Alleged Use no Longer a Relevant Consideration When Examining a Trade-Mark Application, Rules Federal Court of Appeal in Effigi Case

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ALLEGEDUSENOLONGERARELEVANTCONSIDERATIONWHENEXAMININGA
TRADE-MARKAPPLICATION,RULESFEDERALCOURTOFAPPEALINEFFIGICASE

BarryGamache*
LEGERROBICRICHARD
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Inanimportantdecisionthatchangestherulesofthegameregardingthe
filingoftrade-markapplicationsinCanada,Canada’sFederalCourtof
Appeal,inAttorneyGeneralofCanadav.EffigiInc.,2005FCA172(F.C.A.,
Décary,LétourneauandPelletierJJ.A.)confirmedanearlierdecisionofthe
FederalCourt(EffigiInc.v.AttorneyGeneralofCanada(2004),35C.P.R.(4th)
307(F.C.,ShoreJ.))whichhadruledthattheRegistrarcannotrefusean
applicationonthebasisthatitisconfusingwithanotherapplicationfiledata
laterdate,butalleginganearlierdateoffirstuse;inotherwords,atthe
examinationstage,allegationsofusearenotarelevantconsiderationto
determineentitlement.
EversincetheadoptionofCanada’scurrentTrade-marksAct,R.S.C.1985,c.
T-13(the”Act”)backonJuly1,1954,ithadbeenthepracticeoftheRegistrar
ofTrade-markstorefertoanyallegeddateoffirstusementionedinatrade-
markapplication(andnottoitsactualfilingdate)whencomparingtwo
confusingandco-pendingapplications.Thispracticeresultedinpreferential
treatmentbeinggiventoalaterfiledapplicationallegingadateoffirstuse
whichwasearlierthanthefilingdateofafirstfiledproposeduseapplication;
thelaterfiledapplicationwasthustheoneallowedtopublicationfor
oppositionpurposes.
ItisinthecontextofthispracticethatonDecember19,2000,EffigiInc.
(hereafter”Effigi”)filedanapplicationtoregisterthetrade-markMAISON
UNGAVAonthebasisofproposeduseofthistrade-markinCanadain
associationwithbeddingproducts.Exactlyten(10)monthslater,onOctober

CIPS,2005.*BarryGamache,lawyer,isamemberofLEGERROBICRICHARD,L.L.P.,amultidisciplinaryfirmof
lawyers,andpatentandtrademarkagents.PublishedunderthetitleAllegedUseNoLonger
RelevantWhenExaminingTrademarkApplicationintheissueof(August2005),19-8WIPR4-5.
Publication142.177.

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19,2001,whileEffigi’sapplicationhadstillnotbeenexaminedbytheTrade-
marksOffice,anothercompany,TricornInvestmentsCanadaLtd.(hereafter
“Tricorn”),filedanapplicationtoregisterthetrade-markUNGAVAin
associationwithsimilarwaresonthebasisofanallegationofuseofthetrade-
markinCanadasinceOctober1981.
OnMay2,2002,morethansixteen(16)monthsafterthefilingofitsMAISON
UNGAVAtrade-mark,EffigireceivedafirstExaminer’sReportwhichobjected
toitsregistrationbecauseofthelaterfiled(butallegedlypreviouslyused)
UNGAVAtrade-mark,onthebasisofacombinedapplicationofsections37
and16oftheTrade-marksAct.
Section37whichallowstheRegistrartorejectanapplicationatthe
examinationstageprovidesinpart:
37.(1)TheRegistrarshallrefuseanapplicationfortheregistrationofa
trade-markifheissatisfiedthat
(a)theapplicationdoesnotconformtotherequirementsofsection
30,
(b)thetrade-markisnotregistrable,or
(c)theapplicantisnotthepersonentitledtoregistrationofthe
trade-markbecauseitisconfusingwithanothertrade-markforthe
registrationofwhichanapplicationispending,
andwheretheRegistrarisnotsosatisfied,heshallcausethe
applicationtobeadvertisedinthemannerprescribed.

Foritspart,section16whichdescribeswhenapersonisentitledtoregistera
mark(andisreferredtoincontestedjudicialoradministrativeproceedings,
whentwoormorepartiesclaimentitlementtoamark)providesinpart:
16.(3)Anyapplicantwhohasfiledanapplicationinaccordancewith
section30forregistrationofaproposedtrade-markthatisregistrableis
entitled,subjecttosections38and40,tosecureitsregistrationin
respectofthewaresorservicesspecifiedintheapplication,unlessat
thedateoffilingoftheapplicationitwasconfusingwith
(a)atrade-markthathadbeenpreviouslyusedinCanadaor
madeknowninCanadabyanyotherperson;
(b)atrade-markinrespectofwhichanapplicationforregistration
hadbeenpreviouslyfiledinCanadabyanyotherperson;or
(c)atrade-namethathadbeenpreviouslyusedinCanadabyany
otherperson.

16.(4)Therightofanapplicanttosecureregistrationofaregistrable
trade-markisnotaffectedbythepreviousfilingofanapplicationfor
registrationofaconfusingtrade-markbyanotherperson,unlessthe

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applicationforregistrationoftheconfusingtrade-markwaspending
atthedateofadvertisementoftheapplicant’sapplicationin
accordancewithsection37.

InitsresponsetotheExaminer,Effigiarguedthatanyallegeddateoffirstuse
mentionedinanapplicationisnotarelevantconsiderationwhenapplying
paragraph37(1)(c)oftheAct.Moreover,accordingtoEffigi,section16
shouldbeproperlyrestrictedtoadversarialproceedingsi.e.opposition
proceedingsundersection38oftheActandjudicialexpungement
proceedingsundersection18oftheAct.UnfortunatelyforEffigi,theRegistrar
discardedallofitsargumentsandrejectedtheMAISONUNGAVAapplication
onNovember14,2003.
EffigiappealedtheRegistrar’sdecisionbeforetheFederalCourtwhereit
submittedthattheRegistrarerredinLawinreferringtosubsection16(3)ofthe
Acttointerpretparagraph37(1)(c)andthereaftertorejectitsapplicationat
theexaminationstage.Ineffect,EffigiwasarguingthattheRegistrar’sfifty(50)
yearoldpracticetodeterminerentitlementattheexaminationstagedidnot
respectParliament’sintent:AstheRegistrarhasnoinherentpowers,his
jurisdictioncanonlybedeterminedbyreferencetotheAct.Assection37
grantstheRegistrarauthoritytodecide,attheexaminationstage,torejecta
trade-markapplicationonlybecauseitisconfusingwithanothertrade-mark
fortheregistrationofwhichanapplicationispending,anyreferencetoan
allegeddateoffirstuseinaco-pendingapplicationhasnostatutorybasis.
Sincesection37exhaustivelydescribestheRegistrar’sjurisdictionatthe
examinationstage,itisnotnecessarytorelyonsection16todeterminewhen
apersonisentitledtoregistrationunderparagraph37(1)(c).
Ontheotherside,theRegistrar(representedbytheAttorneyGeneralof
Canada)submittedthatparagraph37(1)(c)oftheActhadtobeinterpreted
inharmonywiththerestoftheActwhereeachwordmustbegivenits
ordinaryandgrammaticalmeaning.TheRegistrararguedthatithadtorely
onsubsection16(3)whichdefineswhenapersonisentitledtoregistration
becausetheexpression”personentitledtoregistration”wasalsomentionedin
subsection37(1)byParliament.IntheRegistrar’sview,asParliamenthad
includedthenotionof”personentitledtoregistration”inbothsections16and
37,ithadtohavethesamemeaningthroughouttheAct.TheRegistraralso
reliedontheTrade-markLawRevisionCommittee’sReportof1953
(concerningthethensoontobeinforceTrade-marksAct)andthetestimony
ofoneofitsmembers,Mr.JohnOsborne,beforetheHouseofCommons’
StandingCommitteeonBankingandCommerce,onApril28,1953.
AccordingtotheRegistrar,Mr.Osbornehadtestifiedthatsection37should
beinterpretedbyreferringtosection16.Finally,theRegistrararguedthatthe
importanceof”use”inCanadianTrade-markLawjustifiedthepracticeof

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grantingpreferencetoanapplicationsubsequentlyfiledbutbasedonan
earlierdateoffirstuse.
TheFederalCourtallowedEffigi’sappealandrejectedtheRegistrar’slong-
standingpractice.TheCourtconsideredthatthelanguageusedby
Parliamentinsection16revealedthatitcouldonlybeappliedafterthe
examinationprocess:Indeed,sincesubsection16(4)indicatesthatthe
relevantdatementionedthereinisthedateofadvertisementofan
applicant’sapplication,section16necessarilyhastoapplyoncethe
examinationstagehasbeencompleted,theapplicationpublishedandan
oppositioninitiatedundersection38oftheAct.Therefore,thereisnostatutory
authorityallowingtheRegistrartorelyonsection16whendecidingto
advertiseornotatrade-markapplicationundersection37.
Moreover,theCourtattributedverylittleweighttothetestimonygivenby
membersoftheTrade-markLawRevisionCommitteebeforetheHouseof
Commons’StandingCommitteeonBankingandCommercebackin1953,
referringtothereasonsofMr.JusticeCoryoftheSupremeCourtofCanadain
R.v.Heywood,[1994]3S.C.R.761,atpp.787-788:
Theadmissibilityoflegislativedebatestodeterminelegislativeintentin
statutoryconstructionisdoubtful.(…)ThisCourthasrepeatedlyheldthat
legislativehistoryisnotadmissibleasproofoflegislativeintentinthe
constructionofstatutes.(…)
Itisapparentthatlegislativehistorymaybeadmissibleforthemore
generalpurposeofshowingthemischiefParliamentwasattemptingto
remedywiththelegislation.(…)
Nonethelesstherearepersuasivereasonsadvancedwhichsupportthe
positionthatlegislativehistoryordebatesareinadmissibleasproofof
legislativeintentinstatutoryconstruction.Manyofthesesamereasons
arealsoputforwardtodemonstratethatsuchmaterialsshouldbegiven
littleweighteveninthosecaseswheretheyareadmitted.Themain
problemwiththeuseoflegislativehistoryisitsreliability.First,theintentof
particularmembersofParliamentisnotthesameastheintentofthe
Parliamentasawhole.Thus,itmaybesaidthatthecorporatewillofthe
legislatureisonlyfoundinthetextofprovisionswhicharepassedinto
law.(…)
AstotheimportanceofuseunderCanadianTrade-markLaw,theCourt
agreedwithEffigithattheexaminationstagewastooearlyandincompletea
processtodeterminerightsbasedonuse.ItagreedwithEffigi’spositionthat
thereisinsufficientinformation,attheexaminationstage,toallowa

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determinationthatatrade-markhasactuallybeenusedatadateoffirstuse
allegedinanapplication.Thisdeterminationisbetterleftforotherforums
wherepartiescontestingallegeddatesoffirstusecanfileevidenceinsupport
oftheirrespectiveclaims.
TheAttorneyGeneralofCanadafiledanappealagainstMr.JusticeShore’s
decision.InaunanimousdecisionhandeddownonMay10,2005,theFederal
CourtofAppealconfirmedthelowerCourtdecision.Initsreasons,theCourt
confirmedthatthereisnostatutoryauthorityallowingtheRegistrartoreferto
section16attheexaminationstage.Moreover,theCourtnotedthatthe
Registrar’spracticehadtheperverseeffectofallowingadministrativedelays
toaffectaparty’ssubstantiverights,aswasthecaseforEffigiwhose
applicationwasonlyexaminedonMay2,2002,severalmonthsafterthefiling
ofTricorn’sapplicationonOctober19,2001.Thiswasseenasclearlyunjust.
Mr.JusticeDécarywrotefortheCourt:
[10](…)Inthenormalcourseofthings,theRegistrarsummarilyexamines
theapplicationsinchronologicalorder,beginningwiththeonethathas
theearliestdateoffiling.Ifthereisnoconfusionwithamarkthatis
pendingwhentheapplicationisfiled,andiftheotherrequirementsof
subsection37(1)arefulfilled,theapplicationisacceptedfor
advertisementbytheRegistrarandanyonewhoclaimsaprevioususe
andconfusionwithhisownmarkmayfileastatementofopposition
undersection38.Butaccordingtothepracticecurrentlyfollowedbythe
Registrar,administrativedelays,whicharebeyondthecontrolofafirst
applicant,couldforcehimtobecomeanobjectorifasubsequent
applicantweretoappearwithanallegationofconfusionandprevious
use.Atthehearing,counselfortheRegistrarwasunabletocitetousany
disadvantagewhatsoeverthatmightresultfroma”firstcome,first
served”policyintermsofadministrationoftheAct.
[11]CounselfortheRegistrarreliesheavilyontheweightthatshouldbe
giventoprevioususeintheprotectionoftrade-marks.Thisconsideration
isnotoffendedbyforcingasecondapplicantwhoclaimsprevioususe
onthestrengthofamereallegation(seeMarinelandInc.v.Marine
WonderlandandAnimalParkLimited,[1974]2F.C.558,p.567per
CattanachJ.)toresorttotheoppositionprocedureinordertoestablish,
onthebasisofmoreelaborateevidence,hisrighttoregistrationonthe
basisofaprevioususe.

Itisnowtimeforfulldisclosure:TheauthorofthisarticlerepresentedEffigiboth
beforetheFederalCourtandFederalCourtofAppeal.Oneoftheimmediate
effectsoftheFederalCourtofAppeal’sdecisionisthattheRegistrarhasnow
modifieditsmorethanfifty(50)yearoldpractice.Inanoticepublishedon

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May19,2005,Canada’sTrade-marksOfficestated,interalia:”Duringthe
examinationprocess,theRegistrarwillnolongerconsiderthedatesoffirstuse
ormakingknownasarelevantconsiderationunderparagraph37(1)(c)ofthe
Act[AttorneyGeneralofCanadav.EffigiInc.(unreported,NeutralCitation:
A-423-04)].Therefore,whenpendingmarksareconfusing,theapplicantwith
theearlierfilingdateorprioritydate,willbeconsideredtobetheperson
entitledtoregistrationofthetrade-mark.”Thisnowmeansthatalltrade-mark
applicationsinCanada,irrespectiveofuse,shouldbefiledassoonas
possible,asapplicationswillnowbeexaminedonafirstcome,firstserved
basis;alaterfiledapplicationwillnolongerbepreferredoverafirstfiledone,
onthestrengthofamereallegationofuse.Debatesastoactualusewillbe
restrictedtoadversarialforums,suchastheOppositionBoardandtheFederal
Court,whererivalclaimantswillbeabletointroduceevidenceinsupportof
theirrespectiveclaims.Ifasecondapplicanthasactuallyuseditstrade-mark
priortothefilingdateofafirstproposeduseapplicant,thissecondapplicant
willnowhavetoopposethefirstapplicant’strade-markinOpposition
proceedingsduringwhichreferencetosection16oftheActwillbeentirely
appropriate.

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