Criminal Law in Aid of Trademarks Some Preliminary Thoughts



CRIMINALLAWINAIDOFTRADEMARKSSOMEPRELIMINARYTHOUGHTS

by
Bob.H.Sotiriadis*

LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers,
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.(514)9876242-Fax(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com

Introduction
ThevastmajorityoftrademarkownersinCanadaenforcetheirrightsagainst
allegedinfringersintheCivilCourts.Incertainsituations,however,itmay
proveofinteresttotrademarkownerstotakeadvantageoftheprovisionsof
theCriminalCodewithrespecttotheprotectionoftrademarkrights.Oncea
complainantinacriminalcasesucceedsingettingpasttheobstacles
inherentincriminalproceedings,suchasconvincingaCrownprosecutorto
proceedwithcriminalprosecution,notwithstandingtheinstitutionofa
concurrentcivilsuit,thefactthatnodamagesaretobeexpectedasa
victimundertherelevantprovisionsandthedifficultburdenofproofthat
resultsfromthewordingofsaidprovisions,itmay,incertaincases,be
advantageoustoproceedinthismanner.
ThepotentialprisonsentencesandfinesforeseenbytheCriminalCodein
mattersoftrademarkinfringementmay,incertaincases,provetobemore
influentialontheconductofaninfringerorpotentialinfringerthanasimple
injunctionororderforthepaymentofnominaldamages,which,inthecase
offly-by-nightoperations,isoftennotworththepaperitisprintedoninany
event.
Thereisalsothequestionofthecostofproceedinginacivilcasefora
potentialuselessinjunctionanddamageaward,whentheCrownwill
prosecuteacriminalcaseattheexpenseofthestate.Finally,onemust



















































*
©LEGERROBICRICHARD,1995.
Lawyer,BobH.SotiriadisisaseniorpartnerinthelawfirmLEGERROBICRICHARD,g.p.andin
thepatentandtrademarkagencyfirmROBIC,g.p.Thismaterialwasdesignedforthe
purposeofaconferencegivenattheAnnualGeneralMeetingofthePatentandTrademark
InstituteofCanada(PTIC),heldinLakeGeorgeon1994.10.07.Itwasmeantfordiscussion
anddoesnotconclusivelystatetheopinionoftheauthororthemembersofhisfirmonthe
subjectmatternordoesitprovideanexhaustivereviewthereof.Publishedat(1995),11
CanadianIntellectualPropertyReview321-337.Publication140.



considerthepotentialadvantageofevaluatingtheextentofinfringement
throughtheuseofthesearchandseizureprovisionsoftheCriminalCode
.
Inthispaper,wewillprovideanoverviewofseveraloftheprovisionsofthe
CriminalCodedealingwithtrademarkenforcement,anddiscussseveral
elementsoftheextremelylimitedjurisprudencethatexiststodateonthis
question.
1.0OffensesCreatedbytheCriminalCode
Tocommencewith,weshallreviewthesubstantiveprovisionsoftheCriminal
Code,whichconcernushere,aswellasthosedealingwiththepowerof
searchandseizure.
AsisthecaseforalloftheCriminalCodeprovisionstobediscussedinthis
paper,theword”trademark”,asusedintheCriminalCode,hasthemeaning
assignedtoitintheTrade-marksAct,inaccordancewithsubsection4(4)of
theCriminalCodeandR.v.StrongCobbArnerofCanadaLtd.(1973),16
C.C.C.(2d)150(Ont.C.A.).
1.1ForgingTrademarks
Sections406,407and409oftheCriminalCodedealwiththeforgingof
trademarksandtheinstrumentsthatmaybeusedinforgingatrademark.
Section406defineswhatitmeanstoforgeatrademark,andreadsasfollows:
“ForthepurposesofthisPart,everyoneforgesatrade-markwho
(a)withouttheconsentoftheproprietorofthetrade-mark,
makesorreproducesinanymannerthattrade-markoramarkso
nearlyresemblingitastobecalculatedtodeceive;or
(b)falsifies,inanymanner,agenuinetrade-mark.”

Itisnotclearwhatthelegislatormeantbytheexpression”genuine”trademark
atsub-paragraph(b)ofsection406.Assuch,wemustagreewithFoxthat
thewordisprobably”mere,unmeaningsurplusage.”
1
Theoffencefortheforgingofatrademarkiscreatedatsection407,which
readsasfollows:



















































1
HaroldG.Fox,CriminalOffensesundertheCanadianTradeMarksAct,Vol.25,Section1,
C.P.R.,atp.p.111-112.



“Everyonecommitsanoffencewho,withintenttodeceiveor
defraudthepublicoranyperson,whetherascertainedornot,
forgesatrade-mark.”

WenotethattheCrownmustprovethecriminalintentonthepartofthe
accusedtodeceiveordefraudthepublicoranyperson.Apartfromthis
questionofdeceitorfraud,trademarkpractitionerswillrecognize,inthis
offence,protectionagainstwhatwewouldnormallyandgenerallyrefertoas
trademarkinfringement.TheCrownmusttherefore,inthecaseoftheforging
ofatrademark,firstprovethatthetrademarkunderreviewwasmadeor
reproduced,oranearresemblancewasmadeorreproduced.Inthecaseof
aresemblance,itmustbemadeorreproducedastobecalculatedto
deceive.
Furthermore,suchreproduction,ormakingofanidenticalorresembling
trademark,mustbeeffectuatedwithouttheconsentoftheproprietor.This
constitutesafurtherburdenonthepartoftheCrown.
However,theCrownseemstohaveanadditionalburdenwithrespecttothe
mentalelementoftheinfraction,ascreatedbysection407.TheCrownmust
provethattheaccusedcarriedouttheforgerydescribedinsection406,
whichphysicalactincludestheelementsreferredtoabove,withtheintentto
deceiveordefraudthepublicoranyperson.Thewordingofsection407
suggeststhatsuchpersonmustnotnecessarilybeidentifiable,anditisnot
necessarytoprovethatanyperson,identifiableornot,wasinfactdeceived
ordefraudedbytheaccused.
1.2InstrumentsfortheForgingofaTrademark:
Subsection409(1)
Subsection409(1)dealswithinstrumentsusedforforgingtrademarksand
readsasfollows:
“Everyonecommitsanoffencewhomakes,hasinhispossession
ordisposesofadie,block,machineorotherinstrumentdesigned
orintendedtobeusedinforgingatrade-mark.”

Theinstrumentsreferredtointhissectionaretobeusedintheforgingofa
trademark,thedefinitionofwhichwehavenotedinourreviewofsection
406.Thisoffenceseemstobesubordinatetotheoffencecreatedforforgery
atsection407.ItwouldappearthatfortheCrowntoestablishthatsomeone
hasforgedatrademark,evidenceintheformofinstrumentsusedforthe
forgingofatrademarkwould,inmanycases,beaprerequisiteforafinding
offorgeryundersections406and407.



Theoffencecreatedinsubsection409(1)seemsratherlargeinscopeatfirst
blush.Theinstrumentslistedinsaidprovisionneednotbebothdesignedand

intendedtobeusedinforgingatrademark,but,asisstatedintheprovision,
theCrownmaymakeoutitscaseiftheyaredesignedor
intendedtobeused
inforgingatrademark.ItwouldappearthattheCrownmustprovethatthe
accusedknowsthattheinstrumentsareofsuchaqualityastobeableto
forgetrademarks.
Subsection409(1)istemperedbythegoodfaithdefencesetupinsubsection
409(2),whichstates:
“(2)Nopersonshallbeconvictedofanoffenceunderthissection
whereheprovesthatheactedingoodfaithintheordinary
courseofhisbusinessoremployment.”

Itissubmittedthatthegoodfaithdefence,setupinsubsection409(2),exists
inadditiontoalloftheotherdefencesavailabletotheaccused,including,
butnotlimitedto,thegeneraldefenceofgoodfaith.
Itappearsthatsection409createdanoffencewithaviewtoenjoininga
personfromdealinginanobjectthatmaybeusedtodeceiveanother
personinregardstoatrademarkright.Giventhatweareinmattersof
criminallaw,wewouldalsosuggestthattheraisond’êtreoftheinstrument,
foritspossessiontoleadtoaconviction,musthavebeentobeusedasa
meansofdeceivingthepublicwithrespecttothecomplainant’strademark.
1.3PassingOff
Section408createsanoffencewithrespecttothecommonlawtortof
passingoff.
Thissectionshouldbeofparticularinteresttoownersoftrademarksusedin
associationwiththesaleofluxurygoods,forexample.Itreadsasfollows:
“Everyonecommitsanoffencewho,withintenttodeceiveor
defraudthepublicoranyperson,whetherascertainedornot,
(a)passesoffotherwaresorservicesasandforthoseorderedor
required;or
(b)makesuse,inassociationwithwaresorservices,ofany
descriptionthatisfalseinamaterialrespectregarding



(i)thekind,quality,quantityorcomposition,
(ii)thegeographicalorigin,or
(iii)themodeofthemanufacture,productionorperformance
ofthosewaresorservices.”

Weseethereforethatapersonwhoappliesafalsenoticeoforiginon,for
example,luxuryluggagemaybesubjecttocriminalproceedingsunder
section408.Wemustpresumethatifthereisnodefinitionofpassingoffinthe
Act,exceptthatwhichisfoundatsection408inthedescriptionofthe
infraction,thenwearetounderstandthatthedefinitionofpassingoff,
especiallyasthetermisusedinsubsection408(a)oftheCriminalCode,
shouldadheretothatwhichisprevalentinthestateofthecivillawatthe
timeoftheallegedinfraction.Itissubmittedthatthisviewisconsistentwith
thespiritoftheStrongCobbArnercaseandsubsection4(4)oftheCriminal
Code,aswellaswiththeCuttendencase,whichwillbediscussedbelow.
2.0AvailabilityofDefencesKnownintheCivilSphere
Asmentionedpreviously,theword”trademark”,intheprovisionsrelevantto
trademarksintheCriminalCode,carriesthesamemeaningasthatwhichis
givenintheTrade-marksAct.Thisdictatesthatallquestionsofthe
substantiverightsrelatingtotrademarks,incriminalcases,mustbedecidedin
accordancewiththerightsstemmingfromtheTrade-marksAct.
Itisalsoarecognizedprincipleincriminaltrademarkcasesthatdefences,
whichmayberaisedwithrespecttoatrademarkincivilcases,mayalsobe
raisedincriminalproceedings.Forexample,wherethecomplainantbases
itselfonatrademarkwhichtheaccusedconsidersnullorinvalid,onwhatever
groundsrecognizedbythecivillawtothiseffect,thenitisopentothe
accusedtomakeprooftotheeffectthatthetrademarkisinvalid,orsimply
argueit,andevencreateaburdenonthepartoftheCrowntodemonstrate
thatthemarkofthecomplainanthadbeenvalidlyregisteredand,infact,
wasbeingcontinuouslyusedinCanadainaccordancewiththerelevant
provisionsoftheTrade-marksAct.
Thisprinciplethattheaccusedisnotdeprivedofthebenefitofdefenceopen
tohiminacivilaction,wasstatedinthecaseofTheKingv.Cruttenden
(1905),10C.C.C.223(Ont.C.A.).Atpage227ofsaiddecision,the
HonourableJusticeMossstatedasfollows:
“[…]butthedefendantisnottobedeprivedofhisrightsbecause
oftheforminwhichtheproceedingshavebeenlaunched



againsthim.Heoughtnottobedeprivedofthebenefitof
defencewhichwouldbeopentohiminacivilaction.[…]The
defendantisnotdriventoanapplicationtoremovethe
trademarkfromortorectifytheregister.”

TheprinciplesetupbytheCruttendencaseallows,therefore,anaccused,
undersections407,409and410oftheCriminalCode,todemonstratethat
thepurportedownerofthetrademarkwhofilesacomplaintunderanyof
thesesectionshasnorightsagainsttheaccused,underthelawrelatingto
trademarksinthecivilsphere.Anextensionofthisprinciplewouldperhaps
dictatethenthattheCrownmustdemonstrate,aspartofitsinitialburdenof
proof,thatthecomplainantisinapositiontoinvokerightsforeseenunderthe
Trade-marksActagainsttheaccused,inanygivencase.Itmayevenbesaid
thatifthecomplainantisproventohavenorecourseagainsttheaccused
undertheTrade-marksAct,orasitconcernspassingoff,underthecommon
laworcivillaw,thenithasnorightsatallasacomplainantundertheCriminal
Code.
Itissuggestedthat,forstrategicreasons,anaccusedshouldraisethis
question,ifitistoberaisedatall,followingtheevidenceoftheCrownona
motionfornon-suit.Thissaid,itbecomesevidentthatboththeCrownand
defencecounseloughttobeprepared,intrademarkcasesbasedonthe
CriminalCodeproceedingswearediscussing,toeducatetheCourtastothe
actualcivillawrightsofthepartiestoestablishwhether,inthecivilsphere,the
plaintiffwouldhaveanyrightsorrecourseagainsttheaccused,inthecivil
courts.Questionsofinfringementmustbedebatedsince,forexample,
section409oftheCriminalCode,inparticular,wouldappearsuperfluousand
almostmeaninglessifitcouldbesaidthatthelegislatorwouldallowa
convictionundersaidprovisionincaseswhereinfringement,orevenpotential
infringement,didnotevenexist.
Again,wesuggestthatthesamereasoningshouldapplytopassingoffcases.
2.1OtherOffencesRelatingtoTrademarks
Weshallterminatethispartofthediscussionwitharapidoverviewofsections
410and411oftheCriminalCode,whichreadasfollows:
“Everyonecommitsanoffencewho,withintenttodeceiveor
defraud,
(a)defaces,concealsorremovesatrade-markorthenameof
anotherpersonfromanythingwithouttheconsentofthatother
person;or



(b)beingamanufacturer,dealer,traderorbottler,fillsanybottle
orsiphonthatbearsthetrade-markornameofanotherperson,
withouttheconsentofthatotherperson,withabeverage,milk,
by-productofmilkorotherliquidcommodityforthepurposeof
saleortraffic.”
“Everyonecommitsanoffencewhosells,exposesorhasinhis
possessionforsale,oradvertisesforsale,goodsthathavebeen
used,reconditionedorremadeandthatbearthetrade-markor
thetrade-nameoranotherperson,withoutmakingfulldisclosure
thatthegoodshavebeenreconditioned,rebuiltorremadefor
saleandthattheyarenotthenintheconditioninwhichthey
wereoriginallymadeorproduced.”

Section410initsintroductioncreatesanoffencewhichrequiresanintentto
deceiveortodefraud.Subsection410(a)isratherstraightforwardand
shouldnotrequireanysignificantdiscussion.However,subsection410(b)
appearsonitsfacetobealittlemoreproblematicforanintellectualproperty
practitioner.
Itiseasytoconceiveofasituationwheretrader,fillsabottlebearingthe
trademarkofanotherperson,without
thatperson’sconsent,with,for
example,abeverageofthetrademarkowner’smanufacture,forthepurpose
ofsaleortraffic,withoutanyintenttodeceiveordefraudthepublic.Ifone
referstotheTrade-marksAct,orthegeneralapplicablelawoftrademarks,
thissubsectionappearstogivetrademarkownersrightsthattheywouldnot
necessarilyhaveinacivilcase.Weshallreturntothisquestioninour
discussionofthelimitedjurisprudenceonthesubject.
Section411isratherstraightforwardinthatitsimplyforbidsanypersonfrom
depreciatingthegoodwillinatrademarkbysellingusedorreconditioned
goodsasnew.
2.2Sanctions
Section412setsoutthesanctionsforpersonswhocommitanoffenceunder
sections407,408,409410or411.TheCrownhastheoptionofproceedingby
indictmentorbysummaryconviction.
Moreinteresting,perhapstothetrademarkowner,isthefactthatallmaterials
usedtocommitanoffenceunderanyofthoseprovisionsare,inprinciple,
forfeitedtotheCrownuponconvictionoftheaccused.

3.0InterpretationofCriminalCode
ProvisionsbytheCourts
3.1Introduction
ThereareveryfewreporteddecisionsrelatingtotheCriminalCodeprovisions
ontrademarkinfringementandrelatedoffences,Thevastmajorityofthese
casesarenotreported,aswillbediscussedtowardstheendofthispaper.In
manycases,theaccusedentersapleaofguilty.
3.2IllegalRemovalofTrademarksandConcealment
InthecaseofReginav.Locquet(1985),5C.P.R.(3d)173(Que.Ct.),the
accusedwaschargedwith(1)illegallyreproducingthetrademarkMAGICIEL
inacomputerprogram,withouttheconsentoftheownerandwiththeintent
todeceivethepurchaseroftheprogram,under[thensection365and
present]section407oftheCriminalCode;(2)illegallyconcealingorremoving
fromtheuser’smanualrelatingtothecomputerprogramsoldtoitscustomer
thenameofthetrademarkownerinaccordancewith[thensubsection
368(a)andpresent]subsection410(a)oftheCriminalCode;and(3),under
thesamesection,illegallyconcealingorremovingfromtheuser’smanual,
relatingtothecomputerprogramsoldtoanothercustomer,thenameofthe
trademarkowner,withouttheconsentofthelatter.
Inthiscase,thecomplainantwastheowneroftheregisteredtrademark
MAGICIEL,andtheaccusedwasacompetitorwho,asthechargesimply,
copiedtheuser’smanualforMAGICIELandconcealedthenameofthetrue
ownerofthetrademark,whendealingwithhisowncustomersinthe
computertechnologyinquestion,which,inpassing,wasdesignedto
computerizeaccountingsystems.
Theaccused’sposition,infact,wastotheeffectthatitadmittedthatthe
MAGICIELtrademarkwascopiedalongwiththeuser’smanual,butthatthis
wascarriedoutwiththeknowledgeandconsentofthecomplainant,witha
viewtoproceedtoevaluatetheprogramandtoperhapsadaptitinorderto
betterservetheclienteleitwasdestinedto.Theaccusedalsocontended
thatthecomplainantknewthatthenewproduct,onceitwouldhavebeen
adaptedandmodified,wouldbesoldunderadifferenttrademarkownedby
theaccused’scompany.

Intheabsenceofanywritinginsupportoftheaccused’sposition,andcertain
contradictionsintheevidence,theCourtfoundtheaccusedguiltyas
charged.
Oneelementofthecasethatwasneverdiscussedinthewrittendecisionis
theaccused’spersonalliabilitywhen,fromtherecitalofthefactsofthejudge
inthecase,onemayconcludethatitwasinfactthecorporation,ofwhich
theaccusedwasPresident,thatactuallycommittedtheactscomplainedof.
3.3PassingOff
InthecaseofReginav.Ferjo(1993),47C.P.R.(3d)210(O.C.P.D.-onappeal),
thepassingoffprovisionsfoundatsection408oftheCriminalCodewere
invokedsuccessfullyagainsttheaccusedbythecomplainantVuarnetin
respectofsunglasses.
Thiswasatypicalcasewherethecomplainantaccusedthedefendantof
sellingimitationwaresandpassingthemoffforluxurygoodsotherwise
protectedbytrademark.
Inthiscase,manyofthedefencesthatwouldhavebeensetoutinacivil
casewereinvokedbytheaccused,buttonoavail.
ContrarytoLocquet,referredtoabove,intheFerjo
case,thesentencing
aspectisdiscussedinthereportedcase.Itisperhapsofinterest,therefore,to
knowthattheCourtfinedtheaccused$2,000,or,indefaultofpayment
withintheprescribedtime,asixty-dayjailsentence.
AsintheLocquetcase,thedefendantisanindividualandnotacorporation;
however,contrarytotheLocquetdecision,thecasemakesnoreferenceto
anycorporatevehiclewithwhichMr.Ferjomayhavebeenassociated.
Furthermore,theCourtconsideredthestigmaofacriminalconvictionand
therelativeimportanceofthefineaspotentialdeterrentsforthetypeof
activityinwhichitfoundMr.Ferjotobeinvolved.
WeseethereforethattheLocquetcaseandtheFerjocaseshedsomelight
oncertainpracticalaspectsofsections407(forgery),408(passingoff)and
410(concealment).
3.4Trade-markInfringementandPassingOff



ThecaseofR.v.ImpencoLtd.(1991),J.E.91-280(Que.Ct.)relatesdirectlyto
complaintslaidinaccordancewithsections407(forgery)and409
(instruments),butindirectlyrefersustoaseriesofdilemmasthatcouldoccur
underanaccusationtakenundersubsection410(b)(fillingbottlesorsiphons).
ThecomplainantintheImpencocasewasSeikoTimeCanadaInc.Thefacts
ofthecaseweresuchthatmanyoftheprinciplesdiscussedthusfarinthis
papercameintoplay.
Impencowasamanufacturerofboxesofallkindsnotengagedinany
businessrelatingtothepotentialcontentsoftheboxthatitmanufactured.
ThecomplainantwasSeikoTImeCanadaInc.(hereinafter:”Seiko”).Seiko
was,atthetime,aregistereduserinCanadaofthetrademarkSEIKO,which
wasownedbyHattoriSeiko,aJapanesecorporation.
Thecomplaintwaslaidundersection409oftheCriminalCode,andtherefore
broughtsections406and407intoplay.Moreparticularly,Impencowas
chargedwithpossessionofadiedestinedtobeusedto”forge”atrademark.
Preliminarily,theCourtrecognizedinitsjudgmentthatHattoriSeikodidnot
owntheregisteredtrademarkSEIKOwithrespecttoboxes,andthatits
registereduser,Seiko,thecomplainantinthecase,didnotdealinboxes.It
wasthereforeunderstoodbytheCourtthatthemanufactureofboxeswasan
activitythatwascompletelyforeigntothebusinessofthecomplainant.
Originally,SeikohadcontractedwithImpencoforthemanufactureofboxes
designedtocontainwatchessolddirectlybySeiko.Sometimeaftertheir
relationshipcommenced,Seikoterminatedtherelationship,pursuanttoa
disputebetweenthepartiesoverprices.
AftertheterminationoftherelationshipbetweenSeikoandImpenco,
ImpencocontinuedtomanufactureboxesbearingthenameSEIKO,usingits
ownmouldsanddiestodoso.
TheCourtfoundthatonceSeikoadvisedImpencothatitnolongerwishedto
orderboxesfromit,inearly1984,Impencoimmediatelyremovedthemould,
whichhadbeenfurnishedbySeiko,fromitsmouldingmachine,storeditwith
anumberofmouldsinthebackofitsplant,andneverproducedanyorder
withitagain.Itappearedfromtheevidencethatthemouldinquestionwas
obsolete,oflittlevalue,andthatSeikomadenoseriousattempttoretrieveit.
WhenSeikoinitiatedthecriminalproceeding,itdidsobywayofsearchand
seizure,andseizeditsequipmentalongwithallboxesbearingtheSEIKO
trademark.



Aswehaveseen,subsection409(2)oftheCriminalCodeforeseesagood
faithdefence,whichmaybeinvokedbytheaccusedtonegatethemens
rea,whichseemstoberequiredinparagraph1ofthesaidSection.The
accusedwasthereforeobligedtodemonstratethatitmanufacturedthe
SEIKOboxesintheordinarycourseofitsbusiness.TheCourtwassatisfiedthat
theaccusedwasingoodfaithatalltimes,sincethewatchboxesthatwere
manufacturedwereclearlyidentifiedashavingbeenmanufacturedby
ImpencoLtd.Thisisaninterestingpoint,sinceoneofthemaindefence
availableinpassingoffcases,forexample,istheexistenceofthedefendant’s
owntrademarkontheimpugnedgoods.
IntheImpencocase,thetrademarkofImpencowasmadeevidentby
meansofanengravingthatappearedontheundersideofalmosteverybox
itmanufactured.Infact,Impencoevenmadereferencetothenumberof
themoulditusedformakingeachbox.TheCourttookthesefindingsasa
demonstrationthatImpencoopenlymanufactureditsboxesandhadno
intenttohidetheirorigin.
ImpencoappliedthenameSEIKOtoitsboxes,throughtheuseofasmalldie,
whichfittedontotheImpencomoulds,andwhichwasremovableatwill.
ItwasadmittedattrialthattheboxesImpencohadsoldtoitscustomers,
bearingtheSEIKOmark,weresoldtodealersofauthenticSEIKOwatches.
However,thoseauthenticwatcheswere”greymarket”watches,anditwas
establishedthatSeikohadneverauthorizedthepurchasersofImpenco’s
boxestosellSEIKOwatchesinCanada.Inlightofawell-knownSupreme
Courtdecision,whichwewilldiscussalittlelater,inwhichSeikofailedtostop
parallelimportation,itisperhapsfairtoassumethatSeikopresumeditwould
bedifficulttopursuethepurchasersofImpenco’sboxes,whosoldgrey
marketSEIKOwatches,and,insteadofdoingso,Seikoinvokedprovisionsof
theCriminalCoderelatingtotrademarkinfringementandtotheforgeryof
thetrademarksagainsttheaccused,inanattempttostopthepracticeof
thesaleofauthenticSEIKOwatchesobtainedfromsourcesotherthanSeiko.
TheCourtacceptedtheprinciplesmentionedabovetotheeffectthatthe
word”trademark”intheprovisionsrelevanttothecasecarriedthesame
meaningasthatfoundintheTrade-marksAct.TheCourtalsoreaffirmedthe
principlethattheaccused,insuchcases,isnotdeprivedofthebenefitofthe
defencesthatareopentohiminacivilactionforinfringement.Impenco
waspermitted,therefore,toarguethattheownerofatrademark,whofileda
complaintundersection409insuchcases,hasnomorerightsasagainstthe
accusedthanitwouldunderthelawrelatingtotrademarksinthecivilsphere.
TheCourthadtoconsiderprinciplesestablishedbytheCivilCourtin
determiningtherespectiverightsoftheparties.ThismadetheSupremeCourt



ofCanadadecision,ConsumersDistributingCompanyLtd.v.SeikoTime
CanadaandtheAttorneyofCanadaandAttorneyGeneralforOntario
(1984),[1984]1S.C.R.183,relevant,andithadtobeconsideredand
thoroughlyunderstoodbytheCourtinordertoevaluatethecompetingrights
beforeit.TheCourtconcludedthatifSeikowouldhavenorecourseagainst
ImpencoundertheTrade-marksActnorpursuanttotheextendeddoctrineof
passingoff,asdecidedanddiscussedingreatdetailintheConsumerscase,
thenithadnorightasacomplainantundertheCriminalCode.
ImpencosuccessfullyarguedthatajudgmentinfavouroftheCrownwould
amounttoblockingunauthorizeddealersofgenuineSEIKOwatchesby
attackingthecompanythatpreparestheboxesinwhichtheotherwiselegal
watchesweretobesoldtothepublic.
TheCourtfoundinfavouroftheaccusedunderthegoodfaithdefence,
foreseeninsubsection409(2),butalsoonothergrounds,suchastheconsent
ofthetrademarkowner.TheCourtinferredSeiko’stacitconsentfromthe
mannerinwhichitoperateditsdistributionsystem,inthatSeikodealers,both
authorizedandunauthorized,areresponsibleforthepackaginganddisplay
oftheSeikowatchesthattheysell;theCourtwentsofarastostatethatthe
Crown,insuchcases,hastheburdenofprovingthattheowner’sconsenthad
not
beengiven.
Thereis,however,anotheraspecttothiscasethatbringsintolightthe
importanceofciviltrademarklawprinciplesandtheimportanceofensuring,
ifoneisthecomplainant,thattheCrownattorneyisaware,before
embarkingonatrialinthesematters,ofallcivillawprinciplesrelatingto
trademarksandpassingoff,and,fortheaccused,toberepresentedby
competentcounselspecializingin,oratleasthavingagoodknowledgeof,
suchprinciples.
IntheImpencocase,theCourtconcludedthat,sincetheSupremeCourt
hadheldthat”greymarket”vendorsactlegallyandinaccordancewith
Canadiancompetitionprinciples,andthesamevendorshappentobethe
customerstowhomImpencosellsboxesmarkedwithSeiko’sname,thenSeiko
hadnorightsagainstthedefendantcorporationwithrespecttoinfringement.
Obviously,Impencohadtobepreparedtoarguethegeneralprinciplesof
passingoff,includingtheextendednotionofpassingoff,asdiscussedinthe
Consumerscase.Wementionedearlierthatsection409,forexample,could
almostbeconsideredapreliminaryinfractiontosection407,andthat
subsection410(b)couldeasilyleadtoabusethroughthecriminalsystem,as
couldinfactsection409,unlessalloftherelativeprinciplesofthelawof
trademarksandpassingoffareconsideredevenineachcriminalcase.Thisis
inkeepingwiththeprincipleoftheCruttendencase,referredtoabove.



3.5OtherCivilLawPrinciplesRelevanttoCriminalLawCases
Asmentionedearlier,aconvictionundersection409shouldonlybepossible
intheeventtheaccusedisfoundtohaveinfringeduponatrademark.It
wouldappear,therefore,thatfortheretobeaninfractiontheremustexist
infringingmerchandise.Inotherwords,onecannotnecessarilyconcludethat
thereisacriminalinfractionwithrespecttoatrademark,exceptwherethe
trademarkbelongingtoapersonisappliedtogoodsthatarenotthoseofthe
ownerofthemark.
Furthermore,itisperfectlylegal,underCanadianlaw,tolabelmerchandise
withthenameofthemanufacturer,aslongasthemerchandiseisgenuine.
Or,asstatedbyHaroldFoxintheCanadianLawofTradeMarksandUnfair
Competition(Toronto,Carswell,1972),atpage357:
“Thetestofinfringementis,ofcourse,deception.Andtherefore
theinfringementmustbeinrespectofspuriousgoods.Therecan
benoinfringementifthemarkisusedupontheplaintiff’sgoods
[…]Itis,therefore,quiteproperforapersonwhohasobtained
goodsfromthetrademarkownertoplacetheowner’strademark
onthegoods,ortorenewthelabelsiftheybecomelostor
damaged,orifthetrademarkhasbeenobliteratedandhemay
havelabelsprintedforthepurpose,ifthegoodsareofthe
trademarkowner’squality.”

Foxclearlyrefersto”thepersonwhohasobtainedgoodsfromthetrademark
owner.”IntheImpenco
case,forexample,itwouldappearincongruousfor
thecomplainanttoaccusethemanufacturerofboxesdestinedtothe
complainant’sveryownclients.Afterall,theydidpurchasegenuineSEIKO
watchesfromthetrademarkowner.
Theprincipletotheeffectthatapersonisentitledtoapplythetrademarkof
anotherpersononpackagescontaininggenuinemerchandise
manufacturedbythetrademarkownerwasestablishedintheoff-citedcase
ofFarinav.Silverlock(1856),26L.J.11(H.L.).Farina,adistributorofeaude
Cologne,attemptedtoobtainaninjunctionagainstSilverlock,alabel
manufacturer.FarinaobjectedtothepracticeofSilverlockofapplyinglabels
tocontainersofauthenticFarinaeaudeCologne.Farinacontendedthat
Silverlockinfringeduponitstrademarkindoingso.TheCourt,however,found
infavourofSilverlock,giventhatthebottlesidentifiedbythelabelscontained
genuineeaudeCologne.
Severalimportantprincipleswereestablished,whichcouldbeinvokedin
criminalcases,ifonlytoexplainthelawtoanotherwiseunspecializedCourt



inthesematters.Forexample,theCourtopinedthuslyonthequestionof
labellingonpage13ofthedecision:
“Butitseemstomeclearthatanymanwhohadgotanyofthe
eaudeCologneofMariaFarinaandhadnotgotalabel,might
employanyprinterhethoughtfittoprintorengraveforhima
labelwhichshouldbeanexactcounterpartofthatwhichwas
usedbyMariaFarina.”

Thisquestionoftherighttoprintorengravelabelswouldappeartobecrucial
inanycaseconcerningsections407,409and410(b)oftheCriminalCode,
butalsowithrespecttothepassingoffofsection408.TheCourtwentsofar
astosay,atpage13:
“Allthatthelawrestrainsapersonfromdoingissellingthearticle
whichisnot
themanufacturerofJohannMariaFarinabutwith
thelabelofJohannMariaFarinauponit.Butif
itbethearticle
whichhasbeenmanufacturedbyJohannMariaFarina,hemust
notcomplainthatthepersonsellsitwithsomethinguponitto
representitstrademarkthoughitisnotagenuinetrademark.
Thegistofatrademarkinanactionatlawwouldbethis:thathe
hadsoldasanforthemanufactureoftheplaintiffsomethingthat
wasnothismanufactureandhissupposedspuriouslabelisput
oninordertomakeitmoreapparentthatitishismanufacture.
Therefore,Ithinkitclearthatanymanmaybeatlibertyifheis
capableofprintingandengraving,toprintandengravefor
himselfalabelbeingacolourableimitation,oracopyofthe
plaintiff’slabel.”

Itwouldappearthatsection409,orindeedanyoftheothersectionsofthe
CriminalCoderelatingtotrademarks,shoulddefinitelybeinterpretedinlight
oftherightsofthetrademarkownerandthedefenceofadefendantinthe
civilsphere.TheCriminalCodeshouldnotbeinterpretedsoastocreate
generaloffencesagainstanyone,forexample,whoisfoundinthepossession
ofalabelorofaninstrumenttobeusedtomakealabel,whentheobjectin
questionisused,ordestinedtobeused,forapurposewhichthedoctrineand
thejurisprudencehasotherwisedeclaredtobeperfectlylegalundercivil
principles.Thegoodfaithdefenceinsubsection409(2)underlinesperhaps
thisphilosophyinthatitacknowledgesthatthereexistsnumerouscases
wheretrademarksarereproducedlegallyandwhereveryspecific
instrumentsarenecessaryforthegoalofreproducingofatrademark.A
perfectexampleofsuchasituationisthatofanadvertisingfirm,whichusesa
printertoadvertiseproductsinvariousmedia.



TheprinciplessetoutintheFarinacasearealsosetoutintheoff-citedcase
ofSaperLtd.v.SpectersLtd.andBoxesLtd.(1953),70iR.P.C.173(H.C.J.
Ch.D.).Thiscase,ofcourse,concernedadisputebetweenSaperand
Spectersovertoffeesales.PlaintiffwasupsetthatSpectersusedboxesalmost
identicaltoitsowntoselltoffee,andthereforesuedthemanufacturerofthe
boxes,theseconddefendant,BoxesLtd.TheCourtheldforthedefendant.
Itwouldappearthereforethattheinfractioncreatedatsection409,and
evenalludedtoinsubsection410(b),andwhichisrelevanttoacertainextent
tothepassingoffsectionofaprovisionofsection408,thattheunderlying
infractionproscribedbytheCriminalCodeconsistsinthesaleofaproducton
whichthetrademarkofaparticularmanufacturerisaffixedwithouthis
consentandwiththeknowledgethatthetrademarkownerisnotthe
manufacturer.Thisprinciplehasbeenconfirmedintwooldcriminalappeal
cases:Regv.Closs,[1857]C.L.C.494andRegv.JohnSmith,[1858]C.L.C.33.
4.0CriminalLawDefence
4.1DefenceofMistake
Althoughaspecialistincriminallawmaybebetterpositionedtodiscussthis
potentialdefence,withrespecttoseveraloftheprovisionsoftheCriminal
Codewehavediscussedsofar,itisinterestingtoperhapsconsiderwhether
theaccused,whereintenttodeceiveortodefraudisrequiredunderthese
provisions,mayrelyonthedefenceofmistakeastoprivatelaw,alsocalled
“aclaimofright”.Inotherwords,couldamistakeoflawnegativemensrea
undertheseprovisions.
Therepeatedreferencetothe”intenttodeceive”andto”defraud”,inthe
relevantprovisionsoftheCriminalCode,dictatethattheaccused’s
understandingandappreciationofhiscivillawrightsundertheTrade-marks
Act,orthegenerallawapplicabletotrademarksandtrade-names,should
alsobeconsideredinestablishingthetrueextentofcriminalintent.Itcould
verywellbe,forexample,thatanaccusedknewthathewasenteringintoa
situationwhereatrademarkownercouldconsiderhisactstoconstitute
infringementorpassingoff,inthecaseofanunregisteredtrademark,butthat
theaccused,eitherpursuanttoconsultationwithanexpertornot,calculated
thathisactswouldnotconstituteinfringementorwhattheCriminalCode
definesasforgery.IfacceptedbytheCourt,thisdefencewouldprobably
leadtoanacquittalinalmostanyborderlinecase.
AnapplicationofthisprincipleintheImpencocasecouldhavebeenbases
onthefollowingreasoning:theaccusedcouldhavecontendedthatthey



wereawareoftheConsumerscase,andthattheindividualaccused’s
understandingofthesituationwasthatparallelimportation,or”grey
marketing”,waslegal,andhebelievedthat,invirtueofcivillawprinciplesor
privatelawprinciples,Seikocouldnotinvokeanyrightsagainsthimunderthe
Trade-marksActnorunderthedoctrineofpassingoffandthathewas
certain,tothebestofhisknowledge,thatgenuineSEIKOwatcheswouldbe
soldinhisclient’sboxes.
Ourdiscussionoftheimportanceofcivillawprinciplesincriminaltrademark
matterssuggeststhatweshouldnotruleoutthepossibilityofthedefenceof
mistakeundertheprovisionsweareconcernedwithinthispaper.Assuch,
wereferyoutoseveralauthoritiesonthispoint.
2
4.2SpecificDefenceofGOodFaithunders.409(2)
Asmentionedabove,subsection409(2)specificallyprovidesadefence
whichexistsonbehalfoftheaccused,amongstothers.Furthermore,we
suggestthatthedefenceforeseeninsubsection409(2)needonlybeproven
onabalanceofprobabilitiesinlifhtofRobinsonv.TheQueen(1973),37D.L.R.
(3d)1(S.C.C.).Aspreviouslymentioned,section409isapreliminaryprovision
tosection407.Assuch,itissuggestedthattheCrownmustfirstprovethat
infringementofthetrademark,asdefinedintheTrade-marksAct,has
occurredpriortofindingthedefendantguiltyundersection409.Section409
oftheCriminalCodewouldappearsuperfluousandalmostmeaningless,ifit
couldbesaidthatthelegislatorwouldallowaconvictionundersaidprovision
incaseswhereinfringement,orevenpotentialinfringement,didnoteven
exist.
5.0PracticalAspectsofCriminalProceedingsinTrademarkCases
Itwouldappearfromourforegoingdiscussionthatperhapsonlythemost
straightforwardcasesshouldbeprosecutedthroughthecriminaljustice
system.ThecasesofLocquetandFerjo,eventhoughthelattercaseisunder
appeal,andthestatisticsweobtainedfromaseniorRCMPofficerspecializing
inintellectualpropertyrightsenforcement,(whichwewilldiscussfurtheronin
thispaper),confirmthat,atleastinclearcasesofcounterfeiting,therecourse
canbequiteefficacious.



















































2
GlanvilleWilliams,CriminalLaw,2nded.,Stevens&SonsLtd.,London,atpp.304-345.;J.C.
SmithandBrianHogan,CriminalLaw,6thed.,Smith&Hogan,London,1988,atpp.83-85;
Reginav.Ilczyszyn(1988),45C.C.C.(3d)91(Ont.C.A.);Reginav.VanHerke(1984),12C.C.C.
(3d)359(Alta,C.A.).



OneoftheinterestingaspectsofenforcementthroughtheCriminalCode,in
additiontotheforfeitureprovisionofsection412,aretheprovisionsdealing
withsearchandseizure.
5.1SpecialProceduresandPowersinRelationtoTrademark
EnforcementThroughtheCriminalCode
TheCriminalCodeprovisionsrelatingtosearchwarrantsintheapplyto
trademarkenforcementcases.
Section487oftheCriminalCodestatesasfollows:
“(1)AjusticewhoissatisfiedbyinformationonoathinForm1that
therearereasonablegroundstobelievethatthereisina
building,receptacleorplace
(a)anythingonorinrespectofwhichanyoffenceagainstthis
ActoranyotherActofParliamenthasbeenorissuspectedto
havebeencommitted,
(b)anythingthatthereisreasonablegroundtobelievewillafford
evidencewithrespecttothecommissionofanoffenceagainst
thisActoranyotherActofParliament,or
(c)anythingthattherearereasonablegroundstobelieveis
intendedtobeusedforthepurposeofcommittinganyoffence
againstthepersonforwhichapersonmaybearrestedwithout
warrant,
mayatanytimeissueawarrantunderhishandauthorizinga
personnamedthereinorapeaceofficer
(d)tosearchthebuilding,receptacleorplaceforanysuchthing
andtoseizeit,and
(e)subjecttoanyotherActofParliament,to,assoonas
practicable,bringthethingseizedbefore,ormakeareportin
respectthereofto,thejusticeorsomeotherjusticeforthesame
territorialdivisioninaccordancewithsection489.1.
(2)Wherethebuilding,receptacle,orplaceinwhichanything
mentionedinsubsection(1)isbelievedtobeisinanyother
territorialdivision,thejusticemayissuehiswarrantinlikeform
modifiedaccordingtothecircumstances,andthewarrantmay
beexecutedintheotherterritorialdivisionafterithasbeen



endorsed,inForm28,byajusticehavingjurisdictioninthat
territorialdivision.
(3)Asearchwarrantissuedunderthissectionmaybeintheform
setoutasForm5inPartXXVIII,variedtosuitthecase.
(4)Anendorsementthatismadeonawarrantasprovidedforin
subsection(2)issufficientauthoritytothepeaceofficersorsuch
personstowhomitwasoriginallydirectedandtoallpeace
officerswithinthejurisdictionofthejusticebywhomitisendorsed
toexecutethewarrantandtodealwiththethingsseizedin
accordancewithsection489.1orotherwiseprovidedbylaw.”

Weseethatthisprovisionandthosedirectlyfollowingitallowtheownerof
thetrademarkenforcementpossibilitiesnotnormallyavailablethroughthe
CivilCourts.
Thewarrantobtainedunderthesesectionsallowsthepersonnamedtherein,
orthepeaceofficer,tosearchandseizethearticlesdescribedinthewarrant.
Thewarrantmaybeissuednotwithstandingthefactthataninfringementhas
notyetbeenproven.Thismeansthattheaccusedfindsitselfunderthe
influenceofaseizure,priortobeingfoundguiltyofasubstantiveoffence.
TheCriminalCodeandthegeneralprinciplesofcriminalprocedureforesee
variousgroundsofattackofaseizure.Thismaybedonebasedonthefact
therewerenoreasonablegroundsfortheissuanceofthewarrantinthefirst
place,orwherepartsoftheinformationtoobtainthesearchwarrantare
incompleteormisleadingandalsobyvirtueofcertainextraordinary
remedies.However,notwithstandingtheintricaciesofcriminalprocedure,it
didnotappearfromthejurisprudencethatwereviewedthat,inthespecific
caseoftrademarkinfringementmatters,awarrantwouldbeeasilysetaside
bywayofaproceedingtakenpriortothetrialonthemerits.Onthequestion
ofthereviewingofthesearchwarrant,wereferyoutospecializedtextson
thequestion.
Whatisperhapsofmoreinteresttousisthefactthatthearticlesseizedmay
bedetainedandusedasevidenceattrial,althoughsection490setsoutrules
relatingtomaximumperiodsandthegroundsforwhichseizedarticlesmay
bedetainedbytheCrown,andtheconditionsonwhichsuchtermsordelays
maybeextendedormodified.
5.2UseofarticlesSeizedasEvidenceinCivilCases




Thequestionnowarisesastowhatusemaybemadeinacivilcaseofarticles
seizedundertheCriminalCodesearchandseizureprovisionsintrade-mark
matters.
Itwouldappearthattherightofthetrade-markownertousetheevidence
gatherbythepoliceforcivillitigationwilldependonhowfaradvancedthe
criminalcasehasprogressed.
Intheeventwheretherehasbeenasearchandseizure,chargeshavebeen
laid,atrialhastakenplaceandfinaljudgmenthasbeenrendereditwould
appearthatthereshouldbenopossibleobjectiontotheuseoftheevidence
bythetrade-markownerinacivilcasesincetheevidenceifplacedintothe
recordwillhavebecomeofpublicknowledge.
Therearecaseswherethepoliceseizesarticlesandholditforseveralmonths
beforetheCrownevendecidestoprosecutethecase.Itwouldappear
contrarytotheFederalChartertoallowatrade-markownertotake
advantageofthisevidenceandinvokeitinseveralproceedingsbeforethe
Crownhasevendecidedonwhethertogoaheadwithcriminalcharges.We
mentionedthatthegoodscouldberetainedforseveralmonthssincethey
areprovisionsintheCriminalCodewhichallowthepolicetoaskforan
extensionoftheinitialperiodofdetentionofthegoods.
However,onemustaskthequestionastowhenthepolicehavecarriedouta
searchandseizure,and
theCrownhasbroughtchargesagainstthe
accused.Thissituationislessclearthanthepreviouslydiscussedtwo
situationssinceononehandtheCrownhasindeeddecidedtoprosecutethe
caseandlaidchargesorontheothertheaccusedhasnotbeenfoundguilty
ofanoffenceandhasbeendispossessedofwhatmustbepresumedtobe
propertythatislegallyhis.
IntheprovinceofQuebecthereisaprovisioninatheCivilCodewithrespect
toevidencewhichmayapplytoprotectthedefendant.Article2858inthe
newCivilCodereadsasfollows:
“TheCourtshall,evenofitsownmotion,rejectanyevidence
obtainedundersuchcircumstancesthatfundamentalrightsand
freedomarebreachedandthatitsusewouldtendtobringthe
administrationofjusticeintodisrepute.
Thelatercriterionisnottakenintoaccountinacaseofviolation
oftherightofprofessionalprivilege”

Thearticlerequiresthereforetwothings:firstthatafundamentalrightand
freedombebreachedandsecondthattheadministrationofjusticebe



broughtintodisrepute.THisprovisionobviouslyconfinesmuchdiscretionin
thehandsoftheCourtbutisareminderjustthesameofthedelicatenature
ofthisquestionoftheuseofarticlesseizedincriminalproceedingsforcivil
purposes.
WepresumethatiftheCrownorthepolicedonotmakethearticlesor
informationseizedorobtainedavailabletothecomplainantthecomplainant
willmakeamotiontotheCourtasitispermittedbytheCriminalCodetobe
enabledtoseeandtakecognizanceoftheevidencegathered.Thepolice
willprobablybeverywaryofprovidingtheinformationorcopiesof
documentsorpicturesoftheevidencevoluntarilyandwillusually,asa
safeguard,obligethecomplainanttorequestthepermissiontoobtainthe
informationfromtheCourt.
Thesituationisthereforecomplicatedbythefactthatinsuchsituationsa
CourtofLawhasinfactprovidedthecomplainantwiththerighttotake
cognizanceoftheevidencegatheredinthecriminalproceedings.Isitfair
thereaftertoblamethecomplainantwhobecomesaplaintifforisalreadya
plaintiffinacivilcasetoinvokesuchevidenceinordertosupportitsposition
inthatcivilcase.
Thepeculiaraspectofthisquestionoftheseizedgoodsliesinthenatureof
trade-markrights.Inaseizurefordrugsorfirearmsforexample,thereisnot
necessarilymuchinterestplacedinwhatisseizedforthepurposeofacivil
action.Intrade-markmattersthecomplainantisalwaysapotentialplaintiff
inacivilcaseandassuchhasinterestsinbothtypesofproceedings.
Itisevidentthatacomplainantandthereforepotentialplaintiffmustnotuse
theCriminalCodeinaheavy-handedorabusivemannersinceitwould
exposeitselftoanactionindamagesinanyeventifitscriminalcaseisfound
tohaveobviouslybeenameansandatooltoputundopressureonthe
defendant.
5.3UnofficialStatistics
Beforepreparingthispaper,weconsultedSergeantSergeCorriveauofthe
R.C.M.P.inMontreal.Since1992SergeantCorriveau’sunithasopenedabout
twohundredfilesinvolvingtrade-markinfringementinvestigationsthatcould
beprosecutedundersections406andfollowingoftheCriminalCode.He
toldusthatapproximatelyseventy-fivechargeswerebroughtpursuantto
theseinvestigations,andonehundredorsoseizureswereperformedtoassist
inthegatheringofevidenceagainstthesuspects.



AlthoughSergeantCorriveaudidnothaveconvictionratefigures,he
claimedthatnearlyeverychargebroughtresultedeitherinaguiltypleaora
guiltyverdict.
OnthequestionofsentencingSergeantCorriveauadvisedusthattohis
knowledgetheaveragefineassessedbytheQuebecCourttoafirsttime
infringerundertheCriminalCodeisbetweenfivehundredandonethousand
dollars,althoughjudgesinQuebechaverecentlyshownmorewillingnessto
assesshigherfines,includingamountsofuptotwothousanddollarsforfirst
timeinfringers.
Thetypeofwaresseizedintheseprosecutionsmainlyconsistedof
unauthorizedreproductionsofluxurybrandproductssuchasChanel,Cartier,
Rolex,etc.aswellast-shirts,sweatshirtsandthelike.
SergeantCorriveau’s”anecdotal”evidenceonthechargesresultinginguilty
pleasandguiltyverdictsconfirmsthepaucityofjurisprudenceonthesubject
andisperhapsthebestguidewehaveatthistimeasitconcernsthe
effectivenessofCriminalCodeprosecutionoftrade-markinfringers.
Conclusion
Wehaveattemptedtoprovideanoverviewoftheinter-playbetweenthe
CriminalCodeprovisionsonTrade-Marksandprinciplesapplicabletotrade-
marksandpassingoffinthecivilsphere.
Itwouldappearthatgiventheavailabilityofcivildefences,theexistenceof
goodfaithdefencesandthenecessityandburdenoftheCrowntoprovea
criminalintentinalmostallcases,makescriminalprosecutionofunclearor
moredifficulttrade-markcasesadifficultoption.
However,itdoesseemthattheCriminalCodeprovisionsonTrade-Marksand
thoserelatingtosearchandseizurecanbeaveryeffectivetoolinstraight-
forwardcasesofcounterfeitingandclearpassingoff.Thefinescanonly
increaseoverthenextfewyearsandastheCriminalCourtsareexposedto
moreandmorecriminalcasesanexpertiseandperhapsasympatheticear
tosuchcasesmaybedevelopedinCourtswhichotherwisehavelittleorno
dealingswithourfieldoflaw.





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CRIMINALLAWINAIDOF
TRADEMARKS:
PRELIMINARYREFLEXIONS

PATENTANDTRADEMARKINSTITUTEOFCANADA
Sixty-eightAnnualGeneralMeeting

LakeGeorge
1994-10-07

BobH.Sotiriadis148
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
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CanadaH2Y3X2
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ROBIC,ungrouped’avocatsetd’agentsdebrevetsetdemarquesdecommercevouédepuis1892àlaprotectionet
àlavalorisationdelapropriétéintellectuelledanstouslesdomaines:brevets,dessinsindustrielsetmodèlesutilitaires;
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