Display of Employer’s Symbol During Union Drive Is Not Protected Speech Under Canada’s Constitution



DISPLAYOFEMPLOYER’SSYMBOLDURINGUNIONDRIVEISNOTPROTECTED
SPEECHUNDERCANADA’SCONSTITUTION

By
BarryGamache
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.:(514)9876242-Fax:(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com

IntheFebruaryandMarch1997issuesoftheWIPR(vol.11,nos.2&3),we
reportedontherecentFederalCourtofCanadadecisioninCompagnie
GénéraledesÉtablissementsMichelin-Michelin&Cie[“Michelin”]v.National
Automobile,Aerospace,TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionof
Canada(CAW-Canada)[“CAW”]andal.,T-825-94,December19,1996,yet
unreported(Teitelbaum,J.).Thisisthethirdandlastofthreearticlesonthe
decision.
Duringtheir1994campaigntounionizetheplaintiff’sCanadianaffiliate’s
plantsinNovaScotia,thedefendantsdistributedleafletsdepictingMichelin’s
symbol,the”MichelinTireMan”,alsoknownas”Bibendum”.IntheCAW’s
leaflet,asmiling,largeBibendumfigurestoodcross-armed,onefootraised
overtheheadofaworker,whosecompanionwarnedhimthus:”Bobyou
bettermovebeforehesquashesyou!”.Bobwasseenreplying:”Naw,I’m
goingtowaitandseewhathappens”.TheleafletalsoborethelogoofCAW-
Canadaandacaptioninvitingworkerstosignupwiththeunion.
Michelintookactionallegingtrade-markandcopyrightinfringement.As
previouslydiscussed,theFederalCourtrejectedtheplaintiff’ssubmissionon
trade-markinfringementbutconcludedthatCAWhadinfringedMichelin’s
copyrightsintheBibendumfigure.
However,inordertodefeatMichelin’sclaims,CAWsubmittedthatitsposters
andleafletsdepictingtheBibendumfigurewereformsofexpression
protectedbySection2(b)oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms
whichisanintegralpartofCanada’sConstitutionAct,1982,oneofthe
constitutionaltextswhichgovernthecountry’slegislativelandscape.Section
2(b)provides:”[e]veryonehasthefollowingfundamentalfreedoms:…
freedomofthought,belief,opinionandexpression,includingfreedomofthe
pressandothermediaofcommunication”.



ThedefendantfurtherpleadedthatiftheCopyrightAct(R.S.C.1985,c.C-42)
limiteditsrighttoproducethepostersandleafletsfeaturingtheBibendum
figure,therelevantprovisionsoftheActwerenotsavedunderSection1of
theCharteras”reasonablelimitsprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrably
justifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety”.UnderSection1,theCanadian
CharterofRightsandFreedomsstatesthatitguaranteestherightsand
freedomssetoutinit(includingthefreedomofexpression)subjectonlyto
suchreasonablelimitsprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedina
freeanddemocraticsociety.
However,CAWwasnotaskingtheCourttoinvalidatetheCopyrightActbut
ratherinvitingitto”readdown”therelevantprovisionsoftheCopyrightActto
preservetheirconstitutionality.Readingdownisatechniqueusedtomaintain
theconstitutionalvalidityofalegislativeprovisionbynarrowlyinterpreting
oneofitsterminafashionwhichdoesnotinfringeanyoneofthefreedoms
guaranteedbytheCharter.
FreedomofExpression
DidCAW’sdisplayofMichelin’sBibendumfigurefallwithinthescopeofthe
freedomofexpressionguaranteedunderSection2(b)oftheCharter?Inother
words,canuseofacopyright(bysomeoneotherthanitsownerora
licencee)becalledaformofprotectedexpression?Michelinarguedthat
usinganotherpersonsprivateproperty(suchascopyright)isaprohibited
formofexpression;Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumagreed,statingthatthedefendants
werenotpermittedtoappropriatetheplaintiff’sprivateproperty-the
Bibendum”copyright”-asavehicleforconveyingtheiranti-Michelin
message.
Inrenderinghisdecision,Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumtooknoteofthenovelissue
beforehimandofthefactthattheSupremeCourtofCanadahasnever
givenguidanceonhowtheCourtsshouldevaluatetheuseofacopyrightin
determiningthescopeofprotectionunderSection2(b)oftheCharter.
However,theCourtreliedontheSupremeCourt’sdecisioninCommitteefor
theCommonwealthofCanadav.GovernmentofCanada,(1991)77D.L.R.
(4th)385(S.C.C.).InCommonwealth,theSupremeCourtruledthat,under
certaincircumstances,thereisalimitedrighttotheuseofpublicpropertyas
aforumforfreeexpression.However,theSupremeCourtmaintainedthat
privatepropertywasnotavailableasaforumforfreeexpression,asstatedby
Ms.JusticeMcLachlin:”[i]thasnothistoricallyconferredarighttouse
another’sprivatepropertyasaforumforexpression.Aproprietorhashadthe
righttodeterminewhouseshisorherpropertyandforwhatpurpose.
Moreover,theCharterdoesnotextendtoprivateactions.Itisthereforeclear



thatSection2(b)confersnorighttouseprivatepropertyasaforumfor
expression”.
AlsoinCommonwealth,Ms.JusticeL’Heureux-Dubérecognizedthedistinct
regimeapplicableforpublicpropertyasopposedtoprivateproperty:”[i]fthe
governmenthadcompletediscretiontotreatitspropertyaswouldaprivate
citizen,itcoulddifferentiateonthebasisofcontent,orchoosebetween
particularviewpointsandgrantaccesstosidewalks,streets,parks,the
courthouselawn,andeventoParliamentHillonlytothosewhosemessage
accordedwiththegovernment’spreferences”.
UseofAnother’sPrivateProperty
AnalogywiththeCommonwealthcasehoweverhaditslimitssinceproperty
wasnotthevehicleforthedefendant’smessageinthatcasebut,simplyits
forum.Despitethesedifferences(useofpublicpropertyasaforumfor
expressionversususeofanother’spropertyasavehicleforexpression),it
nonethelesshelpedtheCourttodistinguishthenatureoftheparties’interests
inthecase(ashadbeendoneinCommonwealth);Mr.JusticeTeitelbaum
concludedthatuseofsomeoneelse’sprivateproperty(theBibendum
“copyright”)wasnotconsistentwiththevalueofexpressionenhancing
participationinsocialandpoliticaldecisionmaking.
Thus,Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumstated:”[t]hedefendantshaveusedprivate
propertynotasaforumbutasameansofconveyingamessage.However,
despitethesedifferences,IreasonbyanalogytoCommonwealththatIam
permittedtoconsidertheparties’interestsevenbeforetheSection1stageof
theanalysisinordertoexaminethescopeoftheDefendants’freedomof
expressionunderSection2(b)anddetermineiftheexpressionisina
prohibitedform.Iholdthatitisreasonabletoequatedoingsomethingon
privatepropertyasaforumforexpressionwithusingtheproperty-the
copyright-toconveyexpression.(…)InCommonwealth,[itwas]heldthatin
instancesofuseofpublicproperty,expressionisprotectedonlyifitis
compatiblewiththeprimaryfunctionoftheproperty.Thus,noonehasaright
tosetupapeacecampinthemiddleofapubliclibrarybecausesuch
obstreperousdemonstrationswouldbeincompatiblewithsilentstudy,the
primefunctionofthelibrary”.
Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumwentontoholdthatapersonusingtheprivate
property,suchascopyright,ofanothermustdemonstratethathisorheruse
ofthepropertyiscompatiblewiththefunctionofthepropertybeforethe
CourtcandeemtheuseaprotectedformofexpressionundertheCharter.In
thisparticularinstance,mockingtheBibendumfigurewasnotconsidered



compatiblewiththefunctionofthecopyrightwhichistoprovideprotection
foranauthor’screativework.
Finally,infindingthatCAW’sexpressionwasnotprotectedunderSection2(b)
oftheCharter,theCourttooknotethattheCopyrightActattemptedonlyto
controltheformandnotthecontentofanexpressionanddidnotinterfere
withCAW’sabilitytoconveyitsmessageotherwise.Thedefendant’sthus
failedtoconvincetheCourtthatusingplaintiff’sprivatepropertywaswithin
thescopeofprotectedfreedomofexpression.
Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumconcludedthatevenifhewerewronginhisfindings
onSection2(b)oftheCharterhewouldnonethelesshaveheldthatthe
relevantprovisionsoftheCopyrightActwere”reasonablelimitsprescribedby
law…demonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety”underSection
1oftheChartersincetheprotectionofauthorsandtheresultoftheircreative
initiativeswerelegitimateobjectivesinademocraticsociety.Finally,the
“readingdown”techniquewasalsorejectedsinceitwouldhaveforcedthe
CourttorewritecertainprovisionsoftheCopyrightAct,arolereservedto
Parliament.
Conclusion
AfterMichelin,onefindsaCopyrightActwhichhassuccessfullyovercomea
constitutionalchallenge(muchtothereliefofmanyIPpractitionersand
variouscreators!).Michelinremindsusthatfreedomofexpressionisnotan
absolutevalue[seealsoHillv.ChurchofScientologyofToronto,[1995]2
S.C.R.1130(S.C.C.)]andthatCanada’sCopyrightActisdraftedwitha
concernfortheprotectionoffreedomofexpression(albeitnotastated
concern)withitslistofexceptionsatSections27(2)and(3).
CAWhaslaunchedanappealagainstMr.Teitelbaum’sdecision.
Publishedat(1997),11W.I.P.R.119-120underthetitleUnion’sUseofEmployer’s
SymbolNotProtectedbyFreedomofExpression.

LEGERROBICRICHARD,1997.



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