Concept of Infringement in the Copyright Act



CONCEPTOFINFRINGEMENTINTHECANADIANCOPYRIGHTACT

by
HuguesG.Richard
*
LEGERROBICRICHARD,Lawyers,
ROBIC,Patent&TrademarkAgents
CentreCDPCapital
1001Square-Victoria-BlocE–8
thFloor
Montreal,Quebec,CanadaH2Z2B7
Tel.(514)9876242-Fax(514)8457874
www.robic.ca-info@robic.com

Whendealingwithcopyrightinfringement,ithastobeborneinmindthatone
ofthefundamentalprinciplesofcopyrightlawinCanadaistobefoundin
Section63oftheCopyrightAct
,R.S.C.1985,c.C-42(hereafter:”the”Act”).This
sectionreadsasfollows:
“Nopersonisentitledtocopyrightoranysimilarrightinanyliterary,
dramatic,musicalorartisticworkotherwisethanunderandin
accordancewiththisAct,orofanyotherstatutoryenactmentforthe
timebeinginforce,butnothinginthissectionshallbeconstruedas
abrogatinganyrightorjurisdictiontorestrainabreachoftrustor
confidence.”

Therefore,commonlawcopyrightisnonexistentunderCanadianlawand
consequently,thereisnosuchthingasaninfringementofcommonlaw
copyright.ThisprincipleofcopyrightlawwasconfirmedbytheSupreme
CourtofCanadainCompoCo.Ltd.v.BlueCrestMusic
whereEsteyJ.wrote:
“…CopyrightLawisneithertortlawnorpropertylawinclassification,but
isstatutorylaw.Itneithercutsacrossexistingrightsinpropertyor
conduct,norfallsbetweenrightsandobligationsheretoforeexistingin
thecommonlaw.Copyrightlegislationsimplycreatesrightand
obligationuponthetermsandinthecircumstancessetoutinthe
statute.ThiscreatureofstatutehasbeenknowntothelawofEngland



















































*
©LEGERROBICRICHARD,1994.
Lawyerandtrademarkagent,HuguesG.RichardisaseniorpartnerinthelawfirmLEGER
ROBICRICHARD,g.p.andinthepatentandtrademarkagencyfirmROBIC,g.p.This
documentwaspreparedforaseminarorganizedbytheNationalJudicialInstitute,whichwas
heldinOttawain1994.Arevisedversionofthisdocumentwassubsequentlypublishedin
CopyrightandConfidentialLawinCanada(Toronto,Carswell,1994).Itwasmeantfor
discussionanddoesnotconclusivelystatetheopinionoftheauthororthemembersofhisfirm
onthesubjectmatternordoesitprovideanexhaustivereviewthereof.TheSchedulestothis
materialarenotreproducedhere.Publication120.



atleastsincethedaysofQueenAnnewhenthefirstcopyrightstatute
waspassed.Itdoesnotassisttheinterpretiveanalysistoimporttort
concepts.Thelegislationspeaksforitselfandtheactionofthe
appellantmustbemeasuredaccordingtothetermsofthestatute.”
1.

IntheAct,infringementmaybedividedintotwomaincategories:copyright
infringementandmoralrightinfringement.
Eventhough,therearesomesimilaritiesbetweenthesetwocategories,we
shalldiscussthemintwodifferentparts.
1.COPYRIGHTINFRINGEMENT

UnderSection27,whichdealswithcopyrightinfringement,copyrightis
deemedtobeinfringedbyanypersonwho,withoutthecopyrightowner’s
consent:doesanythingthattheActgivestheownerthesolerighttodo
(Section27(1)),dealswithaninfringingworkincertainmanners(Section27(4))
orperformsinpublicaprotectedworkforprivateprofit(Section27(5)).
InfringementsunderSections27(1)and27(4)canrespectivelybe
characterizedasdirectorprimaryinfringementsandindirectorsecondary
infringements.Thedistinguishingfeaturebetweenthetwoisknowledgeon
thepartoftheinfringerthatcopyrightisbeinginfringed:suchknowledgeis
requiredinthecaseofindirectinfringement,whereasdirectinfringementmay
occurwhetherornotknowledgeexists.
Whatarethecommonfeaturesinanycopyrightinfringement?
1.1CommonFeaturesinanydirectorindirectcopyrightinfringement:
Tosustainanycopyrightinfringementaction,independentlyfromthequestion
ofinfringementinitself,therearetwoprerequisites:thepresenceofaworkin
whichcopyrightsubsistsandtheabsenceofconsentonthepartofthe
copyrightowner.
1.1.1Workinwhichcopyrightsubsists



















































1
CompoCo.Ltd.v.BlueCrestMusic(1979),[1980]S.C.R.357(S.C.C.)EsteyJ.,atpp.372-373.



InaccordancewithSection5(1),infringementofcopyrightpresupposesthe
existenceofaworkinwhichcopyrightsubsists
2.
Theconditionsforobtainingcopyrightprotectioninawork(whetherliterary,
musical,dramaticorartistic)maybedividedintotwocategories:conditions
concerningtheauthoroftheworkandconditionspertainingtotheworkitself
a)theauthor
Shortlystated,underSections5(1)or5(2.1),copyrightmayexistinanoriginal
work,publishedornot,ifatthetimeofthecreationofaworktheauthorwas
aBritishsubject,aresidentwithinHerMajesty’sRealmsandTerritoriesora
citizen,subjectorresidentofaBerneConventioncountryoracountrythat
hasadheredtotheUniversalCopyrightConventionadoptedonSeptember6,
1952inGeneva,Switzerland,ortothatConventionasrevisedinParis,France,
onJuly24,1971oracitizenorsubjectofaforeigncountrythathasnot
adheredtothesaidConventionsbutwhichhasbeentheobjectofanotice
bytheMinisterpublishedintheCanadaGazette(seeSections5(1),(2)and
(2.1)oftheAct).
b)theworkitself
i)natureofthework
TobeprotectableundertheAct,aworkmusteitherbeliterary,dramatic,
artisticormusical.Aprotectableworkcanalsobearecord,perforatedrollor
anothercontrivancebymeansofwhichsoundsmaybemechanically
reproduced.Inthecaseofsuchcontrivances,copyrightshallsubsistinlike
mannerasiftheyweremusical,literaryordramaticworks(seesection5(3)
and(4)).
ii)originality
Moreoverandinallcases,theworktobeprotectedmustbeoriginal.
Originality,undertheAct,doesnotmeannovelty.AsheldbyJohnsonJ.in
KilvingtonBros.Ltd.
v.Goldberg:
“Butnoveltyandinventivenessarenotthetestsoforiginalityinthelaw
ofcopyright.Thetestiswhetherthisdesignisoriginalinthesensethatit
istheoriginalexpressionofthoughtofitsoriginator,thatitoriginated
fromhimandthathedidnotcopyit”
3.



















































2
SeeCanadianAdmiralCorporationv.Reddifusion,Inc.(1954),[1954]Ex.C.R.382(Ex.Ct.)
CameronJ.atp.390.
3
(1957),16FoxPat.C.164(O.S.C.)atp.167.



iii)territory
Furthermore,inthecaseofapublishedwork,itmustbefirstpublishedwithin
HerMajesty’sRealmsandTerritoriesorinaforeigncountrythathasadheredto
theBerneConventionandtoitsAdditionalProtocolortotheUniversal
CopyrightConventionoritsrevisedversionorinaforeigncountrythathasnot
adheredtotheseConventionsandProtocolbutwhichhasbeentheobjectof
anoticebytheMinisterpublishedintheCanadaGazette(seesections5(1),
(2)and(2.1).
InMilliken&Co.v.InterfaceFlooringSystems(Canada)Inc.
Giles,A.S.P.ofthe
FederalCourtofCanada,TrialDivision
4,decidedthatSection5(1)required
thatthefirstpublicationbeinthesameforeigncountryastheoneinwhich
theworkwascreated.ThisdecisionwasrecentlyreversedbyStrayerJ.
5
whereinhewrote:
“Itseemsclearthatthewords”l’un”inthephrase”l’undecespays…”[in
subsection5(1)]haveadifferentrolegrammaticallyfromtheword
“that”asitappearsinthephrase”thatforeigncountry”.”That”is,insuch
use,ademonstrativeadjectivereferringtoasingularnoun,mentioned
before(ShorterOxfordEnglishDictionnary,3rded.(19730at2275),inthis
case”foreigncountry”ofwhichtheauthorisacitizenorsubject.Onthe
otherhand,accordingtoHarrap’sStandardFrenchandEnglish
Dictionnary,revisededition(1980),atp.U:2,”l’un”inthiscontextisan
indefinitepronounandthusdoesnotreferbacktoaparticularthing
mentionedbefore.”L'”isaddedto”un”forpurposesofeuphony
(LibrairieLarousse,DictionnaireModerneFrançais-Anglais(1965).As
saidinLarousse,Difficultés(LibrairieLarousse(1971),atp.419):”on
emploieindifféremmentunde(undes)oul’unde(l’undes);seule
comptelaraisond’euphonie…”.Thus”l’un”hasthesamemeaningas
simply”un”inthiscontext,bothmeaninginthephrase”l’un[un]deces
pays”simply”oneoftheseforeigncountries”;thatis,oneoftheforeign
countriesadheringtotheBerneConvention.
AstheEnglishandFrenchtextsmeandifferentthings,itisnecessaryto
decidewhich,ifeither,shouldbefollowed.
Thebasicruleisthatincaseofdisagreementbetweenthetwoofficial
languageversionsofastatute,onemustapplyotherrulesof



















































4
Milliken&Companyetal.v.InterfaceFlooringSystems(Canada)Inc.GilesA.S.P.T-3016-92
(yetunreported).
5Milliken&Co.
v.InterfaceFlooringSystems(Canada)Inc.(1993),52C.P.R.(3d)92(F.C.T.D.),
StrayerJ.atpp.95-96
and97.



interpretationtofindthetrueintentofParliament[…]Todothis,one
maylookattheentireCopyrightAct,includingitsSchedules[…].Itis
apparentinthepresentcasefromSch.IItotheActthattheFrench
versionoftheBerneConventionwastheoriginal.Butinfactboth
relevantEnglishandFrenchprovisionsoftheConventionarethesame
[…]Thereference[inart.4oftheConvention]topublication”ina
countryoftheUnion”or”dansunpaysdel’Union”areconsistentwith
eachotherandwiththeFrenchversionofs.5(1)oftheAct.Therefore
thatFrenchversionistobepreferred.
Further,itmaybenotedthattheexpression”l’undecespays”inart.4of
theConventionistranslatedas”anyofthecountries”whichisconsistent
withmyconclusionsaboveastothetrueequivalentof”l’undecespays
étrangers”ins.5(1)oftheAct”.

iv)inamaterialform
Asidefromoriginality,productionoftheworkinamaterialformofexpressionis
requiredforaworktobecapableofcopyrightprotection
6.Ideasorconcept
cannotbeprotectedassuchundertheAct.Itistheirexpressionwhenfixed,
reducedorembodiedinamaterialformwhichcanbeprotected.
v)deemingprovisions
When,inaninfringementactionthedefendantconteststheexistenceofthe
copyrightorplaintiff’stitletoit,theworkisdeemedunderSection34(3)(a)to
beoneinwhichcopyrightsubsists.Furthermore,underSection34(3)(b),the
authoroftheworkisdeemedtobetheownerofthecopyright.Theburdenis
onthedefendanttoprovethecontrary.
TheintroductoryphraseinSection34(3)indicatesthatthesepresumptionsonly
applyinrespectofanactionforinfringementofcopyrightand,therefore,
wouldnotseemtoapplytoanactionfortheinfringementofamoralright.
Section34(3)(b)maybesaidtobeacorollarytoSection13oftheActwhich
statesthatsubjecttotheAct,theauthorofaworkshallbethefirstownerof
thecopyrighttherein.
Section53(1)statesthateveryregisterofcopyrightsundertheActisevidence
oftheparticularsenteredthereinandSection53(2)furtherstatesthata
certificateofregistrationofcopyrightinaworkisevidencethatcopyright
subsistsintheworkandthatthepersonregisteredistheownerofthe
copyright.



















































6
CanadianAdmiralcaseopcit.no
2atpage394.



Thesecondcommonfeatureofanycopyrightinfringementwhetherdirector
indirect,istheabsenceofconsentonthepartofthecopyrightowner.
1.1.2AbsenceofConsent
i)bytheownerorlegalrepresentative
Infringementdependsontheanabsenceofconsentbytheownerofthe
copyright,whoistheonlyperson,underSection27(1)oftheAct,whocan
authorizeactswhichwouldotherwiseconstituteinfringement.Itmust
emanatefromtheowneritselfoftheparticularrightconsidered,oritslegal
representative
7.
Consentmaybegivenundertheformoflicenseswhichcouldbe
characterizedasthepermissiontodoanactthatwouldotherwisebean
infringementofcopyright.Licensesareeithergivenvoluntarilyorcompulsorily.
ii)compulsorylicenses
CompulsorylicencesareprovidedforinSections8,15,16and22oftheAct
and,undercertaincircumstances,underSections32and61ofthe
CompetitionAct
(R.S.C.1985,c.C-34).
iii)voluntarylicenses
Voluntarylicensesmaybeexpressedorimplied,theymaybeverbalorin
writing,withorwithoutconsideration
8,directorthroughasociety,association
orcorporationthatcarriesonthebusinessofgrantinglicenses(sections67,
70.1and70.61).However,thoselicensesthatgrantaninterestinthe
copyrightmustbeinwriting(Sections13(4)and57(1)).WhileSection58(1)
and(2)doesgiveindicationsastotheformswhichmaytakethegrantingof
aninterestinacopyright,Section58(4)statesthattheseformsarepermissive
onlyandtheexecutionofanydocumentsreferredtoinSection57mayinany
casebeprovedbyoraltestimony.
Consentmaybepresumedfromcircumstancesortheconductoftheparties,
buttheinferenceofconsentmustbeclearandtheonusofestablishingitlies
onwhoisrelyingonthelicence
9.Butthemeretransferofthepossessionor



















































7
Bishopv.Stevens(1990),[1990]2S.C.R.467(S.C.C.)McLachlinJ.,atpp.485-487.
8Hart
v.Hayman,christy,andLilly,Limited(1916),[1911-16]MacG.Cop.Cas.301(Ch.D.)
9WarnerBros.-SevenArtsInc.
v.C.E.S.M.-T.V.Inc.(1971),65C.P.R.215(Ex.C.C.)CattanachJ.
atp.235;Bishop
v.Stevensop.cit.no6.



propertyofaphysicalwork,doesnotautomaticallyconveytheassignmentof
theincorporealrightsinthework
10.
1.2DirectInfringement

Section27(1)reads:
“Copyrightinaworkshallbedeemedtobeinfringedbyanyperson
who,withouttheconsentoftheownerofthecopyright,doesanything
that,bythisAct,onlytheownerofthecopyrighthastherighttodo.”

1.2.1Definition

Infringementofcopyrightinaworkisdeemed
11whenanyperson12,without
consentfromtheownerofthecopyright,doesanythingwhichtheCopyright
Actconsidersastheowner’sexclusiveright.Toinfringeistoappropriatethe
originalworkofanotherpersonandwithoutauthorizationdealwithitasonly
theownerofthecopyrighthastherighttodo.Conversely,anydealingnot
coveredbytheActwillnotconstituteacopyrightinfringement,itmay
howeverconstituteabreachoftrustorconfidence(Section63).
Infringementconsists,withrespecttoaprotectedworkinproducingor
reproducingtheworkinasubstantialpartthereofinanymaterialform
whatever,inperformingor(inthecaseofalecture)deliveringitinpublic,orin
publishingthework.Copyrightalsocarriesrightsoftranslation,conversion,
recordingthroughaudio,audiovisualorcinematographicmedia,andrights
ofadaptation,radiobroadcastingandexhibition,allofwhichbelong
exclusivelytothecopyrightowner
13.
Inaddition,thecopyrightownerhastheexclusiverighttoauthorizeanyofthe
actsenumeratedinSections3(1)and5(4).Infringementmayalsoconsistof



















































10
Underwriter’sSurveyBureauLimitedv.Massie&RenwickLimited(1940)[1940]S.C.R.218
(S.C.C.)DuffJ.,atp.229.
11
Useoftheword”deemed”raisesapresumptionofinfringementwhenthecircumstances
outlinedinSection27(1)arefoundtoexist,subjectofcoursetothestatedexceptions.As
writtenbyDicksonJ.inthecaseR.
v.Sutherland(1980),[1980]2S.C.R.451(S.C.C.)atpage
456:”Thepurposeofany”deeming”clauseistoimposeameaning,tocausesomethingtobe
takentobedifferentfromthatwhichitmighthavebeenintheabsenceoftheclause”.See
alsoSOPINKA(John)etal.,TheLawofEvidenceinCanada
,(Toronto,Butterworth1992).
12
Section35oftheInterpretationAct
(R.S.C.1985c.I-21)providesthata””person”orany
wordorexpressiondescriptiveofaperson,includesacorporation.”
13
Section3(1)and2(definitionof”infringing)oftheAct.

authorizing,withoutpermissionofthecopyrightholder,thedoingofsuch
acts
14(section3(1)infine).
1.2.2Conditionsunderwhichdirectcopyrightinfringementmayoccur
Inordertofindcopyrightinfringementinawork,twoconditionsarenecessary:
copyingoftheworkorasubstantialpartofitandanaccesstothecopied
work.
A.Copying
Althoughtheterm”copying”isnotdirectlyreferredtoSections3(1)and27(1),
itwasstatedbyMacDonnellJ.inthecaseBritishColumbia
v.Mihaljevic:
“thecase-lawhasinterpretedthestatutoryprovisionsinsuchawaythat
“copying”isanessentialingredientofinfringement”
15.

Theliteralreproductionofaworkinitsentirety,orofasubstantialpartthereof,
asinphotocopyingforinstance,constitutestheprimaryformofinfringement.
However,copyinggoesbeyondliteralreproduction;thecopyingneedsnot
beslavish,butsimilaritiesbetweenthetwoworksmustbesuchthatthefirst
workcanbesaidtobereproducedinthesecondone
16.
a.Substantialpart(seesection3(1))
Thereisnocopyrightinfringementunlessthematterproducedorreproduced
constitutesthewholeoratleastasubstantialpartoftheinfringedwork.What
constitutesa”substantialpart”isaquestionoffactandinthisrespect,the
courtshavegivenmoreemphasisonthequalityofwhatwastakenfromthe
originalworkratherthanthequantity
17.
Eventhoughwhatconstitutesasubstantialpartofaworkisaquestionoffact
anddegreelefttotheappreciationofthetrialjudge,someguidelinesmay
bederivedfromcaselaw.



















































14
CompoCompanyLimitedv.BlueCrestMusicInc.opcit.no
1atpp.364,375and378-379.
15
(1989),26C.P.R.(3d)184(B.C.S.C.)atp.189.
16
Beauchemin
v.Cadieux(1900),10B.R.255(Q.C.A.)LacosteJ.,atp.270.VINCKE(Christian)
etal.Problèmesdedroitsd’auteurdanslemondedel’éducation(Québec,Editeurofficiel,
1974).
17
Breen
v.HancockHousePublishersLtd.(1985),6C.P.R.(3d)433(F.C.T.D.)JoyalJ.,atp.436.

Firstly,inthecaseofacompilationwhichisaformofliterarywork,a
substantialpartofitistakenwhenthereisacopyofthearrangementof
materialinwhichcopyrightexists
18;copyrightinaliteraryworkmaybe
infringedbyappropriatingasubstantialamountofthematerialpublishedby
theoriginalauthoralthoughthelanguageemployedbytheinfringeris
differentandthematerialsbealtered
19.Therecannotexistcopyrightinmere
facts,however,thearrangementofthefactscanbeprotectedasa
compilation.
Secondly,inordertoascertainwhatconstitutesareproductionofa
substantialpartofadramaticwork,theplot(includinginthatword,theidea
andthearrangementoftheincidents),thedialogueandworkingoutofthe
playmustbeconsideredandalsotheextenttowhichbothplaysincluded
stockincidentsandstockcharacters
20.
Inthecaseofdramaticworks,assessingsimilaritiesmaydependupona
numberoffactors.Thesefactorsincludeplot,theme,dialogue,mood,setting
orscenes,pace,sequenceandcharacters.Inassessingthesefactors,thetest
isultimatelywhethertheaveragelayobserver,atleastoneforwhomthework
isintended,wouldrecognizetheallegedcopyashavingbeenappropriated
fromthecopyrightedwork
21.
Thirdly,inthecaseofmusicalwork,thetesttobeappliedisthatnotonlyof
quantitybutalsoofquality(whethertheamountofmusictakenwasso
slenderthatitwouldbeimpossibletorecognizeit)
22.
Fourthly,inthecaseofanartisticwork,whatconstitutesasubstantialpartlies
inthe”feelingandartisticcharacter”
23.
Infringementmayalsoconsistinthemakingofcolourableimitationofawork
orasubstantialpartofawork.
b.Colourableimitation(seesection2definitionof”infringing”)



















































18
Slumber-MagicAdjustableBedCo.Ltd.v.Sleep-KingAdjustableBedCo.Ltd.(1984),3C.P.R.
(3d)81(B.C.S.C.)McLachlinJ.,atp.86.
19
BritishColumbiaJockeyClub
v.Standen(1983),73C.P.R.(2d)164(B.C.S.C.)LeggJ.,atp.
173.
20
Rees
v.Melville(1914),[1911-16]MacG.Cop.C.168(Ch.D.)PickfordJ.,atp.174.
21
Preston
v.TwentiethCenturyFoxCanadaLtd.(1990),33C.P.R.(3d)249(F.C.T.D.)MacKAYJ.
atpp.273-274.
22
CanadianPerformingRightsSocietyLimited
v.CanadianNationalExhibition
Association(1934),[1934]O.R.610(O.H.C.J.)RoseJ.,atp.614-615.Grignonv.Roussel(1991),
33C.P.R.(3d)4(F.C.T.D.)DenaultJ.
23
Bauman
v.Fussel(1953),[1978]R.P.C.485(C.A.)SomervilleJ.atp.487.



Thisconceptcannoteasilybedefinedasitcanapplytovarioussituations
24.
Inshort,acolourableimitationisaworkwhichispresentedasoriginal,whileit
isinfactareproductionofanother’swork,thewholedisguisedwithvarious
alterationstotheoriginalwork.Thedeterminationofwhetheraworkisa
colourableimitationoralegitimateoriginal,isaquestionoffact,itdepends
ontheextentandnatureofthevariousalterations.Forthenewworknotbe
aninfringement,itneedstobesomethingmorethanasimpledisguised
imitation(seeFrenchtextofsection2definitionof”infringing”).
Theconceptof”colourableimitation”mayextendtoaworkwhichistheresult
ofanappropriationofmaterialinitiallycreatedbytheoriginalauthorand
thathasbeenrenderedinadifferentformbytheinfringer.
Indeed,inthecaseBritishColumbiaJockeyClub
v.Standen,Mr.JusticeLegg
wrotethatappropriationoftheresultsofsomeoneelse’slabourisnot
permittedandthatcopyrightmaybeinfringedifsuchappropriationoccurs
eventhoughthelanguageemployedbytheinfringerhasbeenmodified
25.
Acolourableimitationcanalsobeencounteredwhenaninfringerviolates
oneofthevariousrightsenumeratedinSection3oftheAct,andreproduces
aworkinanotherdimensionoranother
medium
26.
B.Accesstocopiedwork
Astrikingsimilaritybetweentwoworks,aloneisinsufficienttoproveplagiarism.
Whileitisrecognizedthatcopyrightinfringementmayresultfromunconscious
copying,theremustbeevidenceofaccesstothecopiedworkora
connectionbetweenthetwoworksforacourttofindthatinfringementhas
occurred,butevidenceofaccessalonewillnotsufficeevidenceofcopying
ofasubstantialpartofaprotectedworkalsohastobeproved
27.



















































24
Infact,thedeterminationofwhatconstitutesa”colourableimitation”mightbecompared
totheconceptofobscenityasitwasdevelopedundertheCommonLaw:”Thereisno
definitionoftheterm…thereislittlemorethantheabilitytosmellit”hadwrittenMr.Justice
DouglasoftheU.S.SupremeCourtinABookNamed”JohnCleland’sMemoirsofaWomanof
Pleasure”v.AttorneyGeneralofMassachusetts(1966),383U.S.413(U.S.),atp.429,himself
referringtoALPERT(LéoM.),JudicialCensorshipofObsceneLiterature
(1938),52HarvardLaw
Review40.”
25
Opcit.No
18atp.173.
26
KingFeaturesSyndicateInc.
v.O.andM.KleemanLtd.(1941),[1941]A.C.417(H.L.).
27
Caron
v.AssociationdesPompiersdeMontréalInc.(1992),42C.P.R.(3d)292(F.C.T.D.).



Whenthecommonsourcecanbeshownandtheallegedlyinfringingworkis
aresultofindependentcreation,thereisnoinfringement.Plagiarismisa
questionoffactandcanbeprovenbyanymeans:directevidenceor
presumptions.Thecourtshouldcloselyscrutinizeandcomparetheworks
submittedtoitsappreciation.Since”ressemblance”betweentwoworkscan
resultfromthelimitedrangeofexpressionsparticulartoafieldofendeavour,
orfromuseofacommonsource,acourtmustbeconvincedonabalanceof
probabilitiesthatadefendanthasactuallytakentheplaintiff’sworkto
producehisown,beforefindingthedefendantliableforinfringement.
Thus,evidenceofindependentcreationoruseofacommonsourcewillserve
toestablishnon-infringement.Ontheotherhand,reproductionofmistakes
foundintheoriginalworkmayconstituteproofofcopying.
Moreover,thefactofcopyingfromanunauthorizedcopyofthework,rather
thanfromtheoriginal,isnodefensetoinfringement
28.
1.3IndirectInfringement
Section27(4)reads:
“Copyrightinaworkshallbedeemedtobeinfringedbyanyperson
who:
(a)sellsorletsforhireorbywayoftrade,exposesoroffersfor
saleorhire,
(b)distributeseitherforthepurposesoftradeortosuchan
extentastoaffectprejudiciallytheownerofthecopyright,
(c)bywayoftradeexhibitsinpublic,or
(d)importsforsaleorhireintoCanada,

anyworkthattotheknowledgeofthatpersoninfringescopyrightor
wouldinfringecopyrightifithadbeenmadewithinCanada.”

Section27(4)considerscertaincommercialdealingsasinfringement.These
dealingsarethesellingorlettingforhire(section27(4)(a)),thedistribution
(section27(4)(b)),thecommercialexhibition(section27(4)(c))andthe
importationforsellingorhire(section27(4)(d))ofworksknowntobeinfringing.



















































28
Underwriter’sSurveyBureauLtd.v.AmericanHomeFireAssuranceCo.(1969),[1969]Ex.C.R.
296(Ex.C.C.)MacLeanJ.,atp.306.



Insummary,section27(1)deemsapersontobeaninfringerifhe,without
authorization,producesorperformsaprotectedwork,whilesection27(4)
deemsapersontobeaninfringerifhedealswithaworkproducedin
contraventionwithsection27(1).
Indirectinfringementmayonlytakeplacewithrespecttoworksfoundto
infringeavalidlysubsistingcopyrightorworkswhichwouldinfringecopyright,
iftheyhadbeenmadewithinCanada.
Asalreadymentioned,section27(4)requiresknowledgeonthepartofthe
allegedinfringerwhodealswithaworkinanyofthewaysdescribedinthis
sub-section,thatthesaidworkinfringesacopyright.
SuchknowledgeisanessentialelementoftheinfringementunderSection
27(4).Theburdenofprovingthisknowledgerestsupontheplaintiff.However,
section27(4)mustbereadinconjunctionwithsection39,whichstatesthatif
atthedateoftheinfringementthecopyrightintheworkwasdulyregistered
undertheAct,adefendantwillbeirrevocablydeemedtohavehad
reasonablegroundforsuspectingthatcopyrightsubsistedinthework.Thus,
oncethisfactisestablished,itisunnecessarytoascertainthedefendant’s
actualstateofmindconcerningthesubsistenceofthecopyrightinthework.
Therewillremainhoweveronthepartoftheplaintifftheburdenof
establishingthatthedefendant(eventhoughdeemedtoknowthat
copyrightsubsistedinthework)hadalsotheknowledgethatthiscopyrightin
theworkhadbeeninfringed,inotherwords,thatthedefendanthad
knowledgethatthedeemedprotectedworkhadbeenreproducedwithout
theauthorizationofthecopyrightowner.
Theterm”knowledge”undersection27(4)shouldbegiventhesenseofnotice
offactthatwouldsuggesttoareasonablemanthatabreachofcopyright
wasbeingcommitted
29.
Therequirementofknowledgeappliesnotonlytotheinfringementinsub-
paragraph(d)butalsotosub-paragraphs(a),(b)and(c).
1.3.1Saleorlettingforhire
Undersection27(4)(a)copyrightisdeemedinfringedbyanypersonwhosells
orletsforhireorbywayoftradeexposes,offersforsaleorforhire,anywork
thattotheknowledgeofthatpersoninfringescopyrightorwouldinfringe
copyrightifithadbeenmadewithinCanada.



















































29
Clarke,Irwin&Co.Ltd.v.Cole&Co.Ltd.(1959),33C.P.R.173(O.H.C.)SpenceJ.atp.181.



Forinstance,thehiringandsellingoffilmsandvideotapeswhicharecopies
ofprotectedfilmsandvideotapeswouldconstituteinfringementunderthis
sub-section.Furthermore,iftheworkswerereproducedbythesameperson
withoutauthority,section27(1)providesanadditionalgroundforan
infringementclaim
30.
1.3.2Distribution
Undersection27(4)(b)copyrightisbeinginfringedbyanypersonwho
distributeseitherforthepurposeoftradeortosuchanextentasto
prejudiciallyaffecttheownerofthecopyright,anyworkthattothe
knowledgeofthepersoninfringescopyrightorwouldinfringecopyrightifit
hadbeenmadewithinCanada.
Thus,liabilityforthedistributionofaninfringingworkissubjecttothedistributor
havingatradingpurposewithrespecttotheworkorcausingaprejudiceto
thecopyrightowner.
Forinstance,thegivingawayofinfringingworksnotcoveredundersection
27(4)(a)mightconstituteinfringementundersection27(4)(b),inasmuchasitis
eitherdoneinamannersuchastoprejudiciallyaffecttheownerofthe
copyrightorforthepurposeoftrade.
Ithastobementionedthattheprejudicetothecopyrightownerisnot
restrictedtoeconomiclossescouldalsoencompassitsmoralrights(ifthe
copyrightowneristheauthor).
1.3.3CommercialExhibition
Undersection27(4)(c),copyrightisdeemedinfringedbyanypersonwho,by
wayoftrade,exhibitsinpublicanyworkthattotheknowledgeofthatperson
infringescopyrightorwouldinfringecopyrightifithadbeenmadewithin
Canada.
Theoperationofthissectioncoversallkindsofinfringingworks(literary,
musical,dramatic,orartistic),whethercreatedbeforeorafterJune7,1988.In
thisrespect,thissectionshouldbecontrastedwithsection3(1)(g)oftheAct,
whichdealswiththepublicexhibitionoforiginalartisticworksonly,created
afterJune7,1988,andexhibitedfornon-tradepurposes,i.e.(otherthansale
andhire).Section3(1)(g)dealswithprotectedworkswhilesection27(4)(c)
dealswithinfringingworks.



















































30
Aldrichv.OneStopVideoLtd.(1987),17C.P.R.(3d)27(B.C.S.C.)DaviesJ.,atp.35.



1.3.4Importation
Undersection27(4)(d),copyrightisdeemedinfringedbyanypersonwho
importsforsaleorhireintoCanada,anyworkthattotheknowledgeofthat
personinfringescopyrightorwouldinfringecopyrightifithadbeenmade
withinCanada.
Eventhough,books,records,videotapesoranyothertypeofworksmay
lawfullybemanufacturedandsoldinothercountries,itisaninfringementto
importforsaleorhireintoCanadasuchworks,withouttheauthorizationofthe
Canadiancopyrightownertodoso
31.
Ascopyrightcanbeassignedterritoriallyundersection13(4)oftheAct,the
copyrightownerinCanadacouldbeapersondifferentfromthecopyright
ownerelsewhereintheworld;thus,theCanadianownercouldpreventthe
importationofworksotherwiselawfullymadeorpurchasedoutsideCanada
32.
ItwasthusheldthatbooksacquiredontheopenUnitedStatesmarketfroma
licenseeofthecopyrightownerwereinfringingworkswhenimportedforsale
intoCanada
33.However,ifabookcanbelawfullyimportedintoCanada,it
canberesoldbytheimporterwithoutinfringementunderthissection
34.
Forinfringementtobefoundundersection27(4)(d),theinfringingworksmust
beimportedintoCanadaforsaleorhire.
Theword”import”isnotdefinedintheAct;butintheCustomAct
(R.S.C.1985
(2ndSupp.),c.1,s.2(2)),forthepurposeofsuchAct,”importmeansimportinto
Canada”.Thisdefinitionisnotveryhelpful.Therefore,theexpression”toimport”
shouldbeconstruedinitsordinarymeaning,namelytobringin,tointroduce
fromabroad.EvenifthegoodswerebroughtintoCanadaintransitonly,it
wouldappeartobesufficienttocontravenesection27(4)(d)
35.



















































31
FlybyNiteMusicCo.v.RecordWharehouseLtd.(1975),[1975]F.C.386(F.C.T.D.)Mahoney
J.,atpp.394-395.
32
DictionaireRobertCanadaS.C.C.
v.LibrairieduNomadeInc.(1987),16C.P.R.(3d)319
(F.C.T.D.)DenaultJ.
33
Clarke,Irwin&Co.Ltd.
v.Cole&Co.Ltd.Opcit.No
28
34
Simon&SchusterInc.
v.ColesBookStoresLtd.(1975),23C.P.R.(2d)43(O.H.C.J.)
WheathersonJ.
35
GramophoneCompanyofIndia
v.Pandey(1984),[1985]11F.S.R.136(S.C.Calcuta)Reddy
J.atp.154.



“Canada”includesthelandmassofCanada,theinternalwatersandthe
territorialsea.Section3oftheTerritorialSeaandFishingZonesAct
,(R.S.C.
1985,c.T-8),readsasfollows:
“3.(1)Subjecttoanyexceptionsundersection5,theterritorialseaof
Canadacomprisesthoseareasoftheseahaving,astheirinnerlimits,
thebaselinesdescribedinthatsectionand,astheirouterlimits,lines
measuredseawardandequidistantfromthosebaselinessothateach
pointoftheouterlimitlineoftheterritorialseaisdistant12nauticalmiles
fromthenearestpointofthebaseline.
(2)TheinternalwatersofCanadaincludeanyareasoftheseathatare
onthelandwardsideofthebaselinesoftheterritorialseaofCanada.”

Itisworthwhiletonotethatsection2oftheTerritorialSeaandFishingZones
ActprovidesthateveryprovisionofthisAct(whichincludesthedefinitionsof
“territorialsea”and”internalwaters”)extendsandappliestoeveryActofthe
ParliamentofCanada.
Thereisanotherkindofinfringementofcopyrightencompassedbysection27
oftheAct,whichisenouncedbysection27(5).
1.4PermittingUseofTheatreforPerformanceofWork
Section27(5)reads:
“Copyrightinaworkshallbedeemedtobeinfringedbyanyperson
whoforhisprivateprofitpermitsatheatreorotherplaceof
entertainmenttobeusedfortheperformanceinpublicofthework
withouttheconsentoftheownerofthecopyright,unlessthatperson
wasnotaware,andhadnoreasonablegroundforsuspecting,thatthe
performancewouldbeaninfringementofcopyright”.

Thissubsectiondeemsthataninfringementofcopyrightwilloccuroutof
permitting,withoutauthorizationfromthecopyrightowner,atheatreorother
placeofentertainmenttobeusedfortheperformanceinpublicofawork,for
theprivateprofitofthepersonwhogivessuchpermission,unlessthatperson
wasunawareandhadnoreasonablegroundforsuspectingthatthe
performancewouldbeaninfringementofcopyright.Onceagain,asitwas
thecaseforsection27(4),thepresumptionestablishedbysection39ofthe
Act,mayservetodefeatadefendant’sclaimofabsenceofreasonable
groundforsuspectingthatcopyrightsubsistedinthework.Theplaintiff
regardlessofsection39,maystillhavetoprovethatthedefendanthad
reasonablegroundforsuspectingthatthecopyrightownerhadnot
authorizedtheperformance.



Thissectiononlyappliestoprotectedworksperformedinpublic.Theterm
“performance”isdefinedatsection2(21)oftheAct,asmeaning”any
acousticrepresentationofaworkoranyvisualrepresentationofany
dramaticactioninawork,includingarepresentationmadebymeansofany
mechanicalinstrumentorreceivingdevice.”
Theexpression”inpublic”isnotdefinedintheCopyrightAct
,buthasbeen
interpretedasmeaning”openly,withoutconcealmentandtotheknowledge
ofall”
36.InCTVTelevisionNetworkLtd.v.Canada(CopyrightAppealBoard)
(1993),[1993]2F.C.115(F.C.A.)LétourneauJ.,atpp.131-132wrote:
“Iamwillingtoacceptthatthewords”tothepublic”arebroaderthan
“inpublic”andthattheinsertionofthosewordsmayhavetakencareof
theconcernofPigeon[inComposers,AuthorsandPublishers’
AssociationofCanadaLimitedv.CTVTelevisionNetworkLimited(1968),
[1968]S.C.R.676(S.C.C.),atpp.681-682]thatperformanceofmusical
worksundertheActmustalwaysbeinpublic.Thewords”tothepublic”
nowfoundins.3(1)(f)oftheActparallelthosefoundinarticle11(1)bis
oftheRomeConventionandwouldsatisfytherequirementthata
performancebeinpublic.”

Astotheconsentrequiredundersection27(5),itmustcomefromtheowner
oftheperformingrightsintheexecutedworkorthelegalrepresentativeof
suchowner.
Theexpression”placeofpublicentertainment”isnotdefinedintheAct.The
UnitedKingdomCopyrightAct,1956
,states,however,thatit”includesany
premiseswhichareoccupiedmainlyforotherpurposes,butarefromtimeto
timemadeavailableforhiretosuchpersonsasmaydesiretohirethemfor
purposesofpublicentertainment”.SinceUnitedKingdomCopyrightAct

extendsthisdefinitionbeyondtheordinarymeaningofwhatisnormally
understoodasa”publicplaceofentertainment”,itshouldonlybereferredto
inCanadawithgreatcautionandshouldinfacthavenoapplicationin
Canada.
Thewordingofsection27(5)shouldbecomparedwiththewordingofsection
69,whichrefersto”theatresthatareordinarilyandregularlyusedfor
entertainmentforwhichanadmissionfeeischarged.”
Thepermissionundersection27(5),relatestoaspecificworkthatshouldbe
knowntothepersongivingthepermission.Thepersoncannotbesaidtohave
givenpermissiontothepublicperformanceofawork,ifitcannotbe
establishedthatthepersonknewthattheworkwastobeperformed.The



















































36
CanadianCableTelevisionAssociationv.CopyrightBoardetal.(1993),46C.P.R.(3d)359
atp.370(F.C.A.)LetourneauJ.A.atp.370.



ownerofabuildingwherea”placeofpublicentertainment”islocated,
cannotbesaidtohavepermittedthepublicperformanceoftheworkin
whichcopyrightsubsistsbythemerefactofhavingrentedthesaidplace.
AsexpressedbySKONEJAMES(EdmundP.)etal,Copinger&SkoneJameson
Copyright,13thed.(London,Sweet&Maxwell,1991),atNo.9.30:
“Undertheequivalentprovisionsofthe1911Act,itwassaidthata
persondoesnotpermitwhathecannotcontrol,anddoesnotpermit
theuseofaplacefortheperformanceofawork,ifhedoesnotknow
thattheworkisgoingtobeperformed.Thus,whereapersonpermitsa
premisestobeused,knowingwhichworkwillbeperformed,thiswillbe
sufficienttoestablish”permission”butnotifthemusictobeperformedis
lefttotheperformersandthedefendanthasnoknowledgeofwhatin
factwillbeperformed.Permissionmaybeinferredfromactswhichfall
shortofbeingdirectandpositive,andmaybeinferredfrom
indifference,butpermissionwillnotbeinferredfromameregeneral
authorizationtouseatheatreforaperformanceofmusicalordramatic
works.”

Astotheprofitdealtwithatsection27(5),itistheprofitwhichtheperson
permittingtheuseofthepremisesintendstomakeandnottheprofitthat
mightderivefromtheperformanceitself
37.
Takenalone,thewords”privateprofit”intheEnglishtextcouldbeinterpreted
asincludingnon-pecuniaryadvantagesorbenefitswhilethewords”lucre
personnel”inthefrenchversionofthissectionputtheemphasisona
pecuniaryconsideration.
Asalreadysaid,becausecopyrightdoesnotexistotherthanunderandin
accordancewiththeCopyrightAct
,copyrightinfringementonlyexistswhen
oneoftheserightsisviolated.
TheCopyrightAct
alsoenouncesactswhichdonotconstituteinfringementof
copyrightandcouldbeinvokedasdefensebyaninfringer.
1.5DefensesavailableinCaseofCopyrightInfringement
Sub-sections27(2)(a)to27(2)(m),ascompletedbysection27(6),enumerate
actswhichdonotconstituteinfringementofcopyright.Otherexceptionsare
foundelsewhereintheAct,suchasundersections28,28.01,64(2)and64.1.
TheActalsoprovidesforprohibitionsofenforcement,suchasundersections
67(5),67.2(3)and70.66(2).



















































37
AustralianPerformingRightAssociationv.J.Turner&Son(1927),27N.S.W.S.R.344
(H.C.N.S.W.)DavidsonJ.,atp.348.



Inthispaper,itisnotourpurposetomakeanexhaustivereviewofallthese
defensesandtherefore,wewillonlydealwithtwoofthem:thedefenseoffair
dealing(section27(2)(a)and(a.1))andthedefensesconcerningcomputer
programs(section27(2)(l)and(m).
AsstatedbyFox:
“Patentsandcopyrightsrestonthetheorythattheresultoftheoriginal
labouroftheauthororinventorare,bothonthegroundofjusticeand
publicpolicy,tobeprotectedagainstpiracy”
38.

Therefore,theonusofshowingthatareproachedactfallsunderoneofthe
statedexceptionsrestsuponthedefendant
39.
1.5.1FairDealing
Section27(2)(a)providesthatanyfairdealingwithanyworkforthepurposes
ofprivatestudyorresearchdoesnotconstituteaninfringementofcopyright.
Section27(2)(a.1)relatestofairdealingswithanyworkforthepurposesof
criticism,reviewornewspapersummary,suchdealingswillnotconstitutean
infringementofcopyrightifthesource,andtheauthor’sname,ifgiveninthe
source,arementioned.
Thefairdealingexceptionofthissectionisnotrestrictedtooneparticularkind
ofwork,butappliestoartistic,dramatic,literaryandmusicalwork,aswellas
tothemechanicalcontrivancesreferredtoinsection5(3)oftheAct.
A.NatureofFairDealing
Fairdealingdoesnotdependupontheconsentorauthorizationoftheowner
ofthecopyright.Itconstitutesadefensetoaninfringementaction.Thetaking
ofasubstantialpartofaworkdoesnotautomaticallyexcludethepossibility
ofrecoursetothisdefense
40.
FairdealingisnotdefinedintheCopyrightAct
.Whetheradefendant’s
dealingwithaworkfallsintooneofthefiveaforesaidcategoriesofpurposes



















































38
Fox(HaroldGeorge),TheCanadianLawofCopyrightandIndustrialDesigns2nded.
(Toronto,Carswell,1967),atp.3.
39
Sillitoe
v.McGraw-HillBookCompany(U.K.)Ltd.(1982),[1983]9F.S.R.545(Ch.D.)DavisJ.,
atp.558.
40
Johnstone
v.BernardJonesPublications(1938),[1938]lCh.599(Ch.D.)MortonJ.,atp.603.




(i.e.privatestudy,research,criticism,reviewornewspapersummary)and
whetheritwas”fair”,islefttojudicialinterpretationuponthefactsofeach
case.Relevantfactsincludethelengthofquotedexcerptsfromthework,
proportionofexcerptsinrelationtothecritic’sorjournalist’sowncomments,
theusemadeoftheworkandtheobjectofthestudy,research,criticism,
revieworsummary.
Fairdealingisultimatelyamatterofimpression
41.Thedealing,itissubmitted,
mustbefairforoneofthepurposesexpressedinsection27(2)(a)andnotfor
someotherpurposes.
Thebearingof”substantiality”onthefairdealingdefenseissummarizedby
Laddieasfollows(footnotereferencesomitted):
“For,althoughitispermissibletotakeasubstantialpartofthework(if
not,therecouldbenoquestionofinfringementinthefirstplace),in
somecircumstances,thetakingofanexcessiveamountwouldnegate
fairdealing.So,ifthedefenseallegedisfairdealingforthepurposesof
criticismofthework,thetakingoflargeamountoftheworkandthe
additionofbriefcriticalnoteswouldnotpresageasuccessfuldefense,
andviceversa.Ontheotherhand,therecanexistcircumstances
whereitwouldbepropertoquotetheentirework,particularlyifitisa
shortone.Perhapsthemostimportantfactortobetakenintoaccount
iswhethertheallegedfairdealingisinfactcompetingwithorrivalling
thecopyrightwork.”
42

Astounpublishedwork,Laddiewrote(footnotereferencesomitted):
“TheCourtshavebeenreluctanttoacceptsomethinginvolvingthe
publicationofanunpublishedworkasfairdealing,unlessthecopyright
workhashadsomesignificantprivatecirculation,butthefactthatit
wasunpublisheddoesnotnecessarilydestroythedefense;so,inone
case[i.e.Fraser
v.Evans[1969]1Q.B.349(C.A.)],wherethedefendants
proposedtoprintshortextractfromaconfidentialreportforthe
purposeofreportingcurrenteventsinthenewspaper,theCourt
declinedtoprejudgewhetherthatwouldbefairdealingandrefusedto
grantaninterlocutoryinjunction.Andthepointhasmuchlessforce
whereitisadramaticormusicalworkwhichisbeingcriticizedif,
althoughunpublished,ithasbeenperformedinpublic.”
43

41
NewEraPublicationsInternational,APSv.Key-PorterBooksLtd.(1987),18C.I.P.R.(3d)569
(F.C.T.D.-Interlocutory)CullenJ.,atp.568.
42
LADDIE(Hugh)etal,TheModernLawofCopyright
(London,Butterworths,1980),atNo

2.110.
43
Ibid.atNo
2.110.



“Fairdealing”shouldbedistinguishedfrom”fairuse”.Thislatterexpression,
broaderinscope,isfoundundersection107oftheUnitedStatesCopyright
Act,1976.Eventhoughthecriteriaoffairnessreferredtoinsection107are
appealing,theyshouldonlybeimportedintoCanadianlawwithgreat
caution.Ofinterestalso,the1990BillC-316entitled”AnActtoAmended
CopyrightAct”soughttoamendsection27(2)(a)and(d)inordertobetter
define”fairdealing”,thereinreferredtoas”fairuse”,butwaswithdrawn.
B.CategoriesofPurposes
Thewords”study”and”research”insection27(2)(a)oughttobegiventheir
dictionarymeaning
44.Theexpression”privatestudy”doesnotincludethe
appropriationofaworkforeducationalpurposesandfortheuseof
students
45,unlessthequotedexcerptsfallundertheexceptionprovidedin
section27(2)(d)
46.
Theword”criticism”inSection27(2)(a.1)isnotlimitedtocriticismofthe
expressionofawork,butcanextendtotheideasortheoriescontained
therein
47,norisitconfinedtoliterarycriticism48.Section30(1)oftheUnited
KingdomCopyrightAct,1988
,providesthatthequotedworksneednot
necessarilybetheworkundercriticism;useoftheexpression”anywork”inthe
Canadianstatutealsosuggeststhisinterpretation.
“Fairdealing”,withrespecttocriticism,isaquestionoffact.Inthisrespect,
Dronewrote:
“Whetherthelimitsoflawfulquotationhavebeenexceededisa
questiongovernedbythecircumstancesofeachcase.Itistobe
determinednotbytheintentionofthecriticorreviewer,butbythe
characterofitspublicationandthepurposewhichitserves.The
controllinginquirieswillbe,whethertheextractsareofsuchextent,
importance,orvaluethatthepublicationcomplainedofwillsupersede



















































44
DeGarisv.NevilleJeffressPidlerPty.Ltd.(1990),95A.L.R.625(F.C.Aust.)BeaumontJ.,atp.
629.
45
UniversityofLondonPress
v.UniversityTutorialPress(1916),[1916]2Ch.601(Ch.D.)
PattersonJ.,atpp.613-614.
46
Section27(2)(d)exemptsfromcopyrightinfringementthepublicationinacollectionmainly
composedofnoncopyrightmatterintendedforschooluse,ofshortpassagesfrompublished
literaryworksnotthemselvespublishedforschooluseandprotectedbycopyright.The
exceptionappliesaslongasnotmorethantwopassagesfromworksofthesameauthorare
publishedbythesamepublisherwithinfiveyears,andthatthesourceofpassagesis
indicated.
47
Hubbard
v.Vosper(1971),[1972]2W.L.R.389(C.A.)DenningJ.,atp.394.
48
Sillitoe
v.McGraw-HillBookCo.(U.K.)Ltd.Opcit.No
38atp.559.



toaninjuriousextentoftheoriginalwork.Isamaterialandvaluablepart
ofthecontentsoforiginalcommunicatedbythecompilation?Willthe
lattertendtodiminishthesaleoftheformer,byreasonofbeingwholly
orpartlyasubstitute?Ifso,theresultsoftheoriginalauthor’slabourare
appropriatedtohisinjury,andhisrightsareinvaded.”
49

Toreproduceintotalityanarticlefromaliteraryjournalforthepurposeof
reviewingitwasheldasnotbeingfairdealing
50.
Itwasalsoheldthattomakecopiesofprotectedvideocassettesforone’s
ownemployeesconstituteaninfringementtowhichtheexceptionofsection
27(2)(a)doesnotapply
51.
ThefairdealingprovisionofSection27(2)(a.1),applicabletonewspaper
summaries,isnotaffectedbytherequirementsofsection27(2)(e)
52.
Amazingly,itwouldappearthatthereportofalectureinanewspaperwould
beforbiddenunderthecircumstancessetforthinsection27(2)(e),while,the
saidsummarywouldbeallowedundersection27(2)(a).Moreover,thereport
inanewspaperofaparticularspeech(i.e.addressofapoliticalnature)will
not,inviewofsection28,constituteinfringementofthecopyrightthatmay
subsistinsuchaspeech.
ItmustberememberedthatunderSection27(2)(a.1),thesourceandthe
author’sname,ifgiveninthesource,mustbementionedinorderforthe
dealingswithanyworkforpurposesofcriticism,reviewornewspaper
summarytobeconsideredfair.
1.5.2Computerprograms
Sections27(2)(l)and27(2)(m)oftheAct,dealwithexceptionsrelatedtothe
reproductionofcomputerprograms.Thesesectionswereintroducedin1988
aspartoftheamendmentsoftheCopyrightAct
thatrecognizedcomputer
programsascapableofcopyrightprotectionasliteraryworks
53.



















































49
DRONE(EatonS.),ATreatyontheLawofPropertyinIntellectualProductionsinGreatBritain
andtheUnitedState(Boston,Little,Brown&Co.1879)atp.388.
50
Zamacois
v.Douville(1943),[1944]Ex.C.R.208(Ex.C.C.)AngersJ.
51
TomHopkinsInternational,Inc.
v.Wall&RedekopRealtyLtd.(1984),1C.P.R.(3d)348
(B.C.S.C.)TrainorJ.
52
Section27(2)(e)enouncesthat”doesnotconstituteaninfringementofcopyright,the
publicationinanewspaperofareportofalecturedeliveredinpublic,unlesssuchreportis
expresslyprohibitedbyaconspicuouswrittenorprintednoticeonthepremiseswherethe
lectureisgiven,bothatitsmainentranceand,unlessthebuildingisbeingusedforpublic
worship,nearthelecturer.
53
S.C.1988,c.15,s.1(3).



Section27(2)(l)exemptsfrominfringementthemakingofasingle
reproductionofthecopyofacomputerprogram.Suchamakingcouldbe
madeeitherbyadapting,modifying,convertingthecomputerprogramor
translatingthecomputerprogramintoanothercomputerlanguage.
However,inorderfortheexceptiontoapply,thepersonwhointendstorely
uponitmustprovethatitownsanauthorizedcopyofthecomputerprogram,
thereproductionisessentialforthecompatibilityofthecomputerprogram
withaparticularcomputer,thereproductionissolelyfortheperson’sownuse
andthereproductionisdestroyedforthwithwhenthepersonceasestobethe
ownerofthecopyofthecomputerprogram.
Itistobenotedthatsuchareproductionmustbeessential,i.e.absolutely
necessaryandindispensable,forthecompatibilityofthecomputerprogram
withaparticularcomputerandnotonlyusefulorconstitutingan
improvement.
Theexceptiononlyappliestotheownerofanauthorizedcopyofthe
computerprogram,asopposedtoanauthorizeduserofsuchacopy.Itisa
relativelycommonpracticeinthefieldnottoassignownershipofthecopyof
thecomputerprogram,butrathertograntalicencefortheusethereof.
Section27(2)(m)exemptsfrominfringementthemakingofabackupcopyof
acomputerprogram.Forthissectiontoapply,severalconditionsmustbe
met,namely:themakingofasinglereproductionforbackuppurposesofan
authorizedcopyofacomputerprogrambythepersonwhoownsthiscopyof
thecomputerprogram.
Moreover,suchabackupcopymustbedestroyedforthwithwhenthisperson
isnolongertheownerofsuchanauthorizedcopy.
Asinthecaseoftheexemptionprovidedforbysection27(2)(l),thisexception
onlyappliestotheownerofanauthorizedcopyoftheprogramwhichisnot
alwaysthecase.Furthermore,thereisnograceperiodandthebackupcopy
mustbeimmediatelydestroyed,namelywhentheowneroftheauthorized
copyofthecomputerprogramisnolongeritsowner.
Moreover,thissectionclearlyindicatesthattheonusisonwhowantstoavail
itselfoftheexceptiontoproveeachoftheconditionssetforthinthe
subsection.
SincethequestionofcriminalandcivilremedieswillbeanalyzedbyMrs.
EmmaGrell,wedonotintendheretodiscussthismatter.



Nevertheless,wewouldliketomakeashortcommentononeparticular
remedyexistinginQuebec:theseizurebeforejudgementofinfringingcopies
ofawork.
1.6Remedy:SeizureBeforeJudgement
AscurrentlyinterpretedbytheQuebeccourts,Section38oftheAct
54,
combinedwitharticle734(1)oftheCodeofCivilProcedure
oftheprovinceof
Quebec(R.S.Q,c.C-25)
55permitstheseizurebeforejudgementofthe
infringingcopieswhichthecopyrightownerisentitledtorevindicatethe
possessionthereofasallegedowner,withouttheneedtoobtainajudge’s
permission.
Theallegedcopyrightownerneedsonlytodeclareinanaffidavit:(1)
subsistenceandownershipofcopyrightinawork;(2)infringementofsuch
copyright;(3)ownershipintheinfringingcopiesbyvirtueofsection38ofthe
Act.Withthat,acopyrightownercanseizeandremovetruckloadsof
alleged
infringingcopies.
ThisiswherewebelievetheQuebeccourtshavegonewrong.Theyhave
takenasinfringing,copieswhichweresimplyalleged
tobeinfringing.We
submitthataslongasajudgmenthasnotdeclaredthecopiestobe
infringing,theycannotbetakenassuch.Therefore,thedeemingprovisionsof
section38shouldonlycomeintoforceafterjudgmentonthemerits,notata
preliminarystageevenbeforethestatementofclaimisfiled.
ThispracticeoftheQuebecSuperiorcourtwhichwasaffirmedbythecourtof
appeal(permissiontoappealtotheSupremeCourtwasrefused)should,with
allduerespect,beabandoned
56.



















































54
Thissectionreads:”Allinfringingcopiesofanyworkinwhichcopyrightsubsists,orofany
substantialpartthereof,andallplatesusedorintendedtobeusedfortheproductionofthe
infringingcopies,shallbedeemedtobethepropertyoftheownerofthecopyright,who
accordinglymaytakeproceedingsfortherecoveryofthepossessionthereof,orinrespectof
theconversionthereof”.
55
Thissectionreads:”Theplaintiffmayalsoseizebeforejudgement:
(1)Themoveablepropertywhichhehasarighttorevendicateasowner,pledgee,
depositary,usufructuary,institute,substituteorunpaidvendor;”
56
FormulesMunicipalesLtée
v.ImprimerieFormulesLégalesProvincialesLtéeAnunreported
judgementrendered1976.03.15bytheHonourableMrJusticeTrépanier,courtdocket500-05
021366-750,translationpublishedat(1976),28C.P.R.(2d)259(Q.S.C.);confirmedbyan
unreportedjudgementrendered1978.02.15bytheQuebecCourtofAppeal,docket500-09-
000027-763(Q.C.A.);(1978),[1978]1S.C.R.viii(S.C.C.).



2.MoralRightsInfringement
TheCopyrightAmendmentAct
(S.C.1988,c.15),introducedsix(6)new
sectionsdealingspecificallywiththeconceptofmoralrights
57.
Sincesection2(19)limitativelydefinesmoralrightsasthosesetoutinsection
14.1,anydealingnotcoveredbytheCopyrightAct
willnotconstitutean
infringementofmoralrights,eventhoughtheconceptofmoralrightsmayin
somecountrieslikeFrance,ItalyorGermany,bemoreencompassingthanin
Canada.
Sections28.1and28.2oftheActdealwiththeconceptofmoralrights
infringement.Section28.1describesingeneraltermswhatconstitutes
infringementofmoralrightsandsection28.2describeswhatconstitutesan
infringementofmoralrightswithrespecttotheintegrityofawork.
Beforegoinganyfurtherintheanalysisoftheseconcepts,itisusefulto
describeshortlywhatisencompassedintheconceptofmoralrightsunderthe
Act.
2.1DefinitionofMoralRights
Undersection14.1oftheCopyrightAct
themoralrightsofanauthorare
twofolds,namely:therighttotheintegrityoftheworkandtherighttobe
associatedwiththeworkasitsauthor.
Asalreadystated,therestrictivedefinitionofmoralrightsprovidedinsection
2(19)combinedwithsection63oftheAct,whichenouncesthatnopersonis
entitledtocopyrightoranysimilarrightsotherwisethanunderandin
accordancewiththeCopyrightAct
,takesallitsimportance.
2.1.1PaternityRight
Section14.1(1)providesfortherightofanauthortobeidentifiedasthe
creatorofawork,irrespectiveoftheownershipofthecopyrightinsuchwork.



















































57
Thesesectionsare:
-Definitionof”moralrights”(section2(19));
-Moralrightsingeneral,rightofauthorshipandwaiver(section14.1);
-Termanddevolution(section14.2);
-Infringementofmoralrights(section28.1);
-Natureofrightofintegrity(section28.2);and
-Civilremedies(section34(1.1)).



Suchrightof”paternity”lastsforthesameperiodasthecopyrightinthe
work
58.
Section14.1providesthattheauthor
ofaworkhas:
i)Therighttobeassociatedwiththeworkasitsauthor;
-bynameor
-underapseudonym;
ii)therighttoremainanonymous.
Thiswouldincludetherightofanauthortopreventtheworkfrombeing
attributedwronglytosomeoneelse.
Thisprovisionwouldalsoallowanauthortorestrainfalseorerroneous
designationofhisqualityofauthoras,forinstance,inaccuraciesinhisname
ordesignation,errorintheattributionofhiscontributiontothework.
Undersection14.1(1),therighttobeidentifiedasanauthorexistsonlywith
respecttotheactsreferredtoinsection3oftheAct.
Furthermore,therightof”paternity”canonlybeasserted”wherereasonablein
thecircumstance”.Itshouldbenotedalsothatsection14.1(1)doesnot
specifythewaysuchpaternityrightshallbeasserted.
2.1.2RighttoIntegrity
Section14.1(1)alsoprovidesthatanauthorhastherighttotheintegrityofhis
work,whetherornothehaswaivedhisrighttobeidentifiedastheauthorof
thework.
Theauthorcanthereforeobjecttoanyderogatorytreatmentofhiswork,
namelytothedistortionofhiswork,themutilationofhiswork,other
modificationtohiswork,ortheuseofhisworkinassociationwithaproduct,
service,causeorinstitution.
2.2Underwhatconditionscanmoralrightsbeinfringed
Section28.1reads:



















































58
Section14.2(1)oftheAct.



“Anyactoromissionthatiscontrarytoanyofthemoralrightsofthe
authorofaworkis,intheabsenceofconsentbytheauthor,an
infringementofthemoralrights”.

Infringementofthemoralrightsrelatingtoaworkoccurswhenanyperson,
withouttheconsentoftheauthor(orhissuccessorintitleasthesubsequent
ownerofthemoralrights),doesanythingoromitstodosomethingwhichthe
CopyrightAct
considersascontrarytotheauthor’smoralrights.
Priortotheenactmentofthissection,theextentofaninfringementofmoral
rightswasunclearandtherelatedcivilremediesavailabledoubted.(see
Gnass
v.CitéD’Alma)59.
Itisnoteworthythatsection28.1,contrarytosection27(1),doesnothavea
(deeming)provisionwithrespecttotheinfringementofmoralrights.
2.2.1InGeneral
Section28.1providesthatthemoralrightsmaybeinfringedeitherbyanact
orbyanomission.
Undersection14.1,anauthorhastherighttobeassociatedwithhisworkasits
authorbyname,tobeassociatedwithhisworkasitsauthorundera
pseudonymandtoremainanonymouswithrespecttohiswork.Therefore,
omittingthenameoftheauthororindicatingsomeoneelsethantheauthor
astheauthormayconstituteaninfringementofthemoralrightsoftheauthor.
Undersection14.1and28.2anauthorisentitled,inrelationwithhishonour,to
theintegrityofhiswork.Whileitiseasytoconceiveactswhich,bythemselves,
willdistort,mutilate,otherwisemodify,orassociateawork,itismoredifficultto
conceiveomissionsinregardthereto.Would,forinstance,theauthorizationby
theownerofaworkorhismerepassiveacquiescencetothedoingofanact
whichotherwiseinfringesthemoralrightsoftheauthor,constituteinitselfan
infringementundersection28.1?
Inthatregard,itwouldappearimportantnottoconfusethecontractual
obligationsthatmayexistbetweentheownerofaphysicalworkandits
authorwiththeobligationofeveryonetorespectthemoralrightsofthelatter
undertheAct.



















































59
Anunreportedjudgementrendered1973.11.23bytheHonourableMr.JusticeMignault,
courtdocketA-158(Q.S.C.)atp.31,confirmedinappeal.



Hence,apartfromthecivilremediesforinfringementofthemoralrightsthat
maybeavailabletoanauthorundersection34(1.1),otherremedies
dependingonthecircumstances,mayalsobeavailabletotheauthorunder
thelawofcontracts
60.
Itmaybealsonotedthat,atcommonlawthespecificreferenceto
infringementbyomissionisaderogationtotheprinciplethat,ingeneral,there
isnoanswerabilityforomissions.AsexpressedbyDias:
“Incontrasttoan”act”,an”omission”isafailuretoact.Inthissense
omissionwouldcovereverythingthatisnotanact,whichisclearlytoo
wide.Ithasthereforetoberestrictedandatoncebecomestechnical.
Thelimitsbecomeapparentwhenitisrealizedthat,aswithact,lawyers
areconcernedwithomissionsforthepurposeofascribingresponsibility
justly.Theyarerelevantonlywhentherehasbeenafailuretocomply
withdutiestoact.Suchdutiesareencounteredinvarioussituationsand
theirexistenceis,asalways,amatterofpolicy.”Anomissiononthepart
ofoneorotherofthedefendant”,saidWillmerL.J.[inZoernsch
v.
Waldock
[1964]2AllE.R.256(C.A.,atp.262)]”wouldnotfurnishthe
plaintiffwithanycauseofactionintheabsenceofsomedutybythe
defendanttotheplaintiff.Thedividinglinebetweenactsandomissions
isnotclearcut.Inthefirstplace,omissionsshouldbedistinguishedfrom
failureswhichareincidentaltolargeractivities.”
61

Thisspecificreferencetoinfringementbyomissionisthecorollarytotheduty
imposedonallpersonstorespectthemoralrightsofauthors.Moreover,
section28.1dealswiththemoralrightsofanauthor,whichencompassesthe
heirsofsuchanauthorforthedurationofsuchrights(section14.2(2)).
Furthermore,theCopyrightAct
doesnotprovideforgeneralprovisionsasto
worksinwhichmoralrightsmaysubsist,asitisthecaseundersection5forthe
subsistenceofcopyright.Intheabsenceofsuchdefinitionorstatutory
qualifications,itcouldbearguedthatmoralrightsmaybeattachedtoany
work,irrespectiveofitsoriginality,thenationalityorresidenceofitsauthor,or
thetimeandplaceoffirstpublication,asthecasemaybe.Suchan
approach,itissubmitted,wouldappearcontrarytothegenesisofthe
introductionintheCopyrightAct
oftheprovisionsdealingwithmoralrights.
2.2.2InRelationwiththeRightofIntegrity
Sections28.2reads:



















































60
Gnassv.VilledeMontréal(1974),[1974]C.S.414(Q.S.C.)MaloufJ.,atp.414.
61
DIAS(R.W.M.),Jurisprudence
5thed.(London,Butterworths,1985),atp.310.



(1)Theauthor’srightstotheintegrityofaworkisinfringedonlyifthe
workis,totheprejudiceofthehonourorreputationoftheauthor,
(a)distorted,mutilatedorotherwisemodified;or
(b)usedinassociationwithaproduct,service,causeor
institution.

(2)Inthecaseofapainting,sculptureorengraving,theprejudice
referredtoinsub-section(1)shallbedeemedtohaveoccurred
asaresultofanydistortion,mutilationorothermodificationofthe
work.

(3)Forthepurposesofthissection,
(a)achangeinthelocationofawork,thephysicalmeansby
whichaworkisexposedorthephysicalstructure
containingawork,or
(b)stepstakeningoodfaithtorestoreorpreservethework

shallnot,bythatactalone,constituteadistortion,mutilationorother
modificationofthework.”

Section14.1(1)providesthatanauthorhastherighttotheintegrityofhiswork.
Thisgeneralprohibitionagainstderogatorytreatmentissubjecttosection
28.2.Themoralrightofintegrityisattachedtoaworkanditsauthorupon
creation,withoutanykindofregistrationorformalities;thisright,whichis
distinctfromthepaternityright,maybewaivedinwholeorinpartbythe
author,asprovidedinsection14.1(2)oftheActandmaybebequeathedas
providedforbysection14.2.
Theauthorcanthereforeobjecttoanyderogatorytreatmentofhiswork,
namelytothedistortionofhiswork,amutilationofhiswork,other
modificationstohiswork,ortheuseofhisworkinassociationwithaproduct,
service,causeorinstitution,ifthesedealingsareprejudicialtohishonourand
reputation,whetherornothehaswaivedhisrightstobeidentifiedasthe
authorofthework.
Thus,section28.2(1)providesfortwokindsofbehaviorswhichmayencroach
upontheintegrityofawork:thefirsthastodowithmodificationsbroughtto
thework(section28.2(1)(a)andthesecondwiththeuseofthework(section
28.2(1)(b).However,forsuchactsoromissionstobeactionable,theyhaveto
prejudicethehonourorreputationoftheauthor.




Section28.2andsection14.1donotindicatewhetherthederogatory
treatmentshouldbeinrelationtoasubstantialpartofthework,asitisthe
case,forinstance,fordirectinfringementofcopyrightundersection3(1).The
properapproachwouldseemtobetoconsiderthattherighttointegrity
appliesinrelationtothewholeorpartofthework.
However,shouldthemodificationbetrivialorquantitativelyunimportantin
regardofthewholework,aCourtmayrefusetointerveneonthebasisde
minimislexnoncurat.Suchwouldnot,itissubmitted,becorrectasthe
infringementisnotinrelationtotheimportanceofthemodificationbutrather
toitsimpactonthehonourorreputationofthecreator.
A.Distortion,MutilationorModificationoftheWork
Section28.2(1)doesnotstate,whenaworkwillbehelddistorted,mutilatedor
otherwisemodifiedinafashionprejudicialtothehonororreputationofthe
author.
Section28.2(1)imposesupontheownerofthephysicalworktowhicharight
ofintegrityattaches,aseriousrestrictionoverthedominionthathecould
otherwiseenjoy,behetheownerofthecopyrightintheworkornot.
Section28.2doesnotcoverassuchthenaturaldeteriorationofthework
withouthumanintervention.Thissectiondoesnoteitherimposeuponthe
ownerofthephysicalworkanyformalobligationtopreserveortorestorethe
work.However,suchanownermaybeunderacontractualobligationto
maintaintheworkinaproperstate.
Whetherthetotaldestructionoftheworkwouldamounttoa”distortion,
mutilationorothermodifications”ofthework,hasfuelledlongbut
unconcludeddebate,atleastinCanada
62.
Thequalifiedexpression”whenreasonableinthecircumstances”isusedin
section14.1withrespecttothepaternityright,butnotinsection28.2.
However,itissubmittedthat,modificationsandevenalterationsmadetoa
workshouldbeallowedinsomecircumstancesand,infact,are
contemplated-aspartofanimpliedconsentoftheauthor,forinstance,for
thepurposesoftranslatingoradaptingawork,asprovidedforbysection3.



















































62
COLAS(Emile),LesRecoursdel’ArtisteenCasdeDestructiondesonOeuvre(1980),1
RevueCanadienneduDroitd’auteur2;VAVER(David),Authors’MoralRights-ReformProposal
inCanada:CharterorBarterofRightsforCreators?(1987),25OsgoodeHallLawJournal749,
atpp.765-766.



B.AssociationoftheWork
Section28.2(b)providesthattheintegrityofaworkmaybeviolatedwithout
modifyingitbutsimplybyitbeingusedinassociationwithaproduct,a
service,acauseoraninstitution.Thisprohibition,whichsometimeisreferredto
as”droitd’aval”,isnotrestrictedtocommercialuse,butattachedtoanyuse
towhichtheauthorhasnotconsentedandwhichthatisprejudicialtohis
honourorreputation.
TheoriginalofthisprovisionmaybetrackedbacktotheBruxellesRevision
1948oftheBerneConventiontowhichCanada,however,isnotaparty.
“Article6bis(1)ofthisConventionwasthenamendedbytheBrusselsrevision
soastoaddtheperiphrase,”oranyotherderogatoryactioninrelationtosaid
work”
63.AswrittenbyStrauss:
“Thispartofthemoralrightallegedlyprotectstheauthoragainstunfair
useormisuseofhisname,hiswork,orhispersonality”
64.

Thisnewprovisionwasadoptedinordertoprotectaworkagainstanyattack,
irrespectiveofanymodificationtotheworkitself.AsexpressedbyPuttemans:
“L’atteinteàl’intégritédel’oeuvrepeutdoncêtreindirecteetrésider
danslaprésentationoulecontexteentourantl’oeuvre,lorsqueceux-ci
sontdenatureàdonneraupublicuneidéeinexactedel’oeuvre.(…)le
droitaurespectprotègesontitulairenonseulementcontretoute
atteintedirecteàl’intégritédel’oeuvre,maisaussienverstoute
utilisationquiendéprécieraitde[sic]valeurouendénaturerait
l’esprit.”
65.

C.HonourorReputationoftheAuthor



















































63
Article6bis(1)oftheBerneConventionreads:”Independentlyoftheauthor’scopyright,
andevenaftertransferofsaidcopyright,theauthorshallhavetheright,DURINGHISLIFETIME,
toclaimauthorshipoftheworkANDtoobjecttoanydistortion,mutilationorotheralteration
THEREOF,ORANYOTHERACTIONSINRELATIONTOTHESAIDWORKwhichwouldbeprejudicial
tohishonourorreputation.”
64
STRAUSS(William),TheMoralRightoftheAuthor
(1955),4TheAmericanJournalof
ComparativeLaw506,atp.514.
65
PUTTEMANS(Andrée),LesAuteurssont-ilsresponsablesdeleursactes?(ou:dudroitau
respectdel’intégritédel’oeuvrefaceauxcontratsetauxexigencesactuellesducommerce
etdelatechnique),inLesJournéesduDroitd’Auteur-ActesduColloque(Bruxelles,Bruylant,
1989),atpp.308-309.



Togiverisetoanactionforinfringementoftheintegrityright,thebad
treatmentsgiventotheworkundersubsections28.2(a)or(b)mustprejudice
thehonourorreputationoftheauthor.Itmaybesaidthattherightofan
authortotheintegrityofhiswork,flowsfromthefactthataworkexpressesthe
personalityofitscreatoranditisnothingbutacontinuationoftheveryperson
ofitscreator.
InthecontextoftheCopyrightAct
,thesetwowords”honour”or”reputation”
donotappeartohaveanyspecialmeaningandrefertothegoodstanding
ofthenameoftheauthor.Usefulreferencecould
bemadetothe1984ThirdRevisionEditionoftheShorterOxfordEnglish
Dictionarytoascertainthenuancesbetweenthosetwoterms,namely:
“Honour:highrespect,esteem,orreverenceaccordedtoexalted
workorrank;differentialadmirationorapprobation”;
“Reputation:thecommonorgeneralestimateofapersonwith
respecttocharacterorotherqualities;therelativeesteeminwhicha
personisheld”.

AswrittenbyLESTER:
“Presumably,itissomethingwhichwillhavetobejudgedbysome
objectivestandard.Itmaybethatsomeassistancewouldbegained
fromlibelcases,asreferencedto”honourorreputation”,seemtohave
moreincommonwiththelawofdefamationthanthelawof
copyright”
66.

AsexpressedbyVAVER:
“Thereputationreferredtonodoubtisprimarilytheauthor’sliteraryor
artisticreputationbut,sinceaperson’sreputationisordinarilyindivisible,
shouldalsoencompasstheauthor’spersonalreputationaswell
67.”

Finally,toparaphrasethequestionputbyNORDEMANN,withrespectto
article6bisoftheBerneConvention:Doessection28.2(1)coverthose
alterationsthataredetrimentaltothehonourorreputationoftheauthor



















































66
LESTER(David)etal.,Joynson-HicksonU.K.CopyrightLaw(London,Sweet&Maxwell,1990),
atNo.11.19.
67
VAVER(David),Authors’MoralRightsinCanada
(1983),14InternationalReviewofIndustrial
PropertyandCopyrightLaw329,atp.356.



(actualharm)ordoesitalsoextendtothosealterationsthatcouldbe
detrimentaltothehonourorreputationoftheauthor(threateningharm)?
68
D.PresumptionofPrejudiceinCertainCircumstances
Section28.2(2)createsapresumptionofprejudiceinfavourofthree(3)types
ofartisticworks,namelypaintings,sculpturesandengravings.Theseare
generallyreferredtoasthe”fineart”.Itistobenotedthatthissub-section
refersto”sculpture”,whichisatermassuchnotdefinedintheAct.Thereis
howeveradefinitionof”workofsculpture”atsection2(27).
Thispresumptiondoesnotapplywithrespecttotheothertypesofartistic
works,likethoseenumeratedundersection2(2),namely:drawings,maps,
charts,plans,photographs,worksofartisticcraftsmanshipandarchitectural
workofart.Itdoesnotapplyneithertoliterary,musicalordramaticworksnor
tomechanicalcontravenciesbymeansofwhichsoundsmaybe
mechanicallyreproduced(section5(1)and(3)).
Thispresumptioncomesintooperationswhereuponthedesignatedtypesof
worksaredistorted,mutilatedormodified;itistobenotedthatthe
presumptiondoesnotapplytotheassociatedusesreferredtoinsection
28.2(1)(b).
Oncethederogatorytreatmentofthedesignatedworkisproved,thereisa
presumptionthatsuchtreatmenthasprejudicedthehonourandreputationof
theauthor.
E.PermittedActs
Section28.2(3)indicatesthatachangeinthelocationofaworkorits
restoration,willnotamountassuchtoadistortion,mutilationormodification
ofsaidwork.
Thissubsectionappliestoanyworkandisnotrestrictedtoworksoffinearts
(i.e.,paintings,sculpturesandengravings);italsoappliestothedeemed
prejudicialsituationsdepictedinsub-section28.2(2),aswellastotheany
encroachmentupontheintegrityrightmoregenerallydescribedunder
section28.2(1).



















































68
NORDEMANN(Wilhelm)etal.,InternationalCopyrightandNeighboringRightsLaw
(Weinheim,VCH,1990),atpp.87-88.



Thissectionprovidesthatthefollowingchangesshallnot,bythemselves
alone,beconsideredasdistorting,mutilatingorotherwisemodifyingawork,
namelyachangeinthelocationofawork,achangeinthephysicalmeans
bywhichaworkisexposedorachangeinthephysicalstructurecontaining
thework.
Inacaseofachangeinalocation,itistobenotedthatthereisno
requirementofgoodfaith,asisthecasewithrespecttorestoration.
Finally,ithastobenotedthattheCopyrightAct
doesnotprovideforany
specificexemptionstotheinfringementofthemoralrights,asitisthecase,for
instanceforactsnotconstitutinginfringementofcopyrightundersections
27(2)and28.
However,section64(2)providesforalimitedexemptionsfromcopyrightand
moralrightsinfringementswithrespecttodesignsappliedtoausefularticleor
inanartisticworkfromwhichthedesignisderived.
2.3RemediesinCaseofMoralRightsInfringement
Section34(1.1)providesthatwhereamoralrightinanyworkhasbeen
infringed,theauthororhisheirs(section14.2(2)isentitledtocivilremediesby
wayofinjunction,damages,accounts,deliveryup,orremediesthatareor
maybeconferredbylawfortheinfringementofaright.
Itisofinteresttonotethatthissectionspecificallydealswiththepowerofthe
Courttoorderthedeliveryofthegoodsinfringingamoralrightwhilesection
34(1)doesnotrefernamelytosucharemedywithrespecttotheinfringement
ofcopyright.
Whethersection35appliesalsotoinfringementofmoralrightsisleftopento
judicialdetermination.Itshouldbenotedthatsection35makesspecific
referenceonlytotheinfringementofthecopyrightinawork,andnotto
infringementofmoralrights.However,section34(1.1)opensthedoortoother
remedieswhenitusestheexpression”…andotherwisethatareormaybe
conferredbylawforinfringementofaright”.
Similarly,thediscretionalawardofcost”inanyproceedingsinrespectof
“infringementofcopyright”referredtoinsection34(2)maynotapplyto
proceedingsforinfringementofmoralrights,savefortheinherentpowersthat
acourtmayhavetoawardthesecosts.
Whethertheconversion/detinueprovisionssetforthinsection38mayapplyto
thecopieswhichinfringethemoralrightsisalsodebatable.Thewordingof



section38refersto”infringingcopies”butgivesdeemedpropertyofthesaid
infringingcopiestothecopyrightowneronly,withnoreferencetothemoral
rightsowner.
Ithastobenotedthatsection43(2)oftheActprovidesthat,withrespectto
anydramaticwork,anyoperaticwork,oranymusicalcomposition,the
followingconstitutesanoffense,namely:anychangeinthetitle,any
suppressionofthetitle,anychangeinthenameoftheauthor,any
suppressioninthenameoftheauthor.
Suchoffensescover,inalimitedway,therightofpaternityandtherighttothe
integrityofawork;theyco-existwiththecivilremediesprovidedforbysection
34(1.1).
Moreover,assections44and45oftheCopyrightAct
referstotheprohibition
ofimportationinfavourofacopyrightowner,itwouldappearthat,inthe
absenceofanyclearprovisionsinfavourofthemoralright’sowner,thelatter
maynotbeabletoinvokesection44and45.Thisuncertaintyremainstobe
clarifiedbytheCourt.
Finally,section41providesforstatutorylimitationofthree(3)yearsforcivil
remediesarisingfrominfringement.
Itisofinteresttonotethattheword”copyright”wasremovedfromthetextof
section41intheCopyrightAmendmentAct
(S.C.1988,c.15,s.9).Theuseof
theall-encompassingword”infringement”insteadoftheterms”copyright
infringement”or”infringementofcopyright”wasmostlikelyintendedto
preventthecourtsfromconcludingthatthelimitationperiodofthree(3)years
setforthinsection41didnotapplytoanactionforinfringementofmoral
rightspursuanttosection34(1.1).
Therefore,thetimelimitationofsection41appliestoinfringementofcopyright
aswellasmoralrights.



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