Intention to resume use of a mark is not a “special circumstance” justifying non use, Federal Court of Appeal Rules

I
NTENTIONTORESUMEUSEOFAMARKISNOTA“SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCE”JUSTIFYINGNONUSE,FEDERALCOURTOFAPPEAL
RULES

STELLASYRIANOS*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,
LLP
L
AWYERS,PATENT&TRADEMARKAGENTS
Inanimportantjudgmentregardingwhatconstitutes“specialcircumstances”
amountingtoexcusablenon-useinexpungementproceedingsundersection45of
theTrade-marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.T-13(hereafter:the”Act”),theFederalCourtof
AppealupheldtheFederalCourt’sdecision,overturningtheRegistrar’srulingto
maintainregistrationofthetrade-markVANITY,afterconcludingthattherelevant
inquiryastowhetherspecialcircumstancesexistisaninquiryintothereasonsfor
thenon-use(ScottPaperLimitedv.Smart&BiggarandtheAttorneyGeneralof
Canada,2007FCA129(Pelletier,J.A.,April4,2008).
Section45oftheTrade-marksAct©sisthe”useitorloseit”provisionallowingthe
Registrar,viaadministrativeproceedingstoexpungetrade-markregistrationsfor
marksnotinuse.Followingarequestmadebyanythirdparty,theRegistrarwill
issueanoticerequiringthataRegistrantshowuseofitsregisteredtrade-markor
justifyitsnon-useduetospecialcircumstances,failingwhichsuchmarkwillbe
expunged.
TheRegistrar’sdecision
OnApril29,2002,theRegistrarofTrade-marksforwardedaNoticetotheScott
PaperLimited(“Appellant”)requiringthatitfurnishanaffidavitorastatutory
declarationshowingwhetherthetrade-markVANITYwasinuseinCanadaatany
timeduringthethreeyearperiodimmediatelyprecedingthedateoftheNoticeandif
not,thedatewhenitwaslastsoinuseandthereasonfortheabsenceofsuchuse
sincethatdate.
TheAppellantsubmittedtheaffidavitofitMarketingandLegalAffairsManagerwho
deposedthatasofthedateoftheNotice,theAppellant’splanswerealready
underwaytocommenceuseofthemarkin2002.Inlatesummer2001theAppellant

CIPS,2008.*Lawyer,StellaSyrianosisamemberofLEGERROBICRICHARD,L.L.P.,amultidisciplinaryfirmof
lawyers,andpatentandtrademarkagents.PublishedintheJuneissueoftheWIPR.Publication
142.213.

2
begantodiscussandreviewplansforthebrand’sreintroductionandatameeting
heldinOctober2001,itwasdecidedthatthere-launchoftheVANITYbrandwould
takeplacein2002.TheaffiantalsodeposedthatinJune2002(outsidethe
relevantperiodofApril29,1999toApril29,2002),salesofVANITYbranded
productshadbeguninCanada.Itisimportanttounderlinethattheaffiantdidnot
providethedateoflastuseofthetrade-markinCanadanoranyreasonsforthe
absenceofsuchuse.
Inreviewingtheevidence,theSeniorHearingOfficerconsideredthatthedateoflast
usewasthedateoftheacquisitionofthemarkbytheregisteredowner,namely
March20,1989,some13yearspriortothedateoftheissuanceoftheNoticeand
thatthenon-usewasduetoadeliberatedecisiontosuspenduse(absentany
evidenceonthesepoints).Thesedeterminationswerenotchallenged.TheHearing
Officerwentontoconsiderwhethertherewasevidenceofaseriousintentionto
shortlyresumeuseofthetrade-markpriortotheissuanceoftheNoticeasthiswould
amounttospecialcircumstanceswithinthemeaningofs.45oftheTrade-marksAct
1.
InmaintainingtheVANITYmarkontheregister,theSeniorHearingOfficerfound
thatsincetheAppellanttookstepstousethemarkbeforereceivingtheNoticeand
madesalesshortlythereafter,suchfactswereofparamountimportanceinshowing
thatthemarkshouldnotbeexpunged.
TheFederalCourtruling
TheTrialJudgeappliedthestandardofreviewofreasonablenessbearinginmind
theRegistrar’sexpertiseinsuchmatters.Nevertheless,theCourtheldthatthe
SeniorHearingOfficer’sconclusionwasnotreasonableassheerredinapplyingthe
lawtothefacts.IntheCourt’sview,a13yearperiodofdeliberatenon-usecouldnot
beexcusedbyaRegistrant’sintentiontousethemarkinthenearfuture
2.
TheFederalCourtofAppealruling
TheFederalCourtofAppealre-examinedthetestforspecialcircumstancesjustifying
non-useofamarkarticulatedintheHarrisKnittingdecisionrelieduponbytheSenior
HearingOfficerandconcludedthatadifferenttestemerges.TheCourtofAppeal

1Basedonitsinterpretationofthethree-prongtestsetoutbytheCourtofAppealinRegistrarof
Trademarksv.HarrisKnittingMillsLtd(1985),60N.R.380,4C.P.R.(3d)488(F.C.A)[HarrisKnitting]:
(1)thelengthoftimeduringwhichthemarkhasnotbeeninuse;(2)whetherthereasonsfornon-useare
beyondthecontroloftheregisteredowner;and(3)whetherthereexistsaseriousintentiontoshortly
resumeuse.
2InquotingfromthereasonsoftheCourtintheHarrisKnittingdecision:“Itisdifficulttoseewhyan
absenceofuseduesolelytoadeliberatedecisionbytheownerofthemarkwouldbeexcused”.

3
statedthattheconclusionstobedrawnfromthetestsetoutinHarrisKnittingarethe
following3:
1-Thegeneralruleisthatabsenceofuseispenalizedbyexpungement.
2-Thereisanexceptiontothegeneralrulewheretheabsenceofuseisdueto
specialcircumstances.
3-Specialcircumstancesarecircumstancesnotfoundinmostcasesofabsence
ofuseofthemark.
4-Thespecialcircumstanceswhichexcusetheabsenceofuseofthemarkmust
bethecircumstancestowhichtheabsenceofuseisdue.
TheCourtfoundthatthefourthfactorwassufficienttodisposeoftheappealby
statingthatitisimportanttodistinguishbetweenexplaininganabsenceofuseand
excusinganabsenceofuse.TheCourthighlightedthat“specialcircumstances”refer
tothecauseoftheabsenceofuseandnottosomeotherconsiderationand
therefore,therelevantinquiryastowhethertheyexistisaninquiryintothereasons
forthenon-use.
TheCourtacknowledgedthatjurisprudenceappearstohaveevolvedinthedirection
oftreatingplansforresumptionofuseasspecialcircumstances.However,in
dismissingtheappeal,theCourtstateditwasclearthatthe13yearabsenceofuse
wasduetoadeliberatedecisionnottousethemarkandthatbecauseplansfor
futureusedonotexplaintheperiodofnon-usetheycannotamounttospecial
circumstances.TheCourtclearlyheldthattheSeniorHearingOfficermadeanerror
byignoringtheAppellant’sexplanationandtreatingoneaspectofthecircumstances
ofnonuse,thatis,Appellant’sintentiontoresumeuse,as“specialcircumstances”.
Conclusion
Thisdecisionissignificantinthatithasclarifiedthemeaningofthewords“special
circumstances”unders.45oftheTrade-marksActwhichisseeminglyadeparture
fromthewaveofcaselawthathadevolved,untilthiscase,inthedirectionoftreating
plansforresumptionofuseofamarkasa“specialcircumstance”.Asaresult,itisa
Registrant’sreasonstojustifynon-usewhichamounttospecialcircumstances;
intentiontoresumeusecannotexplaintheabsenceofuseofthetrade-markinthe
marketplace.

3TheCourtexaminedthedecisioninHarrisKnittingandreferredtothefollowingparagraphs:“Itis
impossibletostatepreciselywhatthecircumstancesreferredtoinsubsection44(3)mustbetoexcuse
theabsenceofuseofamark.Thedurationoftheabsenceofuseandthelikelihooditwilllastalongtime
areimportantfactorsinthisregard,however;circumstancesmayexcuseanabsenceofuseforabrief
periodoftimewithoutexcusingaprolongedabsenceofuse.Itisessential,aswell,toknowtowhatextent
theabsenceofuseisduesolelytoadeliberatedecisiononthepartoftheownerofthemarkratherthan
toobstaclesbeyondhiscontrol.Itisdifficulttoseewhyanabsenceofuseduesolelytoadeliberate
decisionbytheownerofthemarkwouldbeexcused.

4
Anecdotally,theCourt’sreasoningisbestreflectedinthefollowingrhetorical
questionaskedbytheFederalCourtjudgehearingtheappealoftheRegistrar’s
decision:“Wouldoneexcuseatruantschoolboyforanabsenceofamonthbecause,
whenconfronted,hedemonstratedthatalthoughhehadnoexplanationforhispast
absenceshegenuinelyintendedtogotoschoolthenextweek?”