First to File or First to Use? That is the Question to Pass the Exam

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FIRSTTOFILEORFIRSTTOUSE?THATISTHEQUESTIONTOPASSTHEEXAM

BarryGamacheandFranceLessard*
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TheCanadianTrade-marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.T-13(hereinafterthe“Act”)has
justturned50!Foritshalfcenturyanniversary,theFederalCourtofCanada
mayhavejustreversedalongstandingpracticebytheRegistrarofTrade-
markswiththedecisionofMr.JusticeShoreinEffigiInc.v.AttorneyGeneralof
Canada,2004FC1000,handeddownonJuly16,2004.IftheFederalCourt
decisionisaffirmedonappeal,theRegistrarwillnolongerhavethe
opportunitytorefuseanapplicationonthebasisthatitisconfusingwith
anotherapplicationfiledatalaterdate,butalleginganearlierdateoffirst
use.
Forthelastdecades,thepracticeoftheRegistrarofTrade-markshasbeento
givepreferencetotheallegeddateoffirstuse,ratherthanthedateoffiling
whencomparingtwoconfusingandco-pendingapplications.Thisanalysis
wasdoneattheexaminationstageandtheRegistraronlyreliedonthe
allegationscontainedintheapplicationsthemselves.TheRegistrar’sdecision
toacceptornotanapplicationforpublicationhasalwaysbeendone
withoutaccesstoanyevidenceastotheallegedearlierdateoffirstuseofa
laterfiledapplication.
Facts
OnDecember19,2000,EffigiInc.(hereinafter“Effigi”)filedanapplicationfor
theregistrationofthetrade-markMAISONUNGAVA,onthebasisofproposed
useofthistrade-markinCanadainassociationwithwaressuchasbathand
tablelinen.Tenmonthslater,whileEffigi’sapplicationhadstillnotbeen
reviewedbyanExaminer,acompanynamedTricornInvestmentsCanada
Ltd.(hereinafter“Tricorn”)filedanapplicationforthetrade-markUNGAVAin

©LEGERROBICRICHARD,2004.*BarryGamacheandFranceLessardaremembersofthelawfirmLEGERROBICRICHARD,
g.p.andofthepatentandtrade-markfirmROBIC,g.p.Publication062.015.

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associationwithsimilarwares.Thelatterapplication,filedonOctober19,
2001,allegedadateoffirstuseofOctober1981.
Sixteenandahalfmonthsafteritfileditsapplication,Effigireceiveditsfirst
Examiner’sreport.TheExaminerobjectedtotheregistrationofthetrade-mark
MAISONUNGAVAonthebasisofsections37and16oftheAct.TheExaminer
statedthatbyvirtueofsection16,Effigiwasnotthepersonentitledto
registrationofitstrade-marksinceitsdateoffilingwassubsequenttothedate
offirstuseofOctober1981mentionedinTricorn’sapplicationforthetrade-
markUNGAVA,whichwasconsideredconfusinglysimilartoMAISON
UNGAVA.
InitsresponsetotheExaminer’sreport,Effigididnottrytoarguethatthe
trade-markswerenotconfusing;however,itdrewtheRegistrar’sattentionto
theFederalCourtofAppeal’sdecisioninUnitelInternationalInc.v.Canada
(RegistrarofTrade-marks),(2000)9C.P.R.(4th)127.Inaccordancewiththe
FederalCourtofAppealsreasoning,Effigisubmittedthatwhenconsidering
twotrade-markapplicationsthatareconfusing,thedatesoffirstusealleged
intheseapplicationsarenotrelevanttotheapplicationofparagraph
37(1)(c)oftheAct.Effigisubmittedthatsection16doesnotapplyatthe
examinationstage.TheExaminerrejectedthatargumentwhichEffigi
reiteratedinasecondresponse.
Finally,theRegistrardiscardedallofEffigi’sargumentsandrejectedits
applicationonNovember14,2003.Effigithereafterappealedthatdecisionto
theFederalCourt,undersection56oftheAct.
Effigi’sposition
Initsappeal,EffigisubmittedthattheRegistrarerredinreferringtosubsection
16(3)oftheActtointerpretparagraph37(1)(c)andthereaftertorejectits
applicationattheexaminationstage.EffigisubmittedthattheRegistrar,
havingnoinherentpowers,hasonlythejurisdictionprovidedforbytheAct.
Effigiaddedthatsection37grantstheRegistrarauthoritytodecide,atthe
examinationstage,torejectatrade-markapplicationonlybecauseitis
confusingwithanothertrade-markfortheregistrationofwhichanapplication
ispending.RelyingagainontheCourtofAppeal’sdecisioninUnitel
International,Effigiaddedthatbyvirtueofparagraph37(1)(c),theRegistrar
couldrefusetopublishatrade-markapplicationiftherewasariskof
confusionwithapreviouslyfiledapplicationthatwasstillpending,irrespective
ofanyallegeddateoffirstuse.Sincesection37describesexhaustivelythe
Registrar’sjurisdictionattheexaminationstage,itisnotnecessarytorelyon
section16tointerpretwhenapersonisentitledtoregistrationunder
paragraph37(1)(c).

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TheRegistrar’sposition
Ontheotherside,theRegistrar(representedbytheAttorneyGeneralof
Canada)submittedthatwhenanalyzingparagraph37(1)(c)oftheAct,it
hadtointerpretthissectioninharmonywiththerestoftheActandgiveto
eachworditsordinaryandgrammaticalmeaning.
Paragraph37(1)(c)readsasfollows:
“TheRegistrarshallrefuseanapplicationfortheregistrationofa
trade-markifheissatisfiedthat
[…]
(c)theapplicantisnotthepersonentitledtoregistrationofthe
trade-markbecauseitisconfusingwithanothertrade-markfor
theregistrationofwhichanapplicationispending,…”

TheRegistrarsubmittedthattheword“pending”didnotspecifywhich
applicationwassupposedtobeacceptedandwhichwassupposedtobe
rejected.TheRegistrararguedthatithadtorelyonsubsection16(3)which
defineswhenapersonisentitledtoregistrationbecausetheexpression
“personentitledtoregistration”isalsofoundinsubsection37(1).TheRegistrar
addedthattheexpression,asdefinedinsubsection16(3),necessarilyhadto
havethesamemeaningthroughouttheAct.TheRegistrarreliedontheTrade
MarkLawRevisionCommittee’sReportof1953andMr.JohnOsborne’s
testimonybeforetheHouseofCommonsStandingCommitteeonBanking
andCommerce,onApril28,1953.TheRegistrarfurtherarguedthatthe
commentsrelieduponbyEffigiintheUnitelInternationaldecisionwereobiter
andthereforenotbinding.TheRegistraralsoremindedtheCourtofthe
importanceof“use”inCanadiantrade-marklaw,whichjustifiedthepractice
ofgrantingpreferencetoanapplicationsubsequentlyfiledbutbasedonan
earlierdateoffirstuse.
Finally,theRegistrarcouldsaythatanunsatisfiedapplicantcouldopposea
trade-markapplicationfiledatalaterdate,butalleginganearlierdateof
firstuse;theonusofproofwouldthenbeonthefrustratedapplicanttobring
enoughevidencetoforcethesuccessfulapplicanttothen
proveitsfirstuse.
Butthisbegsthequestion:Howdoesoneprovethatthejuniorapplicanthas
notbeenusingitstrade-marksinceitsallegeddateoffirstuse(whenthefacts
astotheallegedusearewithintheknowledgeofthisjuniorapplicant).
Thedecision

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TheFederalCourtallowedtheappealandrejectedtheRegistrar’sposition
andlongstandingpractice.
Attheoutset,theCourtacceptedEffigi’spositionthatithadtoreviewthe
Registrar’sdecisiononthenormofcorrectnessastheissuebeforetheCourt
wasoneofstatutoryconstruction.Mr.JusticeShorethenanalyzedparagraph
37(1)(c)andstatedthatcontrarytosections18and38(whichreferto
circumstanceswhenapersonisnotentitledtoregistrationandthusrequire
anexaminationofsection16),section37usesdifferentlanguage(i.e.”the
applicantisnotthepersonentitledtoregistrationofthetrade-markbecause
itisconfusingwithanothertrade-markfortheregistrationofwhichan
applicationispending,…”)andisthereforecompleteinandofitselfand
describescompletelyalloftheRegistrar’sjurisdictionattheexamination
stage.TheRegistrar,therefore,doesnotneedtoexamineanyothersection
oftheActtodetermineentitlementtoregistration,attheexaminationstage.
TheCourtalsoconsideredsection16butdecidedthatitcouldbeexamined
bytheRegistraronlyonceanapplicationhasbeenpublished.Indeed,since
paragraphs16(4)and16(5)indicatethattherelevantdatementioned
thereinisthedateofadvertisementofanapplicant’sapplication,section16
necessarilyhastoapplyoncetheexaminationstagehasbeencompleted
andtheapplicationpublished.Therefore,theRegistrarcannotnotrelyon
section16whendecidingtoadvertiseornotatrade-markapplicationunder
section37.
Furthermore,theCourtassignedlittleweighttotestimonyofmembersofthe
TradeMarkLawRevisionCommitteebeforetheHouseofCommonsStanding
CommitteeonBankingandCommercebackin1953,referringtothewordsof
theSupremeCourtofCanadainR.v.Heywood,[1994]3S.C.R.761:
“Theadmissibilityoflegislativedebatestodeterminelegislative
intentinstatutoryconstructionisdoubtful….ThisCourthas
repeatedlyheldthatlegislativehistoryisnotadmissibleasproofof
legislativeintentintheconstructionofstatutes….
Itisapparentthatlegislativehistorymaybeadmissibleforthe
moregeneralpurposeofshowingthemischiefParliamentwas
attemptingtoremedywiththelegislation….
Nonethelesstherearepersuasivereasonsadvancedwhich
supportthepositionthatlegislativehistoryordebatesare
inadmissibleasproofoflegislativeintentinstatutoryconstruction.
Manyofthesesamereasonsarealsoputforwardtodemonstrate

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thatsuchmaterialsshouldbegivenlittleweighteveninthose
caseswheretheyareadmitted.Themainproblemwiththeuseof
legislativehistoryisitsreliability.First,theintentofparticular
membersofParliamentisnotthesameastheintentofthe
Parliamentasawhole.Thus,itmaybesaidthatthecorporatewill
ofthelegislatureisonlyfoundinthetextofprovisionswhichare
passedintolaw.…”
TheCourtdidnotdenytheimportanceofuseofatrade-markunder
Canadiantrade-marklaw,butagreedwithEffigithattheexaminationstage
wastooearlyandincompleteaprocesstoascertainsuchuse.Itagreedwith
Effigi’spositionthattheExaminerdidnothavesufficientinformation,atthe
examinationstage,todeterminethatatrade-markhasreallybeenusedat
thedateoffirstuseallegedintheapplication.Thisanalysisisbetterleftfor
otherforumswithappropriateproceduresandevidentiarymechanisms
wherepartiescontestingallegeddatesoffirstusecanfileevidenceinsupport
oftheirrespectiveclaims.
TheCourtfinallystatedthattheUnitelInternationaldecisionwasinconformity
withitsowninterpretationofparagraph37(1)(c)oftheAct.Inthatcase,the
FederalCourtofAppealhadwritten:”Intheirreasons,theRegistrarandthe
TrialJudgereferredtotheallegeddatesoffirstuseinthetwoapplications.
Wewouldobservethatthedatesoffirstusearenotarelevantconsideration
underparagraph37(1)(c).Theonlyissueiswhetherthereisconfusion
betweenanapplicantstrade-markandatrade-markforwhichan
applicationforregistrationisalreadypending”.Althoughthecommentsof
UnitelInternationalwerenotconsideredbindingontheCourt,theyclearly
addressedthequestionsatissueandwereconsideredverypersuasive.
TheAttorneyGeneralofCanadahasfiledanappealagainstMr.Justice
Shoresdecisionandsuchappeal(inCourtfileA-432-04)isstillpending.Under
thecircumstances,theRegistrarhasnotmodifieditslongstandingpractice
regardingparagraph37(1)(c),atleastfornow.
Conclusion
Thereare,inouropinion,manydefectsinthenowdecadesoldpracticeof
theRegistrarofTrade-marks.WhateverinterpretationisgiventotheActitself,
thefactremainsthatnotallapplicationshavebeentreatedinthesameway.
Forexample,whatifthedelaytoexamineEffigisapplicationhadbeen
shorter?Tricorn’sapplicationwasfiledten(10)monthsafterEffigi’s
application.IfEffigi’sapplicationhadbeenexamined,say,inMarch2001,
Tricorn’sapplicationwouldnothavebeencitedbytheExaminer.Tricorn
wouldthenhavehadtoopposeEffigi’sapplicationanddemonstrateuseof

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itstrade-marksince1981.Ontheotherhand,Tricorn,havingfiledatalater
date,butalleginganearlierdateoffirstuse,couldallegeanydateoffirstuse
withoutanyfear(atleastattheexaminationstage),sinceitdoesnothaveto
provethisdateoffirstusetobesuccessfuloverEffigi’sapplication.Thus,the
importanceoffirstuseonlybecomesimportant(andfortheseniorapplicant
filingonthebasisofproposeduse,dangerous)insofarasthejuniorapplicant
(alleginganearlierdateoffirstuse)filesbeforetheseniorapplication(based
onproposeduse)isexamined,publishedandallowed.Thisbeingsaid,evenif
theseniorapplicationisallowedbutnotyetregistered(becausea
declarationofusecannotyetbefiled,forexample),thejuniorapplication
alleginganearlierdateoffirstusecanstillbepublishedandallowed,thus
leadingtoasituationwheretwoconfusinglysimilartrade-markswillbeonthe
register.
Itisnowtimeforfulldisclosure:Itwouldbehardlyappropriatetocriticisethe
Courtsdecisionasoneoftheauthorsofthisarticlesuccessfullyarguedthe
casebeforeMr.JusticeShore.Inallfairness,itwouldbedifficultforthis
attorneytoclaimanyobjectivityunderthecircumstances.Itwillthereforebe
appropriatetosimplyconcludebymentioningthatitisnotbecausea
practicehasbeeninplaceformanydecadesthatitshouldbeallowedto
continueif,infact,ithasnotbeeninaccordancewithwhatParliament
intendedwhenitadoptedparagraph37(1)(c)intheTrade-marksActandthis
iswhatineffecthasbeendecidedbytheCourt.Ofcourse,theFederalCourt
ofAppealwillnowhavethelastword…

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