Filing of Evidence on Appeal in Trade-Mark Opposition Proceedings will now be Impossible in Certain Cases, Federal Court Rules
FILINGOFEVIDENCEONAPPEALINTRADE-MARKOPPOSITIONPROCEEDINGS
WILLNOWBEIMPOSSIBLEINCERTAINCASES,FEDERALCOURTRULES
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ArecentdecisionoftheFederalCourtofCanadahassetasidealong
standingassumptionthatnewevidencecouldalwaysbefiledbeforetheTrial
DivisionoftheFederalCourtofCanadaonappealofdecisionsrenderedby
theTradeMarksOppositionBoard(PrimaxComputerCorp.v.Primax
Electronic(U.S.A.)Inc.,T-665-95,June27,1995,reportedat(1995),62C.P.R.
(3d)75(FederalCourt,TrialDivision,Denault,J.);uponMotion,theFederal
CourtofAppealhasrejectedtheappealofthisdecisiononDecember15,
1995).
UnderSubsection56(1)ofCanada’sTrade-MarksAct(R.S.C.1985,c.T-13),an
appealliestotheTrialDivisionoftheFederalCourtfromanydecisionofthe
Registrar(whetheritbefromoneortheotheroftheRegistrar’sadministrative
Sectionsi.e.theOppositionBoardortheSection45ExpungementDivision)
withintwomonthsfromthedateonwhichnoticeofthedecisionis
dispatchedbytheRegistrarorwithinsuchfurthertimeastheCourtmayallow,
eitherbeforeoraftertheexpirationofthetwomonths.Furthermore,
Subsection56(5)oftheActstates:”OnanappealunderSubsection(1),
evidenceinadditiontothatadducedbeforetheRegistrarmaybeadduced
andtheFederalCourtmayexerciseanydiscretionvestedintheRegistrar”.
ThedecisionoftheRegistrarfromwhichanappealliesunderSection56is
onewhichinvolvesajudicialdeterminationofapracticalquestionoffact
anddoesnotinvolvetheexerciseoftheRegistrar’sdiscretion.Wherethe
Registrarhasgonewrong,itisopentotheCourttosubstituteitsconclusionfor
thatoftheRegistrar(seeOshawaGroupLtd.v.RegistrarofTradeMarksand
CreativeResourcesCo.Ltd.(1982),61C.P.R.(2d)29,perHealdJ.at36.See
alsoBenson&Hedges(Canada)Ltd.v.St.RegisTobaccoCorp.,[1969]S.C.R.
192;BeverlyBedding&UpholsteryCo.v.RegalBedding&UpholsteringCo.
(1982),60C.P.R.(2d)70).
WhennonewevidenceisadducedunderSubsection56(5),theFederal
Courtwillallowtheappealonlyiftheappellantsucceedsinshowingthatthe
Registrarhasmadeanerror.Indeed,theCourtwillalwaysconsiderwith
cautionanyappealfromadecisionoftheRegistrarsincethelatteris
generallyconsideredtobeanexpertorspecialistintrade-markmatters.
However,incaseswherenewevidenceisintroducedinaccordancewith
Subsection56(5)oftheAct,theCourtwillrenderitsdecisionbymeansofa
trial”denovo”sinceithastoconsideralltheevidencepresentedbeforethe
Registrarandadditionalevidencesubmittedforthepurposeoftheappeal
(whichwasobviouslynotbeforetheRegistrar)(seeSaks&Co.v.Registrarof
TradeMarksetal.(1989),24C.P.R.(3d)49(F.C.T.D.,AddyJ.)).
Upuntilrecently,ithasalwaysbeenunderstoodthatinanappealfroma
decisionoftheOppositionBoard,itwaspermittedtoanyparty,whether
appellantorrespondent,inallcircumstances,tofilefreshevidenceon
appeal,ifforwhateverreason,itdidnotorwasunabletofilesuchevidence
beforetheBoard.Thisinterpretationwasbasedonthewordsusedin
Subsection56(5)oftheActasinterpretedbeforeJune1995.
InrenderinghisdecisioninPrimaxComputerCorp.v.PrimaxElectronic
(U.S.A.)Inc.,acasewhereneitherpartyhadfiledevidencebeforethe
OppositionBoard,Mr.JusticeDenaultconsideredthatusebyParliamentin
Subsection56(5)oftheTrade-MarksAct
ofthewords”inadditiontothat
adducedbeforetheRegistrar”meantthatinordertofileevidenceonappeal
beforetheFederalCourt,evidencemusthavebeenfiledbeforetheRegistrar
(Mr.JusticeDenaultdidnotmentionfromwhichpartysuchevidencemust
haveoriginated).
Mr.JusticeDenaultwroteatpages80-81ofhisdecision:”Inlightofthe
specificlanguageofthisprovision,whichisclearandimperative,the
appellantwasbarredonMarch31,1995,andevenmoresonow,fromfiling
evidenceinthiscourtinsupportofitsoppositionsincetherewasnoevidence
adducedbeforetheRegistrar.ItseemsapparentthatParliamentintendedto
conferupontheRegistrarthetaskofevaluatingtheevidenceputforthbya
partyopposingtheregistrationofatrademarkwhereasthiscourt,asan
appealcourtinthesematters,isauthorizedbythelegislationtoaccept
additionalevidencetothatadducedbeforetheRegistrar.Thus,inthe
presentcase,theappellantdoesnothavetherighttofileevidenceon
appealsincenonehasbeenfiledintheoriginalproceedingbeforethe
Registrar”.
Mr.JusticeDenault’srulingraisesinterestingissues:wherenoevidencewas
filedbeforetheOppositionBoard,nopartycanfileevidenceonappeal;
whenonlytherespondenthasfiledevidencebeforetheOppositionBoard,
willtheappellantbeallowedtofileevidence”inadditiontothatadduced
beforetheRegistrar”,thusplacingitinabetterpositionbeforetheCourtonly
becauseoftheotherside’sactionsbeforetheBoard?
Mr.JusticeDenault’sdecisionhasimportantconsequencesfortrade-mark
practitioners:contrarytowhatwasalwaysassumedregardinginterpretation
ofSubsection56(5)oftheAct,onemustnowunderstandthatinordertofile
evidenceonappeal,evidence(fromwhateverparty)musthavebeenfiled
beforetheOppositionBoard.UpuntilMr.JusticeDenault’sruling,ithasoften
beenaparty’sdecisionnottofileevidencebeforetheOppositionBoardfor
strategicreasonsinordertofileevidenceonappealbeforetheFederal
Court.Thisavenuenowseemstobeclosed(especiallyfortheopponentwho
mustfileitsevidencefirstbeforetheBoard)andprudencewouldnowinvitea
partytofileatleastsomeevidence(whetherrelevantornot)beforethe
Boardinordertoenableit,ifneedbe,tofile”evidenceinadditiontothat
adducedbeforetheRegistrar”beforetheFederalCourt.
Publishedat(1996),10W.I.P.R.128-129underthetitleFilingofNewEvidencein
TradeMarksOppositionBoardAppealRestricted.