Federal Court Finds No Confusion Between Identical Trade-marks in the Building Supplies Trade
FEDERALCOURTFINDSNOCONFUSIONBETWEENIDENTICALTRADE–MARKSIN
THEBUILDINGSUPPLIESTRADE
by
DarioPietrantonio
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.:(514)9876242-Fax:(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com
InOakwoodLumber&MillWorkCo.Limitedv.ClassicDoor&MillworkLtd.
(yetunreported;FederalCourtofCanada,TrialDivisionNos.T–1206–92,T–
1207–92,T–1208–92;July28,1995,Jerome,A.C.J.),OakwoodLumber&Mill
WorkCo.Limited(“Oakwood”)appealedthreedecisionsoftheTradeMarks
OppositionBoard(“theBoard”)datedMarch24,1992(42C.P.R.(3d)1992,pp.
303,315,321)regardingtheregistrabilityofthetrademarksCOLONIAL,
CONTEMPORARYandVICTORIANbasedonusefor”specialtywoodtrimsand
mouldings”.TheFederalCourtofCanada,TrialDivision,renderedone
decisionwhichappliedtoallthreetrademarkapplications.
TheoppositionspresentedbyClassicDoor&MillworkCo.(“Classic”)before
theBoardwerebasedonfiveseparategroundsofunregistrability:the
applicantwasnotentitledtousethetrademarksinCanada(s.30(i)ofthe
Trade–marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.T–13(“theAct”));themarkswereeither
clearlydescriptiveordeceptivelymisdescriptive(s.12(1)(b)oftheAct);the
markswereconfusingwithotherregisteredtrademarks(s.6and12(1)(d)of
theAct),allofwhichhadbeenusedandmadeknownpriortoapplicant’s
claimeddateoffirstuse(s.16(1));themarkswerenotdistinctiveofthewares
oftheapplicant.
ThememberoftheBoardwhopresidedtheoraloppositionhearing,after
havingreviewedthepertinentlegalissues,refusedOakwood’sapplicationas
aresultofbeingleftinastateofdoubtwithregardtotheissueofconfusion.
Duetothefactthatthereexistedsimilaritiesbetweenboththewaresand
tradesassociatedtothesubjectmarksandthoseassociatedtocertain
previouslyregisteredmarks,inadditiontothesimilaritieswhichexisted
betweenthemarksthemselves,itwasdecidedthatOakwoodhadnot
succeededinovercomingtheonuswhichrestsontheapplicantinsuch
proceedings.
Oakwoodappealedthedecisionofthehearingofficerclaimingthatthe
latterhadnotadequatelyappreciatedthesurroundingcircumstances
relevanttodeterminingwhetherornotthemarksinquestionwereconfusingly
similartothepreviouslyregisteredmarks.PriortoexaminingOakwood’s
claims,JeromeA.C.J.consideredthescopeofreviewapplicabletosuchan
appeal.TheAssociateChiefJusticecitedseveraldecisionswhichespoused
thefollowingviews:thehearingofficer’sdecisionshouldnotbelightlyset
asideandonlywhenitisapparentthatanerrorhasbeenmadeinthe
appreciationofthefactsortheinterpretationofthelawisacourtjustifiedin
substitutingitsdiscretionforthatofahearingofficer.Theonlyothersituation
identifiedaspermittingsuchadecisiontobealterediswhennewevidence
isbroughtbeforethejudgewhichwasnotavailabletothehearingofficer
andwhichjustifiesadifferentoutcome.
Therequirementthatatrade–marknotbeconfusingwitharegisteredtrade–
markissetoutins.12(1)(d)oftheAct.Section6(2)oftheActstatesthatif
theuseoftwomarksinthesameareawouldbelikelytoleadtotheinference
thatthewaresorservicesassociatedtosaidmarksemanatefromthesame
source,thenthemarksareconfusing.Section6(5)oftheActprovidesanon–
exhaustivelistoffactorswhicharerelevanttomakingsuchadetermination
regardingconfusion.
TheAssociateChiefJusticeconsideredtheevidencewhichwasbeforethe
hearingofficerregardingtheexistenceofnumeroustrade–markswhich
couldbequalifiedassimilaroridenticaltothetrade–marksOakwoodwas
applyingtoregister,andwhichwereallsomehowrelatedtobuildingtrade
supplies.JeromeA.C.J.alsohadthebenefitofcontemplatinganaffidavit
filedbyOakwoodwhichsupportedtheviewthatthevariousmarksatissue
wereinfactrelatedtobuildingtradesuppliesandthattheywerebeingused
bynumerousdifferententities.ThisfactualsituationledtheAssociateChief
Justicetoascertainthatsincetheseregisteredtrade–marksweretheproperty
ofdifferentowners,theycouldnotbedistinctiveofonesource,anddidnot
qualifyasa”family”oftrade–marks.Therefore,smalldifferencesbetweenthe
relatedproductsaresufficienttodistinguishonemarkfromanother.
Basedonthestateofthetrade–markregisterandtheadditionalevidence
consistingoftheaffidavitfiledbyOakwood,JeromeA.C.J.concludedthat
theconsumingpublicwouldnotbeconfusedbytheintroductionofthe
subjecttrade–marksintothemarketplaceandthattherefusaltoregistersaid
trade–markswouldconstituteaninexplicableinconsistencywithprevious
acceptancesforregistration.TheAssociateChiefJusticethereforereversed
thehearingofficer’sdecisionandallowedtheregistrationofthetrademarks
COLONIAL,CONTEMPORARYandVICTORIAN.
Thisdecisionhighlightsthesituationwherethepresenceontheregisterof
numeroustrade–markswhich,atfirst–glance,appeartobeconfusinglysimilar
tothetrade–marksforwhichanapplicationismade,actuallyconstitutesthe
basisforallowingsaidapplication.
Publishedat(1995),9W.I.P.R.305-306underthetitleNoConfusionFound
BetweenIdenticalMarksinBuildingSuppliesTrade.