Contributory and/or Induced Infringement



CONTRIBUTORYAND/ORINDUCEDPATENTINFRINGEMENT

by
FrançoisM.Grenier
*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers,
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.(514)9876242-Fax(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com

Ididnotchoosethetitleofthispaper.Firstly,beforestartingtoresearchthe
subject,Iwasconvinced,asIamsureyouallare,thatthedoctrineof
contributoryinfringementdidnotexistinCanada.Secondly,Ialwaysthought
that”and/or”hadameaningonlyforcorporatelawyersandsomeweirdhuman
beingsinthetaxationdepartment.Forthesereasons,eventhoughusuallythe
subjectisrejectedbythespeaker,hereIfeelrejectedbythesubject.
Oneofthelastspeakersonthissubject,whoseworkwaspublished,wasthelate
JohnC.OsborneQ.C.whoreadapaperentitled”ContributoryInfringement”
(noand/or)tothePatentInstituteofCanadaatits1950meeting
1.Mr.Osborne
cametothefollowingconclusion:
“Themomentousquestionofwhetherornotthereisanactionfor
contributoryinfringementinCanadarevealsitselfasameredebate
overthemeaningofanexpression.”
2

Iagree.OurCourtshaveextendedthedefinitionofinfringementbeyondits
textualmeaningfoundinLawbooks.
Apatentgrantstothepatenteeforaperiodof17yearsfromitsdatethe
exclusiveright,privilegeandlibertyofmaking,constructing,usingandvending
tootherstobeusedtheinventionthereindescribedandclaimed
3.Infringement
isusuallydefinedasthedoingofanyactthatinterfereswiththeabove-



















































©LEGERROBICRICHARD,1987.
*Lawyer,FrançoisM.GrenierisaseniorpartnerinthelawfirmLEGERROBICRICHARD,g.p.and
inthepatentandtrademarkagencyfirmROBIC,g.p.Thismaterialwasoriginallypresented
atthe1987Mid-WinterMeetingofthePatentandTrademarkInstituteofCanada.Itwas
meantfordiscussionanddoesnotconclusivelystatetheopinionoftheauthororthe
membersofhisfirmonthesubjectmatternordoesitprovideanexhaustivereviewthereof.
Publishedat(1987),4CanadianIntellectualPropertyReview26-35.Publication41.
1JohnC.Osborne,ContributoryInfringement,14C.P.R.p.75.
2Ibidp.89.
3Sections46-48,PatentActR.S.C.1970,c.p-4.



mentionedexclusiverights.Fewproblemsarisewhenanyonetakesthewhole
oftheinventionandmakesit,sellsitorusesitwithouttheconsentofthe
patentee.However,problemsdoarisewhen,incasesinvolvingpatentsfor
combinations,onlypartofthecombinationistakenandsoldtoanotherwhowill
useitincombinationwiththeotherelementsandconsequentlyininfringement
ofthepatent.
EventhoughthispaperwillberestrictedtothesituationinCanada,abrieflook
attheEnglishandU.S.solutionsiswarranted.
UnitedStates
Section271,USCStitle35ch.28,readsasfollows:
Section271,Infringementofpatent
(a)Exceptasotherwiseprovidedinthistitle[35USCS§§1et
seq.],whoeverwithoutauthoritymakes,usesorsellsany
patentedinvention,withintheUnitedStatesduringtheterm
ofthepatenttherefor,infringesthepatent.
(b)Whoeveractivelyinducesinfringementofapatentshallbe
liableasaninfringer.
(c)Whoeversellsacomponentofapatentedmachine,
manufacture,combinationorcomposition,oramaterialor
apparatusforuseinpracticingapatentedprocess,
constitutingamaterialpartoftheinvention,knowingthe
sametobeespeciallymadeorespeciallyadaptedforusein
aninfringementofsuchpatent,andnotastaplearticleor
commodityofcommercesuitableforsubstantial
noninfringinguse,shallbeliableasacontributoryinfringer.
(d)Nopatentownerotherwiseentitledtoreliefforinfringement
orcontributoryinfringementofapatentshallbedeniedrelief
ordeemedguiltyofmisuseorillegalextensionofthepatent
rightbyreasonofhishavingdoneoneormoreofthe
following:(1)derivedrevenuefromactswhichifperformed
byanotherwithouthisconsentwouldconstitutecontributory
infringementofthepatent;(2)licensedorauthorizedanother
toperformactswhichifperformedwithouthisconsentwould
constitutecontributoryinfringementofthepatent;(3)sought
toenforcehispatentrightsagainstinfringementor
contributoryinfringement.
(July19,1952,ch.950§1,66Stat.811.)



AlthoughSection271(b)establishesliabilityfor”ContributoryInfringement”,it
doesnotaddanotheractofinfringementtothedefinitionofsuchactsin
Section271(a).Sincetheterm”activelyinducesinfringement”foundinSection
271(b)isnotclearlyinderogationofthecommonlawconceptofcontributory
infringement,itisconcludedthatCongressintendedthistermtocoversituations
inwhichactualinfringementresultsfromsuchactiveinducement.Noonemay
befoundliableforinducinginfringementunlesstheactinducedisan
infringementitself.
Beforetherecanbecontributoryinfringement,theremustbedirect
infringement
4.If”A”sellsto”B”partstobeusedinapatentedcombination,”B”
mustusethepartsinthecombination(andbecomeaninfringer)before”A”can
befoundtohaveinduced”B”.
England
ThepositioninEnglandisgenerallyasfollows.Sellingpartsofacombination
patenttoapersonwhousesthemincombinationandinfringes,isnot
infringementevenifthesellerknowsthatsuchpartswillbeusedtoinfringe.The
sellerofanarticleofcommercehasnothingtodowiththeusethebuyerwill
makeofsucharticle.Thesellingofanarticleintendedtobeusedforthe
purposeofinfringingapatentissimplynotinfringementevenifthearticlecould
notbeusedforanyotherpurpose.(Townsendv.Haworth)
5,(Sykesv.Haworth)6,
(Innesv.ShortandBeal)
7,(DunlopPneumaticTyreCo.Ltd.v.DavidMoseleyand
SonsLtd.)
8.
Thisprinciple,whichIsubmitislogical,hascertainexceptions.InSykesv.
Haworth,thedirectinfringerwasfoundtobeactingasanagentforthe
defendantandconsequently,thedefendantwasfoundtobeaninfringer.
InInnesv.ShortandBeal,itwasdecidedthatwherethevendorasksandinvites
thebuyertousethearticlesoastoinfringeapatent,thevendorbecomesan
infringerhimself.



















































4
TheCodeoftheLawsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica”,Title35,ch.28,Section271and
annotations.
51875,48L.J.Ch.770n.
61879,12Ch.D.826.
71898,15R.P.C.449.
81904,15R.P.C.274.



ItwasalsodecidedinUnitedTelephoneCo.v.Dale9,thatthesaleofa
completepatentedmachineinpartsthatcaneasilybeputtogetherisan
infringementofthepatentonthemachine.
Finally,inIncandescentGasLightCo.Ltd.v.New-IncandescentMantleCo.
10,
thedefendantwasfoundliableforinfringementsincehewassystematically
carryingthebusinessofinfringerofapatent,sellingonepartofthepatented
articleinthesamebuildingwheresomeoneelsesoldtheremainderofit.
InEnglandthereforetosellanarticleintendedtobeusedforthepurposeof
infringing(andknowingthatitwillsobeused)isnotinfringementunlessthe
seller,bypositiveactionsdirects,induces,aidsorabetsthebuyertoinfringe.
Canada
In1950,Mr.Osborneconcludedhispaperasfollows:
(p.92)
“Inthecircumstances,itisratherdifficulttotellexactlywherewe
standinCanadawithreferencetowhathasbeenbroadlycalled
contributoryinfringementintheUnitedStates,andyetIbelievethat
certainpropositionshavebeenestablished.
ThedecisioninDunlopv.Moseleywillprobablycontinuetobe
followedsothatasupplierofapartofapatentedcombinationwill
notbeguiltyofinfringementeveniftheparthasnootherusethan
insuchcombinationandthesupplierknowsthatitwillbesoused.
However,ourCourtswillholdadefendantaninfringerif:
1.hecompletestheactofinfringementthroughthe
instrumentalityofanagent,or
2.heinvitesorprocuresorinducestheactofinfringement,or
3.heisapartytotheactofinfringement.”

WhenMr.Osbornearrivedattheaboveconclusions,theleadingcasein
CanadawasCopelandChattersonCo.v.Hatton,VictorGuertinandHenry
Guertin
11,inwhichthedefendantHattonhavingpurchasedabinderfromthe
plaintiffsontheconditionthatitwastobeusedonlywithsheetssoldbyorunder
theplaintiffsauthority,usedinthebindersheetssuppliedbytheGuertinswho
knewofthetermsuponwhichHattonhadpurchasedthebinderandundertook



















































9
1884,25Ch.D.778.
10
1898,15R.P.C.p.81.
11
1906,10Ex.C.R.224,affd(1906/37S.C.R.651).



toindemnifyhimagainstanyactiontheplaintiffsmightbring.Someofthe
claimsofthepatentrelatedtoacombinationofthebinderandsheets.
TheCourtfirstexpressedtheviewthatithadjurisdictiononlyinrespectofanact
ofinfringementasfoundinthestatute.Anythingfallingshortofthatleavesthe
Courtwithoutjurisdiction.Applyingthisprincipletothefacts,theCourtdivided
theproblemintotwoquestions:first,whetherwhattheGuertinsdidwas
actionableornotandsecond,whetherthatactionablewrongcouldbetermed
aninfringementoftheplaintiffs’patent.
AfterreviewingtheBritishauthoritiesandconcludingthatitisnotan
infringementofapatenttosellanarticlewhichinitselfdoesnotinfringe,
althoughitmaybeusedastoinfringethepatent,theCourtfoundonthefirst
question:
(p.245)
TheseexpressionsofgeneralprinciplesofthelawgofarIthinktoremove
thedifficultywithwhichLordJusticeJamesfelthimselfconfrontedin
Townsendv.Haworthandshow,itseemstome,thatadeclarationatlaw
mightbeframedtomeetthecaseofonewhoprovidedthematerialsfor
theinfringement,andforhisownendsandbenefitprocuredorinduced
anothertoinfringeapatentandindemnifiedhimagainstthe
consequenceofsuchinfringement.
(p.246)
Buttheyknewofthepatentandoftheplaintiffs’claimsandtheytook
theirchances.IfithadturnedoutthatHattonhadnotinfringedthe
patentbyusingtheirsheetsnowrongwouldhavebeendonetoanyone,
andtheywouldnothavebeenliable.Butwehaveseenthatwhat
Hattondidwasactionable,anditseemsveryclearthathewasinduced
tocommitthewrongbythedefendantsGuertins,andthattheydidthis
fortheirownendsandbenefitandtothedetrimentoftheplaintiffs,
knowingverywellatthesametimewhattheyweredoingandthe
chancestheyweretaking.That,itseemstomeissufficientinrespectto
knowledge.Ithinkthefirstofthetwoquestionsproposed,namely,
whetherornotwhatthedefendantstheGuertinsdid,ininducingor
procuringHattontoinfringetheplaintiffs’patent,isactionableornot
shouldbeansweredintheaffirmative.

Havingconcludedonthefirstquestion,theCourtturnedtothesecondquestion
andalsoanswereditintheaffirmative:
(p.246-247)
Underthegrantmadebycanadianletterspatentthepatenteeandhis
legalrepresentativesandassignsacquireduringtheprescribedtermthe



exclusiverightprivilegeandlibertyofmaking,constructingandusingand
vendingtootherstobeused,inCanada,theinventioncoveredbythe
patent.Anditdoesnotappeartometobegoingtoofartoholdthat
anyinvasionorviolationofthatrightisaninfringementofthepatent.But
isnotthattherightwhichoneinvadeswhoknowinglyandforhisown
endsinducesorprocuresanothertoviolateorinfringeit?Andifso,may
nottheactoftheprocurerorinducerbewithproprietytermedan
infringementofthepatent?Inshortdoesnotonewhoknowinglyandfor
hisownendsandbenefitandtothedamageofthepatenteeinducesor
procuresanothertoinfringeapatenthimselfinfringethepatent?Itseems
tomeonprinciplethatitcomestothat.

TheGuertinswerefoundliable.
Wherearewenow?InmyviewthenextdecisionofimportanceinCanadawas
SlaterSteelIndustriesLtd.v.R.PayerCo.Ltd.
12.
Inthatcase,thepatentsprotectedthecombinationofpreformedarmourrods
withastrandedelectricpowertransmissionline.Theplaintiffshadnoprotection
forthepreformedarmourrodsassuch.Theymadeuseoftheirpatentsby
manufacturingthepreformedarmourrodsandsellingthemtothepower
companieswhoappliedthemtotheirtransmissionlines,therebycreatingthe
patentedcombination.Thedefendantsdidexactlythesamething.Itwasalso
agreedthatthedefendantsknewthatthepreformedarmourrodscouldbe
usedsoastoinfringethepatentsinsuitandtherewasnootherpracticalusefor
thearmourrodsinquestionapartfromwhatwastaughtbythepatentsinsuit.
Thiscaseillustrateswhytheprimaryinfringeroftenisnotsued.Thefollowingisan
excerptoftheeditorialnote:
“Theproblemofplottingthelinebetweeninfringementandnon-
infringementinthesecircumstancesarisesbecausethepatenteeis
oftenreluctanttosuetheprimaryinfringerwhousesthe
combinationinthatsuchuserisagoodcustomerofthepatentee.”

TheCourtreviewedthesituationintheUnitedStatesandinEngland,and
acceptingtheCopeland-Chattersoncaseasbeingthelawunderthepresent
CanadianPatentAct,itstatedtheproblemasfollows:
“ThequestionthatIhavetodecideis,therefore,whetherthe
defendantinthiscase”knowingly”,andforhisownendsand
benefitandtothedamageofthepatentee,hasinducedor
procuredanotherto”infringe”theplaintiffs’patent.”

Thefollowingelementshadtobeproven:



















































12
55C.P.R.2d,61.



a)actualinfringementbyapurchaser(therecannothavebeen
infringementbyinducingorprocuringiftherehadbeennoactual
infringement);
b)wasthispurchaserinducedorprocuredtoinfringebythedefendants;
c)ifthispurchaserwasinducedorprocuredbythedefendants,didthe
defendantsdosoknowingly.
Forthepurposeoftheargument,theCourtassumedthatactualinfringement
hadbeenestablished.Turningtothesecondaspect,theCourtsaid:
(p.87)
Inconsideringwhetherwhatthepowerentitiesdid(whichforpresent
purposesIshallassumewasa”wrongfulact”)wasinducedorprocuredby
thedefendants,itmustbeborneinmindthatwhatwearetalkingaboutis
suchactsbythedefendantsaswouldconstitutethedefendantsparties
tothepowerentities’wrongfulacts.Itmustbeclear,Ithink,thatmerely
doingsomethingthatwaspartoftheeventsleadinguptothewrongful
acts(asinequanon),cannotberegardedashavinginducedor
procuredthewrongfulacts.Furthermore,itmustbeborneinmind,in
consideringthisaspectofthematter,thatthedefendantscaninnoway
beheldresponsibleforthefactthatthepowerentitiesmadethe
combinationcoveredbythepatentinsuit.Itwasbeingused,
presumablywiththeactiveinvitationofthepatentee,since1953,and
thereforelongbeforethedefendantcompanycommencedoperations
in1963.Whatthedefendantsmustbefoundtohaveinducedor
procured,iftheplaintiffsaretosucceed,isthemakingofthepatented
combinationbythepowerentitieswithoutalicencefromthepatentee.

andthen:
(p.88-89)
Onthequestionwhetherthedefendantshaveexercisedsuchinfluence
onBritishColumbiaHydrooroneoftheQuebecpowercompaniesthat
theyshouldberegardedaspartiestoadecisionbyoneofthoseentities
tousethepatentedcombinationwithoutgettingalicence,Ihavecome
totheconclusionthattheplaintiffshavefailedtomakeoutacase.There
isnodirectevidenceastowhatcausedanyoftheseverysubstantial
corporationstodecidetousethepatentee’spatentedinventionwithout
gettingalicence.(Itisimportanttonotethattheplaintiffs,insteadof
callingevidenceastowhatcausedthepowerentitiestomakethe
combinationwithoutgettingalicence,areaskingtheCourttoinferthat
thisconductwasinducedbythedefendantsfromisolatedfacts

somewhatremotefromthefacttobedecided.Inthecircumstances,the
Courtislefttodecidethequestiononabalanceofprobabilityand,when
thefailuretocalldirectevidenceisunexplained,theCourtcannotbe
completelyuninfluencedbythepossibilitythattheomissiontocallsuch
evidencewasduetotheprobabilitythatitwouldbeinjurioustothe
plaintiffs’case).Ihavenoevidenceastowhethersuchentitiesknewof
thepatentsornot.Iftheydidknowofthemandneverthelessdecidedto
usethecombinationwithoutgettingalicence,Icanconceivethatthey
didit
(a)becausetheydecidedthatthepatentswereillegal,
(b)becausetheywereoftheviewthattheyalreadyhadanimplied
licence,
(c)inthecaseofBritishColumbiaHydro,becauseitwasoftheview
thatitdidnotrequirealicence.
Icannotconceivethat,assumingtheseentitiesknewoftheexistenceof
thepatents,anyoneofthemwasinducedorprocuredbythedefendant
todosomethingknowingitwasillegal.Anyoneofthemisagiant
comparedwiththedefendant.Judicialknowledgecanbetakeninthis
modernworldthattheyareallwellservicedbylawyersandengineers.I
ampreparedfrommyexperiencewithsuchorganizationstosaythatthe
balanceofprobabilityisthatnoneofthemwoulddecideknowinglytodo
somethingthatitregardedasillegal.Itisevenlessprobablethatthey
couldbe”induced”or”procured”againsttheirownjudgmenttodo
somethingillegalbya”onemanshow”suchasthatoperatedbythe
defendants.Theotheralternativeisthattheseentitiesdidnotknowofthe
patentsinsuitandweremovedto”innocent”infringementby
misrepresentationsmadetothembythedefendants.

Thus,thesellerofpartsofapatentedarticlewillbeliableforinfringementif:
a)thebuyercompletestheactofinfringement;
b)completionoftheactofinfringementisinfluencedbytheseller,tothe
pointwherewithoutsaidinfluence,infringementbythebuyerwouldnot
otherwisetakeplace;
c)theinfluenceisexercisedbythesellerknowinglyi.e.thesellerknowsthat
hisinfluencewillresultinthecompletionoftheactofinfringement.
InProcter&GambleCo.v.Bristol-MeyersCanadaLtd.
13,thepatentincluded
methodclaimspertainingtotheconditioningofhouseholdwashinginadryer



















































13
11.39C.P.R.2nd.p.145.

byuseofapieceofclothtreatedwithachemicalsubstancethatremoves
staticcling.AddyJ.foundthatonlythepersonusingthepieceofclothin
accordancewithdirectionssuppliedbythedefendantwouldbecommittinga
literalinfringementofthemethodclaims.Thequestionwaswhetherthe
defendantwasalsoguiltyofinfringementoftheseclaimsbysupplyingits
productstotheusers.
Mr.JusticeAddyfoundthattherewasnoevidencethatthedefendantitself
useditsproductaccordingtothemethodclaimsandthattheusershadno
licencefromtheplaintiffsotouseit.
AddyJ.agreedwiththeprincipleestablishedbySlaterSteelandtheEnglish
authorities(“…thatthesellingwithoutmoreofarticlestobeusedforthepurpose
ofinfringingapatentisnotaninfringementofpatent”).Healsorecognizedthat
onemaybeinducedtoinfringe:
(p.166)
“Inthecaseatbar,notonlybyitsinstructionsanddirectionsonthe
packagesof”Fleecy”astothemethodofusingitbutbyitsadvertisingon
television,thedefendantinvitesandinducesthepublictoinfringethe
methodclaimsofthepatent.”
(p.167)
Itisdifficulttoconceivehowthepresentdefendantshouldnotbe
consideredassystematicallyengagingforitsownprofitinaidingand
abettinganyinfringementbythepublicoftheplaintiff’smethodclaims
andshouldnotbeconsideredasconstitutingitselfapartytoeach
infringementcommittedbysuchusers.Wherethedefendanthas
inducedorprocuredaninfringement,Idonotfeelthatitisatall
necessaryinsuchcasesforthesuppliertohavehadanypersonalcontact
withtheinfringingconsumer,toevenknowhisorheridentityortohave
soldthearticledirectlytothatperson.Itissufficientinsuchcases,ifitis
alsoestablished,thatthearticleinfacthasbeensoldbythedefendant
forthepurposeofputtingitonthemarketforsaletotheultimateinfringer,
regardlessofwhetherthefinalsaleismadebyanagentofthedefendant
orbyindependentdistributorsorretailers.Inthepresentcase,thearticle
beingsoldinfringestheproductclaimsoftheplaintiff’spatentandis
producedandsoldinitiallyfortheexpresspurposeofhavingitresoldto
thepublictobeusedasdirectedbythedefendant.

ThisdoesnotaltertheprincipleestablishedbySlaterSteel.Theactof
infringementwascompletedundertheinfluenceoftheseller(advertising)with
knowledgeandintentfromtheseller.



ThenextcaseisSaundersv.AirglideDeflectorsLtd.etal.14.Therewerefour
defendantstotheaction:AirglideDeflectorsLtd.,themanufacturerofa
productcalledthe”AirglideDeflector”;Levy-RussellLtd.,asellerandinstallatorof
“AirglideDeflector”;AftercoolersofCanadaLtd.,adistributorofAirglide
DeflectorsLtd.;UnitedTire&RubberCo.Ltd.,auserof”AirglideDeflectors”.
Claim3ofthepatent,partlyreadasfollows:
(p.9)
“3.Incombinationwithatractor-trailervehiclehavingagapbetweenthe
tractorandthetrailer,saidtractorhavingacabwiththeroofthereofof
lessheightthansaidtrailer,asubstantiallysolidupstandingairflow
deflectingbafflemountedtoextendabovethecabroof…”

Whenthetimecametoconsiderinfringement,GibsonJ.said:
Inconsideringwhetherornottheactivitiesallegedtoinfringedoinfact
infringeinthiscase,itshouldbenotedthatthemonopolycoveredbythe
subjectpatentisonlyforthemethodofusingthedeflectorinatractor-
trailercombinationinacertainspecifiedwayandnotinrespecttothe
deflectoritself.
Theplaintiffspleadthatthedefendant,AirglideDeflectorsLimited,in
additiontosellingandofferingforsaleits”AirglideDeflectors”also
“instructsandadvises”purchasersofithowtomountitsdeflector;thatthe
defendant,AftercoolersofCanadaLimited,inadditiontopurchasing
suchdeflectorsfromAirglideDeflectorsLimited,offeringforsaleand
sellingthesameinCanada”advisesandcounselsitscustomersintheuse
thereof”;thedefendant,Levy-RussellLimited,inadditiontopurchasing
deflectorsfromAirglideDeflectorsLimitedandofferingforsaleandselling
theminCanada,”advisesandcounselsitscustomersintheusethereof”;
andthatthedefendant,UnitedTire&RubberCo.Limited,inadditionto
purchasingthesaiddeflectorsasmanufacturedbyAirglideDeflectors
Limited”hasusedinCanada”thesaiddeflectorsessentiallyinthemanner
asprescribedinclaim3ofthepatent.
Theevidenceestablishedinmyviewthatthedefendant,Airglide
DeflectorsLimitedmanufacturedthe”Airglidedeflector”andthatthe
defendant/vendorsandintermediatepurchaser,namely,Levy-Russell
LimitedandAftercoolersofCanadaLimitedknewandknowthatthe
ultimatepurchaser/user,namely,thedefendant,UnitedTire&RubberCo.
Limited,intendedandintendstousethedeflectorsitpurchasedina
tractor-trailercombinationinamannercontemplatedbythepatent.But
theevidencedoesnotestablishthatthedefendants,AirglideDeflectors
Limited,Levy-RussellLimitedorAftercoolersofCanadaLimitedoranyof



















































14
50C.P.R.2nd,p.6.



them,asthecasemaybe,bytheirrespectiveactivitiesmadethemselves
apartytoinfringement,breachingtherightofthepatenteeasdefinedby
s.46ofthePatentAct(cfSlaterSteelIndustriesLtd.etal.v.R.PayerCo.
Ltd.etal.(1968),55C.P.R.61,38FoxPat.C.139).Inaddition,the
evidencedoesnotproveinducementorprocurementbytheseother
defendantsoftheultimatepurchaser/user,thedefendantUnitedTire&
RubberCo.Limitedtoinfringe,nordoesitproveconspiracyamongthese
otherdefendantstocausetheultimatepurchaser/userthedefendant,
UnitedTire&RubberCo.Limited,toinfringe.
Theevidence,however,doesprovethatthedefendant,UnitedTire&
RubberCo.Limitedhasinfringedthepatentandspecificallybothclaims3
and4ofit.

Thiscaseisdifficulttocommentuponsinceinsufficientfactsaredisclosedinthe
reasonswithrespecttoinducement,theonlycommentbeing”…theevidence
doesnotproveinducementorprocurement…”Certainlytheactofinfringement
wascompletedwithknowledgeandintentfromthesellerbutthejudgmentis
silentontheinfluenceexercisedontheultimateuser.
ThencametheFederalCourtofAppealdecisioninWindsurfingInt’lInc.etal.v.
TrilanticCorp.
15,thesailboardcase.Infringementhadtobeconsideredbythe
CourtofAppealwhenthefindingsofinvalidityofthepatentwerereversed.The
invention,asailboard,isthecombinationofanumberofelements.The
respondentallegedthattheevidencewasinsufficientontwocounts:
1)Thattherespondenthadsoldassembledboards;
2)Thatanyonewasinducedbytherespondenttoassemblethesailboardin
amannerthatinfringesthepatent.Therespondent’sargumentwas
summarizedasfollows:
(p.264)
Counselarguedthatthemeremaking,usingorvendingofcomponents
whichafterwardsenteredintoacombinationisnotprohibitedwherethe
patentislimitedtothecombinationitself.Sincetherespondentisnot
doingwhatisclaimedinthepatent,thenitdoesnotinfringeit.Fromthat
argumentthesecondfollows,namely,thattheenduserisinfringingthe
patentbyassemblingandusingthesailboardfromthepartssupplied
eitherbytherespondentitselfdirectlyorbyaretailer.Tosofind,there
mustbeevidencethatthesupplierhasinducedorprocuredthe
infringementbyconspiringwiththemanufacturerorwiththeretailer,as
thecasemaybe,tocausetheinfringement.Toprovesuchinducement



















































15
8C.P.R.3rd,p.248.



orprocurementtheremustbeevidencethatthedirectinfringerinfringed
thepatentduetothesuppliersspecificinstructionsorbyintensive
advertising.

Dismissingthatargument,theCourtusedstrongwords:
(p.265-266)
Therespondentclearlyisnotsellingparts.Itissellingpartsforthepurpose
ofmakingasailboard.Withoutassemblytherecanbenosailboard.
Withoutassemblytherecanbenopurposeinapurchaserbuyingthe
unassembledpartssince,unassembled,theycannotbeusedforthe
purposeforwhichtheyarepurchased,thatis,tosail.Tosuggestthata
patentinfringementsuitcanbesuccessfullyavoidedbysellingpartsas
componentsofakitincontradistinctiontotheirsaleassembledis,inmy
view,errantnonsense.Thepurposestobeachievedbytheissuanceof
anorderfordeliveryupofinfringingarticlesfordestructionasintheBaxter
caseinvolvesentirelydifferentconsiderationsfromthedefencehere
raised.
(p.265-266…)
Thesecondbranchoftheargumentflowsfromthefirst.Itisdependent
uponthetheorythattherecanbenoinfringementbythemanufacturer
sellingtheunassembledparts.Accordingly,therecanbenoinfringement
untilthesailboardhasbeencompletelyassembledbecausethe
patentedinventionisacomplete,assembledsailboard,i.e.,thepatentis
forthesumofthepartsoftheinventionnotforitspartsseparately.The
parts,bythemselves,cannotindividuallyinfringethepatent,itwassaid,
andIthinkthisistruebecauseallwereknownandold.Thepersonwho
assembledthepartsmightbeaninfringer,counselsaid.Unless,however,
themanufacturer,distributororretailerhimselfassembledthediscrete
partsorinducesandprocurestheassemblybyappropriateinstructionsfor
doingsoorbyadvertisingorotherwiseencouragingtheassembly,he
cannot,accordingtocounsel,befoundtohaveinfringedthepatent.
Counselarguedthatinthiscasethereisnodirectevidencethatthe
respondentinducedapurchasertoinfringethepatentbyassemblingthe
partssoldtohiminplasticbagsorcontainerswiththeonlyinstructions
beingex.27.Thatinstructionsheetappearstobeasketchoftheboard
andtheuniversaljointanditsparts.Therearenowritteninstructionsof
anykind.Theinstructionsketchisthus,incounsel’sview,notsufficientto
showinducementwithoutsomeevidencetoshowwhatimpelledthe
purchasertoassembletheparts.
Thatargumenttomecanonlybetermedspecious.Tosuggestthata
personpurchasingcomponents,theonlyknownuseforwhichis



assemblingtoprovidethepurchaserwithwhatheobviouslydesires-a
sailboard-hasnotbeenpersuadedtodosobytheholdingoutofthe
desiredresultbyboththemanufacturerandthevendorthereof,stretches
credulitytoitslimits.That,inmyview,isinducementevenwherethe
printedinstructionsarelimitedtotheextentdisclosedintheevidencein
thiscase.Ithinkitbeyonddisputethattheonlyinferencetobedrawn
fromthevoluminousevidenceinthiscaseisthattherespondentknew
andintendedthattheultimatepurchaserwouldutilizethesailboardparts
fortheassemblyofausablesailboardwhich,uponassembly,would
infringetheappellants’patent.Ittherebybecameapartytosuch
infringement,inmyview.

TheCourtthenconsideredSlaterSteelandadded:
(p.267)
Theforegoingmakesitclear,Ithink,thatthedeterminationthattherewas
noinducementorprocurementbythedefendantsinthatcase,was
madebyinferencesdrawnfromthefactsasfound.Thejudgmentdoes
notprecludethepossibilitythatondifferentfactstheinferencesdrawn
couldbequitedifferentandvendorsofcomponentscouldbefoundto
haveinducedandprocuredinnocentpurchaserstounknowinglyinfringe
apatent,theexistenceofwhichtheywereunaware.Thepurchasersof
sailboards,itwouldappearfromtheevidence,areindividualsseeking
enjoymentandexerciseinanewsailingconcept.Theyarenotlarge
powercompanieswhoareorshouldbeawareoftheexistenceof
patentsinrelationtouseofarticleswhichtheyproposetoincorporatein
theirpowerproductionfacilities.Theyareindividualswho,perhaps
unknowingly,relyonthevendortoprotectthemfromclaimsforpatent
infringementofthearticlestheybuy.Itisasmuchapartofthe
inducementtopurchasethosearticles,astheholdingoutofthejoysof
sailingontheabout-to-be-assembledsailboard.Theinducementsinover-
the-countermerchandisesalessuchasthisaretherebyinsharpcontrast
tothoseofthekindmadeinthecircumstancesoftheSlaterSteelcase.
Forthosereasons,Ithinkthatthecasescanbedistinguishedontheirfacts.
(p.268)
“…Ithinkthattheevidenceasawholeleadsirresistiblytotheinference
thattherespondentknewoftheexistenceoftheappellants’patentand
byitsconductinducedandprocuredpurchasersofitssailboards(albeitin
kitform)toinfringethatpatentand,thereby,itselfinfringedthatvalid
patent.”

Hereagain,theactofinfringementwascompleted,certainlywithknowledge
andintentfromthesupplierofthecomponentsandtheinfluenceofthelatter
ontheultimateuserwasassumed,Isubmit,forthefollowingreasons:



1)Purchaserswereinnocent,unknowinglyinfringingapatent,theexistence
ofwhichtheywereunaware;
2)Theusebythevendoroftheinstructionsheet;
3)Thefactthatallthepartsofthecombinationweresupplied.
Also,theactionagainstthesupplierofallthepartswastheonlypractical
remedy,anactionagainstallendusersbeingdifficulttoimagine.
InReadingandBatesCo.v.BakerEnergyResourcesCorp.
16,GazInterCité
receivedbidsfromBerco(asubsidiaryofBakerEnergy)andReadingandBates
fortheinstallationofagaspipelineundertheSt.LarenceRiver.Bercowas
awardedthecontractandmadethepipelineusingReadingandBatespatents.
StrayerJ.hadtodecidewhetherGazInterCitéwasliableforinduced
infringement.Heconcludedatp.184:
“Inmyviewthissituationisfarremovedfromcasescitedsuchas
Morton-Norwich,supra,orProcter&GambleCo.v.Bristol-Myers
CanadaLtd.(1978),39C.P.R.(2d)145(F.C.T.D.)whereliabilitywas
foundforinfringementthroughaidingandabetting.Suchcases
involveasystematicprocessinwhichitmusthavebeenobviousto
thedefendantthatinfringementwouldresult.”

Letuspausehereforamoment.Withallduerespect,whetheritshouldhave
beenobvioustothedefendantthatinfringementwouldresultisnotthetest.We
haveseeninSlaterandAirglideandintheEnglishauthoritiesthatevenifthe
onlyuseofthearticleisinapatentedcombination,thesellerwillescapeliability
ifitsactivitiesfallshortofinducingthedirectinfringer.
StrayerJ.continued:
(p.184)
“InthepresentcasewehaveoneisolatedcontractbetweenGaz
andBercoamongthehundredsofcontractsintowhichGazmust
havebeenentering.WehavenoclearevidencethatGazknewor
shouldhaveknownthatwhatBercowoulddowouldinfringethe
patentofReading&Batesorthatifitwould,Bercowouldcarryout
theworkwithoutobtainingthenecessarylicence.Furtherthereis
noevidencetoshowthatGazcausedBercotoundertakethework
inanywayotherthanthatinwhichithadalwaysplannedtodoit



















































16
9C.P.R.3rd,p.158.



orthatitwouldnormallydoit.IthereforefindthatGazisnotliable
forinducingorprocuringBercotoinfringepatentNo.1,140,106.”

Onthefactstherefore,thelearnedTrialJudgefoundthatGazInterCitéhadno
influenceonBerco’slineofconduct.
Conclusion
IfeelthatthelawisnowprettywellsettledinCanadaincasesofinfringement
byinducement.Thefewapparentcontradictionsarisefromtheinevitable
divergentfindingsoffacts.Aplaintiffwishingtorelyonthedoctrineof
infringementbyinducementmustallegeandprove:
1)Thattheactofinfringementwascompletedbythedirectinfringerevenif
heisnotapartytotheaction.
2)Completionoftheactofinfringementwasinfluencedbytheactsofthe
inducer.Withoutsaidinfluence,infringementwouldnototherwisetake
place.Thisshouldbeprovenbyfactssuchastheconductoftheparties,
theirrelationship.Thesituationinthemarketplace,etc.Ifthedefendant
provesthatthedirectinfringerwouldhaveinfringedregardlessofany
influenceexercisedonhim,thedefendantshouldescapeliability.
3)Theinfluencemustknowinglybeexercisedbytheselleri.e.theseller
knowsthathisinfluencewillresultinthecompletionoftheactof
infringement.
Withoutbeingadeterminingcriterionassuch,onecannotescapenoticingthat
inSlaterSteel,Airglide,andReadingandBates,thepatenteehad,apartfrom
hisremedyagainsttheallegedinducer,apracticalalternative:thedirect
infringerwaseasilyidentifiedanditwasasimplemattertobringhimtoCourt.In
Procter&GambleandWindsurfing,itwaspracticallyimpossibletosuetheend
users.



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