979]1S.C.R.275,EsteyJ.,at
p.280:[Alimitationsstatute]beingarestrictiveprovisionwhereintherightsof
actionofthecitizenarenecessarilycircumscribedbyitsterms,attracts
astrictinterpretationandanyambiguityfoundupontheapplicationof
theproperprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretationshouldberesolvedin
favourofthepersonwhoserightofactionisbeingtruncated.

§5.6.2Computationoftime

Saveforparagraph41(1)(b),thelimitationperiodsetforthbysection41runsfromthe
datethatthecauseofactionarisesundertheCopyrightAct.Inordertosetoutthetime
withinwhichtheactionmustbecommenced,referenceshouldbemadetothe
“computationoftime”provisionsoftheInterpretationAct(R.S.C.1985,c.I-21,ss.26-
30)aswellastothedefinitionof“year”insubsection37(1)ofthesaidAct.

§6.0CaseLaw

§6.1Canada

§6.1.1CopyrightIssues

1.Underwriters’SurveyBureauLimitedv.Massie&RenwickLtd.(1937),[1938]Ex.
C.R.103,MacLeanJ.(Ex.Ct.).Oneotherpointremainsfordecisionandthatiswhetherornot,in
respectoftheclaimsofinfringementandconversion,theperiodof
limitationapplicabletosuchactionsisabartoreliefhere,theplaintiffs
contendingthatthedefendantfraudulently,andbyfraudulent
concealment,infringedandconvertedtheworksinquestion,andthat,
insuchastateoffacts,theperiodoflimitationcannotbesetupasa
bar.
…
InthecaseofBulliCoalMiningCompanyv.Osborne[[1899]A.C.351]
itwasheldthattheStatuteofLimitationswasnoanswertoaclaimin
respectofaconcealedandfraudulenttrespassintheworkingofacoal
mine,solongasthepartydefraudedremainedinignorancewithout
anyfaultorlachesofhisown.Thefraudulentacttherewasthetaking
furtively,undergroundcoalfromaneighbour’spit.Indeliveringthe

judgmentoftheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCou
ncil,LordJamesof
Herefordsaid:Nowitisalwaysbeenaprincipleofequitythatnolengthoftimeis
abartoreliefinthecaseoffraud,intheabsenceoflachesonthe
partofthepersondefrauded.Thereis,therefore,noroomforthe
applicationofthestatuteinthecaseofconcealedfraud,solong
asthepartydefraudedremainsinignorancewithoutanyfaultof
hisown.Thecontentiononbehalfoftheappellantsthatthe
statuteisabarunlessthewrong-doerisprovedtohavetaken
activemeasuresinordertopreventdetectionisopposedto
commonsenseaswellastotheprinciplesofequity.[pp.126-128]

2.Underwriters’SurveyBureauLimitedv.Massie&RenwickLtd.,(1937)S.C.R.265,
JudsonJ.Itwouldappeartobeunnecessarytoexpressanyopiniononthe
questionwhethersection24[nowsection41]oftheCopyrightAct,
whichisareproductionofsection10oftheEnglishAct,would,apart
fromtheconsiderationsabouttobementioned,affectaclaimunder
section21[nowsection38]oftheCanadianAct,whichissection7of
theEnglishAct.
Thewords“inrespectofinfringementofcopyright”,althoughbyno
meansanaptdescriptionofaclaimmadeundersection21,are
capableofaconstructionbywhichthephrasewouldextendtoaclaim
undersuchsectioniftheinfringingcopywithwhichtheclaimis
concernedisacopyofthemakingandimportingofwhichconstituted
infringementinthepertinentsense.
TheCanadianstatutemustbeassumedtocontemplateproceedingsin
theExchequerCourtofCanadaforthepurposeofenforcingtherights
createdbysection21aswellasproceedingsinprovincialcourts.This
circumstancesuggestsvariousconsiderationswhichwouldappearto
beofnoinconsiderableweight.Firstofall,itwouldseemtobe
improbablethatParliamentcontemplatedauniformperiodoflimitation
throughoutCanadainrespectofactionsadmittedlyfallingwithin
section24anddifferingperiodsoflimitationsasregardsclaims
assertedintheprovincialcourtsundersection21.Then,thereisa
greatpracticaldifficultyifsection24hasnoapplicationtoclaimsunder
section21.Itisatleastplausiblydebatablewhethersuchproceedings
underthestatutewouldbewithinthefieldofoperationofprovincial
statutesoflimitation;andasregardsoneoftheprovinces,especially
havingregardtothetermsoftheFrenchversion,itisaleastarguable
whethertheperiodofprescriptionwouldnotbethirtyyears.

WethinkweareentitledtoassumethattheParliam
entwasnotentirely
oblivioustotheseconsiderationsand,asthelanguageofsection24
cannotbesaidtobecapableofonlyonenecessarilyexclusive
meaningprecludingitsapplicationtoclaimsundersection21ofthe
charactermentioned,therewouldappeartobereasonablegroundfor
holdingthatsuchapplicationwaswithintheprobableintentionof
Parliament.
Otherauthoritiesonthispoint,andtowhichIwasreferred,areLynnv.
Bamber[(1930)L.R.2K.B.D.72],Betjemannv.Betjemann[(1895)
L.R.2Ch.D.474],andOelkersv.Ellis[(1914)L.R.2K.B.D.139].
SalmondontheLawofTorts[9thEd.,pp.180,181],discussingthe
ruleofconcealedfraudstates:Whenthedefendanthasbeenguiltyoffraudorotherwilfulwrong
doing,theperiodoflimitationsdoesnotbegintorununtilthe
existenceofacauseofactionhasbecomeknowntotheplaintiff.
Thisiscommonlyspokenofastheruleofconcealedfraud,but
thetermfraudishereusedinitswidestsenseasmeaninganyact
ofwilfulandconsciouswrongdoing—forexample—awilful
undergroundtrespassandabstractionofminerals.Theterm
concealed,moreoverdoesnotimplyanyactivesuppressionofthe
factsbythedefendant,butmeansmerelythatthewrongis
unknowntothepersoninjuredatthetimeofitscommission….
Theruleofconcealedfrauddoesnotapplywhentheplaintiff
couldbyexerciseofcareanddiligencehavediscoveredthefraud.
Inotherwords,thestatuterunsnotfromthetimewhenthecause
ofactionwasdiscoveredbytheplaintiff,butfromanyearliertime
atwhichitoughttohavebeendiscovered.

Uponaconsiderationoftheevidence,andthecourseofconductofthe
defendant’sofficersandservants,Icannotavoidtheconclusionthat
thedefendantwilfullyandwrongfullyconcealedfromtheplaintiffsits
procurementoforiginalworksoftheplaintiffs,theplaintiffs’property,
frompersonsunauthorizedtopartwiththem,andsimilarlyconcealed
thefactthatithadcausedcopiesofthesametobemadeforitsown
use,andinfurtheranceofthatitcausedorcountenancedtheremoval
ofthenameornamesoftheownersofthecopyrightfromthesaid
copies.Ifsecrecyandconcealmentweredeemednecessaryinthe
stepsleadingtotheproductionoftheinfringingcopies,itisimprobable
thatthedefendantwouldceasetoconcealfromtheplaintiffsthe
conversionoftheinfringingcopiestoitsownuse;anditisafair
inferencethateverypossiblemeanswastakentoconcealthis
conversioninordertopreventtheplaintiffsobtainingevidenceofthe
infringement.Idonotthinktherehasbeenlaches,orlackof
reasonablediligence,onthepartoftheplaintiffs,todiscoverthe

infringementandconversion,anditwasnottheirf
aultthatthey
remainedinignoranceofthesame.Theevidencepointsstronglytothe
conclusionthattheofficersandmanagersofthedefendantcompany
believedtheplaintiffshadcopyrightintheworksinquestion,andthat
wouldbeasufficientmotiveforconcealingtheirwilfulwrongdoing.I
canhardlybelievethattheofficersofthedefendantcompanywouldnot
beconsciousoftheirwrongdoing,andtheywouldnotopenlyadoptthe
attitudethattheywereentitledasofrighttoenjoythefruitsofthe
extensiveandexpensivelaboursoftheplaintiffs,andthiswouldfurnish
amotiveforconcealingtheirwrongdoing.[atpp.269-270]

3.Underwriters’SurveyBureauLimitedv.Massie&RenwickLtd.,[1940]S.C.R.218,
DuffJ.ThereremainsthequestionoftheStatuteofLimitations.Thepoint
whichhasconcernedmemostastothisfeatureoftheappealis
whether,inviewofthefactthattherightstherespondentsseekto
enforcearethecreatureofthestatute,youcangobeyondthestatute
forthepurposeofascertainingthestatutorylimitation.

Ihavecometotheconclusion,however,thattheprincipleappliedin
BulliCoalMiningCo.v.Osborne[1899]A.C.351]cannotbelimitedto
undergroundtrespasses,thatitcoversthiscaseandthattherewas
ampleevidenceinsupportoftheconclusionofthelearnedtrialjudge
thattherehadbeenfraudulentconcealmentwithinthemeaningofthe
rule;withtheconsequencethatthelimitationperiodbegantorunonly
onthediscoveryofthefraud,oratthetimewhen,withreasonable
diligence,itwouldhavebeendiscovered.[atp.244]

4.WarnerBrothers-SevenArtsInc.v.CESM-TVLtd.(1971),65C.P.R.215,
CattanachJ.(Ex.Ct.).Itseemscleartomethattheprescriptionins.24oftheCopyrightAct
isagainsttherightoftheplaintiffstobeawardeddamagesbutthatthe
righttoaninjunctionisnotaffectedthereby.[atp.228]
(…)
Section24[nowsection41]oftheCopyrightActdoesnotapplywhere
theinfringementofthecopyrighthasbeenconcealed.
(…)
SalmondontheLawofTorts,discussingtheruleofconcealedfraud
states:“Whenthedefendanthasbeenguiltyoffraudorotherwilfulwrong
doing,theperiodoflimitationsdoesnotbegintorununtilthe

existenceofacauseofactionhasbecomeknownto
theplaintiff.
Thisiscommonlyspokenofastheruleofconcealedfraud,but
thetermoffraudishereusedinitswidestsenseasmeaningany
actofwilfulandconsciouswrongdoing—forexample—awilful
undergroundtrespassandabstractionofminerals.Theterm
concealed,moreoverdoesnotimplyanyactivesuppressionofthe
factsbythedefendant,butmeansmerelythatthewrongis
unknowntothepersoninjuredatthetimeofitscommission….
Theruleofconcealedfrauddoesnotapplywhentheplaintiff
couldbytheexerciseofcareanddiligencehavediscoveredthe
fraud.Inotherwords,thestatuterunsnotfromthetimewhenthe
causeofactionwasdiscoveredbytheplaintiff,butfromany
earliertimeatwhichitoughttohavebeendiscovered.”

OntheevidenceIcannotavoidtheconclusionthatthedefendant
“concealed”itsconductfromtheplaintiffsinthesenseoftheabove
quotationfromSalmondinthatwhilethedefendantdidnotactively
suppressanyfactsthewrongwasunknowntotheplaintiffs.The
defendantdidmakefulldisclosureofitsplantotheDepartmentof
Transportinitsapplicationforitsinitiallicenceandduringthe
negotiationsthereforeandtostationsCBWTandCJAYrequestedto
dosobytheDepartmentofTransport.[atpp.244-245]

5.FormulesMunicipalesLtéev.Pineault(1975)19C.P.R.(2d)139,WalshJ.
(F.C.T.D.).Thefactthatdefendantshavebeencompetingwithplaintiffformany
yearsinthepublicationandsaleofsimilarformsseemstohavebeen
toleratedbyplaintiffsothateveniftheseearlierformswerecopied
fromplaintiff’sandgiventhesameorsimilarnumbersitwouldappear
tobetoolateforplaintifftoinvokecopyrightprotectioninconnection
withthem.
(…)
Idonotfind,however,thatevenifplaintiffhasadoptedacourseof
conductovertheyearswherebyithastoleratedthecopying,printing
andsaleofformsdevisedbyit(if,indeed,suchisthecase)by
defendantswithoutcomplaintitistherebyprecludedfrombringing
proceedingsininfringementofcopyrightwithrespecttomorerecently
devisedformswhichithascopyrightedprovidedithasthen,with
reasonablediligence,broughtactiontoenjoindefendantswhohave
allegedlycopiedandarepublishingandsellingsamefromsodoing.[at
pp.142-143]

6.Kerrv.R.(1982),66C.P.R.(2d)165,GrantJ.(F.C.T.D.).

AfterMarch18,1976,thedefendantdidnotusethe
cartooncharacter
“Metrix”inanyofitscommercials.Section24[nowsection41]ofthe
CopyrightActprovidesasfollows:
24.Anactioninrespectofinfringementofcopyrightshallnotbe
commencedaftertheexpirationofthreeyearsnextafterthe
infringement.

ThisactionwascommencedonFebruary21,1980.Therefore,the
plaintiffcouldonlysucceedinrespectofinfringement(ifany)thattook
placesubsequenttoFebruary21,1977.Subsequenttothatdate,the
MetricCommissiondidgrantpermissiontoothercorporationstocreate
artworkincorporatingthecartooncharacter“Metrix”thereininrelation
tothemetricsystemonly.[atp.169]
7.UniversalCityStudiosInc.v.ZellersInc.(1983),[1984]1F.C.49,WalshJ.
(F.C.T.D.).Whiledefendantcontendsthatplaintiffswaitednearlysixmonthsfrom
October1982untilMarch1983beforebringingproceedingsitwas
necessaryforplaintiffstofulfilcertainlegalrequirementsfirstbywayof
theformalassignmentsofthecopyrightsinNovember,antthe
registrationofE.T.sculptureinDecember1982.Assoonasthe
allegedinfringingsaleswerediscoveredletterstodesistwerewritten
bothtoDefendantZellersInc.andtoInternationalGamesofCanada
LimitedinOctober,andInternationalGamesrespondedpositively,
undertakingtowithdrawanymerchandisingofthedolls.Itwasonlyin
Novemberthatplaintiffsbecameawareofthesalebydefendantofthe
keychains.Idonotconsiderthereforethatthedelayininstituting
proceedingsconstitutesacquiescence.
(…)
Thefactthatotherinfringingsalesaretakingplaceisnotadefence
availabletodefendantnoristhereanyevidencebeforetheCourtinthe
presentproceedingstoindicatethatstepshavenotalsobeentakenby
plaintiffsagainsttheothervendorsofsuchallegedlyinfringing
merchandiseassoonasthesesalesareascertained.Theymaywell
besocommonthatitisdifficultforplaintiffstokeepupwithallsuch
sales.Inthecaseofsmallinfringersitmaywellnotbeworththeirwhile
toinstituteproceedingsagainstthem.Idonotbelievehoweverthaton
theevidencebeforemeitcanbesaidthatplaintiffshavetoleratedor
condonedanysuchinfringement.[atpp.61-62]
8.RandallHomesLtd.v.HarwoodHomesLtd.(1987),17C.P.R.(3d)372,FergJ.
(Man.Q.B.).

Alloftheevidenceinthecase,someadmissionsby
thedefendant’s
presidentondiscovery,includingtheabsenceofanyevidencetothe
contrary,pointtothecharacteranddesignofthishomeasbeing
uniqueandoriginal.Thereareonly23homesofthisparticulardesign
inWinnipeg,allerectedfromHarzan’sparticularcreativedesign,orif
youwill,artisticwork.Itwasarguedahouseisahouse,thattherecan
benooriginalityinahouse,butheretherewasdefinitelyoriginality.
Evidenceindicatedthishousewasdifferent,wasdesignedwithflair,
manydistinctivefeatureswereusedanditselevations,itsthree
dimensions,producedaparticularlypleasingcurbappeal,thatis“the
look”.Distinctive,ifnotuniqueanglesinroofingandover-allstructural
formforasplit-levelhome,areevidentinPlan1605.Somuchso,in
fact,thatthedistinctivenessandoriginalityofthedesigncouldbe
recognized(andwasbythebasementcontractor)assoonasthe
basementofthecopiedhomewaspoured.Theunauthorizeduseof
theplanwasdiscoveredjustafterthebasementwaspoured.Ithas
beensaidthatwhereadesignerproducesgooddesign,good
proportion,andgooduseofmaterial,thatthisisthetrueartistryof
architecture.Thatthisdwellingdesigncarriedwithitinfactan
originality,Icannotquestion.Andthat,Ithink,withrespect,isthetest.
[atp.377]
9.R.v.Shimming(1991),35C.P.R.(3d)397,AllenJ.(Sask.Prov.Ct.).A.The
limitationperiod
Itiscleartomethattheinfringementofacopyrightnotonlygivesrise
toacivilactionforinjunctionanddamages,butalsotopunitive
penaltieswhichmaybeleviedbycourtsofsummaryjurisdiction.
Authoritiessupportthepropositionthatacriminalprosecutionfor
summarypenaltiesdoesnotdebarthecopyrightownerfromhis
remedybywayofinjunctioninacivilactionbroughtforthe
infringementofthecopyright.
TheCopyrightActaddressesthecivilremediesinss.34to41andthe
summaryremediesinss.42and43.
TheonlylimitationperiodspecifiedintheCopyrightActisfoundins.
41.
LearnedCrowncounselhasurgeduponmetheinterpretationofthe
word“action”asfoundins.41toincludeaproceedinginacourtof
justicebywhichonepartyprosecutesanotherforthepunishmentofa
publicoffence,asfoundinBlack’sLawDictionary,Revised4thed.
(1968),p.49.
Withrespect,Ithinkitisobviousfromareadingofss.34to43thats.

41appliesonlytoactionsforcivilremediesandd
oesnotapplytothe
provisionsoftheActwhichimposesummarypenalties,namely,ss.42
and43.
SincetheActdoesnotcontainaspecifictime-limitwithinwhich
summaryconvictionproceedingsmustbeinstituted,thegeneraltime
limitationofsixmonthsprovidedins.786(2)oftheCriminalCode,
R.S.C.1985,c.C-46,applies,sincetheseproceedingscomewithinthe
definitionof“proceedings”withins.785oftheCode.

Inthesubjectcase,theinformationcontains53counts.Thefirst25
countsareallegedtohaveoccurredbetweenOctober1,1986,and
January10,1990.The26thcountisallegedtohaveoccurredbetween
December11,1989andJanuary12,1990.Thenext10countsare
allegedtohaveoccurredbetweenApril1,1989andJanuary10,1990.
Thelast17countsareallegedtohaveoccurredbetweenJuly11,1988
andJanuary10,1990.
Theinformationdetailingthe53countswasswornonJuly4,1990.The
six-monthlimitationperiodrunningbackintimefromthatdatebrings
ustoJanuary4,1990.Inmyopinion,thisprovidesatimeframeofsix
days(January4,1990toJanuary10,1990)withinwhichthe
infringementsallegedmusthaveoccurredinordertosustainthe
charge.ThesoleexceptiontothisiscountNo.26,wherethetime
frameiseightdays(January4,1990toJanuary12,1990).[atpp.398-
399]
10.ConstructionsnouvelledimensionInc.c.Alarie(1992),J.E.92-938,GoodwinJ.
(Que.Sup.Ct.).L’avocatdelademanderessesoutientque,danslescirconstances,le
recoursnepeutêtreprescritparleseulécoulementdutemps.Eneffet,
saclienteétaitdansl’impossibilitéd’intenterdesprocédures:Elle
ignoraitjusqu’enoctobre1989quesondroitd’auteuravaitétéenfreint.
Lasituationimpliquequelaprescriptionnecourtqu’àcompterdela
connaissancedelaviolation.
Ilyalieudenoterquelademanderesseafaitdiligenceetn’a
aucunementrenoncéàprotégersesdroits,telqu’enfontfoid’autres
poursuitesqu’elleaintentées.[atp.4ofthefullreport]

…
LeTribunaldéclarequelerecoursestprescrit.
L’actiondelademanderesseaétédéposéeaugreffedelaCour

supérieurele30mars1990,soitquelque42moisap
rèsquela
violationalléguéeeutétéincontestablementapparente,quel’on
retienneseptembre1986ouoctobre1986.
LeTribunalnemetpasendoutelesproposdeM.Beaulieuàl’effet
qu’iln’aitpuconstaterlaviolationalléguéeavantoctobre1989.Mais,
enl’absencedefraudeoudedissimulationfrauduleusedelapartdela
défenderesse,ilfauts’enteniràl’article41précitéquifixela
prescriptionàtroisansàcompterdelaviolation.

Letextedecettedispositionestsanséquivoqueetdoitêtreappliqué
rigoureusement.Silelégislateuravaitvouluqu’ilensoitautrement,il
auraitdûledire.Cependant,mêmeàl’occasiondel’adoptiondelaLoi
modifiantlaLoisurledroitd’auteur(envigueurdepuis1988),iln’apas
jugéàproposdemodifiercetaspectdel’article41(3).Iln’estdoncpas
loisibled’yajouterquelqueautrenotionouconsidération,malgré
l’exposébienétofféduprocureurdelademanderesse.[atp.5ofthe
fullreport]
11.Pagliarov.Pantis(1994),J.E.94-1041,BenoîtJ.(Que.Sup.Ct.).
L’article41delaloistipulequelesactionspourviolationdesdroits
d’auteurseprescriventpartroisansàcompterdelaviolation.Le
demandeuratémoignéqu’ils’estenquisavant1980desventesdeces
albumsmaisqueledéfendeurDenisPantisaprétenduquelesventes
n’étaientpassuffisantespourdonnerdroitàdesroyautésetdes
redevances.Ledemandeurprétendqu’iln’aeuconnaissancedes
violationsdesesdroitsqu’àsonretourd’Europeàlafindel’année
1987,soitaudébutdel’année1988.Àcepropos,ledemandeurs’est
trouvéauQuébecjusqu’en1980etilluiauraitétéfaciledeconstater
quelesdéfendeursreproduisaientoupermettaientàd’autresde
reproduirelesœuvresmusicalesdesalbumsDP-1,DP-2etDP-3et
d’obteniruneordonnanced’injonctionetuneredditiondecompte.La
loinepeutvenirenaideàquisefermelesyeux.Lesdemandeursne
peuventenconséquenceexercerdesréclamationspourlesvingt
annéespasséesavantd’instituerlaprésenteaction.

Cependant,ledemandeurMichelPagliaros’étantétablienFrancede
1980à1987inclusivement,apuattacherfoiauxprétentions
antérieuresdesdéfendeurs.Iln’étaitpasenmesuredeconstaterpar
lui-même.Ilaaffirméquec’estàsonretourauQuébecqu’ila
découvertquelesdéfendeursreproduisaientalorssesœuvresetles
avaientreproduitesenalbumouprétenduavoiraccordél’autorisationà
destiersdelesproduireenalbums(piècesDP-4àDP-11plusdeux
autresalbumsetquatrecassettes).LedemandeurMichelPagliaron’a
pudécouvrirque,pendantsonabsencedupays,lesdéfendeurs

étaientlesproducteursimmédiatsouparintermédia
iredes
reproductionsillégales.Lesdéfendeursn’ontjamaisagiouvertement.
Aussiledemandeurest-il,danslescirconstancesrévéléesparla
preuve,endroitderéclamerpourviolationdesesdroitspourlesdix
annéesantérieuresàl’institutiondel’action.Ilestreconnuquela
prescriptionn’estpasunobstacledansuntelcas.[atpp.16-17]

12.Prud’hommev.EnseignesNormallRussell(1993),J.E.93-840,(DownsJ.(Que.
Sup.Ct.).Eneffet,lesdroitsd’auteurnefontpaspartiedelapropriétémobilière
ouimmobilièreausensdel’article585(2)delaLoisurlescitéset
villes.Ilssontdelacompétenceexclusivedugouvernementfédéralen
vertudel’alinéa91(23)delaLoiconstitutionnellede1867.Ilsne
peuventdoncêtrerestreintsousupprimésparuneloiprovinciale.

Noussommesenprésenced’untextefédéralclair.L’article41dela
Loisurledroitd’auteur,S.R.C.1970,c.C-30,prévoitqueledroit
d’actioncivileàl’encontred’uncontrevenantauxdroitsd’unauteurse
prescritpartroisans.Or,sil’applicationdel’alinéa585(2)delaLoisur
lescitésetvillesdevaiticiêtreretenue,del’aveumêmeduprocureur
deladéfenderesse-requérante,lenon-respectdudélaiprévu
signifieraitqueledroitd’actionàl’encontredelamunicipalitén’aurait
jamaisprisnaissance.[atp.4]
13.Tele-Direct(Publications)Inc.v.AmericanBusinessInformation,Inc.(1996),113
F.T.R.123,McGillisJ.(F.C.T.D.-Merits).Icannotaccepttheargumentofcounselforthedefendantthatthe
actionisbarred,inwholeorinpart,bythethreeyearlimitationperiod
ins.41oftheCopyrightAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42,asamended(“Act”).
TheactioninthismatterwasinstitutedbyaStatementofClaimfiledon
June10,1994,andtheallegationsofcopyrightinfringementwere
raisedinanAmendedStatementofClaimfiledonOctober27,1994.
AlthoughABIbeganitsoperationsinCanadain1990,theevidence
adducedattrialestablishesthatTele-Directwasunawareofthe
activitiesofABI,whichformthebasisoftheallegationsofcopyright
infringement,untilsomepointin1994.EvenifIweretoassumethat
theABIpamphletssubsequentlyfoundinthefilesofTele-Directduring
thecourseofpreparingthislitigationweresufficienttoimputeTele-
Directwiththerequisitedegreeofknowledge,thesepamphletsbear
datesrangingfromJuly1992to1995.Inthecircumstances,thatwould
beinsufficienttoengagethelimitationperiodins.41oftheAct.The
actionisthereforenotbarred,inwholeorinpart,bythelimitation
periodins.41oftheAct.[atp.136]

14.
Milliken&Co.v.InterfaceFlooringSystems(Canada)Inc.75CPR(3d)481
(FCTD-SummaryJudgment;1996-12-02)Tremblay-LamerJ.
Iamoftheopinionthatthedefendantwasrightinassertingthatthes.
41limitationperiodhasnoapplicationwithrespecttoinjunctiverelief.

[…]

Therationaleforthatrulelies,inmyopinion,withtheequitablenature
ofinjunctiverelief.Inclaimsforinjunctionorotherequitablerelief,
statuteslimitingthetimeduringwhichactionsmaybebroughtshould
generallybeconsideredinapplicable.[See,byanalogy,I.C.F.Spry,
ThePrinciplesofEquitableRemedies,TheLawBookCompanyLtd.,
4thed.,Australia,1990,atpp.241and242.]
Notwithstandingthis,thes.41limitationperiodstillpreventsaplaintiff
fromclaimingnon-injunctivereliefifmorethanthreeyearshavelapsed
sincetheallegedinfringementdate.Certaincommonlawexceptions
may,however,preventadefendantfromrelyinguponastatutory
limitationperiod.Suchisthecasewiththepromissoryestoppeland
waiverdoctrines.Forpromissoryestoppel,theplaintiffmustestablish
thatthedefendant,bywordsorconduct,madeapromisewhichwas
intendedtoaffecttheirlegalrelationshipandtobeactedupon.Further,
theplaintiffmustestablishthatheactuallyreliedonsuch
representation.Forwaiver,theplaintiffmustestablishthatthe
defendantactedinamannerwherebytheywaivedrelianceupona
knownrightordefect.[atp.489.]

15.Pagliarov.Pantis(1997),J.E.97-1940,NussJ.(Que.C.A.).
Pourcequiestdesroyautésàtitred’interprète,labasedurecours
étantdenaturedélictuelle,laprescriptionestdedeuxansenvertude
l’article2261(2)duC.c.B.I.-C.[…]
Parleurappelincident,lesintimésallèguentquelesappelantsne
peuventbénéficierdelaprescriptioncarilyaeucontinuitédansles
actesqu’ilscaractérisentfrauduleux.Or,ilesterronédeprétendreà
lacontinuitédelacontrefaçonpuisquelesintervallesentreles
reproductionssontdesixans(1976-1982)etdeseptans(1982-
1989).
D’autrepart,lorsqu’ils’agitd’uneactiondélictuellefondéesurla
fraude,lesmêmesdélaisquepourlesautresactionsdélictuelles
trouventapplication.NotreCour,souslaplumedujugeMontgomery,
dansl’arrêtLilianDiamondc.SergeBikadoroff,(1976)C.A.695,s’est
prononcéeencesmotssurlapériodedeprescriptionsrelativeàla

fraude:
“Iknowofnorulethatprescriptiondoesnotruninfavourofone
whohascommittedafraud,andcounselforAppellantcould
submitnoauthorityforsucharule.”

(messoulignements)(p.696)
[atpp.34-14]

LaCoursupérieureadéclaréPagliaropropriétairedesbandes
maîtresseset/ouphonogrammesproduitsencontrefaçondesesdroits
d’auteur.Bienquejesoisd’avisquetouteslesœuvresenlitigeontété
reproduitesencontrefaçondesdroitsdePagliaro,ilsubsistela
questiondudélaideprescriptionapplicableàlarevendicationdela
propriétédesbienscontrefaits.
LeseularticledelaLoirelatifàlaprescriptionestl’article41précitéqui
lafixeàtroisans.
LaCoursuprême,dansl’affaireMassie&Renwick,Ltd.c.
Underwriters’SurveyBureauLtd.,[1937]R.C.S.265,270,énonceque
cedélaideprescriptions’appliqueàtouslesredressementsprévusà
titrederecourscivilsincluantlerecoursprévuàl’art.38relatifàla
propriétédesœuvrescontrefaites.
Jesuisdoncd’avisquePagliarodoitêtredéclarépropriétairedes
œuvrespourlesquellessondroitderevendiquerlapropriétén’estpas
prescrit,c’est-à-direl’albumK-Tel(DP-10)de1985ainsiqueles4
cassettes15035,15057,15078et21003quiontétéproduitesen
1989.Lasaisiedesautresœuvresdevraitparconséquentêtre
annulée.[atp.19]
16.McCutcheonv.Haufschild(1998),146F.T.R.28,HargraveProthonotary
(F.C.T.D.-Pleadings)[Onplaintiff’smotiontoamendthestatementofclaim].
Paragraph83pleadsapostponementoflimitationunders.41(1)(b)of
theCopyrightAct,thePlaintiffallegingshewasnotawareofany
infringementwhichoccurredmorethanthreeyearsbeforefilingthe
statementofclaim.TheissuewillthereforebewhetherthePlaintiff,by
exercisingreasonablediligence,mighthavediscoveredthe
infringementatanearliertime:seeforexampleWarnerBros.-Seven
Artsinc.v.CESM–TV(1971),65C.P.R.215at246.Underthe
circumstancesthisisanappropriateamendment.

17.
Robinsonv.FilmsCinarInc.(1998),R.E.J.B.98-9618,RayleJ.(Que.Sup.Ct.-
Option).SileTribunaldevaitfractionnerl’actionaujourd’hui,plusdedeuxans
aprèssasignification,ilneferaitqueretarder«lamarchenormaledu
procès»sansparailleursremédieràquelquepréjudicequecesoit.Au
contraire,leTribunalcraintquepareiljugementn’aitpourrésultat
d’enclencherentrelespartiesuneséried’incidentsprocéduriers
additionnels.L’article41delaLoisurledroitd’auteurprévoiteneffet
quelesactionspourviolationseprescriventpartroisansàcompterde
laviolation.Ilaétédécidé[Massie&RenwickLtd.c.Underwriters’
Survey(1937)R.C.S.265,arrêtcitéetsuividansPantisc.Pagliaro,
J.E.97-1940(C.A.)]quecedélais’appliqueàtouslesredressements
prévusparlaloi.Lesdéfendeursayantattenduprécisémenttroisans
etunmoisdepuislasurvenancedesévénementspourexigerqueles
demandeursoptententreleursdiversrecours,onpeuts’attendreàce
qu’unjugementquileurseraitfavorabledonnelieuàdesincidents
additionnelsparlesquelsonopposeraitauxdemandeursl’extinctiondu
recoursdisjoint.Or,cesdébatsseraientfutilespuisquelejugementqui
ordonneraitlefractionnementdel’action,n’apaspoureffetd’éteindre
lesdroitsdespartiescommelesoulignaitlaCourd’appeldansl’arrêt
CogecoDesign&ConstructionLtéec.Commissiondelaconstruction
duQuébec[J.E.89-330(C.A.)].[atp.8]

18.R.v.Bonamy(2000),6C.P.R.(4th)1,RowlesJ.(B.C.C.A.).
[13]Theappellantarguesthattheoffenceschargedincounts1and2,
bothofwhichwereallegedtohavetakenplacebetween1May1991
and1November1993,arebarredbecauseofthetimelimitation
containedins.41oftheCopyrightAct.Section41providesthat“an
actionshallnotbecommencedaftertheexpirationofthreeyears
immediatelyfollowingtheinfringement”.Theappellantpointsoutthat
hewasnotchargedwiththeoffencesincounts1and2until12
January1996.
[14]Anexaminationoftheprovisionsinss.34to41oftheCopyright
Actleadsmetotheconclusionthatthosesectionsareconcernedwith
civilremediesforinfringementofcopyrightwhereasss.42and43of
theActclearlycreateoffencesforwhichfinesorimprisonmentmaybe
imposed.Thelimitationperiodreferredtoins.41wouldapplyto
actionsforcivilremediesbutnottothesectionswhichcreateoffences.
[atparas.13,14]

19.Bergeronv.SogidèsLtée,[2000]J.Q.3058,RobertJ.(Que.C.A.).
Enl’espèce,lesintimésdoiventrendrecompteauxauteurschaque
année.Laprescriptiondespaiementsdusauxauteurscourtàcompter

dechaqueéchéance.[atpara.33]

§6.1.2LimitationCases

1.Martelv.Hôtel-DieuSt-Vallier,[1969]S.C.R.745,PigeonJ.
[Translation]Butinviewofthefactthatthehospitalmustbeheldliable,
itwouldseemcleartomethatthelimitationperiod,whichwas
interruptedbyserviceofthewritonthehospital,wasalsointerruptedin
sofarastheactiontheanaesthetistisconcerned….Accordingtoa
well-establishedlineofjurisprudence,thereisjointandseveralliability
amongallthoseresponsibleforthesameoffenceorquasi-offence.[at
p.753]

2.ConsolboardInc.v.MacMillanBloedel(Saskatchewan)Ltd.(1982),63C.P.R.(2d)
1,CattanachJ.(F.C.T.D.).Certainlytheapplicationtopleadastatuteoflimitationshasamost
materialbearinguponthequestionofliability.
Atcommonlawastatuteoflimitationsdoesnotbaranobligationor
debtbutitdoesbartherightofactiontoenforcethatobligationordebt.

Underthecivillawprescriptionisanextinctionofthoserights.

AsIseethedifferenceunderthecommonlawitisaproceduralpointof
lawandmustberaisedbyanexpresspleading.Rule409providesthat
ifadefendanthasaspecialgroundofdefencewhichmakestheclaim
ofaplaintiffnotmaintainablethatdefencemustbepleadedotherwiseit
isnotavailable.
Underthecivillawinprescriptionsofshortdurationsthedebtor
obligationisabsolutelyextinguishedandnoactioncanbemaintained.

InthatinstancetheCourtofitsownmotionwillsupplythedefence.At
substantivelawthereisnodefence.Thatholdstrueonlywhereitis
apparenttheclaimisextinguished.Differentconsiderationswould
prevailinthecasesofacontinuinginfringementofapatentright.In
thateventunderthecivillawaprescriptionwouldaffectonlythepartof
thedamagesprescribed.
Thesamewouldholdtrueunderthecommonlawifastatuteof
limitationshadbeenpleaded.Theplaintiffcouldonlyobtainreliefin
damagesfortheperiodnotprescribed.Fordamagesincurredbeyond
thatperioditsactionisbarred.Butthatispredicateduponthestatute
beingpleaded.

Itmaybethatcounselforthedefendantconsidered
thatbecause
limitationperiodshavebeenfixedbylegislationthatsuchprovidesa
guidetothetruemeasureofdamagesbecausethedelaybythe
plaintiffinassertingitsrightsinaCourtofcompetentjurisdictionwould
makedamagesforagreaterperiodunreasonable.Ithinksucha
groundforminimizingdamagesinthisinstanceisuntenable.

ACourtofequityhasalwaysrefuseditsaidtostaledemandswherea
partyhassleptonitsrightandacquiescedforagreatlengthoftime.

Thatisthemaxim,Vigilantibusetnondormientibusjurasubserviunt.

LordBlackburninErlangeretal.v.NewSombreroPhosphateCo.et
al.(1878),3A.C.1218,quotedatp.1279theexpositionofthis
doctrinebySirBarnesPeacockinLindsayPetroleumCo.v.Hurdetal.
(1874),5L.R.P.C.221.
SirBarnesPeacocksaidatpp.239-40:…ThedoctrineoflachesinCourtsofEquityisnotanarbitraryor
atechnicaldoctrine.Whereitwouldbepracticallyunjusttogivea
remedy,eitherbecausethepartyhas,byhisconductdonethat
whichmightfairlyberegardedasequivalenttoawaiverofit,or
wherebyhisconductandneglecthehas,thoughtperhapsnot
waivingthatremedy,yetputtheotherpartyinasituationinwhich
itwouldnotbereasonabletoplacehimiftheremedywere
afterwardstobeasserted,ineitherofthesecaseslapseoftime
anddelayaremostmaterial.Butineverycaseifanargument
againstrelief,whichotherwisewouldbejust,isfoundedupon
meredelay,thatdelayofcoursenotamountingtoabarbyany
statuteoflimitations,thevalidityofthatdefencemustbetried
uponprinciplessubstantiallyequitable.Twocircumstancesalways
importantinsuchcasesare,thelengthofthedelayandthe
natureoftheactsdoneduringtheinterval,whichmightaffect
eitherpartyandcauseabalanceofjusticeorinjusticeintaking
theonecourseortheother,sofarasrelatestotheremedy.

ButSirBarnesPeacockspecificallypointedoutthatthedelay,toserve
asadefenceoflaches,mustnotbesuchamountingtoabarbyany
statuteoflimitations.
Thedoctrineoflachesisalsoadefenceandassuchittoomustbe
pleadedanditwasnotpleadedinthedefendant’sstatementof
defence.

Whileastatuteoflimitationsisadefencetoaqu
estionofliabilityitalso
hasamostmaterialbearingonthequestionofdamagesina
continuinginfringement.Itprescribes,ifpleaded,theperiodforwhich
damagesforinfringementwillexist.Ifnotpleadedthedamagesarefor
theperiodduringwhichinfringementtookplacesubjecttonolimitation.
[atpp.27-28]
3.Guérinv.R.,[1984]2S.C.R.335,DicksonJ.
Itiswellestablishedthatwheretherehasbeenafraudulent
concealmentoftheexistenceofacauseofaction,thelimitationperiod
willnotstarttorununtiltheplaintiffdiscoversthefraud,oruntilthetime
when,withreasonablediligence,heoughttohavediscoveredit.The
fraudulentconcealmentnecessarytotollorsuspendtheoperationof
thestatuteneednotamounttodeceitorcommonlawfraud.Equitable
fraud,definedinKitchenv.RoyalAirForceAssociation,[1958]1
W.L.R.563,as“conductwhich,havingregardtosomespecial
relationshipbetweenthetwopartiesconcerned,isanunconscionable
thingfortheonetodotowardstheother”,issufficient.Iagreewiththe
trialjudgethattheconductoftheIndianAffairsBranchtowardthe
Bandamountedtoequitablefraud.AlthoughtheBranchofficialsdidnot
actdishonestlyorforimpropermotivesinconcealingthetermsofthe
leasefromtheBand,inmyviewtheirconductwasnevertheless
unconscionable,havingregardtothefiduciaryrelationshipbetweenthe
BranchandtheBand.Thelimitationsperioddidnotthereforestartto
rununtilMarch1970.Theactionwasthustimelywhenfiledon
December22,1975[atp.390]

4.Krugerv.R.(1985),17D.L.R.(4th)591,HealdJ.(F.C.A.).
Subsection38(1)[nowsection39]oftheFederalCourtActprovides
that:
38(1)…thelawsrelatingto…thelimitationofactionsinforcein
anyprovince…applytoanyproceedingsintheCourtinrespect
ofanycauseofactionarisinginsuchprovince…

Subsection38(2)providesthat:38(2)…thelawsrelatingto…thelimitationsofactionsreferredto
insubsection(1)applytoanyproceedingsbroughtbyoragainst
theCrown.

Accordingly,itisnecessarytoconsiderthelawofBritishColumbia
respectinglimitationofactions,attherelevanttimes.Theapplicable
StatuteofLimitationsin1941and1946,whenthesecausesofaction

arose,wasR.S.B.C.1936,c.159.Underthatstatut
e,thelimitation
periodforactionsrelatingtorealpropertywasstatedtobe20years.
Howevers.38ofthatActprovides:38.Ineverycaseofaconcealedfraud,therightofanypersonto
bringasuitinequityfortherecoveryofanylandorrentofwhich
he,oranypersonthroughwhomheclaims,mayhavebeen
deprivedbysuchfraudshallbedeemedtohavefirstaccruedat
andnotbeforethetimeatwhichsuchfraudshallorwith
reasonablediligencemighthavebeenfirstknownordiscovered…

UnlikeGuerinetal.v.TheQueenetal.(1984),13D.L.R.(4th)321,
[1984]2S.C.R.335,[1984]6W.W.R.481,thecausesofactioninthe
instantcasecouldhavebeendiscoverediftheappellantshad
exercisedreasonablediligenceatthesametimethecausesofaction
arose.Puttingtheappellants’caseatitsveryhighest,theeffective
datesunderthissectionwouldbe,inthecaseofParcel“A”,Januaryof
1941,andinthecaseofParcel“B”,Februaryof1946.Inbothcases
then,thelimitationperiodwouldhaveexpiredlongbeforethisaction
wascommenced,iftheBritishColumbiaStatuteofLimitationsof1936
isapplied.[atp.624]
5.Sandvik,A.B.v.WindsorMachineCo.(1986),8C.P.R.(3d)433,CollierJ.
(F.C.T.D.).Limitation(prescription)periods
ThedefendantsarguedthatanyallegedinfringementbyWindsorwas
inBritishColumbia,andthetimeforbringingsuitwasdeterminedby
applicablelegislationofthatprovince.Itwascontendedthetimeforsuit
wastwoyearsafterthecauseofactionarose.Itwassaidany
damages,oraccountingofprofits,must,accordingly,onlygobackto
twoyearsbeforethisactionwascommenced(June30,1975).

AsimilarcontentionwasadvancedonbehalfofStihl,basedonart.
2261oftheCivilCodeofQuebec,foratwo-yearprescription.

Thesearguments,inmyview,failbecausetheso-calleddefences
havenotbeenproperlypleaded.Inpara.20ofWindsor’sdefence,and
para.19ofthatofStihl,thisissaid:“Inthealternativedefendant…will
relyuponSection38(1)oftheFederalCourtAct.”Section38(1)ofthe
FederalCourtAct,R.S.C.1970,c.10(2ndSupp.),isasfollows:
(38(1)ExceptasexpresslyprovidedbyanyotherAct,thelaws
relatingtoprescriptionandthelimitationofactionsinforceinany
provincebetweensubjectandsubjectapplytoanyproceedingsin

theCourtinrespectofanycauseofactionarising
insuch
province,andaproceedingintheCourtinrespectofacauseof
actionarisingotherwisethaninaprovinceshallbetakenwithin
andnotaftersixyearsafterthecauseofactionarose.

Rule409oftheFederalCourtRuleshassomeapplication.
Rule409.Apartyshallpleadspecificallyanymatter(e.g.,
performance,release,astatuteoflimitation,prescription,fraudor
anyfactshowingillegality)
(a)thatheallegesmakesaclaimordefenceoftheopposite
partynotmaintainable,
(b)that,ifnotspecificallypleaded,mighttaketheoppositeparty
bysurprise;or
(c)thatraisesissuesoffactnotarisingoutofthepreceding
pleading.

Thedefendants’pleainthiscaseisoneoflaw.Thereisnoprecise
statementofmaterialfacts(Rule409(1)whichcanthenbesaidto
bringintoplaythelimitationorprescriptionprovisionsofparticular
provinces.Thepleas,asframed,arecompletelydevoidofinformation
astowhatisreallyalleged.Thepropermethod,tomymind,wouldbe
tosetoutthematerialfactsgivingrisetotheinvocationofthetwo-year
prescriptionperiodsreliedon.Thepleashouldthengoontospecify
thespecificprovinciallimitationsections,orarticles,andtheeffectthey
haveonthetimefromwhichallegeddamages,oraccountingofprofits
canbeassessedorcalculated.
Thepleasinthiscaseleavetheplaintiffcompletelyinthedark.[atp.
443]

6.DeJongP.Z.v.FalconMaritimeManagementS.A.(Panama)(1988),[1989]2F.C.
63,DubéJ.(F.C.T.D.).Casesrecognizingtheinterruptionofprescriptionagainstjointand
severaldebtorsofanobligationarisingfromaquasi-offenceare
numerousinQuebeclaw.[Gélinas-Deschènesc.Damphousse,[1967]
C.S.709;Berthiaumec.RicheretLefebvreetVilledeLongueuil,
[1975]C.A.638;BanqueCanadienneNationalec.Gingras,[1973]
C.A.868;andseealsoMartineau,Pierre,LaPrescription,P.U.M.
1977,atp.346.]Ithasthereforebeenclearlyestablishedthat
interruptionagainstalljointandseveraldebtors,includingtortfeasors,
iseffectedwhenoneofthemissuedinduetime.[atp.68]

7.
Kibalev.R.,(1990),[1991]1F.C.D-46,PratteJ.(F.C.A.).
UnerequêtefaiteenvertudelaRègle419(1)a)doitêtrejugéesurla
seulevuedespiècesdeprocéduresansqu’aucunepreuvesoit
admissible.C’estlaRègle419(2)quiledit.[Voiràcesujetceque
disaitlejugeHugessendansSembawangReeferLines(Bahamas)
Ltd.v.TheShip“LineErre”,etal.—décisionnonrapportéedu15mai
1990,dossiernoA-330-89.]D’autrepart,un“StatuteofLimitations”
suivantla“commonlaw”n’éteintpasledroitd’actionmaisdonne
seulementaudéfendeurunmoyendedéfensed’ordreprocéduralqu’il
peutnepasinvoqueretqu’ildoit,s’ilveuts’enprévaloir,plaideren
défense(voirRègle409).C’estdirequ’undemandeurn’estpastenu,
lorsqu’ilrédigesadéclaration,d’alléguertouslesfaitsquidémontrent
quesonactionestpriseentempsutile.Eneffet,undemandeurn’est
pasobligédeprévoirtouslesmoyensquesonadversairepourralui
opposer.Ilpeutattendrelaproductiondeladéfenseet,danslecasou
ledéfendeurinvoquequel’actionesttardive,plaiderenréponseles
faitsqui,àsonavis,révèlentqu’ellenel’estpas.Ils’ensuitque,
commelejugeCollierledécidaitdansHannaetal.v.TheQueen
(1986),9F.T.R.124,undéfendeurdoitplaiderun“Statuteof
Limitations”danssadéfense;ilneluiestpaspermisdelefairedans
unerequêteenradiationsousl’empiredelaRègle419,car,onne
peut,pourlesmotifsquej’aidits,affirmerqu’uneactionesttardive
pourleseulmotifqueladéclarationnefaitpasvoirqu’ellenel’estpas.
[atp.2ofthefullreport]

8.Tolofsonv.Jensen,[1994]2S.C.R.1022,LaForestJ.(S.C.C.).
Canadiancourtshavealsobeguntoshatterthemystiqueofthesecond
reasonwhichrestsonthenotionthatstatutesoflimitationaredirected
totheremedyandnottheright.[atp.1070]

§6.2UnitedKingdom

1.BulliCoalMiningCompanyv.Osborne,[1899]A.C.351,HerefordJ.(J.C.P.C.).
Nowithasalwaysbeenaprincipleofequitythatnolengthoftimeisa
bartoreliefinthecaseoffraud,intheabsenceoflachesonthepartof
thepersondefrauded.Thereis,therefore,noroomfortheapplication
ofthestatuteinthecaseofconcealedfraud,solongastheparty
defraudedremainsinignorancewithoutanyfaultofhisown.[atp.363]

2.Nicolv.Barranger(1921),[1917-23]MacG.Cop.Cas.219,PetersonJ.(Ch.D.)
(laterreversedonothergroundsbytheCourtofAppeal).
Dealingwithadefenceundersec.10oftheCopyrightAct,1911,that
theinfringement,ifany,occurredmorethanthreeyearsbeforethe

commencementoftheaction,Mr.JusticePetersonsa
id:“Itwasurged
thatifMrs.SouttenreproducedMr.Faulkner’sdrawingitwasa
reproductionwhichwasmademorethanthreeyearsbeforetheissue
ofthewrit.Butthecataloguesof1916and1917werepublishedless
thanthreeyearsbeforetheissueofthewrit.Accordingtothe
defendant’scontentionthisfactisimmaterial.Thisisreallyacontention
thatthesectionmeansthatanactionforinfringementcannotbe
commencedmorethanthreeyearsafterthefirstinfringementofthe
copyrightbythedefendant.Butthisisnot,inmyview,thetrue
constructionofthesection.Everyunauthorizedreproductionisan
infringementofcopyright.Thesectionassumesthatitisproposedto
takeproceedingsinrespectofsomeparticularinfringementand
providesthatanactionshallnotlieinrespectofthatinfringement,
unlessithasoccurredwithinthethreeyearswhichimmediately
precedetheissueofthewrit.Thewords‘theinfringement’pointtothe
reproductionorinfringementofwhichcomplaintismade.Moreover,the
sectiondoesnot,inmyopinion,applytoanactionforaninjunction
restraininginfringementsinthefuture,inwhichpastinfringementsare
evidenceofthethreattoinfringeinthefuture(seeHoggv.Scott,L.R.
18Eq.444,adecisiononsec.26oftheActof1842).Apart,then,from
thefactthatsec.10hasnotbeenpleaded,Iamofopinionthatthis
argumentonthepartofthedefendantfails.”[atpp.228-229]

3.SutherlandPublishingCo.v.CaxtonPublishingCo.(1937),[1938]Ch.174,
MacKinnonJ.(C.A.).(DissentingopinionlateradoptedbytheHouseofLords).
Theplaintiffsinthiscasearebringinganactionforinfringementof
copyright.Theyclaimdamagesforthatinfringementunders.6,sub-s.
I.Theyclaimalsodamagesforconversionunders.7.Itisarguedthat
itisonlyinsofarastheremedyclaimedisunders.6,sub-s.I,that
thereisanactioninrespectoftheinfringementofcopyrightwithinthe
provisionofs.10.Butinsofarasinthisactiontheremedyclaimedis
unders.7,thisisnot“anactioninrespectofinfringementof
‘copyright’”withins.10,andasregardsthepartoftheclaimforthat
remedythelimitationofthreeyearsins.10doesnotapply.

Icannotacceptthiscontention.Ithinkthatthelimitationofthreeyears
ins.10doesapplytotheremedyclaimedunders.7.Withthereasons
givenbyCrossmanJ.forcomingtothatconclusionIamnotsurethatI
quiteagree.Heseemstohavesaidthatinthiscasetheplaintiffswere
undoubtedlybringinganactioninrespectofinfringementofcopyright.
Fortheywereclaimingdamagesunders.6,sub-s.I,aswellasunder
s.7.Thereisonlyoneaction,thoughtwosortsofreliefareclaimedin
it.Andastheoneactionisclearlyinpart“anactioninrespectof
infringementof‘copyright’”unders.10thatactioncannotbe
commencedaftertheexpirationofthreeyears.

WithoneaspectofthisreasoningIdoagree.Itse
emstomethatthe
damagesforbreachofcopyrightanddamagesforconversionare
complementarytheoneoftheother,andtogethermakegoodthe
totalityofthelossinflictedontheownerofaninfringedcopyright.
Speakingbroadly,damagesforinfringementarewhataplaintiffhas
lostbythediversionofhiscustomerstothedefendant’spublication,
whiledamagesforconversionarewhatthedefendanthasgainedby
sellingtheplaintiff’sproperty.Ifforbreachofhiscopyrighttheownerof
ithastworemedieswhichtogethercompensatehimforthetotalityof
thelossinflictedonhim,itseemstomemostimprobablethatthe
Legislaturecanhavehadanyreasontofix,orcanhaveintendedtofix,
oneperiodoflimitation(threeyears)forthedamagesforbreachof
copyrightandalongerperiod(sixyears)forthedamagesfor
conversion.
Theequivalentofthesetwo-foldremedieswascreatedbythefirst
CopyrightActof1709(s.1),byforfeitureofpiratedcopies,anda
penaltyofonepennyforeverysheet.Sect.10providesalimitationof
threemonthsforbothremedies.SointheActof1842,s.15provided
theremedyofdamagesforbreachofcopyright,ands.23thatfor
detentionorconversion,whilebys.26theperiodoflimitationforboth
wastwelvemonths.Inviewofthishistoricalbackgrounditwouldbethe
moresurprisingthatin1911theLegislatureshouldhaveintendedthat
theperiodoflimitationshouldapplytoonlyoneofthetwosortsof
relief.[atpp.197-198]
4.SutherlandPublishingCo.v.CaxtonPublishingCo.,(1938),[1939]A.C.178,Lord
RussellofKillowen(H.L.).Afurtherconsiderationisthis,thatifs.10doesnotapplyto
proceedingsunderorbyvirtueofs.7,theperiodoflimitation
applicabletothoseproceedingswillvaryaccordingtothecountryin
whichtheproceedingsareinstituted.UndertheActof1842auniform
periodofoneyearwasfixedbys.26;butontherespondents’
argumenttheperiodwouldbesixyearsinEnglandandfortyyearsin
Scotland,withtheresultthataplaintiffbarredinEnglandaftersixyears
could,uponfoundingjurisdictioninScotland,claiminrespectofall
copiesconvertedanywherewithinfortyyears.
MyLords,Iamconsciousthatonanyviewtherearedifficultiesof
constructionundertheAct,butwithmewhatwascalledthepositional
argumentweighsmoststrongly.Theonlyanswertoitseemedtobe
theallegedimpossibilityincertaincasesunders.7offixingastarting-
pointforthethreeyears.ForthereasonswhichIhaveendeavouredto
explainthisallegedimpossibilitydoesnotexist.Accordinglythe

positionalargumentbringsitsfullweighttobear,
andIwouldholdthat
asamatterofconstructions.10appliestoproceedingsunders.7.[at
p.188]
5.Banksv.CBSSongsLtd.,[1992]17F.S.R.278,SocttJ.(C.A.).
Thequestionwhetherornotthemanufacture,distributionandsaleofa
particularrecordcanproperlyberegardedasallpartofacontinuing
causeofactioncannot,inmyopinion,atthepresentstageofthe
litigationbegivenaclearanswer.Ihavealreadyreferredtodictafrom
Holev.Chard.IshouldalsorefertoNationalCoalBoardv.Gallery
[1958]1W.L.R.16inwhichHolev.Chardwasconsidered.PearceL.J.
(ashethenwas),givingthejudgmentofthecourt,saidthisatpage26:
“Itmust,wethink,beaquestionofdegreeastowhetherseparate
actsaresoknituptogether,socloseintimeandquality,astobe
properlydescribedinthewords‘acontinuingcauseofaction’.

Thegeneralpropositionthatpersistenceintortiousconductof
particularkindssuchastrespassornuisanceconstitutesa
continuingcauseofactionmustberegardedasestablished.It
mustalsobeacceptedthatincontractalso,breachesofobligation
ofvariouskindsmayamounttocontinuingbreaches.Butthat
mustdependonthenatureoftheparticularobligationbroken.”

Atpage27hesaidthis:“Acontinuingcauseofactionisnotinourviewconstitutedby
repealedbreachesofrecurringobligationsnorbyintermittent
breachesofacontinuingobligation.Theremustbeaqualityof
continuancebothinthebreachandintheobligation.”

AsPearceL.J.said,thequestionwhetherthereisorisnotacontinuing
causeofactionisaquestionofdegree.Thatbeingso,itisaquestion,
inmyopinion,bestlefttobeansweredattrialwherealltherelevant
factscanbegiveninevidence.[atp.295]

§6.3UnitedStates

1.Roleyv.NewWorldPicturesLtd.(1994),30U.S.P.Q.(2d)1654,TangJ.(9th
Circuit).Thisinterpretation[ofsection507(b)]isconsistentwiththeprevailing
viewthatthestatutebarsanyclaimfordamagesthataccruedmore
thanthreeyearsbeforecommencementofsuit.

(…)
Inacaseofcontinuingcopyrightinfringements,an
actionmaybe
broughtforallactsthataccruedwithinthethreeyearsprecedingthe
filingofthesuit.[atp.1656]

§6.4Varia

1.FaxDirectories(Pty.)Ltd.v.SAFaxListingsCC(1989),[1990]2S.A.164,HugoJ.
(SurbanandCoastLocalDivision).Thisargumentisclearlyuntenable.Applicanthasexplainedwhyitdid
notcometoCourtandindeedsoughttoprotectitsrightsalong
different,ifperhapsill-judged,lines.Meredelayorevenacquiescence
doesnotreflectawaiver.Itisperfectlypermissibletoignorewhatis
conceivedtobeapinprickuntilthepricksbecomesofrequentandso
damagingthatactionbecomesessential.(Questionsofprescriptiondo
notarisehere.).[atp.176]

§7.0ListofCases

§7.1Canada

§7.1.1Copyright

1.Beaucheminv.Cadieux(1899),10B.R.255at259(Que.Sup.Ct.);rev’d(1900),
10Que.K.B.255(Que.C.A.);aff’d(1901),31S.C.R.370(Que.Sup.Ct.-
Damages).

2.Underwriters’SurveyBureauLtd.v.MassieandRenwickLtd.,[1936]Ex.C.R.47
(Ex.Ct.-Interlocutory);[1937]Ex.C.R.15(Ex.Ct.);rev’d[1937]S.C.R.265(S.C.C.
Quash);[1938]Ex.C.R.103(Ex.Ct.);rev’dinpart[1940]S.C.R.218(S.C.C.);
specialleavetoappealrefused[1940]S.C.R.ix(J.C.P.C.-Canada);(1941),1
C.P.R.207(Ex.Ct.-Referee);var’d(1941),1C.P.R.224(Ex.Ct.-Reference).

3.Cartwright&SonsLtd.v.CarswellCo.(1957),29C.P.R.5(Ont.H.C.-Pleadings);
(1958)29C.P.R.101(Ont.H.C.-Interlocutory).

4.WarnerBrothers-SevenArtsInc.v.CESM-TVInc.(1969),58C.P.R.97(Ex.Ct.-
Pleadings);(1971),65C.P.R.215(Ex.Ct.).

5.CompoCo.v.BlueCrestMusicInc.(1974),17C.P.R.(2d)149(F.C.T.D.);rev’d
(1976),30C.P.R.(2d)14(C.A.);aff’d(1979),45C.P.R.(2d)1.

6.Turgeonv.Noles(unreported),Que.Prov.Ct.,Doc.No.500-02-001911-73,

VerscheldenJ.,October21,1974.

7.FilmsR.P.c.FilmexLtd.,[1975]C.S.964(Que.Sup.Ct.).

8.Kerrv.R.(1982),66C.P.R.(2d)165(F.C.T.D.).

9.UniversalCityStudiosInc.v.ZellersInc.(1983),73C.P.R.(2d)1(F.C.T.D.).

10.DictionnairesRobertCanadaSCCv.LibrairieduNomadeInc.(1987),16C.P.R.
(3d)319(F.C.T.D.);aff’d(1990),37F.T.R.240(note)(F.C.A.).

11.R.v.Harris(1990),34C.P.R.(3d)392(Nfld.Prov.Ct.).

12.R.v.Shimming(1991),35C.P.R.(3d)397(Sask.Prov.Ct.).

13.ConstructionsNouvelleDimensionInc.c.Alarie(1992),J.E.92-938(Que.Sup.
Ct.);inappeal(Que.C.A.).

14.Bemben&KuzychArchitectsv.Greenhaven-CarnegyDevelopmentsLtd.(1992),
45C.P.R.(3d)488(B.C.S.C.).

15.U&RTaxServicesLtd.v.H&RBlockCanada,Inc.(1993),47C.P.R.(3d)430
(F.C.T.D.-Pleadings);affirmed(1993),42C.P.R.(3d)522(F.C.A.).

16.Pagliarov.Pantis(1994),J.E.94-1041(Que.Sup.Ct.);rev’dinpart(1997),J.E.
97-1940(Que.C.A.).

17.BMGMusicCanadaInc.v.Vogiatzakis(February20,1996),Doc.T-2585-95,
HargraveJ.A.(F.C.T.D.-Pleadings).

18.Prud’hommev.EnseignesNormanRussell(1993),J.E.93-840(Que.Sup.Ct.);
(1996),J.E.96-1741(Que.Sup.Ct.-Merits).

19.Tele-Direct(Publications)Inc.v.AmericanBusinessInformation,Inc.(1996),74
C.P.R.(3d)72(F.C.T.D.);aff’d(1997),76C.P.R.(3d)296;leavetoappealtothe
SupremeCourtofCanadarefused.

20.Milliken&Co.v.InterfaceFlooringSystems(Canada)Inc.(1996),[1997]1FCD-
47,75CPR(3d)481,123FTR269,[1996]CarswellNat2011,[1996]FCJ1571,
[1996-12-02]
http://www.cmf.gc.ca//cgi-bin/sino/disp.pl/fc/1997/fic/v1/1
997fca2520.html,inFrenchat
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/cgi-bin/sino/disp.pl/cf/1
997/fic/v1/1997cfa2520.html(summary)(FCTD-SummaryJudgment)

21.Weissv.PrencticeHallCanadaInc.(1995),66C.P.R.(3d)417(Ont.Gen.Div.
SmallClaimsCourt).

22.
Prud’hommev.EnseignesRussellInc.(1993),J.E.93-840(Que.Sup.Ct.-
Pleadings);(1996),J.E.96-1741(Que.Sup.Ct.).

23.Dalbernetv.Centreéducatifetculturelinc.(1996),J.E.97-282(Que.Sup.Ct.).

24.McCutcheonv.Haufschild(1998),146F.T.R.28(F.C.T.D.-Pleadings).

25.Lapierre-Desmaraisv.Edimaginc.(1998),R.E.J.B.98-5104(Que.Ct.-Civ.Div.).

26.Robinsonv.FilmsCinarInc.(1998),R.E.J.B.98-9618(Que.Sup.Ct.-Option).

27.R.v.Bonamy(2000),6C.P.R.(4th)1(B.C.C.A.);applicationforleavetoappealto
theSupremeCourtofCanadadismissed[2000]S.C.C.A.345.

28.Candowv.Savory(2000),8C.P.R.(4th)219(Nfld.S.C.-T.D.).

29.Bergeronv.SogidèsLtée,[1998]A.Q.2384(Que.Sup.Ct.);rev’d(2000),R.E.J.B.
2000-20192(Que.C.A.).

§7.1.2LimitationsIssues

1.ConsolboardInc.v.MacMillanBloedel(Saskatchewan)Ltd.(1978),39C.P.R.(2d)
191(F.C.T.D.);rev’d(1979),41C.P.R.(2d)94(F.C.A.);rev’d(1981),56C.P.R.
(2d)145;(1981),62C.P.R.(2d)38(F.C.T.D.-Referee);(1982),63C.P.R.(2d)1
(F.C.T.D.-Reference);(1983),74C.P.R.(2d)199,50N.R.161(F.C.A.-Reference);
leavetoappealrefused[1983]2S.C.R.vi.

2.Guérinv.R.,[1982]2F.C.385(F.C.T.D.);(1981),D.L.R.(3d)170(F.C.T.D.-
Suppl.);rev’d(1982),[1983]2F.C.656(F.C.A.);rev’d[1984]2S.C.R.335
(S.C.C.).

3.Krugerv.R.(1981),125D.L.R.(3d)513(F.C.T.D.);aff’d(1985),[1986]1F.C.3
(F.C.A.);leavetoappealrefused[1985]2S.C.R.viii.

4.Sandvik,A.B.v.WindsorMachineCo.(1986),8C.P.R.(3d)433,7C.I.P.R.232,2
F.T.R.81(F.C.T.D.).

5.DeJongP.Z.v.FalconMaritimeManagementS.A.(Panama)(1988),21F.T.R.
187(F.C.T.D.-Prot.);aff’d(1988),24F.T.R.156(F.C.T.D.).

6.Kibalev.R.(1988),26F.T.R.307(F.C.T.D.);rev’d[1991]1F.C.D-46(F.C.A.).

§7.1.3Patent

1.
LeesonaCorp.v.ConsolidatedTextilesMillsLtd.(1975),20C.P.R.(2d)255
(F.C.A.);rev’d(1977),35C.P.R.(2d)254(S.C.C.).

§7.1.4Varia

1.Gingrasv.Québec(Citéde)(1947),[1948]B.R.171(Que.C.A.).

2.Sommersv.R.(1959),124C.C.C.52(B.C.C.A.);aff’d[1959]S.C.R.678.

3.R.v.BelgalHoldingsLtd.,(1966),[1967]3C.C.C.34(Ont.H.C.).

4.Larochellev.R.,[1972]F.C.1137(F.C.T.D.);aff’d[1974]2F.C.107(F.C.A.).

5.Corpex(1977)Inc.v.Canada,[1982]2S.C.R.643;[1982]2S.C.R.674(S.C.C.-
Rehearing).

6.R.v.Bell(1982),66C.C.C.(2d)317(Que.C.A.);aff’d[1983]2S.C.R.471.

7.Berardinelliv.OntarioHousingCorp.(1976),13O.R.(2d)354(Ont.H.C.);aff’d
(1977),15O.R.(2d)217(Ont.C.A.);rev’d(1978),[1979]1S.C.R.275.

8.Canada(A.G.)v.Delaurier(1979),93D.L.R.(3d)434(Man.Q.B.).

9.Tolofsonv.Jensen,(1989),40B.C.L.R.(2d)90(B.C.S.C.);aff’d(1992),65
B.C.L.R.(2d)114(B.C.C.A.);rev’d[1994]2S.C.R.1022(S.C.C.).

§7.2UnitedKingdom

§7.2.1Copyright

1.Nicolv.Barranger,(1920),[1917-23]MacG.Cop.Cas.219(Ch.D.);rev’d[1917-
23]MacG.Cop.Cas.230(C.A.).

2.SutherlandPublishingCo.v.CaxtonPublishingCo.,[1936]1AllE.R.177(Ch.D.);
rev’d(1936),[1937]1AllE.R.338(C.A.);rev’d(1938),[1937]Ch.294(Ch.D.);
[1937]4AllE.R.405(C.A.);aff’d[1938]4AllE.R.389(H.L.).

3.Czezowskiv.G.W.Parr&King(1960),73D.A.55(Ch.D.).

4.Banksv.CBSSongsLtd.(1990),[1992]17F.S.R.278(Ch.D.);rev’d[1992]17
F.S.R.278-286(C.A.).

§7.2.2Varia

1.
Hoggv.Scott(1874),L.R.18Eq.444(Ch.).

2.Muddockv.Blackwood(1897),[1898]1Ch.58.

3.BulliCoalMiningCo.v.Osborne,[1899]A.C.351(J.C.P.C.-Scotland).

4.NationalCoalBoardv.Galley(1957),[1958]1AllE.R.91(C.A.).

§7.3UnitedStates

1.Taylorv.Merrick(1983),219U.S.P.Q.2d420(7thCir.).

2.Roleyv.NewWorldPicturesLtd.(1994),30U.S.P.Q.(2d)1654(9thCir.).

§7.4ListofCases-Varia

1.LEDBuildersPty.Ltd.v.MastertonHomes(NSW)Pty.Ltd.(1994),30I.P.R.447
(AustraliaFed.Ct.).

2.FaxDirectories(Pty.)Ltd.v.SAFaxListingsCC(1989),[1990]2S.A.164(Surban
andCoastLocalDivision).

§8.0Authors

§8.1Canada

§8.1.1LimitationinGeneral

1.BAUDOUIN(Jean-Louis),Laresponsabilitéciviledélictuelle,4thed.(Cowansville,
Blais,1994),atnos.1407-1425.

2.BOURGEOIS(Marie),Laprotectionjuridiquedel’informationconfidentielle
économique:étudededroitquébécoisetfrançais(1988),1Cahiersdepropriété
intellectuelle1;(1987),3IntellectualPropertyJournal259.

3.CASTEL(Jean-G.),CanadianConflictofLaws,3rded.(Toronto,Butterworths,
1994),atnos.80-81.

4.FRÉCHETTE(J.G.),Laprescriptionendroitinternationalprivé(1972),3Revuede
Droitdel’UniversitédeSherbrooke121.

5.LINDEN(AllenM.),CanadianTortLaw,4thed.(Toronto,Butterworths,1988),at

pp.91-93.

6.MARTINEAU(Pierre),LaPrescription(Montréal,PUM,1977,atpp.237-249,302-
315,324-354.

7.MEW(Graeme),TheLawofLimitations(Toronto,Butterworths,1991).

8.MIGNAULT(Pierre-Basile),Ledroitcivilcanadien,Vol.9,Ch.19,spec.atpp.337,
345-353,452-453.

9.MORTON(JamesC.),LimitationofCivilActions(Toronto,Carswell,1988),atpp.
59-62and101-103.

10.RODYS(Witold),Delaprescription(Montréal,Wilson&Lafleur,1958),atpp.59-
66,380-382.

11.VAVER(David),CivilLiabilityforTakingorUsingTradeSecretsinCanada(1980-
81),5CanadianBusinessLawJournal253.

12.VAVER(David),LimitationsinIntellectualProperty“TheTimeIsOutofJoint”
(1994),73CanadianBarReview451.

13.VIDRASCU(Émile),Lanaturejuridiquedelaprescriptionextinctive:droitcomparé
etdroitquébécois(1995),98Revuedunotariat3.

14.WILLIAMS(JeremyS.),LimitationofActionsinCanada,2nded.(Toronto,
Butterworths,1980),atpp.29-39and210-213.

§8.1.2ProceduralIssues

1.CHALLIES(GeorgeS.),TheInterruptionandSuspensionofPrescriptionin
Quebec(1937-38),16RevueduDroit360.

2.DAVID(Hillel),PostponementofLimitationPeriods:TheInnocentDefendant
(1986),6TheAdvocates’Quarterly385.

3.GROFFIER(Éthel),Précisdedroitinternationalprivéquébécois,4thed.
(Cowansville,Blais,1990)atno.236;Supplement1992atno.102.

4.
5.HUGHES(RogerT.),FederalCourtofCanadaService(Toronto,Butterworths,
1970),atpp.3041-3048.

6.SALHANY(RogerE.),CanadianCriminalProcedure,2nded.(Agincourt,Canada

LawBook,1972),atpp.10-11and179-180.

7.SALHANY(RogerE.),CanadianCriminalProcedure,5thed.(Agincourt,Canada
LawBook,1989),atpp.18-19,314-315.

8.SGAYIAS(David)etal.,FederalCourtPractice1995(Toronto,Carswell,1994),at
pp.214-219and486-488.

9.SHARPE(RobertJ.),InjunctionsandSpecificPerformance(Toronto,CanadaLaw
Book,1983),atpp.84-103.

10.SHARPE(RobertJ.),InjunctionsandSpecificPerformance,2nded.(Toronto,
CanadaLawBook,1992),atnos.1.880-1.950.

11.WATSON(GarryD.),AmendmentofProceedingsAfterLimitationPeriods(1975),
53CanadianBarReview237.

§8.1.3InterpretationIssues

1.CÔTÉ(Louis),TheOperationinTimeoftheStatuteofFraudsandoftheStatuteof
Limitations(1985),16Revuededroitdel’UniversitédeSherbrooke315.

2.CÔTÉ(Pierre-André),Interprétationdeslois,2nded.(Cowansville,Blais,1990),at
pp.174-184and447.

3.CÔTÉ(Pierre-André),TheInterpretationofLegislationinCanada,2nded.
(Cowansville,Blais,1992),atpp.158-166and392.

4.DRIEDGER(ElmerA.),ConstructionofStatutes,2nded.(Toronto,Butterworths,
1983),atp.185.

5.FALCONBRIDGE(J.D.),TheDisorderoftheStatutesofLimitation(1943),21
CanadianBarReview669;(1943),21CanadianBarReview786.

§8.1.4CopyrightIssues

1.BARRIGAR(RobertH.),TheLimitationsonDominionStatutoryCausesofAction
(1964),40CanadianPatentReporter82.

2.BONCOMPAIN(Jacques),Ledroitd’auteurauCanada:étudecritique(Montréal,
CercledulivredeFrance,1971),atpp.305-306.

3.CARRIÈRE(Laurent),Prescriptionetpropriétéintellectuelle,inLapropriété
intellectuelle—Récentsdéveloppements(Toronto,CanadianInstitute,1992),ch.

4.CARRIÈRE(Laurent),Prescriptionetpropriétéintellectuelle—LaPrescription
extinctivecommefindenon-recevoirenmatièredepropriétéinte
lectuelle,(1993),
10CanadianIntellectualPropertyReview357.

5.CHROMECEK(Milan)etal.,WorldIntellectualPropertyGuide—Canada(New
York,MatthewBender,1991),atno.4[j][1].

6.FOX(HaroldGeorge),TheCanadianLawofCopyrightandIndustrialDesigns,2nd
ed.(Toronto,Carswell,1967),atpp.435-436and473.

7.GILKER(Stéphane),Laprotectiondesoeuvresarchitecturalesparledroitd’auteur
auCanada(1991),4LesCahiersdelapropriétéintellectuelle7,atpp.55-56.

8.GILKER(Stéphane),Unenouvelleloisurlesdroitsd’auteur:19504jourset19
étudesplustard(1988),1Cahiersdelapropriétéintellectuelle31.

9.HUGHES(RogerT.),HughesonCopyright(Toronto,Butterworths,1984),atno.
59.

10.KEYES(AndrewA.)etal.,CopyrightinCanada—ProposalsforaRevisionofthe
Law(Ottawa,CCAC,1977),atpp.203,207and215.

11.McKEOWN(JohnS.)etal.,Copyright,inCanadianEncyclopedicDigest,3rd
WesternEdition,(Toronto,Carswell,1991),ch.35,atnos.182-184.

12.TAMARO(Normand),TheAnnotatedCopyrightAct1991(Toronto,Carswell,
1991),atpp.379-381.

§8.2UnitedKingdom

1.COPINGER(WalterArthur),TheLawofCopyrightinWorksofLiteratureandArt,
2nded.(London,StevensandHaynes,1881),atpp.228-229and250-252.

2.CORNISH(WilliamR.),IntellectualProperty,2nded.(London,Sweet&Maxwell,
1989),atno.2-036.

3.DRONE(EatonS.),ATreatiseontheLawofPropertyinIntellectualProductionsin
GreatBritainandintheUnitedStates(Boston,LittleBrown,1879),atpp.475et
sq.

4.HARWOOD(GilesFrancis),Odgers’PrinciplesofPleadingandPracticeinCivil
ActionsintheHighCourtofJustice,20thed.(London,Stevens,1971),atpp.16-
17,40-41,52-53,86,109,113,124-125,128,144-145,152-153,187-189,199,

219,228-229.

5.
6.LESTER(David)etal.,Joynson-HicksonUKCopyrightLaw(London,Sweet&
Maxwell,1990),atpp.360-361.

7.McGEE(A.),LimitationPeriods(London,Sweet&Maxwell,1990).

8.MacGILLIVRAY(E.J.),ATreatiseupontheLawofCopyright(London,Murray,
1902),atpp.91-92,156,165,181and292.

9.McLEAN(H.M.),LimitationsofActionsinRestitution(1989),48CambridgeLaw
Journal472.

10.ROBERTSON(GeorgeStuart),TheLawofCopyright(Oxford,ClarendonPress,
1912),atpp.149-150.

11.SCRUTTON(ThomasEdward),TheLawofCopyright,4thed.(London,Clowes,
1903),atpp.157,178,200and204.

12.SHORTT(John),TheLawrelatingtoWorksofLiteratureandArt:Embracingthe
LawofCopyright,theLawrelatingtoNewspapers,theLawrelatingtoContracts
betweenAuthors,Publishers,PrintersandtheLawofLibel,2nded.(London,
Reeves&Turner,1884),atpp.252-254and258.

13.SKONEJAMES(EdmundP.)etal.,CopingerandSkoneJamesontheLawof
Copyright,8thed.(London,Sweet&Maxwell,1948),atp.179.

14.SKONEJAMES(EdmundP.)etal.,CopingerandSkoneJamesonCopyright,12th
ed.(London,Sweet&Maxwell,1980),atno.673.

15.SKONEJAMES(EdmundP.)etal.,CopingerandSkoneJamesonCopyright,13th
ed.(London,Sweet&Maxwell,1991),atno.11.96.

16.STERLING(J.A.L.)etal.,CopyrightLawintheUnitedKingdom,1sted.(London,
LegalBooks,1986),atnos.703&734.

§8.3UnitedStates

1.AMDUR(LeonH.),CopyrightLawandPractice(NewYork,ClarkBoardman,
1936),atpp.1036-1041.

2.BLACK(HenryCampbell)etal.,Black’sLawDictionary,6thed.(St.Paul,West,
1990).

3.DAWSON(JohnP.),
UndiscoveredFraudandStatutesofLimitation(1931),81
MichiganLawReview591.

4.FELDMAN(Franklin)etal.,Artworks:Law,Policy,Practice(NewYork,PLI,1974),
atpp.465etsq.

5.HENN(HarryG.),CopyrightLaw—APractitioner’sGuide,2nded.(NewYork,
PLI,1988),atpp.304-305.

6.HENN(HarryG.),CopyrightLaw—APractitioner’sGuide,3rded.(NewYork,PLI,
1991),atno.28.5.

7.LATMAN(Alan),TheCopyrightLaw,5thed.(Washington,BNA,1979),atpp.234-
235.

8.LERNER(RalphE.)etal.,ArtLaw(NewYork,PLI,1989),atpp.82-90,167-168,
269-271,299-300and431-434.

9.NIMMER(MelvilleB.),NimmeronCopyright(NewYork,MatthewBender,1990),
atnos.12.04[C]&12.05.

10.NOTE,DevelopmentsintheLaw—StatutesofLimitations(1949-50),63Harvard
LawReview1177.

11.ROTHENBERG(Stanley),CopyrightLaw,(NewYork,ClarkBoardman,1950),at
pp.23,544,646-689.

§8.4France

1.BANDRAC(Monique),Lanaturejuridiquedelaprescriptionextinctiveenmatière
civile(Paris,Economica,1986).

2.BRUSCHI(Marc),Essaid’unetypologiedesprescriptionsendroitprivé,inCOTÉ
(Pierre-André)etal.,ed.LeTempsetledroit—Actesdu4eCongrèsinternational
del’Associationinternationaledeméthodologiejuridique(Cowansville,Blais,
1996),pp.261-294.

3.DUMAS(Roland),Lapropriétélittéraireetartistique(Paris,PUF,1987),atpp.307-
308.

4.PLAISANT(Robert),Sanctionsdudroitpécuniaire,inPropriétélittéraireet
artistique—Juris-Classeurs(Paris,éditionsTechniques,1977),fascicule19,at
nos.72-82.

5.PLAISANT(Robert),
Propriétélittéraireetartistique:sanctionsdudroitpécuniaire,
règlescommunesauxdiversdélits,inJuris-classeurPropriété

§8.5Australia

1.LAHORE(James),IntellectualPropertyinAustralia:CopyrightLaw(Sydney,
Butterworths,1988),atno.4.15.340.

2.RICKETSON(Stanley),TheLawofIntellectualProperty,(Melbourne,LawBook,
1984),atp.307.

§8.6Varia

1.COPLING(A.J.C.),CopyrightLawinSouthAfrica(Durban,Butterworths,1969),at
p.167.

ROBIC,ungrouped’avocatsetd’agentsdebrevetsetdemarquesdecommerce
vouédepuis1892àlaprotectionetàlavalorisationdelapropriétéintellectuelledans
touslesdomaines:brevets,dessinsindustrielsetmodèlesutilitaires;marquesde
commerce,marquesdecertificationetappellationsd’origine;droitsd’auteur,
propriétélittéraireetartistique,droitsvoisinsetdel’artisteinterprète;informatique,
logicielsetcircuitsintégrés;biotechnologies,pharmaceutiquesetobtentions
végétales;secretsdecommerce,know-howetconcurrence;licences,franchiseset
transfertsdetechnologies;commerceélectronique,distributionetdroitdesaffaires;
marquage,publicitéetétiquetage;poursuite,litigeetarbitrage;vérificationdiligente
etaudit.ROBIC,agroupoflawyersandofpatentandtrademarkagentsdedicated
since1892totheprotectionandthevalorizationofallfieldsofintellectualproperty:
patents,industrialdesignsandutilitypatents;trademarks,certificationmarksand
indicationsoforigin;copyrightandentertainmentlaw,artistsandperformers,
neighbouringrights;computer,softwareandintegratedcircuits;biotechnologies,
pharmaceuticalsandplantbreeders;tradesecrets,know-how,competitionandanti-
trust;licensing,franchisingandtechnologytransfers;e-commerce,distributionand
businesslaw;marketing,publicityandlabelling;prosecutionlitigationandarbitration;
duediligence.
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