Display of Employer’s mark During Union Drive Does Not Constitute ‘use’ of Trade-mark
DISPLAYOFEMPLOYER’SMARKDURINGUNIONDRIVEDOESNOTCONSTITUTE
‘USE’OFTRADE-MARK
by
BarryGamache
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.:(514)9876242-Fax:(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com
ArecentdecisionoftheFederalCourtofCanadahasreviewedwhat
constitutes”use”ofatrade-markunderCanada’sTrade-marksAct(R.S.C.
1985,c.T-13);italsodiscussedcopyrightinfringementandvarious
constitutionalissuesinvolvingfreedomofexpressionundertheCanadian
CharterofRightsandFreedoms(CompagnieGénéraledesÉtablissements
Michelin-Michelin&Cie[“Michelin”]v.NationalAutomobile,Aerospace,
TransportationandGeneralWorkersUnionofCanada(CAW-Canada)
[“CAW-Canada”]andal.,T-825-94,December19,1996,yetunreported
(Teitelbaum,J.)).Inthefirstofaseriesofarticles,wewillreviewtheparties’
attemptstointroducenovelinterpretationsinCanadianIPLawandthe
Court’sultimatedecisiontofollowlongestablishedprecedents.
FollowingCAW-Canada’s1994attempttounionizetheCanadianemployees
ofPlaintiffMichelin,thelatter,aFrenchcorporationinvolvedinthe
manufactureandsaleoftiresandautomotiveaccessories,broughtanaction
forinfringementofitstrade-marksandcopyrights.DefendantCAW-Canada
respondedbyraising,interalia,thedefenceoffreedomofexpression.
DuringitscampaigntounionizePlaintiff’semployees,CAW-Canadahad
distributedleafletsanddisplayedpostersthatusedMichelin’scorporatelogo,
theMichelinTireManor”Bibendum”design,adrawingofabeaming
marshmallow-likerotundfigurecomposedoftires.Intheearly1980’s,Michelin
hadregisteredtrade-marksandhadsecuredcopyrightregistrationsinthe
“Bibendum”design.Ofcourse,CAW-CanadahadnotobtainedMichelin’s
permissionbeforeusingPlaintiff’sintellectualpropertyduringitsuniondrive.
MichelinthereforesoughtdamagespleadingthatitsIPrightswereviolated;it
alsorequestedapermanentinjunctiontorestrainCAW-
Canadafromusingitstrade-marksandcopyrightsinthefuture.
OneofCAW-Canada’sinitiativeswhichpromptedMichelin’slawsuitwasits
distributionatthreeofMichelin’sCanadianplantsofleafletsdepictinga
broadlysmiling”Bibendum”,armscrossed,withhisfootraised,seemingly
readytocrushunderfootanunsuspectingMichelinworker;underneaththis
figure,onecouldreadtheplea”don’twaituntilitstoolate!Becausethejob
yousavemaybeyourown.Signtodayforabettertomorrow”.
Initsaction,MichelinsoughtreliefunderCanada’sTrade-marksActand
arguedthatitdidnothavetoprovethattheDefendanthad”used”its
registeredtrade-markscoveringthe”Bibendum”characterasthattermhad
generallybeenunderstoodandinterpretedinCanadianjurisprudenceover
theyears.PutontrialbythePlaintiffwasalsothecurrentstatusandvalidityof
adecisionrenderednearly30yearsagowhichanalysedthemeaningofthe
term”use”undertheTrade-marksActandhasbeenfollowedeversince
(ClairolInternationalCorporationv.ThomasSupplyEquipmentCo.Ltd.,etal.
(1968),38FoxPat.C.176).
Initsaction,MichelinreliedonSection20oftheTrade-marksActwhichreads,
interalia:”Therightoftheownerofaregisteredtrade-marktoitsexclusiveuse
shallbedeemedtobeinfringedbyapersonnotentitledtoitsuseunderthis
Actwhosells,distributesoradvertiseswaresorservicesinassociationwitha
confusingtrade-markortrade-name…”.Section22wasalsoreliedupon:”No
personshalluseatrade-markregisteredbyanotherpersoninamannerthatis
likelytohavetheeffectofdepreciatingthevalueofthegoodwillattaching
thereto…”
Inthe1968Clairolcase,Mr.JusticeThurlowhadheldthatapartywhoalleges
infringementofanexclusiveright(astheoneconferredbyregistration)hasto
firstprovethattheinfringerhas”used”the”trade-mark”astheterm”trade-
mark”andtheverb”use”aredefinedundertheTrade-marksAct:underthe
Act,atrade-markisdefinedasamarkthatisusedbyapersonforthe
purposeofdistinguishingorsoastodistinguishwaresorservices,
manufacturedorperformedbyaspecificpartyfromthosemanufacturedor
performedbyothers.
Theconceptof”use”isalsodefinedinaspecificmanner:”atrade-markis
deemedtobeusedinassociationwithwaresif,atthetimeofthetransferof
thepropertyinorpossessionofthewares,inthenormalcourseoftrade,itis
markedonthewaresthemselvesoronthepackagesinwhichtheyare
distributed…[it]isdeemedtobeusedinassociationwithservicesifitisused
ordisplayedintheperformanceoradvertisingofthoseservices”.
Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumdecidedthattheclassicClairolanalysisofuseunder
Section20wasstillgoodlawandinordertoestablishtrade-markinfringement
thePlaintiffhadtosatisfyatwo-parttest:(1)didtheDefendantassociateits
serviceswiththePlaintiff’strade-marks?Inotherwords,wasthereusein
associationwithservices?(2)didtheDefendantusethemarkasatrade-mark
forthepurposeofdistinguishingoridentifyingtheDefendant’sservicesin
connectionwiththePlaintiff’swaresorservices?
PlaintiffMichelinarguedagainstthistestputforwardbyClairolbysubmitting
thatSection20madenoexplicitreferencetotheinfringer’s”use”ofa
registeredtrade-mark.AccordingtoMichelin,Section20createda
presumptionthattheregisteredowner’sexclusiverightisinfringedininstances
wheretheselling,distributingoradvertisingofwaresorservicesinassociation
withaconfusingtrade-markhasoccurred;Michelinfurtherarguedthat,
ultimately,Section20didnotrequireproofofuse.Inotherwords,Plaintiff
MichelindeniedMr.JusticeThurlow’sClairolrulingthatthereisanimplicitand
preliminaryrequirementunderSection20tofirstprove”use”bythedefendant
ofaplaintiff’strade-mark.ReviewingthereasoningbehindMr.Justice
Thurlow’s1968two-parttest,andthenecessaryinclusionoftheconceptof
“use”asdefinedundertheTrade-marksAct,Mr.JusticeTeitelbaum
concludedthatrequirementof”use”underSection20isdesignedsothatnot
allusersoftrade-marksbelongingtoanotherpersonarecaughtwithinthe
threadsoftheseinfringementprovisions.
Asanotherargument,Michelinpleadedthattheexplicitreferenceto”use”in
Section22shouldbeexpandedbeyondMr.JusticeThurlow’sconclusionin
Clairol.InClairol,Mr.JusticeThurlowhadheldthatSection22only(butsurely)
requiredproofof”useinassociationwithwaresorservices”(underSection22,
ithadbeendecidedthatthereisnoneedtoprovetheadditionalelementof
useofthemarkasatrade-markforpurposesofdistinguishingwaresor
services(asrequiredunderSection20)).
TobesuccessfulunderSections20and22oftheTrade-marksAct,the”usein
association”testmustbemetinbothcaseswhichleadMr.JusticeTeitelbaum
tostudythenatureoftheDefendant’sorganizingactivitiesanditsapparent
non-commercialstatus.IntheJudge’sopinion,thetestwasnotmet:”Thefact
thattheunionorganizingactivitiesmighthavereapedfinancialrewardsdoes
notaltermycrucialdeterminationthatthetrade-markswerenot”used”in
associationwithwaresorservicesundertheSection4criteriafor”use”.There
canbenouseinassociationwith”wares”becausethedefinitionofwares
underSection4(1)requiresassociationduringtheordinarycourseoftrade.
Handingoutleafletsandpamphletstorecruitmembersintoatradeunion
doesnotqualifyunderthattestascommercialactivity…Ifindthatthe
Defendants’distributionofleafletsandpamphletsdoesnotqualifyas
“advertising”.Onceagain,advertisingcarriesacommercialconnotationthat
isnotborneoutbythefactsofthiscase.TheDefendantswerenot
advertisingservicestoreaprevenuesalthoughasIstatedabove,new
membersalsorepresentedsignificantamountsofmoneyintheformofunion
dues.Dues,however,arenotprofits.”
Mr.JusticeTeitelbaumconcludedthattheDefendanthadnot”used”the
Plaintiff’strade-marksinassociationwithitswaresorservices;itfollowed
consequentlythattherecouldnotbeafindingofinfringement,eitherunder
Sections20or22oftheTrade-marksAct.However,initsaction,Plaintiffraised
copyrightissuesandthesewillbedealtwithinournextcontributionalong
withDefendant’srelianceonCanada’sCanadianCharterofRightsand
Freedoms.
Publishedat(1997),11W.I.P.R.040-042underthetitleUnionDisplayof
Employe’sMarkDoesnotConstitute’Use’ofMark.