Licensee May Be Named Predecessor in Title in Trade-Mark Application
LICENSEEMAYBENAMEDASPREDECESSORINTITLEINTRADE-MARK
APPLICATION,FEDERALCOURTRULES
by
BarryGamache
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.:(514)9876242-Fax:(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com
ArecentdecisionoftheFederalCourtofAppealofCanadahasexpanded
thepoolofpredecessorsintitlewhichmustbenamedwhenfilingatrade-
markapplicationinCanada,byincludinglicensees(PernodRicard,société
anonymev.MolsonBreweries,apartnership,No.A-1214-91,November23,
1995).
AppellantPernodRicardfiledanapplicationonSeptember26,1984for
registrationofadesigntrade-markRICARDbasedonuseofthetrade-markin
Canadasince1954inassociationwithwines,aniseed-basedaperitifs,spirits,
andalcoholicbeverages.Thereafter,PernodRicardfiledanamended
applicationalleginguseinCanadasince1954byitselfanditspredecessorsin
title,RicardandS.E.G.M.UponpublicationofPernodRicard’sapplication,
MolsonBreweriesfiledbeforetheOppositionBoardastatementofopposition
alleging,amongothergrounds,thattheapplicationdidnotconformto
paragraph30(b)ofCanada’sTrade-MarksAct(R.S.C.1985c.T-13)inthat
neitherPernodRicardnoritsallegedpredecessorsintitledidusethetrade-
markinCanadasince1954;furthermore,MolsonBreweriesspecificallydenied
thatS.E.G.M.hadbeenapredecessorintitleofPernodRicard.
Section30oftheTrade-MarksActlistsvariousrequirementswhichan
applicantmustrespectwhenfilingatrade-markapplication;amongothers,
paragraph30(b)statesthatanapplicantfortheregistrationofatrade-mark
shallfilewiththeRegistraranapplicationcontaininginthecaseofatrade-
markthathasbeenusedinCanada(suchastheapplicationfiledbyPernod
Ricard),thedatefromwhichtheapplicantorhisnamedpredecessorsintitle,
ifany,havesousedthetrade-markinassociationwitheachofthegeneral
classesofwaresorservicesdescribedintheapplication.Thefactthatan
applicationdoesnotconformtoSection30oftheActisagroundof
oppositionprovidedforbySection38oftheAct,whichwasallegedby
MolsonBreweriesinitsstatementofopposition.
Caselawisclearthatwhereanapplicant’scompliancewithSection30ofthe
Actisinissue,thereisalegalburdenontheapplicanttoshowcompliance
andanevidenciaryburdenontheopponenttoleadevidenceinsupportof
theallegationsofnon-compliancepleadedbythatparty.Theevidencial
burdenistheburdenofadducingsufficientevidencetopersuadethetrierof
factthattheallegedfactsaretrue.However,asthisisoftenthecaseforthis
groundofopposition,anapplicantobviouslyhasmoreopportunitiesof
knowledgeoftheallegedgroundsthantheopponenthas;consequently,the
evidencialburdenontheopponentislessthaninordinarycases[JohnLabatt
Ltd.v.MolsonCompaniesLtd.(1990),30C.P.R.(3d)293(F.C.T.D.,McNair,J.)].
Forvariousreasons,MolsonBreweriesdidnotfileanyevidenceconcerningits
groundofoppositionbasedonSections38and30oftheActbeforethe
OppositionBoard.Ultimately,forlackofevidence,theRegistrarrejected
MolsonBreweries’sopposition[reportedat(1990)31C.P.R.(3d)42
(T.M.Opp.B.)].
MolsonBreweriesappealedtheRegistrar’sdecisionand,aspermittedbythe
rules,itfiledevidencebeforetheTrialDivisionoftheFederalCourtregarding
theallegednonconformityofPernodRicard’sapplicationwithregardsto
paragraph30(b)oftheAct.Thisevidenceconsistedofvariousexcerptsof
affidavitsthathadbeenfiledbyPernodRicardinotherproceedingsinvolving
MolsonBreweries.Intheseaffidavits,onecouldlearnthatS.E.G.M.isaFrench
corporation,constitutedin1975andonehundredpercent(100%)affiliatedto
PernodRicardofwhichitistheexclusiveworldwidelicenseefortheRICARD
trade-mark.ItwasMolsonBreweries’sargumentbeforetheTrialDivisionthat
S.E.G.M.,aslicensee,couldnotbetheapplicant’spredecessorintitleas
claimedbyPernodRicardinitsapplication.Inhisdecision,Mr.JusticeDubé
sidedwithMolsonBreweriesandconcludedthatPernodRicard’sapplication
didnotconformtoparagraph30(b)oftheTrade-MarksAct(bynamingan
entitythatcouldnotbepredecessorintitle),allowedtheappealand
rejectedPernodRicard’sapplication[reportedat(1991)40C.P.R.(3d)102
(F.C.T.D.)].
PernodRicardappealedthetrialjudge’sfindingsand,initsdecisionof
November23,1995,theFederalCourtofAppealsetasidethedecisionofthe
trialdivisionandrestoredtheRegistrar’sdecision.IntheCourtofAppeal’s
opinion(PratteJ.A.withDécaryandChevalierJJ.A.,concurring),an
applicationfortheregistrationofatrade-markcannotbesaidnottoconform
totherequirementsofparagraph30(b)oftheTrade-MarksActforthesole
reasonthattheapplicanthasnamed,asoneofhispredecessorsintitle,a
personwhohasusedthemarkmerelyasalicenseeofonethenamed
predecessorsintitle.AlthoughtheCourthasstatedthatitisnotanerroneous
affirmationtonameaspredecessorintitleanentitywhohasusedthemark
asalicensee(thereforeexpandingthepoolofpredecessorsintitle),ithasnot
specificallydecidedifalicenseemustbenamedaspredecessorintitle.
Inanyevent,theovercautiousapplicantwhonamesaspredecessorintitlea
licenseewhohassimplyusedtheappliedformarkwillnotbepenalizedsince
itmightbearguedthatitistechnicallynotrequiredbyparagraph30(b),but
notforbiddeneither.Indeed,paragraph30(b)doesnotrequirethelistingof
licensees;however,providingthislistwillnotjeopardizetheapplication.The
CourtofAppeal’sdecisionsignalsthatonemustnotadoptanoverly
technicalapproachtorefuseanapplicationwhichotherwiseconformstoall
otherprovisionsoftheAct.
Publishedat(1996),10W.I.P.R.41underthetitleLicenseemaybenamed
predecessorintitleintrademarkapplication.